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ABSTRACT 
To advance important social values it is often necessary to change the law. Yet changes in 
the law create not only ‘winners’, but also ‘losers’. Paradigmatic examples are workers and 
corporations in the coal industry that are adversely affected by climate change laws. Should 
governments take steps to avoid or mitigate transitional losses and gains? If so, for whom 
and under what conditions, and why? This is the normative ‘problem of legal transitions’, the 
subject of this thesis. Various theories to resolve the problem have been proposed by scholars 
in the normative branches of political, legal and economic theory. The first part of this thesis 
critically evaluates the four dominant families of theories: property theories (in the classical 
liberal and libertarian tradition); efficiency theories (in the ‘law and economics’ tradition); 
legitimate expectations theories; and justice theories (the last two in the liberal-egalitarian 
tradition). The ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ method is employed to evaluate both the 
implications of each theory in concrete cases and the antecedent (e.g. ontological) 
commitments in which it is grounded. The existing theories—which tend to entail state 
responses that are either extremely conservative (e.g. full grandfathering or compensation) 
or purely reformative (let all losses and gains lie where they fall)—are found wanting. The 
second part of the thesis specifies and defends a new theory—Adaptive Responsibility 
Theory—which forges a principled middle path. The appropriate state response is shown to 
be a function of two kinds of reasons: wellbeing reasons and fairness reasons. Crucially, these 
reasons have both a direction (conservative vs reformative) and a magnitude/weight. This 
opens up the wide middle ground between the extremes, justifying a central role for adaptive 
transition policies, the aim of which is to ensure that people have the time and adaptive 
capabilities needed to adapt successfully to new conditions.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 LOST IN TRANSITION  
What we owe to individuals and corporations who lose out when the law changes is a difficult 
normative question that pits the value of legal stability against the value of legal change. 
Given the prevalence of legal changes throughout the history of law-governed societies, and 
the enormity of policy challenges that confront us today, it is a question that has been 
surprisingly under-analysed by normative theorists. What prompted me to ask it was my 
personal involvement in one such episode of major reform—an episode that vividly 
illustrates the normative and political stakes of ‘the problem of legal transitions’. 
The episode begins in my native Australia in the hot, dry summer of 2007. With much of the 
country sweltering through a prolonged drought, the body politic of the world’s largest coal 
exporter was beginning to reckon with the inconvenient truth of climate change. A 
conservative government led by self-proclaimed climate change sceptic John Howard was 
entering its eleventh straight year in office—an election year. But it was looking stale. Over 
four terms in office, it had done virtually nothing to tackle the issue of Australia’s ballooning 
greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel exports—a fact that would become a major electoral 
liability. In the November 2007 federal election—dubbed by some observers as the world’s 
first climate change election (Chubb 2014, 4)—the Australian Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd 
was swept to victory. A central pillar of its election campaign was a promise to introduce an 
economy-wide carbon emissions trading scheme to tackle climate change. 
What unfolded over the subsequent six years of Labor Government must rank as one of the 
greatest policy and political failures of the 21st century: a political party of government and 
its two successive prime ministers were destroyed by the fiendish politics of carbon pricing. 
Transitional losers from these reforms, and the poorly managed attempts by the Government 
to placate them with transitional assistance policies, were central plotlines in this story.  
The most important of these plotlines featured Australia’s coal-fired power generators—
among them, in particular, the privately-owned power stations located in the Latrobe Valley, 
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two hours east of Melbourne. These ageing behemoths produced 90% of the electricity for 
the state of Victoria from brown coal, the most greenhouse gas-intensive of all fossil fuels. 
The workers in these power plants and in the adjacent coalmines, as well as the regional 
communities they underpinned, faced what seemed to many like an existential threat from 
carbon pricing. This sentiment was echoed in other regions of Australia that depended on 
carbon- and energy-intensive industries like coalmining, steel production and aluminium 
smelting. One might think that these workers and communities would have been the object 
of any sensible government’s deliberations about transitional assistance. Yet it was the 
foreign owners of the Latrobe Valley power plants that captured the bulk of government 
attention. Under Prime Minister Rudd’s proposed carbon pricing scheme, the plants’ owners 
stood to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in the capital value of their assets. To protect 
these assets, they waged a “fierce, orchestrated and relentless campaign” to undermine public 
confidence in the scheme—threatening blackouts and economic chaos—as a basis for killing 
it politically or extracting billions of dollars in “compensation” (Chubb 2014, 26).  
The Rudd Government severely mismanaged the generators’ (that is, the owners’) claims 
during the long process of carbon pricing policy development from 2007–2010. The original 
policy document on the carbon pricing scheme, the Green Paper of July 2008, contained no 
coherent, principled statement on the question of transitional assistance. In vague 
bureaucratese, it simply proposed that a “limited amount of direct assistance” be provided to 
generators to “ameliorate the risk of adversely affecting the investment environment” 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2008, 370).  
The absence of clear and compelling normative principle at the heart of this proposal 
effectively left the Government with no basis other than raw political calculation for deriving 
specific transitional assistance policies for the generators. This much was evident in the 
succession of wildly variant “compensation” offers the Government produced at different 
stages of the policy process, with each new figure succeeding only in encouraging the 
generators to escalate their demands (Chubb 2014, 42–43). The White Paper of December 
2008, for example, proposed compensating the generators (as a group) in the form of free 
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emissions permits worth a whopping AU$3.9 billion (£2.2 billion; USD$2.6 billion).1 By 
mid-2009, when the ink on the proposed scheme legislation was dry, the Government had 
committed to pay the coal-fired generators a staggering AU$7.3 billion (£4.1 billion; 
USD$4.9 billion) worth of free carbon permits spread over ten years (Chubb 2014, 206).  
In his magisterial account of Australian climate politics in this period, Power Failure (2014), 
journalist-turned-academic Philip Chubb describes the wider impact on the political process 
of the Government’s escalating compensation offers to the generators: 
The wild swings in the fortunes of the generators made it obvious there was confusion behind 
the scenes. It undermined public confidence in the policy process, which contributed to a 
perception of a lack of leadership and eroded voter support. The generators continued to press 
their advantage. The government’s final response [the AU$7.3 billion in free permits] did not 
quieten them but still managed to alienate another major stakeholder, the environmental 
lobby, which was appalled by the size of the handout. (Chubb 2014, 43) 
“The inability to handle the generators”, argues Chubb, “became a major cause of the fiasco 
that followed”, in which the Rudd Government abandoned its own carbon pricing reform in 
April 2010 before it had been passed into law. This move triggered a slump in Rudd’s 
popularity—what, many thought, did he stand for if not tackling what he had earlier called 
“the great moral challenge of our generation” (ibid 3, 112)? Rudd’s decline in popularity, in 
turn, prompted a collapse in his support in the Labor caucus, leading nervous MPs to dump 
him two months later and install his deputy, Julia Gillard, as leader (and therefore Prime 
Minister) ahead of the looming election.  
Seeking to put the carbon pricing fiasco behind her, Prime Minister Gillard went to the 
August 2010 election promising that there would be “no carbon tax under the government I 
lead” (ibid 143). But electoral fortune did not favour her timidity: the election delivered a 
hung Parliament, forcing Gillard’s Labor Party to enter into a minority government alliance 
                                                 
1 Great British Pound and US Dollar amounts calculated based on Australian Dollar exchange rates on 22 
August 2019. 
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with the Australian Greens and a number of independent MPs. The cost of the Greens’ and 
independents’ support was a commitment to establish a multi-party committee to agree the 
terms of a new carbon pricing law (ibid 144–48). Many in the electorate came to see this 
post-election pivot on pricing carbon as an act of betrayal, severely damaging Gillard’s 
standing in the eyes of the electorate (ibid 154–56).  
The policymaking process culminating in this second version of the carbon price exhibited 
some marked improvements on its predecessor, and the Government ultimately had the 
numbers in the Parliament to get the scheme passed (ibid 195, 219–22). The voluminous 
scheme legislation was duly enacted in November 2011 with a commencement date fixed for 
1 July 2012. But the scheme’s inauspicious beginnings meant that it would be battered by 
political headwinds. By the time the scheme was enacted, opposition leader Tony Abbott’s 
campaign against what he called the “great big new tax on everything” was in full swing 
(Abbott 2012; Chubb 2014, 154, 161–65). Abbott, aided by the coal-fired power generators, 
other segments of the business community, and conservative media outlets, was fomenting 
an atmosphere of panic in the electorate at the alleged economic destruction that the new tax 
would wreak (Chubb 2014, 154, 161–70, 230). These conservative forces had succeeded in 
so muddying the political waters that the term “climate change” itself had come to be an 
electoral liability, associated with Gillard’s broken carbon tax promise, and everything that 
was disliked about the Labor Government (ibid 181, 191–92, 233). 
In this febrile political environment, the Government sought to shift public attention away 
from the soon-to-commence carbon tax and its beneficial impact on the climate, and toward 
the package of transitional assistance measures for households that would flow along with it. 
To soften the impact of the carbon tax on the voting public, the reform package included 
significant cuts in personal income tax and increases in transfer payments to the tune of more 
than AU$4 billion per year (£2.2 billion; US$2.7 billion) (see Spash and Lo 2012, 76–77)— 
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a package so generous that almost 90% of Australian households would be fully compensated 
or over-compensated for the average household impact of the carbon tax (Chubb 214–15).2  
These household assistance measures would come to form the centerpiece of a cynical 
government strategy to build public support for the carbon tax—a strategy that Gillard’s 
Communications Director liked to call “cashy, cashy, cashy” while waving an invisible wad 
of cash in the air (Chubb 2014, 232). Central to this strategy was an advertising campaign 
that, remarkably, did not mention the phrases “climate change”, “carbon tax” or “carbon 
price”. Chubb describes, in chilling terms, the Ministerial decision that led to this seemingly 
bizarre turn of events: 
Signalling the extent of the government’s fear, disillusion and disappointment, a mid-March 
2012 meeting of ministers decided that to continue talking about climate change was playing 
into Abbott’s hands, so they agreed to stop. In just over four years Australia had moved from 
a country galvanized by the need to act on climate change to a place where ministers no 
longer dared even to use the words. While the Gillard Government, against all the odds and 
showing tremendous determination, had instituted a major climate policy, it now could not 
say why. In Australian public discourse the term “climate change” had died. (ibid 233) 
The ad campaign fell flat, succeeding only in sowing further confusion in the minds of the 
electorate and playing into Abbott’s claim that the carbon tax was just a “money-go-round” 
(Thompson 2011), conjuring the image of a parasitic government taking with one hand and 
giving back with the other, with who-knows-what nefarious creaming-off along the way. 
By the time of the 2013 federal election, the carbon tax had been operational for more than 
14 months. The sky had not fallen in. Costs were manageable, the economy continued to 
perform well, and Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions had fallen (Chubb 2014, chap. 11). 
But it was too late. The public mood had turned, and Tony Abbott’s conservative coalition 
                                                 
2 This was in addition to the AU$22 billion of assistance committed for emissions- and energy-intensive 
industries over six years, including AU$5.5 billion in cash payments to the coal-fired power generators, AU$1.3 
billion to the owners of “gassy” coalmines, and billions of dollars to ‘Emissions-Intensive Trade Exposed 
Industries’ (see Green 2011a, 2011b). 
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was elected on the back of his unrelenting campaign to “Axe the Tax”. Within less than a 
year of taking office, the newly-elected Abbott Government had secured passage of 
legislation to repeal the carbon tax. 
(As of August 2019, Australia still has no economy-wide carbon-pricing scheme.) 
*** 
I had a front-row seat to this unfolding spectacle. At the time, I was working as a lawyer 
advising companies, state governments and NGOs on how the carbon pricing policies 
affected their legal obligations and rights, and I was a public commentator on these issues. 
To my mind, this extraordinary episode raised larger normative and political questions about 
major policy reforms—questions that would come to occupy a central plank of my research 
agenda over the subsequent years, and the core of this thesis. What do we owe the losers from 
legal transitions? Do some losers have stronger claims to state assistance than others, and if 
so, why? How should societies balance the imperatives for reform with the value of legal 
stability? What, specifically, should our transitional response be (the persistent framing of 
this question in terms of “compensation”, it seemed to me, was neither normatively warranted 
nor politically helpful)? What about transitional winners—should we be clawing back their 
gains? And could a normatively desirable set of answers to these questions provide a 
principled basis for a more politically effective approach to the big reforms of our time? 
For answers to these questions, I turned to a larger conversation about the values of stability 
and change within normative political, economic and legal theory. In the next section, I 
provide a synoptic historical overview of these normative debates, which serves as a literature 
review of the wider normative field in which my thesis sits. I then come to a precise statement 
of the problem of legal transitions and the scope of the thesis (Part 1.3), followed by an 
indication of the topic’s importance (1.4). Next comes an explanation of the thesis’ aims (1.5) 
and methods (1.6), followed by an outline of its structure (1.7). 
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1.2 THE WIDER NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE: STABILITY VS CHANGE 
In his History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell describes the search for permanence 
that runs through western philosophy since the pre-Socratics: 
The search for something permanent is one of the deepest of the instincts leading men to 
philosophy. It is derived, no doubt, from love of home and a desire for a refuge from danger; 
we find, accordingly, that it is most passionate in those whose lives are most exposed to 
catastrophe. (Russell 2004 [1946], 52) 
The struggle between the value of stability and the value of change (or reform or progress) 
is a recurring tension in the history of western political, legal and economic thought. It is, 
most obviously, the fault-line that divides conservatives and non-conservatives. But it is also 
one that cuts across, in interesting ways, many of what we now see as central divisions in 
moral and political philosophy, such as those between consequentialism and deontology, and 
between liberalism and republicanism. As Russell notes, moreover, it is a fault line that 
becomes most salient in moments of turmoil.  
Peace, order and stability were central themes of the early-modern period, as exemplified in 
the political writings of Thomas Hobbes and Margaret Cavendish. Both of these authors, 
having lived through a period of political disintegration culminating in the English Civil War, 
advocated that absolute sovereignty be vested in a single individual so as to prevent disputes 
and factionalism from sliding into civil strife (see Cunning 2017, sec. 7; Lloyd and Sreedhar 
2019, sec. 2).  
In the decades and centuries that followed, amid lurking threats of revolution and strife, many 
canonical western thinkers were likewise concerned with the need for order and stability. 
However, they tended to see the sources of such stability quite differently from Hobbes and 
Cavendish. As we see in different ways with Hume and Locke, private contract and property 
rights—be they conventional (as with Hume) or natural (as with Locke)—were thought to be 
a key source of stability and order, with government justified principally for its capacity to 
perfect and enforce such rights (Hume 2007 [1738–40], III.ii; Locke 1967 [c.1679], secs. 12, 
15, 21–23, 34–51, 89–90, 95, 123, 131, 138, 222). Even the great legal reformer, Jeremy 
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Bentham, tempered his reformist zeal with a conservative approach to legal transitions in his 
later economic and civil law texts (Crimmins 1996; Kelly 1990). The imperative for 
economic reforms, Bentham thought, had to be balanced against the superior value to people 
of stabilising their expectations, which stemmed from legal property rights (see my Chapter 
2.3). As Kelly notes, Bentham’s civil law texts were produced in the context of widespread 
unemployment and the circulation of “French revolutionary ideas”, which may help to 
explain their underlying system-preservation impulses (Kelly 1989, 79). And it was, of 
course, French revolutionary foment that brought “self-conscious conservatism” into its own 
as a philosophical standpoint more generally (Hamilton 2015, sec. 1.1). Against the 
revolutionaries’ Enlightenment project of liberating the human spirit through reason and 
rationality, Edmund Burke’s (1969 [1790]) conservatism was marked by a scepticism of such 
agendas; he trusted, rather, in the historical sedimentation of traditions and conventions, 
preferring that they evolve gradually (see Hamilton 2015, sec. 2.3).  
Sidgwick would later capture some of these tensions in his discussion of the distinction 
between “conservative” justice and “ideal” justice. We expect the law to protect the existing 
distribution of benefits and burdens, he observed. Yet at the same time we seek reform of the 
law in the name of an ideal of justice (Sidgwick 1962 [1874], 273–74). “It is the reconciliation 
between these two views”, Sidgwick thought, “which is the chief problem of political Justice” 
(ibid 273). Sidgwick thought the expectations generated by existing laws produced a genuine 
normative dilemma. On the one hand, “when such expectations are disappointed by a change 
in the law, the disappointed persons complain of injustice, and it is to some extent admitted 
that justice requires that they should be compensated for the loss thus incurred” (ibid 271). 
On the other hand, he continued, such expectations admit of a wide range of “definiteness 
and importance … so that it is practically impossible to compensate them all” (ibid 171–72). 
Sidgwick could think of “no intuitive principle by which we could separate valid claims from 
invalid, and distinguish injustice from simple hardship” (ibid 172). Thus we find at the edge 
of conservative justice a “dim borderland”, tenanted by tacit expectations of legal consistency, 
the normative significance of which is unclear (ibid 270). 
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The reformative–conservative tension has also been the subject of discussion among legal 
scholars under the more general rubric of ‘the rule of law’. This ideal is thought to prescribe, 
at a minimum, a set of thin, formal criteria that laws must meet, including that they be general, 
public, coherent, clear, prospective, and stable (Fuller 1964; Rawls 1999, 208; Raz 1979, 
214–18). The last two of these criteria seem relevant to the issue of legal transitions. The first 
is arguably undemanding: prospectivity merely requires that the law take legal effect on or 
after its enactment (Rawls 1999, 209; Raz 1979, 214; Waldron 2012, 83–84). 3  The 
demandingness of the stability requirement is more debatable. Few, if any, rule of law 
scholars would think that stability requires that individual laws stay the same. Raz, however, 
thought that laws “should not be changed too often” (1979, 214).4 “If they are frequently 
changed”, he worried, “people will find it difficult to find out what the law is at any given 
moment and will be constantly in fear that the law has been changed since they last learnt 
what it was” (1979, 214; see also Fuller 1964, 79–80). Waldron, by contrast, reminds us that 
a degree of uncertainty in future laws is inevitable, and that uncertainty can be monetised and 
priced into long-term decisions (2012, 73). Provided due process is followed and the 
framework of law-making as a whole is stable, Waldron thinks that regular change in 
individual laws would not offend the rule of law’s stability requirement (ibid 77, 82–83). 
Others have argued that the rule of law embodies certain underlying values, central among 
which is predictability (Bingham 2010, 38; Hayek 1960, 153, 156–57; Raz 1979, 220–22; 
Simmonds 2013, 39; Waldron 2016b, sec. 6). The idea, echoing Bentham, is that stable laws 
promote long-term decision-making and planning, and therefore both individual autonomy 
and productive efficiency.  
                                                 
3 Here we may distinguish between retrospective and retroactive laws. Retrospective laws are, at the time they 
are enacted, nominally deemed to have taken effect at some earlier time, thus changing the legal characterisation 
of past behaviour. Such laws are generally thought to be inconsistent with the prospectivity requirement of the 
rule of law. Retroactive laws, by contrast, merely change the value of past durable decisions (e.g. asset 
investments) made under the old law, the ongoing value of which was sensitive to future changes in the law 
(Shaviro 2000, 26). Such changes, other than in the domain of criminal law, are generally thought not to offend 
the prospectivity requirement of the rule of law (Persad 2017, 283; Rawls 1999, 209; Waldron 2012, 83–84). 
However, Fuller thought such a division was too neat, and left the issue unresolved (1964, 59–62). 
4 Aristotle in the Politics, too, expressed the view that change in the laws was by and large a bad thing, as it 
undermined their role in the inculcation of virtue (1962 [c.350 BC], II.viii, 81–83). 
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Developing in parallel to these increasingly specialised legal-philosophical debates was a 
uniquely ‘economic’ perspective on government policymaking (and hence legal transitions). 
Increasingly sceptical about the scientific validity of the ‘interpersonal utility comparisons’ 
that were at the heart of classical utilitarian political economy (Robbins 1932), early 20th 
century economists began to develop theories for improving economic efficiency without the 
need for such comparisons (Hicks 1939, 1941; Kaldor 1939). As I shall explain in Chapter 3, 
this led to the predominance of two superficially contradictory approaches: Pareto-improving 
policies, which require that all losers be compensated from the gains of winners; and Kaldor-
Hicks efficient (‘potentially-Pareto improving’) policies, which require that the losers are 
able to be compensated from the greater gains of the winners, but not that the losers actually 
be compensated. In the US economics and legal establishment up until the mid-1970s, 
something closer to the Pareto view held sway (see Fried 2003, 125; Hsu 2015, 2061; Kaplow 
1986, 522, fn 26).  
From the mid-1970s, the ideal of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency would come to be the dominant 
value guiding American legal scholarship on transitions, thanks to the ascendancy within the 
US legal academy of the ‘law and economics’ school of jurisprudence. Scholars in this 
tradition took seriously the reality of a political system in which laws frequently change, 
noting that this provided information which, on the assumption of ‘rational expectations’, 
investors would price into their decisions, effectively making strategic bets about the legal 
future. Rejecting the traditional rationales for a conservative approach to legal transitions, 
these scholars saw no reason to treat changes in the law any differently from other kinds of 
market risks that investors are expected to assume and manage. This led these scholars to 
adopt a default reformative position: let losses and gains lie where they fall (see Chapter 3).  
I want to end this synoptic tour by highlighting the tensions between stability and reform in 
the work of Rawls, for the legacy of these tensions shapes the contemporary political-
theoretic milieu in which this thesis sits. From his studies and early work in the late 1940s 
right through to his late works on political liberalism, Rawls was preoccupied with the 
question of how a pluralistic society could stably persist over time (Forrester 2019). In his 
mature and most important works, the theory Rawls espoused was an “ideal theory” of 
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stability: a set of principles of justice to regulate the basic structure of society that, if 
instantiated, would purportedly ensure the stability of social cooperation over time (Rawls 
1971, 1993, 1999, 2001a). As to the reforms necessary to reach such a condition, Rawls said 
famously little; these were questions of “non-ideal theory” that had to somehow marry the 
politically possible with the morally permissible, guided by the priority rules of his ideal 
theory (Rawls 1999, 215–18). 
But what if the best reconciliation between reformative ideals and the value of stability in its 
standardly understood, conservative sense doesn’t lead to Rawls’ ideal basic structure? That 
is, what if the best answers to the questions of what we ought to do now are not fully amenable 
to Rawls’ ideal-theoretic guidance because they are to some extent constrained by the way 
things have historically evolved and are currently configured? There are at least two bodies 
of scholarship that assert an historical or presentist claim against ideal theorists such as Rawls. 
Framing these two bodies of work in terms of different approaches to “justice”, Miller (2017, 
secs. 2.1, 2.2) calls these “corrective justice” and, following Sidgwick, “conservative justice”, 
respectively. The former, also known as “restorative justice” or “historical justice”, concerns 
remedial principles that apply bilaterally as between wrongdoers and their victims (ibid sec. 
2.2), while the latter is concerned with the normative claims of individuals to retain what is 
due to them under existing laws (or social conventions), as pressed in the face of changing 
laws (or conventions) (cf. ibid sec. 2.1).  
Of these two strands, it is the former that has received more attention in contemporary (by 
which I mean Rawls and beyond) Anglo-American political and legal theory—including in 
some of the most searing criticisms of Rawls by Robert Nozick (1974, chap. 7) and Charles 
Mills (2009, 162, 177–81). 5  Despite their otherwise radically different normative 
commitments and goals, what Nozick and Mills share is the conviction that history matters 
to justice; ideal-theoretic blueprints can’t begin from the blank slate of pure reason, for doing 
                                                 
5 For a sense of the variety of contemporary philosophical writings on historical/corrective/restorative justice, 
see Boxill (2015), Butt (2008), and Coleman (1992). 
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so will overlook a history marked by just transactions that should be respected, injustice that 
stands in need of rectification, or a mix of both.  
By contrast, the ‘ideal vs conservative’ debate, which is the focus of this thesis, has received 
surprisingly scant attention from contemporary political philosophers. The exceptions are: 
the work on ‘legitimate expectations’ that I discuss in Chapter 4, most of which is very recent 
(Brown 2011, 2012, 2017a, 2017b; Buchanan 1975; Green 2017; Matravers 2017; Meyer, 
Pölzer, and Sanklecha 2017; Meyer and Sanklecha 2011, 2014; Moore 2017); works by Fried 
(2003), Persad (2015, 2017) and Räikkä (2014, chap. 2), and the writings discussed in 
Chapter 9 on state response measures, specifically grandfathering and compensation (Bovens 
2011; Goodin 1995; Knight 2013, 2014; Schuessler 2017). I see these nascent discussions as 
very much continuous with the earlier lines of thought about the value of stability, convention 
and expectation sketched above, and am convinced that there is much to be gained from 
placing them in conversation. Likewise, I think it is fruitful in the spirit of ‘PPE’—or perhaps 
PPEL[aw]—to collide the political-philosophical trains of thought on these matters with the 
hitherto almost exclusively separate trains of economists and lawyers.6  
At this point, Rawlsians may protest that I am neglecting the sub-branch of non-ideal theory 
known as ‘transitional’ theory (Valentini 2012, 660–62), which takes forward Rawls’ above-
mentioned plea to figure out how to advance toward a just basic structure governed by his 
two principles. But rather than stacking the deck by assuming that the theoretical task is to 
find permissible ways to transition to a Rawlsian ideal basic structure, I begin with a genuine 
openness to the possibility that both reformative and conservative claims about legal 
transitions might carry normative weight. I am open, therefore, to the possibility that the past 
and the present might constrain any future ideal that we otherwise want to bring about (quite 
aside from whatever constraints rectificatory justice claims might also impose). If I had any 
starting intuition, it was simply that both stability and reform can be valuable under certain 
                                                 
6 To my knowledge, the only example of cross-pollination between law, economics and political philosophy on 
the subject of legal transitions generally is Fried (2003), though the work of Michelman (1967) and Epstein 
(especially Epstein 1985) in the property ‘takings’ (law) literature also draws heavily on both economics and 
political philosophy. 
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conditions and that we need a better way of reconciling them than the western canon of 
political thought has bequeathed us.  
1.3 THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL TRANSITIONS 
With this birds-eye view of the broader normative terrain in mind, let us now descend back 
to earth, take up our analytical tools, and scope-out more precisely the parameters of the 
present inquiry into the problem of legal transitions.  
Barbara Fried provides a helpful starting point: 
The problem of legal transitions, put simply, is the problem of whether it is appropriate, for 
reasons of efficiency or fairness, for the government to offset (through grandfathering, direct 
compensation or other mechanisms) changes in wealth occasioned by changes in legal 
regimes. (Fried 2003, 123) 
I will endorse a slightly broader definition, but I agree with Fried’s general, four-part 
structure, which involves: two conditions of application, i.e. (i) a legal change (ii) which 
causes a change in value; and two normative questions, i.e. (iii) what is the appropriate state 
response? And (iv) for what reasons? 
With respect to the conditions of application, a number of questions arise. First, what counts 
as a legal change? As is conventional in the literature on legal transitions, I do not consider 
judicial decisions to fall within the scope of the problem.7 Rather, I consider legal changes 
or legal transitions (I will use these terms interchangeably) to include changes to primary 
legislation by the legislature and administrative actions by the executive.8  
                                                 
7 There are at least two reasons for this exclusion. The first, for those who subscribe to legal positivism, is that 
judges don’t make the law but merely interpret it (though I acknowledge that this is somewhat of a fiction, at 
least with respect to the common law). The second is that judges have authority to make orders only in respect 
of the parties to the cases before them; even though their rulings will typically affect a wider class of persons, 
judges generally lack the authority to order the kinds of wider transitional responses considered central to legal 
transitions (e.g. compensation, adaptive support) that the legislature and/or executive has. 
8 This includes secondary legislation and other delegated legislation, as well as other kinds of general rules, 
regulations, and policy statements. I am open to also including “administrative measures”—defined by Brown 
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An interesting ‘boundary’ question arises in respect of more fundamental changes in the 
machinery of government. Post-conflict societies raise some similar issues to ordinary legal 
transitions, but also other issues unique to violent conflict that put this topic clearly ‘outside 
scope’ for my purposes (see the literature on “transitional justice”: Eisikovits 2017). Closer 
to my scope boundary lie normal constitutional amendments—those that occur within the 
machinery of the existing constitution. Though I do not consider such cases explicitly, I take 
them to be within the scope of my analysis. In between ‘normal’ constitutional amendments 
and post-conflict societies lies an interesting set of cases involving peaceful but radical 
changes to the fundamental machinery of government, such as: constitutional replacements; 
radical transformations in economic institutions, as with the transition of eastern bloc 
countries following the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the self-determination of political 
territories, as with former colonies; and the joining (and leaving!) of supranational 
governmental institutions like the European Union (Schauer 2003). I can’t give a general 
answer about whether such cases, which admit of wide variety, would fall within my scope. 
Where such cases also involve ordinary legislative change, as with Britain’s exit from the 
EU, they will more obviously do so. But cases such as the former Soviet transitions no doubt 
raise additional issues to which I have not given serious consideration (though I suspect that 
many of the issues would be sufficiently similar that my theory could be extended to such 
cases, perhaps with some modification).  
Second, what counts as a change in value? In other words, what is the ‘currency’ in which 
the problem of legal transitions deals? Fried mentions wealth only. Changes in wealth are 
clearly relevant, but I see no reason to restrict the scope of the problem to changes in wealth, 
or even ‘resources’ more generally. Rather, I think the currency is something that needs to 
be argued for. At this stage, I will leave the ‘currency question’ open, though I take a stand 
                                                 
(2017b, 98) as encompassing particular administrative orders, decisions, and adjudications that relate to a single 
agent or small number of identifiable agents—however in my view these will tend to be more appropriately 
governed by special rights and duties (see my Chapter 4.3). I am more interested in theories of legal transitions 
applicable to laws and administrative rules of general application. 
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on it in Chapter 6.3, and criticise other proposed currencies at various other points along the 
way.  
It is worth briefly spelling out upfront, though, how such changes in value arise. They arise 
because agents make decisions that are “durable” (Shavell 2008, 43–44) in the sense that they 
have operative consequences of an enduring nature—such as buying an asset, studying to 
acquire skills, taking a new job, opening a business, pursuing a hobby, building a relationship, 
or cultivating an identity. When governments change legal rules, even where the rules are 
nominally prospective, they typically alter the value of people’s past durable decisions (to 
the extent that the reforms were not anticipated), such that some will be made worse off 
relative to their position under the regulatory status quo ante, and others will be made better 
off (Kaplow 1986, 515–17; Shaviro 2000, 25–26).  
Third, what does it mean for a legal change to cause a change in value? I assume that a legal 
change must be both a necessary and a proximate cause. Regarding necessity, I mean that 
the legal change must be a ‘but-for’ cause of the change in value, even if only one necessary 
element in an actual set of sufficient conditions (on “NESS” causation, see Wright 1985). I 
assume that a legal change will always only be one causal element in a wider set of conditions 
that will always also include some relevant durable decision of the affected agent. This 
assumption raises a normative question about how the effects of legal change should be 
apportioned as between the state and the individual. In my view, this cannot be resolved in a 
purely empirical or metaphysical sense, but rather requires a normative judgement, and I deal 
with this through the Fairness Principle (Chapter 8).  
By proximity, I mean to single out those legal changes that stand out among other necessary 
causes for various possible reasons such as temporal closeness, social salience, and perceived 
causal contribution. The need for a proximity condition arises from the fact that the laws of 
a modern state are, strictly speaking, pervasive necessary causes in all kinds of social 
processes which, despite effecting changes in value, lie outside the scope of the problem of 
legal transitions, standardly conceived. I am thinking, in particular, of changes in value 
created by technological innovation and commercial competition. Though these occur 
against the backdrop of existing laws and policies (e.g. corporations law, labour law, 
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industrial policy, product standards, etc.), they are standardly conceived as too remote in their 
causal influence to fall within the problem of legal transitions.9 The line I have drawn is more 
pragmatic than principled, as is the line between proximity and remoteness in all areas of 
philosophy and law where causation is relevant. Thankfully, because laws change through 
formal processes, the processes involved in changing the law provide a reliable pragmatic 
basis for identifying cases of legal transitions and anticipating their proximate effects. 
Finally, on the conditions of application, note that Fried’s definition refers to changes in 
wealth (or in currency-neutral ‘value’, as I prefer for now), not losses. Fried’s more neutral 
term is quite deliberate on her part and has important implications: it means that the problem 
of legal transitions applies to both losers and winners. As Fried notes, and as we shall see, 
many theories of legal transitions focus only on losers, reflecting “an implicit (and probably 
unconscious) decision to ignore the symmetrical problem of transition winners, with the 
consequence that transition gains simply lay where they fell, by default” (Fried 2003, 125). I 
share with Fried the conviction that a theory of legal transitions must take winners seriously. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that winners raise distributional issues in their own 
right. The second is that, in recognising that eventual losers had an ex ante possibility of 
winning, we may have reason to appraise their initial durable decision in a new normative 
light: as a risky bet that they lost. “No principle of ethics”, after all, “requires that Monte 
Carlo produce only winners” (Ramseyer and Nakazato 1989, 1160). While there are limits to 
the casino analogy, I shall argue in Chapter 8 that there are, nonetheless, many kinds of 
durable decisions in which responsibility for managing the risk of legal change should be 
allocated to the individual, in part because it entailed the ex ante possibility of gains. 
This leaves us with our two normative questions: how should the state respond to such 
changes in value that it causes by its legislative and executive functions, and for what reasons? 
                                                 
9 The effects of these non-legal (that is, not proximately legal) changes may also warrant a state response. Indeed 
they do raise similar issues, hence some scholars consider them together (Persad 2015, 2017; Schuessler 2017). 
I am inclined to think that legal transitions raise additional issues, though not necessarily ones that are so unique 
as to justify a radically different approach to non-legal losers/winners. However, I remain neutral on this 
question for the purpose of this thesis. 
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The question of how the state should respond is the question of what the “transition policy” 
or “transition rule” should be (cf. Logue 2003, 211; Shaviro 2000). This is often conceived 
in terms of a choice between what we may call a “conservative” or a “reformative” transition 
policy.10 This is—unfortunately, in my view—often reduced to a question of whether losers 
should be “compensated” or not (Trebilcock 2014, 6–7). Compensation is a conservative 
transition policy option, to be sure, but it is only one among numerous possibilities (as Fried’s 
definition alludes to). The other main conservative option is to ‘grandfather’ an agent’s prior 
legal position, effectively exempting the agent from the application of the new law. However, 
as I explain in Chapter 9.2.1, grandfathering can come in partial and temporary forms 
(compensation can also be partial). Such partial and temporary forms of grandfathering (and 
partial compensation) reveal a fact that is, I believe, essential to the development of a good 
theory of legal transitions: fully conservative transition policies (e.g. full and permanent 
grandfathering) and fully reformative transition policies (let all losses and gains lie where 
they fall) are but the two poles on a wide spectrum of possibilities, which I call the transition 
policy spectrum, or sometimes the conservative–reformative spectrum. A key contribution 
of this thesis (especially Chapter 9) is to motivate, specify and defend a central place in 
theorising about legal transitions for what I call adaptive transition policies—those that 
occupy the middle ground between the conservative and reformative extremes. Finally on 
this question of what the state should do, we must also make theoretical room for transition 
policies covering winners. At the conservative end of the spectrum, grandfathering can in 
principle apply also to winners (i.e. grandfathering an agent’s prior inferior position), while 
the converse of compensation for losers is to claw-back the gains of winners—for example, 
through windfall taxation. At the reformative end, winners simply keep their gains. 
                                                 
10 I borrow the distinction from David Raphael who discusses the distinction between “conservative justice” 
and “reformative justice” (Raphael 2001, 2)—see also the above discussion of Sidgwick in Part 1.2. I prefer 
Raphael’s contrasting of “conservative” to “reformative” rather than to “progressive” because “progressive” 
would be apt to confuse, since it can connote egalitarianism (e.g. progressive political causes; progressive 
taxation), whereas letting losses and gains lie where they fall is not necessarily egalitarian (e.g. if the winners 
are already well off and the losers are already badly off). 
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The normative question of most interest to normative theorists, however, is why a more 
conservative or more reformative response is desirable, and this question shall occupy the 
bulk of my concern in this thesis. Fried mentions fairness or efficiency as the only possible 
reasons (I suspect because her paper is part of a symposium that engages with law and 
economics scholars of legal transitions, for whom these options are the only ones that tend 
to be considered). But there are other contenders, of which this thesis considers (in addition 
to efficiency and fairness) property, aggregate utility, wellbeing, justice, and legitimate 
expectations11. 
In light of these remarks, I adopt the following redefinition of the problem: 
The problem of legal transitions is the problem of whether, to what extent, and why it is 
normatively appropriate for the government to offset (through grandfathering, compensation, 
adaptive assistance, or other means) changes in value caused by changes in the law. 
1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
1.4.1 Normative importance 
In addition to the general point made earlier about the potential constraints on ‘ideal justice’ 
arising from the normative demands of the past and present, I see an in-depth exploration of 
the problem of legal transitions as potentially relevant to a number of important topics in 
political and legal philosophy/theory. These include: the role in individual wellbeing of such 
things as stability, change, attachments (to people, places, cultures and material objects), 
expectations (and their disappointment), and long-term planning (and its frustration); the role 
of private property, legitimate expectations, justice, and the rule of law with respect to those 
issues; the distributive consequences of risky decisions; and the civic status, duties, rights 
and virtues of citizens in respect of processes of legal change. Since legal transitions touch 
on issues such as the conception of the person-through-time, the content of citizenship, and 
the legislative and administrative powers of the state, the topic is also relevant to numerous 
                                                 
11 Respecting legitimate expectations could be considered a requirement of fairness. 
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foundational debates in political theory—including those between conservatives and their 
reformative opponents, between liberals and republicans, and among competing strands of 
liberalism.  
As this list suggests, moreover, there is an important democratic-theoretic dimension to 
transitions that has been under-explored. Even the most optimistic ‘ideal theorist’ would have 
to concede that societies will never be fully ideal—there will always be a justice- or 
goodness-oriented imperative to change primary rules12—nor are we (in my view) likely to 
get substantial agreement on what the correct theory of justice is and how it should be 
implemented. But maybe societies could get better at transitions. That is, in the spirit of 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996), maybe we could get more agreement on our ‘second order’ 
democratic institutions; maybe these could consciously be shaped so that, over the long-run, 
we become better at fairly reforming the rules in whichever direction the majority decides. 
As Buchanan put it in his early critique of Rawls, “what is needed is nothing short of a theory 
of institutional change—a set of systematically related principles defining institutions for 
institutional change” (Buchanan 1975, 422, emphasis in original). Forty-four years later, 
political philosophy still lacks a good normative theory of institutional change. It is hoped 
that this thesis will contribute toward filling that lacuna. 
Finally, some of the particular chapters in this thesis raise issues of importance for the 
theoretical development of positive law doctrines, and for normative economics. The 
chapters on property and legitimate expectations are relevant to the law of property 
(especially immunity to ‘takings’) and the law of legitimate expectations, respectively. Both 
of these doctrines, moreover, are relevant to investor-state dispute settlement, which is an 
increasingly prevalent feature of international trade and investment law. Additionally, 
                                                 
12 As Buchanan (1975) pointed out, even if we have already instantiated a Rawlsian ideal basic structure at 
some time, the fact that conditions outside the basic structure (e.g. technology, business practices, etc.) will 
inevitably change means that not only will particular laws often need to change, but even the basic structure 
itself will need to change if compliance with the principles of justice (especially the demanding ‘difference 
principle’) is to be maintained. For different views about what should follow in terms of transitional 
arrangements under such conditions, compare Buchanan’s view with Persad (2017). 
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Chapter 3 contributes to economic and law and economics debates over legal transitions and 
over the philosophical justification of normative-economic concepts such as efficiency. 
1.4.2 Political importance 
Making progress on many of the (arguably) most urgent political challenges of our time 
requires large-scale structural reforms that would make many people significantly worse off. 
The fate of policy reforms is to a large extent determined by the interplay of what political 
scientists would call ‘interests’ and ‘institutions’, but is never fully determined by them; 
‘ideas’, including normative ideas about what is just, fair or otherwise appropriate, also 
matter greatly when it comes to both elite and mass politics (Béland and Cox 2011; Blyth 
2002; Hall 1993). As the Australian carbon pricing experience illustrated, policymakers often 
have little clue about how to deal with transitional issues;13 lacking a principled leg to stand 
on, they are at the whim of vested interests, who usually have their own (very clear!) ideas. 
Moreover, powerful losers often take their claims public, and since appeals to naked self-
interest will rarely prove convincing, they tend to clothe their self-interested claims in the 
language of fairness or the public interest. Good normative analysis can provide governments 
with a principled default basis for transition policy and can help the public to distinguish 
between good and bad arguments about the impacts of reform and their mitigation (Kaplow 
1986, 571–72; Swift and White 2008, 54–55). 
1.5 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
Adapting Timmons’ (2002, 3–4) delineation of the twin aims of a moral theory, my thesis 
has a primary theoretical aim and a secondary practical aim: 
                                                 
13 This experience is hardly unique. For example, in an OECD publication on the political economy of climate 
change mitigation, the authors note that while climate policy “is ultimately expected to create more winners 
than losers, those who stand to lose the most will naturally mobilise most effectively, in opposition. And, 
providing appropriate compensation is both costly and has proved difficult in practice” (de Serres, Llewellyn, 
and Llewellyn 2011, 22). But what is “appropriate” compensation? The report does not say! 
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Theoretical aim: to discover the best (most justifiable) normative theory of legal 
transitions. 
Practical aim: to provide action-guiding normative prescriptions that policymakers 
and other stakeholders in legal transitions can deploy so as to feasibly approximate 
the best normative theory of legal transitions. 
The theoretical aim is self-explanatory. The practical aim concerns how to operationalise the 
theoretical aim given additional real-world constraints, such as epistemic limitations, 
transaction costs, the need for a high degree of determinacy in institutional rules and norms, 
and the need to generate political agreement among pluralistic constituents (the last of these 
is also relevant to the theoretical aim: see Part 1.4.1, above, and List and Valentini 2016, pt. 
7). This aim is motivated by my desire to develop a theory that can contribute to real-world 
political debates about legal transitions, and to provide prescriptions that are sufficiently 
action-guiding that they can be deployed by stakeholders in relevant debates (Daniel Butt 
calls this a “double practicality”: Butt 2008, 8). 
In the next section on methods, it will be clear that some evaluative desiderata are more 
relevant to the theoretical aim, and others to the practical aim.  
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
1.6.1 Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
This thesis is concerned with normative theories of legal transitions, the principles they 
contain, and the concepts that are used to construct, motivate and justify them. Following 
List and Valentini, I take a normative principle to be a propositional statement that contains 
normative content and potentially applies to more than one case (2016, 535–36), and a 
normative theory to be a set of normative principles and its implications (ibid 536). A concept 
classifies “objects” in a particular “domain of application”, which is “the set of objects of 
which it is meaningful to ask whether they fall under the given concept or not” (ibid 531). A 
concept also has “defining conditions”—the conditions that determine whether an object falls 
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under the concept or not (ibid 531). I will use the term “conception” to refer to variants of a 
concept whose defining conditions are fully specified.  
This thesis uses the method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) to critique (other) and to 
construct and defend (my own) theories, principles and concepts pertaining to legal 
transitions. WRE was first proposed by Rawls (1971, 1974)14 and systematically developed 
by Daniels (1996, 2016). It has also recently been defended by Knight (2006b, 2017) and I 
have developed it for the specific purpose of analysing theories of legal transitions (Green 
2017).  
WRE is a coherentist methodology in the sense that it seeks coherence among normatively-
relevant moral (and nonmoral) beliefs across three ‘levels’ of generality (Daniels 1996, 22; 
Green 2017).15 The ultimate object of analysis in WRE is the middle level, consisting of a 
normative theory (or principle)—here, a theory of legal transitions. The most specific level 
is a set of implications in particular cases. The most general level is a set of theoretical 
antecedents, by which I mean, loosely, any normative theories, normative principles, ideals, 
concepts, and nonmoral beliefs that play a significant constitutive, motivational, or 
justificatory role in the middle-level normative theory (Green 2017, 185, 190–92; cf. Daniels 
1996, 338–39).16  Specific combinations of theoretical antecedents will often come pre-
packaged in a tradition of political thought. Accordingly, I will often speak of traditions of 
political thought as shorthand for a package of theoretical antecedents that is more or less 
accepted among adherents to a particular tradition. 17  Middle-level theories, then, are 
                                                 
14 Rawls uses the phrases “wide” and “narrow” reflective equilibrium in his article “The Independence of Moral 
Theory” (1974, 8). Though he does not use these terms in A Theory of Justice, the distinction is there in 
substance (1999, 43). 
15 There can in principle be more than three levels of generality, and sometimes Daniels refers to more (e.g. 
1996, 23–24). Three levels are sufficient for my purposes. 
16 Daniels defines this most general level as involving “some or all of those elements involved in the process of 
giving a systematic account of moral beliefs and practices” (1996, 339). Daniels’ definition, as well as his list 
of theoretical elements (1996, 6, 338), and Knight’s (2017, sec. 3) scheme of elements, are broader than mine 
in that they involve more elements than I have listed. I do not wish to preclude inclusion of such elements in 
WRE. Rather, I am merely focusing on normative, conceptual and nonmoral theoretical elements because these 
are the focus of my thesis. 
17 In Green (2017, 185–86, 194–201) I allay four potential concerns one might have about engaging with 
theoretical antecedents as part of a putative analysis of a middle-level theory.  
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distinguished by having a more specific domain of application than their theoretical 
antecedents (Daniels 1996, 22–24, chap. 3). 18  Metaphorically, we can move from the 
formulation of the middle-level theory ‘downstream’ to specific cases or ‘upstream’ to more 
general theoretical antecedents (Green 2017; Sen 1979a, 197–98).  
1.6.2 Evaluative desiderata—theories and principles 
In this thesis, I will analyse theories (and principles) of legal transitions by appealing to a 
combination of desiderata at all three levels:  
 internal desiderata, concerning the theory itself (or its principles);  
 case-implication desiderata, concerning the relationship between intuitions (or 
“considered judgements” 19 ) about specific (real or hypothetical) cases and the 
implications of the normative theory when applied to those cases; and  
 theoretical-antecedent desiderata, concerning the more general theoretical 
antecedents and their relationship to the middle-level theory.  
Building on the desiderata for evaluating theories and principles suggested by List and 
Valentini (2016, 538–44), Sen (1979a, 197–98) and Timmons (2002, 12–17), I will use the 
following scheme of six desiderata—two at each level—throughout the thesis (where I think 
it will be helpful, I will refer to “desideratum #X”, where X is the Arabic numeral from the 
following numbering scheme, or the Roman numeral from the numbering scheme for 
desiderata concerning concepts, outlined subsequently): 
  
                                                 
18 In this way, what counts as a middle-level theory is defined relatively to its theoretical antecedents.  
19 I adopt Knight’s (2017) definition of considered judgements, which refers to Rawls’ requirement that the 
judgements are those made in “conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in general” (Rawls 1999, 
42). According to Knight (2017, sec. 2), this is all that is required for a judgement to be deemed “considered” 
and thus admitted into the reflective equilibrium process. That said, in the remaining chapters of the thesis I 
will simply refer to intuitions, as this is less cumbersome, though I mean considered judgements. 
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1. Internal consistency (internal). The theory of legal transitions, together with relevant 
factual information, yields consistent (not self-contradictory) normative verdicts about 
transition policy in the cases to which it is applied (cf. List and Valentini 2016, 539; Timmons 
2002, 13). 
2. Determinacy (internal). The theory, together with relevant factual information, yields 
definite normative verdicts about transition policy in the cases to which it is applied (cf. 
Timmons 2002, 13–14). 
3. Intuition correlation (case-implication). The theory implies verdicts about transition policy 
in particular cases that comport with widely shared intuitions (or considered judgements) (cf. 
List and Valentini 2016, 541–42; Sen 1979a, 197; Timmons 2002, 15). 
4. Explanatory power (case-implication). The theory features principles and concepts that 
convincingly explain the verdicts about transition policy in particular cases, helping us to 
understand why the theory implies the transition policy that it does (cf. Timmons 2002, 15–
16; Valentini 2015, 737). 
5. Theoretical plausibility (theoretical-antecedent). The theory’s concepts and principles are 
constituted, motivated and justified by normative and non-normative antecedent theoretical 
ideas that are themselves plausible (for desiderata concerning the plausibility of concepts, see 
below; empirical claims are plausible in virtue of, and to the extent of, the empirical evidence 
for those claims) (cf. Daniels 1996, 6, 13, chap. 7; Timmons 2002, 14, 16). 
6. Theoretical coherence (theoretical-antecedent). The antecedent theoretical ideas are 
coherent with the middle-level theory (Daniels 1996; Rawls 1971, sec. 9; Sen 1979a, 197–
98). 
Of course, confining the three pairs of desiderata to their respective three levels is somewhat 
artificial. In practice, the analysis works best when one moves between the three levels, such 
that coherence is maintained across elements at all three levels, i.e. (for a good theory) 
between plausible theoretical antecedent ideals, the theory of legal transitions itself, and the 
compelling explanations and intuitively correct results that it consistently and determinately 
implies in specific cases (see Daniels 1996; Green 2017). 
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1.6.3 Evaluative desiderata—concepts 
Finally, because concepts are not themselves normative (though they can be normatively 
loaded), we need a slightly modified scheme of desiderata for evaluating them. These six 
further desiderata also go to the “plausibility” of concepts insofar as they are theoretical 
antecedents to, or elements in, a middle-level principle/theory (see above, desideratum #5): 
I. Motivational coherence. The concept is defined consistently with the motivation for being 
normatively concerned with the concept in the first place.  
II. Determinacy. The concept is defined such that it yields definite verdicts about the 
classification of objects. 
III. Intuition correlation. The concept is defined such that its classification of objects 
comports with widely shared intuitions (or considered judgements) about whether the objects 
are tokens of the concept, especially if the concept has a common-sense interpretation (cf. 
List and Valentini 2016, 533).  
IV. Explanatory power. The concept is specified such that its classification of objects not only 
correlates with widely held intuitions but also convincingly explains what it is about the 
objects so classified that makes them tokens of the concept (cf. Timmons 2002, 15). 
V. Having defining conditions that are epistemically accessible. According to List and 
Valentini (2016, 534): 
Depending on the intended use of a concept, we may require its defining conditions 
to be such that it is possible, at least in principle, for us to know whether an object 
meets them. For example, a concept of welfare whose defining conditions refer to 
certain kinds of mental states that are in principle inaccessible to any observer would 
be of little practical use. … Of course, the context and intended use may determine 
what counts as epistemically accessible. 
Given the practical aim of this thesis, a concept intended for use in a theory of legal transitions 
should be defined such that the state can feasibly access the relevant facts needed to classify 
relevant objects.  
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VI. Having defining conditions that are neither too “thick” nor too “thin”. A concept’s 
defining conditions “should not refer to any ‘irrelevant’ facts about the objects to be 
categorized, but refer to all ‘relevant’ facts” (List and Valentini 2016, 533). One significant 
aspect of thickness/thinness concerns “moralisation”: a concept (the first concept) is 
moralised if its defining conditions refer to some other normative or evaluative concept (the 
second concept) and is non-moralised otherwise (cf. ibid 533–34). While moralisation is not 
necessarily problematic, it carries risks for the first concept: if a conception of the second 
concept is not specified, then the first concept will be indeterminate; the first concept might 
be an empty shell (i.e. where the second concept does all of the normative work); and/or the 
first concept might be nebulous, involving unclear relations with the second concept. These 
risks grow exponentially where the second concept is itself moralised. 
With these analytical tools in hand, let us now proceed to a brief outline of the thesis. 
1.7 STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The eight core chapters of this thesis constitute two halves. The first half (Chapters 2–5) is 
primarily critical and the second half (Chapters 6–9) is primarily constructive.  
In the first half of the thesis I critically analyse theories of legal transitions structured around 
four idioms, respectively: property; efficiency; legitimate expectations; and justice. 
Aggregate utility is also discussed where relevant in the chapters on property and efficiency. 
The chapters are structured somewhat differently, but each essentially involves a mix of 
exposition and critical evaluation using the method and criteria described above. In Chapter 
2, I first consider libertarian natural rights theories of property and, second, classical liberal 
approaches to legal transitions based on conventional-instrumental theories of property, 
focusing on Bentham. In Chapter 3, I consider the rich literature on legal transitions 
emanating from the ‘law and economics’ school of jurisprudence. Chapters 4 and 5 turn to 
liberal-egalitarianism. Chapter 4 discusses recent scholarship on ‘legitimate expectations’ 
and legal transitions, in which various conceptions of what makes expectations legitimate 
have been proposed. One such ‘legitimacy basis’ that has been debated is ‘justice’. Chapter 
5 considers whether justice can provide a sound basis for a theory of legal transitions in its 
own right. Ultimately, I argue that each of the theories of legal transitions discussed in these 
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chapters should be rejected. However, there are strengths and weaknesses in each that help 
to motivate some of the choices I make in developing my alternative theory. 
Specifying and defending that alternative theory, which I call Adaptive Responsibility 
Theory (ART), is the task of the second half of the thesis. Chapter 6 introduces the general 
thrust of ART and—in the spirit of WRE’s concern with antecedent theoretical ideas—
discusses the key ontological, moral and political assumptions that underpin it. 20  Most 
important among these is what I call the ‘ecological’ account of the self and its agency, which 
I contrast with two dominant ‘liberal models’ of self and agency that I think do considerable 
implicit work in the theories of legal transition that I criticise in the first half of the thesis. 
The second half of Chapter 6 addresses what I referred to above as the “currency question”. 
I specify and defend a modified functionings account of wellbeing, which I adopt as the 
currency of ART. The next two chapters specify and defend the two principles of ART—the 
Wellbeing Principle (Chapter 7) and the Fairness Principle (Chapter 8)—each of which 
generates independent reasons for transition policy. Because these reasons have both a 
direction (conservative or reformative) and a magnitude (their strength/weight), I sometimes 
refer to them as “vectors” of reasons. Chapter 9 explains how the combination of wellbeing 
and fairness vectors yields institutional requirements for particular classes and types of 
transition policy: conservative, adaptive, or reformative. Since adaptive responses are central 
to ART and yet have been under-theorised in the relevant literature, the bulk of that chapter 
is devoted to the specification and illustration of adaptive transition policies and a 
justification of their instrumental role in support of wellbeing and fairness. 
The concluding chapter elucidates some of the key implications of ART for different agents 
and for various real-world cases, and compares these implications with those of the other 
theories discussed in this thesis. It closes with a summary of the thesis’ key contributions and 
some suggestions for future research. 
                                                 
20 As I shall explain in Chapter 6, these are assumptions because defending them in detail would take me too 
far off course. 
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 PROPERTY: LIBERTARIAN AND CLASSICAL 
LIBERAL THEORIES  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Legal transitions are in large part about impacts on the value of assets in which individuals 
have interests that could be characterised, morally or as a matter of law, as private property 
rights. Accordingly, in this chapter I critically analyse a tradition of political thought that is 
centrally concerned with theorising private property rights, viz. what Mack and Gaus (2004) 
call “the liberty tradition”, encompassing libertarianism1 and classical liberalism.  
There are important distinctions between classical liberal and libertarian political theories 
(Freeman 2001, 2011), some of which will be emphasised in this chapter. What justifies 
considering them in the one chapter is that they “endorse similar (though not the same) robust 
conceptions of economic [including property] rights and liberties”, and accordingly “endorse 
market capitalism as the appropriate mechanism for determining the just distribution of 
income, wealth, and economic powers and responsibilities” (Freeman 2011, 27, footnote 
omitted). In other words, theories in the liberty tradition tend to converge in their ascription 
to persons of robust rights in respect of whatever private property they have actually 
accumulated through production and/or exchange, even if the resulting distribution of 
property is vastly unequal (Freeman 2011).2 Such theories therefore have direct and weighty 
implications for theories of legal transitions. Specifically, they tend to imply theories that are 
conservative in their protection of all existing property rights, whether the property in 
question be the council flat of someone scraping by or the estate of a billionaire.  
                                                 
1 I am referring to right libertarianism. I leave aside discussion of so-called “left libertarianism”, though many 
of the critiques of right-libertarianism discussed in this chapter apply also to left-libertarianism. 
2 Distinguishing classical liberal theories from the liberal-egalitarian tradition is slightly harder, but Freeman 
identifies the distinguishing feature in their respective approaches to the economic liberties (including freedom 
of contract and property rights). Specifically, Freeman argues that classical liberals countenance only a 
relatively minimal list of restrictions on economic liberties, and justify such restrictions “in terms of the 
conditions required to establish and maintain economically efficient market allocations of resources and 
distributions of income and wealth” (Freeman 2011, 21–22, and see also at 27–55). 
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While they share similar (conservative) conclusions with respect to legal transitions, 
libertarian and classical liberal theories each tend to cluster around (though are not 
coterminous with) a distinct theoretical approach to property: non-instrumentally valuable 
natural property rights (libertarian); and instrumentally valuable conventional property rights 
(classical liberal). 3  This chapter is therefore structured around these two theoretical 
approaches. Part 2.2 is concerned with libertarian natural property rights theories. I begin by 
outlining the relevant family of theories and explaining their broad implications for legal 
transitions, and then provide a number of critiques of these theories, concluding that they 
face an implausibility–incoherence–indeterminacy trilemma. At the end of Part 2.2, I briefly 
discuss the position of Epstein, which purports to generate highly-conservative libertarian 
conclusions about legal transitions from a foundation of utilitarianism, rather than natural 
rights. I show that he is subject to the same trilemma. Part 2.3 is concerned with 
conventional–instrumental property rights theories in the classical liberal strain of the liberty 
tradition, and in particular with the property-based rule-utilitarian theory of legal transitions 
articulated by Jeremy Bentham in his later writings on the civil law. I argue that, despite 
being broadly right about private property being instrumental to its holders’ utility, 
Bentham’s argument for an approach to legal transitions that is conservative of status quo 
property holdings is unpersuasive. The analysis of Bentham illustrates a broader point about 
consequentialist theories that invoke conventional-instrumental conceptions of the nature and 
value of property: they will tend (in existing, highly unequal societies) to imply a relatively 
reformative, rather than conservative, approach to legal transitions. Part 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 LIBERTARIAN NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORIES 
2.2.1 Exposition 
Libertarianism is an especially far-reaching theory of private property rights, and 
consequently it stakes out the most conservative position with respect to transitional issues 
                                                 
3 Natural property rights are not necessarily non-instrumentally valuable and conventional property rights are 
not necessarily merely instrumentally valuable, however natural rights theorists tend to treat property as non-
instrumentally valuable and conventionalists tend to be instrumentalists (see Freeman 2011, 33–35; Stilz 2018, 
244).  
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(at least among philosophers). Libertarians, often drawing on one (contested) interpretation 
of the natural rights theory of Locke (1967 [1679]), take individuals to be initial full “self-
owners”—as having a “full” set of liberal private ownership rights over their own bodies 
(Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005, 1; Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 1).4 The 
“core” of this set of maximal ownership rights consists of “control” rights (a liberty right to 
use one’s body and a claim right that others not use it), but the set also includes rights of 
disposition (e.g. to transfer by way of sale, gift, rental, loan etc.) as well as second-order 
rights such as enforcement rights, rights to compensation for violation, and immunities to the 
non-consensual loss of those rights (Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 1).5 This right 
of self-ownership extends to one’s personal endowments, talents and other attributes (Nozick 
1974, 169–72; Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 2). From this premise of self-
ownership, individuals purportedly have moral powers to acquire property rights in other 
unowned things (Buckle 1991; Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 2).6 Once acquired 
(in accordance with the conditions of the particular libertarian theory7), the same set of full 
                                                 
4 As Freeman notes, “Libertarians rely upon a Lockean account of natural property, but their account of absolute 
property rights is not Locke’s view since, like liberals generally, he had no reservations about taxation and 
governmental regulation of property for important public purposes” (2011, 24, fn 6). See, e.g., Locke (1967 
[c.1679], secs. 73, 120, 140). 
5  Vallentyne & van der Vossen, in their Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Libertarianism”, 
correctly acknowledge that the notion of self-ownership involves some indeterminacy because enforcement and 
immunity rights cannot both be maximal for all persons, since maximal immunity would imply A’s property 
rights are immune to violation even from B when B seeks to enforce B’s own property rights against A, which 
implies B does not have maximal enforcement rights, and vice versa (2014, sec. 3). They fail to acknowledge, 
however, that all property rights have this zero-sum structure, including the purported “determinate core” of 
control rights (see Part 2.2.2.1, below). They simply say “(on the issue of indeterminacy, see Fried [2004, 2005] 
and Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka [2005])”. Vallentyne, Steiner and Otsuka (2005, 205) make exactly the 
same concession about the indeterminacy that plagues enforcement and immunity rights (they correctly add the 
further concession that this uncertainty also plagues rights to compensation for violations, too), but go onto 
claim that there is a significant determinate core to the notion of self-ownership (ibid 205–06). As I discuss 
below, this claim is implausible, and Fried’s reply to Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka demonstrates this (see 
also Fried 2004, pt. II, 2012).  
6 The power of initial acquisition is typically (at least on Lockean theories) conditioned by an interaction 
requirement (the person must be the first to discover the resource, or “mix” their labour with it) (Vallentyne 
and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 2). On some views, this interaction constraint is thought to be a more onerous 
‘efficiency’ constraint, requiring ongoing productive use of the land or object, as Locke seemed to envisage 
(1967 [c.1679], secs. 34–51). Libertarians disagree over the other conditions and constraints on this power to 
acquire unowned things, including the interpretation of the ‘Lockean Proviso’ that the acquisition must leave 
“enough, and as good” for others (Locke, 1967 [c.1679], secs. 27, 33) (Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, 
sec. 2).   
7 See the previous footnote. 
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ownership rights extends to those things. The resulting distribution of property is said to be 
just insofar as it has been justly acquired and transferred. In this way, persons become entitled 
to their “holdings” of things in virtue of the just processes of acquisition and transfer by 
which they came about (Nozick 1974, 150–51).  
From these “full” self-ownership and thing-ownership rights, individuals purportedly enjoy 
strong protections from external interference. Since individuals justly acquire full private 
ownership rights over themselves and over the things they justly hold (by just initial 
acquisition or just transfer), other persons cannot interfere with those rights without the first 
person’s explicit consent.8 Property rights thus serve to demarcate a system of absolute 
boundaries, within which rights-holders are absolutely free to do as they please (without 
violating others’ boundaries), and which absolutely restricts others from crossing them 
(absent explicit consent) (see Mack 2018, sec. 2.4). By implication, governments cannot 
generally so interfere (Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 4). Accordingly, laws—and 
hence legal changes—that have not been explicitly consented to are generally unjustified.9 
Given the extensive conception of property rights envisaged by natural property rights 
theories, it follows that legal transitions are impermissible not only to the extent that they 
adversely affect the value of what laypersons tend to think of as property (e.g. ownership of 
physical assets such as land and buildings), but also the value of one’s skillset and other 
intangible assets (see, e.g., Nozick 1974, chap. 7). Indeed, so extensive are the individual 
property rights claimed by libertarians that there is little if any scope left for justifiable 
collective action at all (Nozick 1974, 166, 270). Insofar as there is scope for collective action, 
laws would have to be drafted so that they did not extend beyond it, i.e. so that they did not 
infringe existing property rights. The full grandfathering of otherwise-affected property 
rights would therefore seem to be the only conservative remedy that could satisfy libertarian 
                                                 
8 This is one of Nozick’s positions on the nature of the rights—the one he invokes explicitly or implicitly in the 
Preface (p. ix), and in Chapters 3 (pp. 30–31, 34), 5 (p. 95) and 7 (p. 171) of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) 
(hereafter ‘ASU’) (see Fried 2012; Mack 2018, sec. 2.4). 
9 The use of the qualifier “generally” in this sentence alludes to some exceptions, which are more or less 
extensive depending on the specific libertarian theory (Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, secs. 3, 4). 
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side constraints on state law-making (I explore grandfathering and its connection to natural 
property rights theories in Chapter 9.2.1). 
2.2.2 Critique 
2.2.2.1 Indeterminacy and plausibility objections 
Libertarian natural property rights theories are subject to two sources of uncertainty, the first 
of which is conceptual (and which relates also to an issue of conceptual plausibility) and the 
second of which is contingent but empirically ubiquitous in the real world.  
The conceptual indeterminacy stems from the fact that the central concept of ownership is 
itself indeterminate (desideratum #II). Libertarians assume that one can logically deduce 
from natural property rights “particular rights over particular things held by particular 
persons” (Nozick 1974, 238); that “one can derive from the abstract principle of ‘self-
ownership’ a detailed regime of unqualified rights over one’s self and one’s product” (Fried 
2004, 75). Fried, drawing on the insights of legal realists Holmes (1895) and Hohfeld (1914, 
1917), and on the social cost analysis of Coase (1960), highlights the inescapable fact that 
“[a]ll property rights necessarily infringe the liberties of others, as all entail reciprocal 
burdens on others, and in a world of scarcity, such burdens are often substantial” (Fried 2004, 
74). Therefore, “in enlarging any one party’s formal powers, we necessarily diminish 
everyone else’s” (ibid 73).  
No wonder, then, that self-ownership is indeterminate. The claim that self-ownership implies 
“full” liberal ownership (see Part 2.2.1, above), or at least a determinate “core” of control 
rights, is false. Natural rights theorists appeal to intuitions about easy cases such as forced 
eyeball transfers and unmotivated stabbings, about which no-one would disagree (see, e.g., 
Nozick 1974, 171; Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005, 206). Once we get to hard cases 
that are ubiquitous in the real world, self-ownership is revealed to say nothing about where 
entitlements lie and what kind of protection from interference they entail (Fried 2004, 79–
82). For example, Fried asks, rhetorically (2004, 78): “Suppose I stand two feet from you and 
blow smoke in your face. Or suppose I imitate your voice in a commercial, passing myself 
off as you. Have I coercively interfered with your right to control your body?” Self-ownership 
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entails no answer to these and infinite other examples from social intercourse in any complex 
society. What self-ownership entails for the ownership of things is no less indeterminate and 
even more controversial, even among libertarians themselves (see Fried 2004, 82–84; 
Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014, sec. 2). Natural property rights theories therefore fail 
the determinacy condition of a good principle/theory of legal transitions (desideratum #2) by 
importing an indeterminate concept (desideratum #II). 
At a deeper level, there is something suspect about the idea of persons owning themselves. 
If ownership is a bundle of rights held by a person in relation to things, then self-ownership 
seems to be a contradiction in terms, at least on an ordinary understanding of what it is to be 
a self. It turns out that Locke himself had no ordinary understanding of what it is to be a self. 
Rather, Locke has a Cartesian-like dual model of the self, in which the self is essentially a 
non-physical “consciousness”, self-awareness or sentience (Locke 1959 [c.1690], II.xxvii.11, 
16ff; Taylor 1989, 49, 172–73). This mysterious entity is capable of taking a detached, 
instrumental stance toward its body and its own desires: through self-discipline it can come 
to fashion its desires at will in order to bring about the best results, pleasure, or happiness 
(1959 [c.1690], II.xxi.71; Taylor 1989, 171). Something like this Lockean “punctual self” 
(Taylor 1989, 171) seems like a necessary ontological supposition to render the idea of self-
ownership coherent: an essential self (consciousness) can in principle own its contingent self 
(body, tastes, etc.). But this would be a costly move, importing as it does an ontological claim 
of dubious plausibility into a theory of legal transitions (desideratum #5). Contemporary 
theorists who wish to invoke such an unusual and counterintuitive conception of the self 
should bear the heavy burden of motivating and justifying it.  
The contingent source of indeterminacy in natural property rights theories stems from the 
practical impossibility of tracing existing normative entitlements through to their historically 
rightful first appropriators and administering the necessary rectification. For one thing, the 
Lockean first appropriation story has to be literally true (Waldron 2016a, sec. 4), as even 
Nozick acknowledged (1974, 151–52). Yet the Lockean account was highly controversial at 
the time, and seems unlikely to have been true in many countries (Waldron 2012, 28–33, 38–
39). But even if we ignore all these objections—even if we assume that natural rights confer 
45 
 
determinate ownership upon first possessors and subsequent transferees and that there was 
in fact a clearly identified and uncontested first possessor of all property—clearly there have 
been countless unjust interferences throughout history that demand rectification (ibid 32). 
Applying this problem to legal transitions, even if one was otherwise persuaded that the 
correct transitional theory is not to violate natural property rights, one could not assume that 
current resource owners were the rightful owners, according to one’s favoured historical 
entitlement theory. The epistemic burden being insurmountable, the concept of natural 
property rights fails the epistemic accessibility desideratum on concepts (#V)—and therefore 
the determinacy desideratum on principles and theories (#2) of which that concept is an 
element, as with Lockean natural property rights theories.  
But let’s be incredibly generous and assume for the sake of argument that these 
indeterminacy and plausibility worries could be overcome and that natural property rights 
libertarianism determinately specifies the existing distribution of actual, legal property, 
implying a conservative theory of legal transitions. We might call this position “everyday 
libertarianism” (cf. Murphy and Nagel 2002, 15, 31–37). Still, two further objections would 
plague the theory, both of which appeal to the counterintuitive implications of everyday-
libertarian property rights theories of legal transitions.  
2.2.2.2 The ‘too much’ objection 
To illuminate these objections, let us posit the following condition pertaining to the ‘currency’ 
of loss/gain that is used in a theory of legal transitions, which I shall call the “correspondence 
condition”: a currency of loss/gain should correspond to the normative significance of losses 
and gains to the relevant agents. When losses (and gains10) are tallied in terms of natural 
property rights violations, I will argue, the correspondence condition is violated because, 
relative to widespread intuitions, this currency (i) in some respects counts too many things 
as losses, or at least accords many of those losses excessive moral weight, and (ii) in other 
                                                 
10 Changing the law to benefit some person (other than where the benefit is the person’s rightful historical 
entitlement according to the relevant theory) would not be permissible on a libertarian theory, so the idea of 
‘gains’ becomes irrelevant. Hence I will focus solely on losses. 
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respects counts too few things as losses, or accords them insufficient moral weight. I will call 
these the “too much objection” and the “too little objection”, respectively, and develop them 
in this order. 
To appreciate the too much objection, let us note two key features of natural property rights 
theories. First, as discussed in Part 2.2.1, such theories impose absolute side-constraints on 
others’ actions; they impose strict obligations never to cross another’s property boundaries, 
absent explicit consent. Second, all such boundary-crossings count as equally impermissible 
and wrong. Nozick (1974, 75) captures the latter feature when he writes that the natural rights 
tradition with which he identifies “holds that stealing a penny or a pin or anything from 
someone violates his rights. That tradition does not select a threshold measure of harm as a 
lower limit …” (Nozick 1974, 75, emphasis in original). More specifically, natural property 
rights theories provide no basis for distinguishing among property rights violations on 
account of their significance for the agent whose property boundaries are crossed (Railton 
2003, 189; Sobel 2012, 34, 2013, 100). It follows that causing a trivial amount of pollution 
that adversely affected someone in a real but incredibly small way—even if the ‘victim’ knew 
about and was unconcerned with it—would count as a property rights violation of equal 
gravity to non-consensually removing the person’s spare kidney (Sobel 2012, 36). Such 
theories, then, “conflate cases on the trivial end of the spectrum and on the serious end and 
treat them as if they were equally morally important” (Sobel 2013, 103). This “conflation 
problem” (Sobel 2013) is enough to violate my correspondence condition for a currency of 
loss/gain. When combined with the first-mentioned feature of natural property rights 
theories—their absolute stringency—the conflation problem turns trivial infringements into 
grave ones, with wildly counterintuitive implications for normatively permissible conduct 
(Sobel 2013, 104, 2018, 125–26). Both Railton (2003, 190–94) and Sobel (2012, 35–36, 2013, 
109) have demonstrated the vast extent of this problem in light of basic facts about 
environmental externalities that are ubiquitous in a modern economy. Applying libertarian 
natural rights property theories would, Sobel notes, effectively “make a wide range of 
industry and transportation impermissible, perhaps even most uses of fire” (Sobel 2012, 36).  
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My argument is simply that the same kinds of wildly counterintuitive implications follow 
from the application of such theories to the realm of legal transitions. A law that dispossessed 
a poor person from her home would count that person’s loss as being of equal normative 
significance to the ‘loss’ experienced by a billionaire agriculturalist when a law restricts the 
amount of land-clearing he can undertake on his vast agricultural estates. By counting the 
latter as a loss of the same magnitude as the former, libertarian natural property rights theories 
greatly over-value the significance of many losses. This alone makes such theories 
problematic, violating as it does my “correspondence condition”. But libertarian natural 
property rights theories do more than that: as noted above, legal changes instantiating any 
such loss would simply be morally impermissible. Of course, libertarians may well welcome 
that conclusion on the face of it, but the problems of trivial harms and the resulting (illiberal) 
paralysis that would seem to prevail in the absence of state regulation, discussed above, 
should give them pause. Reflection on such paralysis helps to motivate the empirical claim 
that legal institutions actually enable the economic activities of a modern industrial economy 
(Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; Friedman 1962, 26, 162; Murphy and Nagel 2002, 32–33; 
de Soto 2001).  
As it happens, when confronted with trivial infringement cases many libertarians abandon or 
diminish their natural property rights-based theories at a more fundamental level of the theory 
(i.e. well before thinking about legal transitions), and in so doing can avoid some of the 
‘impermissibility’ implications just mentioned. Revealingly, those libertarians who have 
grappled with this issue of trivial infringements (Nozick 1974, chap. 4; Otsuka 2003; 
Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005, 206–7) have conceded that the issue is a problem for 
natural property rights theories (see Sobel 2012, 37–38, 59). They have attempted to develop 
responses to it, but each such attempt involves backing away from the foundational 
commitment to full self-ownership in a way that either abandons it altogether (at least 
selectively) or deepens concerns about its determinacy (Fried 2005, 2012, Sobel 2012, 2013, 
2018). Let us consider here only Nozick’s attempt, since it is probably the most influential, 
and since it affords me the opportunity to draw some connections between (what start out as) 
natural property rights theories and welfarist theories discussed later in this chapter and in 
Chapter 3.  
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Nozick was sufficiently aware of the problem of trivial infringements and concerned about 
its implications that he spent considerable effort grappling with them (1974, chap. 4). Nozick 
ultimately seems11 to endorse the position that non-consensual property rights boundary-
crossings (by any other agent) are not rights infringements (hence are permissible) provided 
that adequate ex post compensation is actually paid to the rights-holder, where adequate 
compensation means at least that which is sufficient to leave the rights-holder indifferent by 
her own lights as between non-infringement and infringement-plus-compensation (Nozick 
1974, 57, 71–73).12 As critics have noted, this move by Nozick amounts to abandoning the 
idea that individuals have property rights in themselves and their holdings (what lawyers call 
a “property rule”) and substituting for it a “liability rule”, thus rendering his entire theory of 
rights incoherent (Fried 2012; Mack 2018, sec. 2.4; Sobel 2012, 38–40). For one thing, 
understanding rights as liability rules implies that the foundation of rights is welfarist: what 
matters ultimately is not the maintenance of individuals’ natural property rights (which, once 
the move to a liability rule is made, turn out to be chimerical), but rather the maintenance of 
individuals’ welfare or utility, i.e. not causing people to fall to a lower indifference curve. If 
that is so, then property rights are not ultimately valuable after all: they are at best 
instrumentally valuable to individual welfare. Yet, it is difficult to motivate and justify 
libertarian conclusions in general on the basis of welfarist theories. But for my purposes, 
what matters is that welfarist theories certainly can’t justify the ultra-conservative 
conclusions about legal transitions on which libertarians tend to converge (see below Parts 
2.3 and 3).  
                                                 
11 Nozick’s official position is unclear from the relevant sections of ASU (1974, chap. 4). Sobel (2012, 38, fn 
19) argues persuasively that the view I attribute to Nozick in this paragraph is the best reading. Mack also 
attributes this position to Nozick and explains why Nozick needs to make this move for his argument for a 
minimal state (contra the Individualist Anarchist) to succeed (Mack 2018, sec. 2.4, 3.2). In any case, I am less 
interested in precisely what Nozick thought than in an exposition of potential natural rights property theories 
and their implications for legal transitions. 
12 I say “at least” because actually Nozick thinks compensation that would merely leave the person indifferent 
would allow the boundary-crosser to appropriate all of the gains from the exchange, and so he thinks that the 
first-best position is to allow actual negotiations over compensation to take place (1974, 63–65).  
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2.2.2.3 The ‘too little’ objection 
The “too little” objection to using natural property rights as a currency of loss/gain follows 
from the fact that there are many things that intuitively should count as losses but do not 
amount to natural property rights boundary crossings (or do not do so without exacerbating 
the indeterminacy problem).13 Consider three classes of case.14 
The first involves certain kinds of impositions of risks of harm to a person—specifically, 
cases “where there is no actual physical change produced in a person or his property by an 
activity that nonetheless raises the probability he will suffer wrongful harm” (Railton 2003, 
193). Railton gives the example of your neighbour operating an unsafe miniature nuclear 
fission reactor on his property, unbeknown to you, but that happens to result in no harm to 
you (ibid 193–94). We could easily transpose this example to state legislative activity, such 
as passing a new law permitting nuclear power generation near your property (again, let’s 
assume for the sake of simplicity that you don’t know about it—maybe it’s far enough away 
to be unknown to you but close enough to impose a serious risk). At least some such risks—
those sufficiently large in terms of their magnitude and probability—do seem like they ought 
to count as losses.15 Such losses can be conceptualised as losses of security of some valued 
good16 and we should be concerned if a moral or political theory (including a theory of legal 
change) ignored their imposition in its evaluations and prescriptions (Herington 2017; John 
2011; Railton 2003, 200–202; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 3).  
                                                 
13 By saying that there are things that intuitively count as losses, I am not committing to the further thesis that 
such losses should be remedied. I merely mean that in the moral ‘accounting’ that goes into the state’s 
transitional responses, such losses must be counted. 
14 These classes of case clearly overlap. For example, the third (economic competition) could potentially be 
assimilated to the first (risk/insecurity) or the second (psychological effects) categories. But I think they are 
sufficiently distinctive and illustrative of the concerns to be worthy of separate discussion. 
15 Railton (2003, 200–203) argues convincingly that natural property right theorists themselves have good 
reasons (i.e. they have good Lockean and Kantian reasons) to take such risks seriously, and yet doing so greatly 
complicates the standard Lockean assumption that one has absolute freedom within one’s boundaries so long 
as one doesn’t cross another’s boundary. Nozick concedes that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a principled way in 
which the natural‐rights tradition can draw the line to fix which probabilities impose unacceptably great risks 
upon others” (1974, 75). 
16 The force of the present point does not depend on conceptualising the valued good in terms of any particular 
‘currency’, though I will later go onto endorse a ‘functionings’ currency (see Chapter 6.3). 
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A second class of cases involves psychological (or ‘psycho-social’ or ‘symbolic’ harms), 
such as causing someone to experience sadness, anxiety, depression, disappointment, 
disrespect or offence; insulting someone; libelling or defaming someone; passing oneself off 
as someone; diminishing someone’s social status, and so on. It seems plausible that at least 
some of these should count as losses for the purposes of moral and political (including legal 
transitions) theorising. Yet it is not clear whether, on a natural property rights theory, they 
would.17 If they do not, then they provide further evidence in support of the “too little” 
objection to such theories. But perhaps they do; perhaps self-ownership entails the right not 
to have any other person diminish your psychological state (or similar). But if this is so, then 
such theories are all the more vulnerable to the “too much” objection, since all such violations 
would (i) count as equally bad and (ii) be impermissible, with consequently even more 
stultifying restrictions on everyone’s freedom of action (for further discussion see Railton 
2003, 204–206). 
A third class of cases involves a loss of a flow—or, more specifically, a loss of an expected 
flow—such as a stream of income or profits.18 Economic competition is perhaps the clearest 
example here: does shopkeeper A incur a loss when shopkeeper B sets up in competition 
down the road (on B’s land) and customers voluntarily switch their loyalty from A to B, 
causing A to lose income? It seems at least plausible to consider counting expected flows as 
something that can be lost—certainly we do in everyday language, when we speak of the 
unemployed person’s ‘lost income’ or the shrinking business’ ‘lost profits’. Yet since no 
property boundary is obviously crossed, the natural property rights theorist would 
presumably deny that this is a loss. But this, again, may be too fast, since it appeals only to 
physical property boundaries (that is, it takes the boundary metaphor literally). Libertarians, 
                                                 
17 Nozick says, in a somewhat question-begging way, that “Not every act that produces lower utility for others 
generally may be forbidden; it must cross the boundary of others’ rights for the question of its prohibition to 
even arise” (1974, 67). Yet he is also concerned about the consequences of permitting compensation for non-
consensual boundary-crossings for people’s fears (ibid 65–71). For discussion of the alternative positions the 
natural property rights theorist could take, both of which seem open, see Railton (2003, 204–207) and Sobel 
(2012, 44–45). In fact, these kinds of cases really just underscore the indeterminacy objection: see, e.g. Fried’s 
example of ‘passing off’ and her surrounding discussion (2004, 79). 
18 I say “expected” flow, since once an income stream is banked it becomes part of one’s stock of assets, just as 
does the rain that falls into my dam. 
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as we have seen, are typically wont to extend property boundaries into the intangible realm, 
as any modern economy must. Indeed, as Jonathan Wolff (2006, 1616–19) points out, if first 
appropriation on a natural property rights view yields absolute property in land, why not also 
in spheres of economic activity and hence flows of income (as with feudal, pure-monopolistic 
economic systems) or ideas (as with intellectual property, a partially-monopolistic system)? 
So perhaps loss of expected flows are private property rights violations, after all. But then 
we would have to add ‘economic activity’ to the list of items on our “too much” objection, 
since it would imply (ironically) that natural rights libertarianism rules out all economic 
competition (Wolff 2006). At the very least, we seem to be up to our necks in the 
indeterminacy problem.  
In conclusion, libertarian natural property rights theories face an implausibility–incoherence–
indeterminacy trilemma: purportedly determinate specifications of such theories yield 
profoundly counterintuitive implications that even libertarians themselves concede are 
troubling (implausibility19), forcing them to retreat from those implications by either making 
ad hoc modifications to their theories, which inflate underlying concerns about the theories’ 
determinacy (indeterminacy), or by appealing to non-libertarian values and principles 
(incoherence). 
2.2.3 Libertarian compensation? 
It is worth exploring briefly the potential of libertarian arguments to support a somewhat 
weaker, but still quite conservative position on legal transitions: that legal transitions may 
permissibly occur despite crossing natural property boundaries, provided compensation is 
paid as a remedy.  
One such version of this position is opened up by the Nozickian retreat to a liability rule 
theory of rights, discussed earlier (Sobel calls this position “cross and compensate”: 2012, 
38). Relevantly for our purposes, this position would seem also to licence state infringements 
of one’s property (however grave) provided full compensation is paid to the rights-holder 
                                                 
19 By which I really mean, in this instance, (highly) counter-intuitive (i.e. desideratum #3, not #5). 
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(call this “state cross and compensate”).20 I have already pointed out that such a move is 
incoherent with natural property rights (and in Nozick’s case inconsistent with positions held 
in other parts of ASU). But let us set aside for now that more foundational worry (including 
the Nozick-specific version) and treat ‘state cross and compensate’ as a genuine, albeit 
‘second-best’ libertarian position on legal transitions, and focus instead on its implications.  
What state cross and compensate amounts to is something similar to a Pareto Efficiency 
theory of legal transitions (the concept of Pareto efficiency is explained in Chapter 3.2).21 
Such a position is not nearly as conservative as natural property rights libertarianism. This is 
because Paretian welfarist views would permit government actions to which individuals do 
not consent, provided full compensation (that which is necessary to restore that agent’s 
previous level of utility) is paid. First, this would permit paternalist laws that actually make 
individuals better off (Mack 2018, sec. 2.4). Second, it would permit theoretically unlimited 
state interventions that disrupt people’s chosen ends (goals, plans, projects, relationships 
etc.), provided full compensation is paid22—a result that should trouble libertarians (see, e.g., 
Nozick’s discussion of the value of long-term planning in ensuring the meaningfulness and 
coherence of people’s lives: 1974, 49–50). That said, in other respects the Paretian position 
on legal transitions remains extremely—and in my view, excessively—conservative. It 
would, for example, require the state to fully compensate oil companies for mitigating climate 
change, billionaires for redistributing a tiny fraction of their wealth, and monopolists for 
tightening competition (antitrust) regulation (I submit these all violate desideratum #3).  
A different libertarian position on compensation, which also sits awkwardly between natural 
property rights libertarianism and welfarism, is that of US legal scholar Richard Epstein. 
                                                 
20 Sobel notes that “Nozick’s thought is not the relatively mundane idea that if others have already crossed our 
boundaries, they owe us compensation. Rather his thought is that one may permissibly prospectively plan to 
and succeed in crossing the boundaries of someone’s legitimate property without her consent provided 
compensation is paid” (2012, 38–39, footnote omitted). 
21 I say “similar to” because Pareto efficiency theories deal in the money value of preferences (“Willingness to 
Accept”), not preferences per se (i.e. a preference-satisfaction theory of welfare), which leaves the former more 
hostage to resource inequalities (see Chapter 3.4.3.1). 
22 I explain why this is so and why it is problematic (drawing on Goodin 1989) in my discussion of compensation 
in Chapter 9.2.2.3 (see also Chapter 3.4.4). 
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Epstein provides a normative political-theoretic interpretation of the ‘takings’ clause of the 
5th Amendment to the US Constitution (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation”). In his first and most famous treatise on this topic, Takings 
(1985), Epstein purports to derive a conservative approach to takings from Lockean natural 
property rights foundations. Takings mixes utilitarian with natural rights claims (ibid 5, 11), 
but subsequently Epstein came to defend his theory on rule-utilitarian grounds.23 In this later 
view, 24  Epstein argues that the Lockean natural rights of life, liberty and property are 
grounded in the imperative to maximise utility. In particular, utilitarian considerations are 
said to ground (i) the rule that first possession confers title, via the empirical claim that such 
a rule minimises conflict over scare resources, and (ii) the absolute strength of the relevant 
bundle of property rights, via the empirical claim that qualifications of property rights would 
lead to uncertainty and hence socially wasteful disputation, which undermines utility (Epstein 
1986a, 258–59, 1989, 730–37, 1993, 25–38, 1995, 59–63). The only threat to utility that 
Epstein admits, once initial acquisitions have been settled, is the resulting inability to solve 
collective action problems (and related inefficiency problems), and so Epstein allows that 
resolving such problems is a “public use” for which the state may legitimately take private 
property (Epstein 1985, 5, 1986b, 4–5).25 But this state power, argues Epstein, creates a 
further risk of utility drain: from “rent-seeking” behaviour (Epstein 1986b, 13–14, 17–18). 
His response is to restrict legitimate public takings to those that create a social surplus and to 
require that that surplus be divided (as compensation) among existing property holders in 
proportion to their existing property holdings (Epstein 1986b, 13–14).  
In terms of institutional conclusions about legal transitions, Epstein’s position leaves him 
somewhere in between the conclusions (and stultifying, ultra-conservative implications) of 
genuine natural rights property theories and the conclusions (and slightly less stultifying, but 
still very conservative implications) of liability rule theories. Accordingly, my above 
                                                 
23 See especially Epstein (1986a, 256–58) and Epstein’s other works cited in this paragraph.  
24 My summary of Epstein’s views here draws on Wenar’s summary (Wenar 1997, 1935–38). 
25 It is the only legitimate use, according to Epstein, other than the state’s “police power”, of which he gives a 
very narrow interpretation (Epstein 1985, 5, 15–16, 1986b, 11–12). 
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criticisms of those views (in light of their implications) apply mutatis mutandis to Epstein’s 
conclusions. 
In terms of its normative foundations, Epstein’s position sits somewhere in between natural 
rights property theories and utilitarianism, and this leaves him exposed to the implausibility–
incoherence–indeterminacy trilemma outlined earlier. If property rights are natural, then 
Epstein has no grounds for permitting the state to alter property rights even in order to solve 
collective action problems. The Epstein of Takings holds an agency conception of the state, 
according to which the state can hold no rights beyond those endowed to it by, and hence 
originally held by, its citizens (1985, 12–18, 331). However, as Wenar points out, individuals 
in the state of nature could not have acquired the kind of third-order power to non-
consensually alter other people’s second-order powers to transfer their property,26 so the state 
(on the agency view) could not be endowed with such powers, either (Wenar 1997, 1940). 
Epstein would have to accept the ultra-conservative implication that the state has no power 
at all to alter anyone’s property rights (not even to solve collective action problems) or he 
would have to abandon natural rights foundationalism. As we have noted, he chose the latter 
course, embracing utilitarian foundations to support his very conservative conclusion. But 
now his very conservative conclusion is hostage to fortune, and faces irresistible pressure 
from the other direction, for it is patently implausible as an empirical generality that 
utilitarianism would entail a very conservative approach to legal transitions of the kind 
Epstein advocates (or anything close to it). At least, it is implausible to think it would do so 
in any currently existing society, and certainly one in which property rights are so grossly 
unequally distributed as the contemporary United States in which Epstein is writing. To see 
why this is so, we must move to the second kind of property rights theory, of which Epstein—
and “consequentialist libertarianism” more generally (see Wolff 2006, 1605–6)—is but a 
token instance. 
                                                 
26 How could one plausibly “appropriate” such a right naturally? Nor would such an appropriation be plausible 
on a utilitarian-foundationalist approach to state-of-nature rights: what could create more utility-sapping 
uncertainty in the state of nature than having such a third-order power over others’ second-order powers?! 
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2.3 CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONVENTIONAL–INSTRUMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORIES 
Other theories within the liberty tradition—those more closely associated with 18th and 19th 
century classical liberalism and their 20th century heirs—do not take private property to be a 
natural, morally basic right that is non-instrumentally valuable (nor do they rely on any notion 
of self-ownership). Rather, they tend to conceive of property rights as conventional and to 
place a special value on private property for instrumental reasons (Freeman 2011, 33–35). 
Here we may distinguish between instrumental reasons pertaining directly to the individual 
property holder, such as enhancing the individual’s negative liberty, security, or utility,27 and 
instrumental reasons pertaining to the collective good, from which (at least some) individuals 
derive benefit in a less direct way. Among the latter category are arguments about the value 
of a system of private property for social stability, social coordination, decentralisation, 
efficiency, and aggregate utility.28 
Importantly for our purposes, instrumental arguments for private property are hostage to 
fortune; they hold only to the extent that they actually promote the ultimate value to which 
they are purportedly instrumental. The individual benefits of property accrue only to those 
individuals who hold it and only to the extent of their holdings, and the collective benefits of 
property are correspondingly limited by its particular distribution in a given society (Waldron 
2016a, sec. 5). To the extent that property provides its holders with individual benefits, a pro 
tanto case for a more egalitarian, or at least sufficientarian, distribution of property arises, so 
that all persons may enjoy its putative individual benefits (Waldron 1988, 408–15, 444). And 
to the extent that arguments for collective benefits such as stability, efficiency, utility and 
democracy trade on the aggregation of individual benefits, a more egalitarian or 
                                                 
27 I mention here only values that tend to be emphasised by classical liberals. Writers in other traditions have 
pointed to various other values-to-individual-holders to which their private property is instrumental, including 
positive and effective conceptions of liberty, wellbeing, and flourishing (see, e.g., Waldron 1988, chap. 8, 
2016a, sec. 2). 
28  Again, other traditions emphasise other collective benefits. Most notably, the Republican tradition 
emphasises the benefits of private property for democracy and the independence of the state (see, e.g., Sunstein 
1992, 914–16). 
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sufficientarian distribution of property would, all else equal, better promote those 
outcomes.29 At least, no such redistribution can be ruled out a priori.  
What the advocate of an instrumental property theory of legal transitions must weigh against 
these redistributive pressures are the adverse implications of the redistribution for one’s 
favoured ultimate value—be it for the individual or for the collective. What the would-be 
conservative theorist of legal transitions needs, then, is a further argument in favour of the 
current conventional or legal distribution of property that is sufficiently weighty to defeat 
the pro tanto case for egalitarian (or sufficientarian) redistribution. In the remainder of this 
section, I want to explore what I think is the most explicit and thoroughly argued case that 
has been made in the classical liberal tradition for a conservative theory of legal transitions 
based on the instrumental value of property—the indirect utilitarian argument of Jeremy 
Bentham.30  
2.3.1 Exposition: Bentham’s conservative theory of legal transitions 
Influenced by the empiricism of the scientific revolution, Bentham’s moral and political 
theory is built upon a naturalistic concern with the maximisation of pleasure over pains (see 
Crimmins 2017, sec. 2). This imperative to avoid pain led Bentham straightforwardly to a 
concern with the value of bodily integrity and hence physical security. Yet he did not view 
human beings as mere vessels of transient sensory experience. Rather, central to Bentham’s 
conception of the person was the notion that individuals are temporally-extended beings with 
future goals, plans and expectations, and a desire to connect these coherently with their past 
(1838–43, I, “Principles of the Civil Code”, 308). Bentham thought that security was so 
important because these links between one’s present and future self provide a basis for the 
formation of one’s interests (ibid 308). Private property is then valuable partly because it 
provides individuals with the stability and security they need to carry out their life plans and 
                                                 
29 Indeed, some scholars, especially those in the republican and liberal-egalitarian traditions, invoke these 
benefits precisely in order to argue for some such redistribution (Claassen 2015, 226–27; Freeman 2011, 33; 
Mill 2006 [1848], II.i.3, 223, 225; O’Neill and Williamson 2012; Rawls 2001a, 114; Sunstein 1992, 917; 
Waldron 1988). 
30  As Freeman points out, classical liberal arguments for relatively free market capitalism are commonly 
couched and justified in indirect-utilitarian terms (2011, 23 [and fn 5], 25). 
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hence live coherent lives (ibid 305–312). Ensuring that people enjoyed such security, 
Bentham believed, was a central objective of the state (see Kelly 1990, chap. 4). Bentham 
also assumed the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. He therefore recognised that, all else 
equal, the greatest happiness will be produced by an equal distribution of goods (Bentham 
1838–43, I, “Principles of the Civil Code”, 305; 1840, I, 103–9).  
Yet Bentham believed that the disutility caused by changing hitherto legally sanctioned 
distributions of property was so strong that he endorsed a highly conservative approach to 
legal transitions (Brown 2017a, 437–38). How does Bentham arrive at this conclusion? 
Part of the answer lies in the disutility experienced by individuals who lose their property. 
Bentham thought that the “four basic conditions of personal continuity and coherence, 
namely, person, possessions, condition in life and reputation are all modifications of property” 
(Kelly 1989, 78). Let us focus briefly on “possessions”. Bentham thought that wealth and 
other physical possessions were the material conditions of interest formation and the basic 
focus of one’s expectations (Kelly 1989, 78–79). When we possess things, Bentham argued, 
we not only come to treat them as our own and so vest them with a special kind of value, but 
we also infuse in them our expectations about the future (Bentham 1838–43, I, “Principles 
of the Civil Code”, 307–10). Accordingly, when we lose our property we experience not only 
the pain of losing the relevant thing itself, but also a sui generis kind of acute pain in the form 
of disappointment at the frustration of our expectations (1838–43, I, “Principles of the Civil 
Code”, 309–10; II, “Supply without Burden”, 590; III, “Equity Dispatch Proposal”, 312; V, 
“A Commentary on Mr Humphrey’s Real Property Code”, 416).31 This disutility had to be 
weighed on the utilitarian scales against the benefits of redistributing property to others. 
Still, to justify placing so much weight on the disutility plate of the utilitarian scales as to 
imply a conservative theory of legal transitions, Bentham had to appeal to something more 
than the psychological pains of individual property owners who lose their property. Here it 
                                                 
31  This “expectation effect” (Brown 2017b, 164) has more recently been identified experimentally by 
psychologists and behavioural economists (Beggan 1992; Koszegi and Rabin 2006). 
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is necessary to understand Bentham’s views about the aggregate effects of a stable property 
system.  
Bentham thought that expectations have a social dimension that links them to the rule of 
law.32 The utility individuals gain from carrying out their long-term projects is dependent 
upon social conditions that are sufficiently stable to permit social coordination and the 
expectations associated with it (Kelly 1989, 69). Accordingly, our expectations are 
themselves necessarily shaped by our social context, important among which are the informal 
sanctions of public opinion that attend social conventions and the formal sanctions and 
rewards that attend laws (Crimmins 2017, sec. 3.1). For Bentham, then, “social interaction 
and therefore social well-being depend upon the existence of rules and norms which give rise 
to expectations and expectation utilities” (Kelly 1989, 69). Bentham thought that law plays 
a particularly powerful role in shaping the content, strength and longevity of people’s 
expectations: “expectation, as far as the law can be kept present to men’s minds, follows with 
undeviating obsequiousness the finger of the law” (Bentham 1838–43, II, “Supply Without 
Burden”, 589). It is their underpinning in law, then, that Bentham takes to warrant or 
legitimise those expectations (Brown 2017a, 437–38).  
Because of the close connections between law, property, and the systemic conditions of social 
coordination, Bentham thought that stripping some people of their property by changing the 
law would bread systemic insecurity (Bentham 1838–43, I, “Principles of the Civil Code”, 
311–12). “The legislator”, thought Bentham, “owes the greatest respect to these expectations 
to which he has given birth: when he does not interfere with them, he does all that is essential 
to the happiness of society; when he injures them, he always produces a proportionate sum 
of evil” (ibid 309). He continues: “if property were overthrown with the direct intention of 
establishing equality of fortune, the evil would be irreparable: no more security—no more 
industry—no more abundance; society would relapse into the savage state from which it has 
arisen” (ibid 312). These considerations led Bentham to propose the “disappointment 
                                                 
32 My discussion of Bentham’s approach to legal transitions is indebted to Alex Brown (2017a, 437–40, 2017b, 
54–57, 161–64). 
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prevention principle”, according to which security of expectations takes precedence over all 
other ends (including redistribution), except when the public interest manifestly requires 
otherwise (1838–43, III, “Equity Dispatch Proposal”, 312; V, “A Commentary on Mr 
Humphrey’s Real Property Code”, 416). This meant that property rights should be conserved 
in all but extreme circumstances; normal legal reforms should be done in ways that avoid 
upsetting expectations (Crimmins 2017, secs. 4.1, 6). 
2.3.2 Critique of Bentham’s argument 
What are we to make of Bentham’s argument? As Bentham scholars have noted, there are 
obvious tensions in Bentham’s oeuvre between the utilitarian reformative strand and the 
classical liberal conservative strand of his thought (Crimmins 1996). Sociological and (as 
noted in Chapter 1.2) historical-political reasons might go some way to explaining the tension 
(Crimmins 1996; Kelly 1989, 79). In any case, transmuted to the empirical reality of 
contemporary societies, Bentham’s argument for a conservative theory of legal transitions is 
unpersuasive.33  In contemporary capitalist societies in which many barely subsist while 
others are multibillionaires, no self-respecting utilitarian could claim that a significant degree 
of redistribution would be ruled out a priori on utilitarian grounds. Let us accept for a 
moment that, as per Bentham, hedonism is the correct conception of utility. Granted, this 
supposition would make Bentham’s argument somewhat less implausible, since people’s 
desires and expectations are to a great extent shaped by their histories. The magnitude of 
disappointment felt by the miserly landlord who loses his mansion might well be greater than 
the measure of happiness gained by the pauper when gifted a modest lodgement. But how 
far, really, can this be pushed, even on a hedonistic theory of utility? If a modest wealth tax 
forced a few billionaires to sell their unused luxury yachts, and the proceeds enabled 
thousands of starving people to eat, surely the utility gains of the latter would outweigh the 
losses of the former. The notion, moreover, that such redistributive transfers would induce 
                                                 
33  There are also internal conflicts within Bentham’s account. One problem, identified by Brown, is that 
Bentham unduly privileges the law-based aspect of expectations. Bentham himself thought that social 
conventions also powerfully shape expectations, as noted above. So what should the state do when social 
conventions conflict with the law, and some people’s expectations are based on social convention and others’ 
are based on the law? There is an indeterminacy here that Bentham does not resolve (Brown 2017a, 438–40).  
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widespread fear and insecurity, tending toward systemic breakdown, is patently overblown—
at least when applied to today’s circumstances.  
Furthermore, these examples also point us to some concerns about using hedonism, or indeed 
any purely subjective conception of wellbeing, as the relevant currency. Given the 
documented phenomenon of hedonic adaptation (Armenta et al. 2014)—and its preference-
satisfaction-theoretic cousin, adaptive preferences (Elster 1983)—we should be wary of 
basing social distributions on the balance of psychic pleasures and pains (or subjective 
preferences) alone, as contemporary capability theorists have argued (Nussbaum 2000, chap. 
2; Robeyns 2017, 119–21, 125–26, 130–35).  
There is certainly wisdom to be mined in Bentham’s writing. There is clearly something to 
the ideas that: persons are more or less continuous over time; part of wellbeing consists in 
the pursuit of long-term projects and these projects link our past, present and future selves; 
planning is typically important to the pursuit of such projects; our plans and projects are 
shaped by our expectations; our expectations are shaped by the past, including our history of 
interactions with particular objects; having a degree of security over those objects is therefore 
valuable for planning; and the law’s having underpinned that security provides some grounds 
for thinking that it should continue to do so. I certainly take these ideas seriously in the 
development of my own theory. But what they amount to is a pro tanto case for conserving 
some conventional property rights on instrumental grounds, not an all-things-considered case 
for preserving all conventional property rights (see also Michelman 1967, 1211–13). 
Ultimately, Bentham’s arguments illustrate the difficulty that classical liberals face in 
generating conservative conclusions about legal transitions from premises about the 
conventional nature and instrumental value of private property.  
Before closing, I want to probe, in the spirit of WRE, the conceptions of the person and the 
good life underpinning Bentham’s conclusions. How, in particular, are we to square 
Bentham’s ideal of persons as rational expected-utility calculators with his conservative 
approach to legal transitions, given the political reality that laws frequently change? It is fair 
to say that the bourgeois men of Bentham’s civil law writing, whose property-based 
expectations he was so keen to conserve, come across as somewhat politically naïve. 
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Wouldn’t rational, utility-maximising individuals factor in the risk of legal change and 
prudently manage their investments accordingly, smoothly adjusting to legal changes much 
as they do to price changes in the marketplace?  
Perhaps an answer (though not necessarily the one Bentham would have provided34) lies in 
the classical liberal ideal of the public-private divide.35 The marketplace takes on a special 
significance in the classical liberal imaginary, and classical liberals were eager to preserve it 
as a zone of freedom from interference by the state—hence the strict separation between the 
public sphere and the private sphere of commerce (and the household) (Walzer 1984). In the 
classical liberal imaginary, the affordances and demands of modern economic life left citizens 
with neither interest in nor time for public political deliberation (Constant 1988 [1819]). 
Correspondingly, the institution of citizenship in the classical liberal tradition serves as a 
legal protection for civically passive individuals from interference by the state so that they 
may pursue their private good relatively uninterrupted (Leydet 2017, sec. 1.2). In this way, 
the classical liberal ideal of personal responsibility, and associated virtues such as foresight 
and prudence, were scope-limited to the private sphere. This contextual aspect of the classical 
liberal conception of the person, argues Taylor (1989, pt. III), is bound up with modernity’s 
“affirmation of ordinary life”—the life of productive work and family—and its rejection of 
life goods such as philosophical contemplation and civic virtue, which were exalted in earlier 
periods.  
But this radical separation between a prudent and hyper-flexible self in the private sphere 
and a passive and hyper-vulnerable self in the public sphere cannot withstand metaphysical, 
empirical, or normative scrutiny. Metaphysically and empirically, no such radical separation 
exists: the public and private “are, and always have been, inextricably connected” (Okin 
1992, 69), and feminist scholars have detailed the multifarious ways in which this is and has 
been true (e.g. Frazer and Lacey 1993, 72–76). This being the case, the notion that one could 
and ought to simply switch on and off the virtues of foresight and prudence as one moves 
                                                 
34 Consider, for example, Bentham’s view on popular sovereignty and civic duty (see Crimmins 2017, sec. 9). 
35 This paragraph is drawn from Green (2017, 188). 
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through different social contexts becomes (even more) untenable. Normatively, the 
juxtaposition of an active private self and a passive public one comes at a great theoretical 
cost: as proponents of republican citizenship have pointed out, it is unclear how such a person 
could be motivated to defend, and capable of defending, the democratic political order from 
the persistent internal and external threats to its survival (Lovett 2018, sec. 4.3). These 
considerations pose a challenge to the plausibility of the conception of the person and the 
ideal of the good life at the heart of any classical liberal justification of a conservative theory 
of legal transitions (desideratum #5). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have critically evaluated theories of legal transitions based on conceptions 
of property rights from the ‘liberty tradition’. I first argued that Lockean natural property 
rights theories, as interpreted by 20th century and contemporary right-libertarians, are 
vulnerable to deep objections and are not a compelling basis for a theory of legal transitions. 
I then argued that instrumental theories of property are hostage to fortune, and therefore any 
attempt to build a conservative theory of legal transitions on the basis of an instrumental 
theory of property is likely to require heroic empirical premises that cannot withstand 
scrutiny. I illustrated this more general tendency by focusing on the most explicit of such 
arguments within the classical liberal canon, that of Jeremy Bentham. I also exposed some 
problems with the ideals of the person and the good life underlying classical liberal 
conservatism about property in the context of legal transitions. 
I should emphasise that this chapter has not exhausted the possible argumentative linkages 
that one could make between property and legal transitions. Some contemporary scholars 
have drawn on the natural rights tradition to argue for a much more limited set of natural 
rights to property, and argued that these natural rights are of only instrumental value. For 
example, Anna Stilz (2018) draws on Grotius and a different reading of Locke’s Second 
Treatise—a reading consonant with those of Scanlon (1976) and Tully (1980)—to argue for 
a limited natural right of secure use and possession of physical objects insofar as these are 
instrumental to our rights to a reciprocally justifiable degree of autonomy (cf. Moore 2017, 
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240–242). 36  Margaret Radin’s Hegelian-inspired “personhood perspective” on property 
articulates the importance of certain kinds of property to individuals’ personal development, 
providing a distinctive normative basis for justifying and delineating the relative importance 
to persons of different kinds of property rights.37 Republican political theory, moreover, 
suggests democratic reasons for certain kinds of property distributions (see, e.g., Sunstein 
1992, 914–16). All of these theories present potentially fruitful avenues for developing at 
least a partially property-based theory of legal transitions. None of them seems likely to entail 
the strong conservatism of classical liberal theories, let alone the ultra-conservatism of 
(“everyday”) right libertarianism.
                                                 
36 On Stilz’s account, “[o]ther aspects of liberal private ownership—like the right to alienate, to bequeath, to 
draw income, and to possess apart from use (incidents fundamental to the development of inequalities in modern 
societies)” are purely conventional, meaning her resulting account is a hybrid natural–conventional theory 
(2018, 245). Adam Smith, too, held a proto-hybrid theory of property, at least on one reading (Fleischacker 
2004, 177–92). 
37 Given the conception of wellbeing I endorse for the purpose of ART (in Chapter 6.3), my Wellbeing Principle 
(Chapter 7) ends up being sensitive to these kinds of relations between persons and property. 
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 EFFICIENCY: ‘LAW AND ECONOMICS’ 
THEORIES  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I noted that the conservative institutional conclusions about legal 
transitions endorsed by natural property rights libertarians were similar to those endorsed by 
Paretian welfarists. I also explained that, despite their very different theoretical 
underpinnings, there has been a surprising amount of theoretical shape-shifting among 
proponents of these approaches. Fried notes that, up until the mid-1970s, a similarly 
conservative approach, albeit grounded in fairness, was dominant in the American legal and 
economics academy: 
Prior to the mid-1970s, the legal literature exhibited a general bias in favor of ex post 
compensation for the loser. That bias reflected, I think, an often unexamined assumption that 
people had a right to (and did) expect legal stability when they made long-term investment 
decisions, and hence that any significant change in legal regimes constituted unfair surprise, 
the ex post (negative) consequences of which they were entitled to be protected against. It 
reflected as well an implicit (and probably unconscious) decision to ignore the symmetrical 
problem of transition winners, with the consequence that transition gains simply lay where 
they fell, by default. Outside of the legal academy, the scant literature on the topic leaned 
towards the same pro-compensation position for losers, on the same or similar grounds. (Fried 
2003, 125, footnote omitted) 
This chapter is about what came after this prevailing conservatism in the American legal 
academy: the avalanche of ‘law and economics’ (L&E) scholarship on legal transitions. By 
L&E, I am referring to the scholarly legal movement beginning in the 1960s, and situated 
predominantly in American law schools, which draws primarily on neoclassical economic 
concepts, theories and analytical methods to (positively) analyse and explain the law, and to 
(normatively) evaluate and prescribe the law (see generally Butler n.d.; Hackney Jr. 1997). 
The movement, which “has had a profound effect on public policy debates” (Hackney Jr. 
2003, 361), has addressed subjects spanning the gamut of American jurisprudence. By the 
mid-1970s, L&E scholars were beginning to address the topic of legal transitions, and 
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scholarly L&E writing on that topic is now extensive. In fact, more articles have been written 
on legal transitions by L&E scholars than by philosophers and political theorists of all other 
theoretical perspectives combined. Discussing this corpus therefore affords us the 
opportunity to trace the evolution of thinking about legal transitions from the perspective of 
a mature research program whose foundational normative values and methods are largely 
shared.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Parts 3.2 and 3.3 are expository. Part 3.2 briefly 
introduces the key conceptions of efficiency used throughout the chapter, good grasp of 
which is essential to understanding the positions of L&E scholars discussed in Part 3.3 and 
my criticisms of them in Part 3.4. Part 3.3 describes the reasoning and conclusions of the 
efficiency-based “new view”—which reigned supreme in the legal academy for the last 
quarter of the 20th century and remains influential—and traces the subsequent scholarly 
debates that have challenged the empirical assumptions on which the initial “new view” 
conclusions were predicated. Part 3.4 develops four distinct criticisms of the L&E approach 
to legal transitions. Part 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 EFFICIENCY CONCEPTS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
3.2.1 Pareto Efficiency 
In order to understand the meaning of the dominant conception of efficiency used in L&E 
analysis today—as well as certain purported justifications of L&E-based transition rules—it 
is first necessary to consider the foundational concept of Pareto efficiency.1  
A Pareto improvement is a change in the distribution of resources that makes at least one 
person better off without making anyone worse off (the new distribution is said to be “Pareto 
superior”). A Pareto efficient (or “Pareto optimal”) distribution is one in which no further 
Pareto improvements can be made (because any attempts to make one person better off will 
make at least one other person worse off). Achieving a Pareto improvement is treated in 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed introduction, see Coleman (1980a, 1984). 
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neoclassical public economics not merely as a transition rule, but as a decision-rule for 
undertaking a primary legal change in the first place, albeit one that has an in-built transition 
principle: the rule change can only be carried out if full transitional relief (i.e. grandfathering 
or full compensation) is given to every person made worse off by the change (Graetz 1977; 
Kanbur 2003).  
When presented as a freestanding principle (as it often is in the economics literature), there 
is little that can be said by way of justification for Pareto-improving policies (and hence 
conservative transition rules). The virtues of a Pareto improvement are that it makes at least 
one person individually better off, and, because it does so without making anyone worse off 
in absolute terms, it also therefore results in an increase in aggregate welfare (Adler and 
Posner 1999, 188; Coleman 1984, 650–51). Aggregate welfare could thus be improved 
without the need to make interpersonal utility comparisons of the kind necessitated when 
comparing one person’s loss against another’s gain. Economists were thus supposedly 
liberated from having to make “normative” judgements that were increasingly viewed as 
unscientific and therefore outside the purview of economic science during the discipline’s 
analytic turn (Robbins 1932; Hackney Jr. 1997, 288–91), allowing them instead to focus on 
technical improvements in efficiency (Kaldor 1939). 
But there are at least four objections that can be made to the proposition that governments 
should implement Pareto improvements. First, where resources are scarce and there are 
opportunity costs, there may be an alternative Pareto improvement that leads to higher 
aggregate welfare than the improvement on offer (a possibility that only arises if we are 
willing to make interpersonal utility comparisons). Second, a Pareto improvement might 
make an unjust or otherwise morally objectionable status quo more unjust. Consider, for 
example, a slave-owning society in which a Pareto improvement results in the slave owners 
being made better off while the slaves stay at the same level of utility. Third, we may have 
reason to favour an alternative policy that is not a Pareto improvement but that results in a 
(more) just, or otherwise normatively better, distribution (Adler and Posner 1999, 188; 
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Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2016, 148–49).2 In light of these objections, perhaps the best 
principled justification of Pareto improvements is that, assuming the welfare improvements 
are independently justifiable in a particular case, a Pareto inefficient situation is wasteful 
and could be improved upon (cf. Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2016, 148). But it was a 
fourth, more practical objection to Pareto improvements that was to prove more significant 
in the development the discipline of public economics: in the realm of public policy and law, 
there are very few genuine Pareto improvements available—almost everything the state does 
will leave at least one person worse off—which leaves the pure Paretian economist somewhat 
hamstrung (Adler and Posner 1999, 189; Coleman 1984, 651; Mishan 1952).  
3.2.2 Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
Public economists in the 1930s and ’40s, dissatisfied with the restrictiveness and 
conservatism of a pure Paretian approach, sought to develop alternatives (see Scitovsky 1951, 
305–307). An enduringly popular approach developed in the late 1930s, and now known as 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (KHE), advocated government policies (including legal changes) 
that would increase society’s aggregate economic resources by producing net-benefits, in the 
sense of economic gains that outweigh economic losses. The motivating idea, expressed in 
Paretian terms, is that the winners from a KHE-improving legal change could (assuming 
costless transfers: Coleman 1984, 651), compensate the losers and still leave at least someone 
better off; that the policy is, in other words, a potential Pareto-improvement (Hicks 1939, 
1941; Kaldor 1939, 550). In common sense terms, a KHE improvement implies that the 
economy’s aggregate quantity of economic resources—often metaphorically called the “pie”, 
or the economy’s stock of “wealth” (Dworkin 1980a, 1980b)—and hence its capacity to 
satisfy preferences, has increased (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2016, 159–61).  
However, application of the KHE principle does not require that the losers actually be 
compensated, hence it entails a transitional principle at the opposite extreme of the Paretian 
                                                 
2 The last two criticisms assume there are other normative values beyond loss-avoidant aggregate welfare 
improvement. For a concise argument to this effect in the context of a critique of Pareto efficiency, see 
DeMartino (2015, 326–329). 
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principle: i.e. do not provide transitional relief (Kanbur 2003; Mishan 1952). In fact, that is 
a slight over-simplification: some individual economists who advocate KHE-efficiency 
contemplate the possibility of actually doing the compensation, though they often prefer to 
leave this “political” question to governments (e.g. Kaldor 1939, 550–551). The point, 
though, is that the KHE test itself does not entail a requirement to compensate losers. Indeed, 
if full compensation were required, then the KHE test would be redundant, since the policy 
would be an actual Pareto improvement (Sen 1979b, 25). 
Neoclassical welfare economists typically use cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a way of 
evaluating the net-benefits of a policy (ideally comparing the net-benefits of various 
alternative policies), and CBA is widely understood by economists to operationalise the KHE 
test (see, e.g., Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2016, 159; Kanbur 2003, 29–30).3  Net-
benefits are calculated by summing the costs of a policy (costs to losers plus policy 
implementation costs) and subtracting these from the aggregate benefits enjoyed by the 
winners. For this purpose, gains and losses are measured in monetary terms: a person’s 
“willingness to pay” (WTP) to have a desired good or service, or not to have an undesired 
one, is taken to indicate the intensity of their preference for that good or service.4 Posner 
describes the relationship between wealth and preferences in an efficientarian system as 
follows:  
Wealth is the value in dollars or dollar equivalents ... of everything in society. It is measured 
by what people are willing to pay for something or, if they already own it, what they demand 
in money to give it up. The only kind of preference that counts in a system of wealth 
maximization is thus one that is backed up by money ...” (1979, 119). 
                                                 
3 There are some technical differences between KHE and CBA (see Adler and Posner 1999, 190–91), but these 
are not relevant to the argument here. 
4 Of course, asking about WTP assumes that the respondent does not have an entitlement to the good in question 
to begin with; if they did have the entitlement, then “willingness to accept” (WTA) would be the correct 
measure. This matters greatly, because WTP and WTA values systematically diverge, and economists have no 
coherent means (one that is efficiency-based, all the way down) of determining initial entitlements and hence 
whether WTA or WTP is the appropriate means of valuation (see Kennedy 1981 for extended discussion of this 
“offer-asking problem” and the associated indeterminacy at the heart of the L&E enterprise). 
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WTP for (or “willingness to accept”/WTA to give up) a preferred good is rendered 
epistemically accessible by inference from market prices or through survey methods that 
directly elicit persons’ WTP (or WTA).5 Through such techniques, all effects of a legal 
change (both gains and losses) on any given individual could in principle be ascribed a 
monetary value, with the net impact on that individual ultimately being negative (loss), 
positive (gain) or zero (no transitional effect). In this way, all mental activity is reduced to 
the notion of a preference and agents’ preferences are assumed to be completely ordered and 
continuous (Hausman 2012, 13–19, 77). When preferences are converted into WTP values 
and assumed to conform to these assumptions, they become comparable on a cardinal scale, 
and all objects over which agents have preferences are treated as perfectly substitutable at 
the margin.  
The neoclassical tools of KHE and CBA thus provided L&E scholars with an operable, 
purportedly scientific framework for evaluating and prescribing legal rules and regimes 
(Hackney Jr. 1997, 303–22, 2003, 362–68), and this framework was later applied to legal 
transition rules. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter is concerned with the analysis of 
L&E scholarship that evaluates legal transitions by reference to KHE. Subsequent references 
to “efficiency” should be read as references to KHE, unless otherwise specified or the context 
otherwise indicates. 
3.3 LAW AND ECONOMICS IN LEGAL TRANSITIONS: FROM THE ‘NEW VIEW’ TO NO VIEW 
3.3.1 The ‘new view’ 
The regnant conservative consensus on legal transitions (see Part 3.1, above) was destabilised 
in a seminal article on tax transitions by Michael Graetz (1977), and generalised to other 
areas of law by Louis Kaplow (1986) a decade later. Together, these two articles ushered in 
                                                 
5 See Mendelsohn and Olmstead (2009) for a discussion of how economists try to measure people’s WTP/WTA 
and see Hausman, McPherson and Satz (2016, 163–64) and Adler (2015, 323–24) for a summary of criticisms 
of such techniques. By contrast, pure preference satisfaction accounts of wellbeing (i.e. not mediated by 
WTP/WTA) are epistemically inaccessible (violating my desideratum #V). Hedonistic accounts of wellbeing 
are ruled out on the same grounds. 
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a new consensus in the legal academy—the “new view”— in favour of generally reformative 
transition policy on grounds of efficiency (Shaviro 2000, 3).6  
A key move by new view L&E scholars was to treat the risk of legal transitions as just another 
risk of doing business. On this view, the question of how private agents should manage that 
risk is just another case of decision-making under uncertainty, and the question of how 
government should respond to it is just another instance of the larger question of when, if 
ever, government should “intervene” in such private decision-making (Fried 2003, 125–26; 
Graetz 1977, 65–66; Kaplow 1986, 520, 523, 533–36; Shaviro 2000). “If this analogy 
between market and government risks is accepted”, argued Kaplow, “transition policy should 
vanish as a separate concern” (1986, 535). A second key move was to appreciate that the risk 
of legal change leads to gains as well as losses—ex ante, such risk has an upside as well as a 
downside—thus extinguishing another asymmetry in historical approaches that had 
concentrated on avoiding investors’ losses while letting them retain their gains from legal 
change (Fried 2003, 125–26; Kaplow 1986, 552–55). 
Having neutralised any distinction between private and public risks, and between transition 
losses and gains, the proponents of the new view set about analysing legal transitions, in 
standard L&E fashion, in terms of the two key parameters affecting efficiency: risk and 
incentives (see especially Kaplow 1986, 527–32, 615). On the one hand, uncertainty about 
future government action imposes risks on durable (long-term) decisions, and risk is 
generally seen as undesirable (ibid 527). The undesirability of risk, notes Kaplow, is the 
reason many previous scholars had advocated conservative transition policy, which 
effectively mitigates the downside risk (ibid 615). But, crucially, government mitigation of 
risk has costs in terms of incentives for efficient behaviour (ibid 527–32, 586). “The efficient 
level of investment is that induced when investors bear all real costs and benefits of their 
decisions” (ibid 529). Conservative transition policy (with respect to losses) socialises 
downside transition risks, meaning agents externalize some of the costs of their risky choices 
                                                 
6 A parallel shift in scholarship on takings law had been occurring over this period (see Fried 2003, 125–126, 
fn 4). 
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onto the government. This socialisation induces over-investment, raising the total social costs 
of legal change (Kaplow 1986, 528–31; Nash and Revesz 2007).  
By contrast, reformative transition policy privatises the risks of legal change—both downside 
risks of losses and upside risks of gains (Kaplow 1986). It thus incentivises private agents to 
better anticipate those risks (Levmore 1999). It also incentivises agents to prudently manage 
those risks on their own, in accordance with their own risk preferences—for example, by 
self-insurance (through diversifying their investments or hedging) or by obtaining third-party 
insurance to the extent it is available (see Shaviro 2000, 35–36). By incentivising foresight 
and prudent risk-management, reformative transition policy reduces the total social costs of 
legal change (Kaplow 1986, 528–31).  
Risk and incentive considerations “must be analysed simultaneously to determine how they 
interact in the context of transition policy”, and “a perfect market would achieve the optimal 
trade-off” (Kaplow 1986, 532). Of course, markets are not perfect, but in the final analysis 
Kaplow took the view that “the market will generally balance these competing considerations 
at least as well as the government could” (ibid 578).  
3.3.2 Debating the new view 
Against this general position in favour of reformative transition policy, new view scholars 
and their intramural L&E critics have debated various nuances, exceptions and alternative 
assumptions. These fall into three broad categories: cases involving failures of rational 
foresight/expectations; cases involving failures of prudent risk management (both individual 
failures and market failures); and various issues pertaining to government behaviour (cf. 
Wonnell 2003).  
3.3.2.1 Individual agents: Rational expectations? 
The first line of attack has questioned the rationality of agents’ expectations about the 
direction and probability of future legal changes. New view scholars adopt a default empirical 
assumption of “rational expectations”, which applies the homo economicus of neoclassical 
microeconomics to the issue of legal transitions (see especially Shaviro 2000, 19–25). 
Shaviro, for example, assumes that “when people have reason to care about future 
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government policy … they make reasonably good use of available information that sheds 
light on it, including what the government has done in the past, its leaders’ incentives or 
apparent beliefs, and the balance of political forces” (ibid 19). Past policies (including 
transition policies) are internalised and expectations of future policies adjusted, so that 
“people will tend to observe accurately the government’s true policy over time” (ibid 21). 
The assumption is important to new view scholars given that they place so much emphasis 
on the incentive effects of transition policies: if expectations are not rational, incentives won’t 
cause changes in behaviour. 
The rational expectations assumption has been much criticised. Fried has challenged the 
assumption on the ground that the future direction of legal change, being the political product 
of a complex constellation of causes, is typically extremely difficult for people to foresee 
(2003, 140–41). Indeed, the more temporally remote the legal change, the more its ex ante 
probability is characterised by Knightian uncertainty in a way that makes probabilistic 
assessment virtually meaningless (ibid 142–43). This difficulty in isolating the causes of 
legal change makes it difficult for agents to extrapolate from past legal changes and transition 
policies, casting doubt on the causal link between reformative transition policy and the 
improved foresight of agents (ibid 142–43). These points go to the objective difficulty of 
foreseeing future legal change. Additionally, Fried argues, people err systematically because 
their subjective ability to accurately assess risks is limited (ibid 146–49). 
Shaviro acknowledges that the weight of empirical evidence—e.g. in psychology and 
behavioural economics—renders this strong form of the rational expectations assumption 
implausible (2000, 19–25). But he insists that, when one recognises that imperfect rationality 
can lead agents to both underestimate and overestimate the probability of future legal change, 
and that future legal change can bring both losses and gains, a more epistemically modest 
version of the rational expectations assumption becomes available. A “sophisticated rational 
expectations view … holds only that people’s use of the information available at any time 
should not too readily be presumed to involve systematic error in any predictable direction” 
(ibid 19–20). On this weaker version of the rational expectations assumption, it is a default 
position that agents have rational expectations on average and over the long run, but this can 
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be disproved in particular cases with evidence of systematic bias in agents’ expectations (ibid 
19–25). In this vein, some new view scholars have sought to identify the kinds of agents, and 
kinds of circumstances, which lend themselves to systematic errors in foreseeing legal 
transition risks. Both Kaplow (1986, 549, 2003, 186) and Logue (2003, 212), for example, 
have argued that corporations and other sophisticated investors (in the context of legal 
changes affecting asset prices) are likely to act much closer to the model of a fully rational 
agent than laypersons (for further discussion, see Wonnell 2003, 295–98). 
3.3.2.2 Agents in markets: prudent risk management? 
Another line of attack has focused on the capabilities of agents to behave prudently in 
response to risks of legal change (assuming these are knowable ex ante). There are two issues 
here: the external options available to agents to prudently manage those risks (such as the 
availability of third-party insurance or opportunities to self-insure) and the prudence of the 
agents themselves in the face of those options. With regard to the latter, Fried, drawing on 
evidence from psychology and behavioural economics, finds strong reason to question the 
blanket assumption that agents are likely to maximise expected utility in the face of such 
risks (2003, 146–49).  
However, among L&E scholars themselves, the former issue has proved a livelier topic of 
debate. One might think that various “market failures” (such as adverse selection, moral 
hazard, transaction costs, and access to markets) could preclude agents from prudently 
managing the risks of legal change in the marketplace. New view scholars considered this 
possibility, but tended to be fairly dismissive of it (Kaplow 1986, 536; Shaviro 2000, 33–42). 
That said, they have also identified certain kinds of agents and investments for which insuring 
against the risk of legal change is likely to be especially costly or otherwise difficult.7 For 
example, Shaviro thinks that “human capital and perhaps home ownership” are special cases 
“where we have a particular reason to suspect that the risk averse will be left underprotected 
                                                 
7 Some scholars have argued that third party insurance for risks of legal changes is generally unavailable (Blume 
and Rubinfeld 1984; Masur and Nash 2010; Shavell 2014). 
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by their own best efforts” because these assets “are costly or inconvenient to diversify” (2000, 
41–42; cf. Kaplow 1986, 593–96, 2003, 185–86).8  
3.3.2.3 Government behaviour: legal progress and official virtue? 
So far I have mentioned the two main debates over the new view that pertain to the efficiency 
of private agents’ behaviour. But what about the behaviour of the state? Much transitions 
analysis in the tax context, up until the publication of Daniel Shaviro’s influential book When 
Rules Change (2000), “simply ignored the government side of the picture, focusing on the 
supposed effects of compensation on individual investor behaviour” (Fried 2003, 129, fn 11). 
Since that time, government behaviour and other political economy factors—typically via 
public choice analysis—have become key empirical variables affecting the analysis of 
efficient transition policy (see especially Epstein 2003; Kaplow 2003, 192–200; Logue 2003, 
218–19; Shaviro 2000, chaps. 4 & 5). Nowadays, notes Logue (2003, 219), 
consequentialist transition scholars evaluate transition norms not only for their effects on the 
incentives of private actors but also for their effects on the incentives of political actors, 
whether those actors are government officials making decisions about public policy or private 
parties seeking to influence those decisions. 
For example, recent L&E transitions literature has debated the effect of different transition 
policies: on government incorporation of the full social costs of primary laws into CBA; on 
risks of government abuse of power; on the political feasibility of a particular primary legal 
reform (i.e. given interest group politics); and on interest groups’ incentives for socially 
wasteful/inefficient lobbying (see, e.g., Doran 2007; Kaplow 2003, 197–200; Levmore 1999, 
1665–66; Logue 2003, pt. IV; Shaviro 2000, 79–81).  
Given this empirical complexity—and the need to aggregate all such effects along with the 
incentive effects on private agents—it is not surprising that Shaviro concluded that the 
would-be efficientarian faces “an indeterminate political incentives problem, at least in the 
                                                 
8 Other articles have discussed various other classes of legal changes in which the general new view conclusion 
about the efficiency of private incentive effects is unlikely to hold (Logue 1996; Shavell 2008). 
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abstract” (2000, 81; for similar sentiments, see Kaplow 2003, 200). In response to this 
conundrum, the tendency has been toward the identification of subclasses of cases where 
empirical patterns of politics exhibit sufficient regularity to permit the drawing of general 
conclusions about the direction of political incentive effects (Logue 2003; Shaviro 2000).9 
3.4 CRITIQUES OF THE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO LEGAL TRANSITIONS 
3.4.1 Efficiency, all the way down? 
The problem of indeterminacy identified by Shaviro and Kaplow, and the response of moving 
toward more particularist solutions, are suggestive of a deeper quandary facing L&E theories 
of legal transitions. Efficiency analysis is—like utilitarian analysis (Lamont and Favor 2017, 
sec. 5)—essentially an exercise in tallying the aggregate value (in this case, monetary value) 
of the predicted empirical effects of alternative courses of action. As such, it can only get off 
the ground when determinate facts can be plugged into a CBA (see generally Kennedy 1981). 
This means that one’s conception of the state (and of the virtue of public officials) and 
conception of the person (their foresight, prudence and rationality) must be treated as 
exogenously given constants. In the short run, this is fair enough: for the purposes of a given 
legal transition, an efficient transition response can reasonably take institutions and persons 
‘as read’. For this purpose, ‘local’ (spatio-temporally specific) assumptions are what matters. 
This is consistent with the direction in which, as I noted, recent L&E scholarship has in fact 
evolved: towards more partial, contingent and tentative analysis of transition rules. But this 
sits awkwardly with L&E scholars’ professed intentions to develop “constitutional” 
transition norms to guide policymaking over the long run (e.g. Shaviro 2000, chap. 5).  
If L&E scholars want to adopt a longer-term or more universal approach to legal transitions, 
they can no longer help themselves to exogenously given facts about individuals and the 
state. This is because individuals and state institutions are mutually constituted: institutions 
                                                 
9  Some other legal scholars have argued for a more thorough-going particularism: see Hasen (2010) 
(resurrecting reliance and expectations-based considerations and arguing that these need to be balanced against 
flexibility-based considerations on a case-by-case basis) and Frisch (2006, 803). 
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are artefacts of human construction informed by normative ideals; and (non-state) agents are 
constituted by social roles and identities that are shaped by the institutions of their society 
(see Chapter 6.2). The kinds of institutions we have and the people and group agents who 
inhabit them are therefore endogenous to the very policy recommendations that L&E seeks 
to instantiate. But this means that, over the long run, L&E scholars would not simply be doing 
the ‘empirical analysis’ necessary for efficiency calculations; rather they would be shaping 
the very empirical reality that they are purporting neutrally to ‘read off’. From the perspective 
of other mainstream normative political theories, this is putting the cart before the horse: 
most theories have a normative vision of what the state ought to do and the dispositions that 
individuals ought to have, and these ideals inform their short-term prescriptions (Daniels 
1996, 337; Freeman 2011, 52–55; Ramsay 1997, 26–27, 32–33; Taylor 1989). If L&E 
scholars really want to be in the business of shaping society over the long run, they had better 
have a set of normative ideals, and present these up for critical scrutiny. But then these 
normative ideals stand in need of independent justification, and that means one cannot be an 
efficientarian, all the way down (violating desideratum #6).10 
3.4.2 Homo economicus in the political marketplace 
In reality, I think L&E scholars do operate with (often unexamined) conceptions or ideals 
about the individual and the state in mind. These conceptions resist the endogeneity problem 
I identified in the previous section only by embodying heroic assumptions about the 
independence of agents (both private agents and state officials). In this respect, L&E 
scholarship shares much with the classical liberal model of the person as homo economicus, 
who seems to materialize on his own “endowed with a starter set of basic desires, ready to 
select additional desires and construct overarching goals, and skilled in performing 
instrumental rationality tasks” and then seeks to maximise the satisfaction of his preferences 
in the marketplace given his budget constraint (Willett, Anderson, and Meyers 2015, sec. 1). 
Neoclassical economics (which informs the enterprise of L&E) retained roughly the 
                                                 
10 I take Coleman (1981, 148–54), discussing constitutional economics, to be making a similar point about 
efficiency analysis being endogenous to institutional settings. 
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ontological features of this classical liberal model of the person (Davis 2003, 2009). In L&E 
scholarship on legal transitions, these features are reflected in the ‘rational expectations’ and 
‘prudent risk-management’ assumptions discussed above: individuals are assumed to have 
accurate, probability-weighted ex ante expectations and to prudently manage risks associated 
with those expectations. 
For our purposes, what most definitively distinguishes neoclassical homo economicus from 
the conception of the self invoked in classical liberalism is not its ontological features but 
rather what I have elsewhere called its “contextual features” (Green 2017, 185): the 
conception of the good life, with its distinctive goods and domains of activity, that is 
imagined for such a person (see Taylor 1989, 91–107, Pt. III). In the classical liberal tradition, 
as we saw in Chapter 2.3.2, the valorisation of the ordinary life of commerce and a strict 
public-private divide were necessary to restrict homo economicus’ calculative rationality to 
the marketplace while excusing his ignorance of political matters, guaranteeing instead his 
protection from state interference. L&E scholarship on legal transitions tore down that 
conceptual “wall” (Walzer 1984, 315). The self-responsible, savvy and flexible manoeuvring 
of neoclassical homo economicus, including the rationality of his expectations, are assumed 
in L&E to extend beyond the marketplace traditionally conceived and into the political 
domain, encompassing the anticipation of legal changes. Hence Kaplow (1986, 536) asserts: 
“from an economic perspective, there is nothing particularly unique about risk concerning 
future government policy that would justify departing from a society’s more general 
approach toward risk bearing”. Self-responsibility justifies laissez faire in the market; so too 
in the polis.  
Whereas the classical liberal conception of the person’s role in anticipating and managing 
the risks of legal change is, as I argued in respect of Bentham, insufficiently demanding, the 
L&E conception of homo economicus-unbound seems empirically implausible and 
normatively over-demanding, at least with respect to natural persons in many contexts 
(violating desideratum #5). Specifying and defending a position on the degree of foresight 
and prudent risk management that is required of individuals is a major challenge facing any 
theory of legal transitions (Fried 2003, 140–49). It is a challenge I take up in Chapter 8. 
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3.4.3 Why maximise efficiency? 
In this section I critique the distributional implications of efficiency-maximising policies 
(with respect to efficientarian theories of legal transitions, this critique targets desiderata #5 
and #6). Recall from Part 3.2 that one supposed virtue of KHE improving policies is that, 
like Pareto improvements, they do not require for their implementation controversial 
interpersonal utility comparisons or utility aggregations, thus giving economists a supposedly 
“objective” (Hicks 1941, 111), scientific yardstick for public policy analysis, yet without the 
conservative, loss-avoidant constraints of the Pareto test (DeMartino 2015, 318, 320–21). As 
we shall see, however, implementation is not the same as justification, and the justification 
of KHE-improving policies cannot in fact avoid value judgements and interpersonal 
comparisons (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2016, 165). Since KHE-improving policies 
can in principle condone the widespread infliction of losses (even if we assume, for the 
purposes of this section, that these are defined in terms of disutility) in the name of creating 
a greater aggregate stock of economic resources, there is nothing obviously normatively 
justifiable about a KHE improvement in and of itself (Adler and Posner 1999, 190–91; 
Coleman 1980a, 248–49; DeMartino 2015; Sen 1979b, 24–25). Accordingly, various 
attempted justifications of KHE-improving policies have appealed to the contingent effects 
of KHE improvements on related values. One such attempted justification argues that KHE 
policies are quasi-Paretian, and two others argue that they are quasi-utilitarian.11 
3.4.3.1 The quasi-Paretian defence 
A “quasi-Paretian” (Polinsky 1972, 409) defence of KHE-improving policies acknowledges 
that there will be winners and losers from any single KHE-improving policy viewed in 
                                                 
11 By contrast, Posner (1979, 1985) attempts to justify a “principle of wealth maximization” without recourse 
to utilitarian or Paretian values (contra Posner 1980, discussed below in Part 3.4.3.1, wherein he mounts a 
quasi-Paretian defence). Posner’s defence of wealth maximisation is, nonetheless, instrumentalist and 
pragmatist (see Hackney Jr. 2003, 377–83), appealing to a range of ultimate values, including productivity, 
happiness (of the productive and law-abiding, i.e. happiness of a more limited kind than entailed by 
utilitarianism), “the traditional virtues (‘Calvinist’ or ‘Protestant’)”, economic and political liberty, rights, and 
competition (Posner 1979, 122–27, 131–32, 135–36, 1985, 97–100). Posner openly embraces the startling 
wealth inequalities that a system of wealth maximisation would produce (1979, 128, 130–131, 1985, 103). I 
leave aside detailed discussion of Posner’s pragmatist/instrumentalist defence here (for criticism of his position, 
see Bebchuck 1980, 1687–88; Coleman 1980b, 528–30; Dworkin 1980a; Kronman 1980). 
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isolation, but asserts that the gains and losses from the systematic implementation of many 
KHE improvements will, over the long run, be distributed roughly randomly across the 
population. Since each policy necessarily induces a net gain, the roughly random distribution 
of benefits means everyone (most people?) will probably be better off; there will (probably?) 
be a rough net Pareto improvement in the long run (Hicks 1941; Hotelling 1938; Polinsky 
1972; Posner 1980, 491–97; Tullock 1980, 664).12  
As DeMartino (2015, 323–25) points out, this purported justification of KHE/CBA is “proto-
contractarian” in its structure. Posner (1980, 491–97) argues that rational individuals would 
generally consent to a system of uncompensated KHE-improving policies because the long-
run efficiency benefits are a kind of “ex ante compensation”.13 One way of interpreting 
Posner’s “consent” argument is in this proto-contractarian sense (Coleman 1980b, 538–40).14 
Similarly, in the legal transition context, Wonnell asserts that transition policy:15  
is likely to be applied in a large number of incidents … If the losses exceed the gains in a 
Kaldor-Hicks sense, and if the game is played many times, it is possible that everyone … 
would come out ahead from the policy, and even more likely that they would have been 
willing to sign on to the [transition policy] principle in advance because they would 
reasonably have expected they would come out ahead. (Wonnell 2003, 308–09, citation 
omitted16) 
                                                 
12 Hotelling’s (1938) version of the argument applied to more restrictive conditions, involving large benefits 
and small costs (e.g. certain public works paid for by general taxation). Hicks (1941) generalised the argument 
and Polinsky (1972) formalised it. Posner (1980, 491–97) and Tullock (1980, 664) are early examples of the 
argument’s use in L&E.  
13 Posner is not invoking a hypothetical situation of radical ignorance, as per Rawls, because in such a situation 
“the choices of the unproductive are weighted equally with those of the productive”, hence Posner assumes 
“actual people deploying actual endowments of skill and energy and character” (Posner 1980, 499). 
14 Another interpretation involves inferring consent literally in each relevant transaction, but this is implausible 
and thus has been heavily criticised (Coleman 1980b, 531–37). 
15 See McCloskey (2010, 82–85) for another example of a quasi-Paretian defence that comes quite close to 
being contractarian. Adler and Posner (1999, 189, fn 63) also consider and reject this possible contractarian 
justification.  
16 At the end of the quoted passage, Wonnell cites his earlier paper (Wonnell 2001, 659–82). In that paper, 
however, Wonnell acknowledges the two criticisms of the quasi-Paretian defence that I make below, and instead 
defends uncompensated KHE improvements on proto-contractarian grounds only when coupled with a system 
of redistributive taxation—an approach that is vulnerable to criticisms I make in relation to the diachronic quasi-
utilitarian defence (see Part 3.4.3.2, below).  
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However, the purported Paretian credentials of long-run, systematic KHE policy 
implementation evaporate under close inspection (Adler and Posner 1999, 189; DeMartino 
2015, 323–34). The Paretian defence is, at the very least, empirically speculative: there is no 
way of knowing, and no reason to believe, that the distribution of losses and gains from 
successive KHE-improving policies will be random (Little 1957; Sen 1979b, 24–25).  
In fact, two stronger criticisms are available. First, the distributions of costs and benefits 
occasioned by the repeated application of KHE/CBA are not random, but will rather 
systematically advantage the relatively wealthy and disadvantage the relatively poor, with 
the inequalities compounding over time (Adler and Posner 1999, 183–84, 189; Baker 1975; 
Bebchuck 1980). This is because (i) the poorer one is, the more one’s WTP for a given good 
is constrained by one’s income, i.e. what one can pay (Baker 1975) and (ii) the diminishing 
marginal utility of income means the poorer one is, the higher one’s opportunity cost of 
money (Bebchuck 1980, 682–84). The former reason applies only when WTP is used, but 
the latter applies regardless of whether WTP or WTA is used (Bebchuck 1980, 682–84).17  
Second, certain—arguably many—policies or projects would obviously make some persons 
and groups worse-off to an extent that could not be, or would not likely be, offset by any 
other KHE-improving policies (DeMartino 2015, 328–30; Nussbaum 2001b, 196–200).18 
Consider, for example, the siting of a toxic waste dump, which exposes nearby residents to a 
heightened risk of terminal cancer. It is fantastical to think that the person who suffers cancer 
as a result of the siting decision will have been fully compensated by other KHE-improving 
policies. More generally, policy changes associated with major infrastructure projects 
constitute a class of legal transitions that will often concentrate large losses on few people 
(DeMartino 2015, 330; Kanbur 2003). Similar observations apply to policy changes that 
cause large job losses, such as some kinds of trade liberalisation, for the “[d]isplaced workers 
                                                 
17 If WTA is used, a poor person will be more willing to accept a lower offer price for some good or entitlement 
he owns than a rich person will for an equivalent good/entitlement, all else equal, because the poorer person 
will value the money, which he can use to buy necessities, more highly (Bebchuck 1980, 683–84). 
18 Some proponents therefore place a scope condition on the quasi-Paretian defence, limiting its application to 
cases where relatively small costs are imposed on a given individual (see, e.g., Polinsky 1972, 414, fn 6; Posner 
1980, 499–502). 
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who suffer them are not apt to be made whole through the lower prices now available at 
Walmart for the imported goods they once produced” (DeMartino 2015, 330–31). 
The above two criticisms are also interactive in an important way: because the systematic 
application of KHE-improving policies compounds economic inequalities, it is the poor who 
become systematically more exposed to large risks. This asymmetry in the distribution of ex 
ante risks seriously undermines the proto-contractarian (or ex ante compensation, or consent-
based) underpinnings of the quasi-Paretian defence of KHE: since those with less than 
average wealth at a given time face a higher ex ante risk of bad outcomes over the long run 
from the systematic application of KHE, why would it be rational for them to consent to such 
a system? 
3.4.3.2 The diachronic quasi-utilitarian defence 
The first purported quasi-utilitarian justification posits uncompensated KHE-improving 
policies as the first stage of a two-stage process consisting of: (1) ‘maximising the pie’ 
(efficiency); and then (2) ‘redistributing the pie’ through the tax and welfare system (what 
economists and L&E scholars call ‘equity’). The idea is that the Stage-2 transfers could 
theoretically be engineered to maximise social welfare, rendering the overall two-stage 
process utilitarian (see, e.g., Frank 2000, 917).19  
But there are two problems with this justification, both of which highlight the difficulty (if 
not impossibility) of separating ‘efficiency’ from ‘equity’ and pursuing them in stages. The 
first problem, which concerns the efficiency effects of the equity stage, is that taxes and 
transfers are not costless; they are not purely redistributive. Specifically, raising taxes and 
transferring wealth between persons has administration costs and adverse efficiency effects, 
resulting in deadweight losses (Bebchuck 1980, 707; Okun 1975). Consequently, any attempt 
                                                 
19 Kaldor (1939, 550–51) was open to the possibility of such transfers but deemed them a “political” matter for 
governments, outside the technical purview of economists, since they would require interpersonal utility 
comparisons. By contrast, the economists discussed in this section recommend such transfers on explicitly 
utilitarian grounds. 
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to do ‘equity’ affects the overall efficiency of the two-stage policy combination (Adler 2015, 
329).  
The second problem concerns the equity effects of the efficiency stage. At the very least, the 
political viability of the equity stage is highly contingent and cannot be assumed (Scitovsky 
1951, 309–10). Specifically, efficiency-improving policies affect the probability, nature and 
degree of redistributive taxation and transfers. Initial distributions shape the attitudes, beliefs, 
desires and preferences of people, including their political preferences (Murphy and Nagel 
2002, 34–36). For example, people’s psychological tendency to prefer keeping what they 
already own—and to prefer existing states of affairs—introduces a conservative bias with 
respect to people’s policy preferences (Korobkin 2002, 1266–67). This bias extends to 
economic policy and social policy: the wealthy tend to prefer lower redistributive taxation 
and less welfare provision, at least in the US (Gilens 2012; Page, Bartels, and Seawright 
2013; cf. Barnes 2015). Moreover, “system justification” tendencies even lead many poor 
people to prefer status quo distributions, believing they are justified (Jost 2019; Jost and 
Banaji 1994; Jost and Nosek 2004). Distributions also affect political preferences through 
the operation of social identity, including class identity, and through the way different socio-
economic groups are constructed in popular social discourse (consider media discourse about 
“producers vs. scroungers” / “makers vs. takers” / “lifters vs. leaners” etc.) (Morrison 2019; 
Skeggs 2004). Furthermore, initial economic distributions (and their social effects) affect the 
distribution of political power, and hence one’s ability to have one’s political preferences 
enacted into government policy: the wealthy have greater political power with which to enact 
those preferences (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Soss and Jacobs 2009). Given that, as discussed 
earlier, efficiency improvements bias resulting distributions of resources in favour of the 
already-wealthy, the two-stage process is therefore likely systematically to bias redistributive 
taxation and welfare policy in favour of the anti-egalitarian preferences of the wealthy. 
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) advance a version of this quasi-utilitarian defence that allocates 
the two tasks to separate institutions rather than separate stages. They propose that the 
judiciary be charged with wealth maximisation (via judicial decision-making) and that 
redistribution be left to the legislature. Their argument can be seen as a response to the first 
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objection raised in this section (two paragraphs above), since they are cognisant of that 
objection and explicitly argue that their proposed institutional division of labour would 
nonetheless maximise efficiency (but see Sanchirco 2000). But they say nothing that 
addresses my second objection (preceding paragraph), and they explicitly leave aside 
questions of “democracy” that affect the actual probability of utility-maximising tax and 
transfer schemes (Kaplow and Shavell 1994, 675). As such, they effectively “substitute 
political agnosticism for distribution agnosticism” (Hackney Jr. 2003, 384–85).20 
3.4.3.3 The synchronic quasi-utilitarian defence 
The other quasi-utilitarian justification seeks to render standard CBA directly 
(synchronically) utilitarian through the use of “welfare weights” (also known as 
“distributional weights”) in the social welfare function (SWF). Recall that the application of 
standard KHE/CBA creates a pro-wealthy bias (see Part 3.4.3.1). Given the diminishing 
marginal utility of money, it follows that an increase in aggregate efficiency does not imply 
an increase in aggregate social welfare/utility. If the background distribution of income and 
wealth were equal, this problem would be avoided. Introducing a social welfare function with 
welfare weights that reflect the diminishing marginal utility of money seeks to correct for 
this distortion and to approximate the equal baseline, and so to render CBA distribution-
sensitive (see Adler 2016, 264 and references there cited). One commonly used SWF is a 
utilitarian one (others include leximin and prioritarian functions). If welfare weights were 
applied to a utilitarian SWF then CBA would be rendered utilitarian (Adler 2016, 266).  
One problem with this approach is that it entails further normative controversy over how the 
weights are determined (see, e.g., Adler 2016; Sen 1972). Another, more practical problem 
is that this approach “is not useful because it is too demanding on the decisionmaker, and 
                                                 
20 Adler (2011, 560–66) discusses the Kaplow/Shavell approach. He makes a more cautious version of my point, 
raising the possibility that there is not an “appropriate political economy” to ensure the relevant tax-and-transfer: 
“The political economy of the tax system may be such that tax bodies would regularly fail to make the changes 
to the tax code required to render non-tax policies passing a simple CBA test universally beneficial” (at 564–
65, emphasis added). Adler notes four, additional, more technical assumptions of the Kaplow/Shavell approach 
that are also highly unlikely to be satisfied in real-world tax contexts (ibid 564). Taken together, Adler concludes 
that “it is extremely implausible to think that the five conditions just described are jointly realized in any actual 
legal system” (ibid 565). 
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agencies do not use such ambitious social welfare functions in the real world” (Adler and 
Posner 1999, 193). Nonetheless, the use of social welfare functions and distributional weights 
is capable of translating CBA into “moral views with considerable philosophical support—
the utilitarian SWF to utilitarianism, the prioritarian SWF to prioritarianism—and such SWFs 
(by contrast with the Kaldor-Hicks test) are therefore a plausible basis for identifying morally 
better or worse outcomes” (Adler 2015, 331). Such welfarist-consequentialist approaches, 
however, still face the next objection concerning the conception of welfare that that they seek 
to optimise: the preference satisfaction account of wellbeing. 
3.4.4 Why value preference satisfaction? 
Insofar as justifications of efficientarian distributive principles appeal ultimately to effects 
on aggregate wellbeing qua ‘preference satisfaction’, they rely on a theoretically implausible 
currency of value (violating desideratum #5).21 A long-standing critique of the preference 
satisfaction account is that it fails to track the actual, richer, more complex structure of 
persons’ mental, embodied, ethical and social lives (DeMartino 2015, 327–28; Goodin 1989; 
Hausman 2012, chap. 7; Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2; Sen 1977). As a currency of loss/gain, it 
therefore violates what I called in Chapter 2.2.2.2 the “correspondence condition” (offending 
desideratum #III).  
Of particular interest for my purposes is a more specific aspect of this objection: preference 
satisfaction accounts of wellbeing fail to distinguish between goods valued in an agent’s 
scheme of ultimate ends, which typically are non-substitutable goods22, and things valued 
merely instrumentally, as mere means to those ends, which are typically substitutable (and, 
insofar as goods are valued for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons, it fails to distinguish 
these distinctive components of the good’s value to an agent) (Goodin 1989; Hausman 2012, 
78; Raz 1988, 177–180). The generic categories of ultimately-valued goods, which tend to 
be less variable among persons than instrumentally-valued goods (Hausman 2012, 78), 
                                                 
21 Insofar as they do not so appeal, then they rely on an even less theoretically plausible concept: aggregate 
wealth (see above footnote 11; and see Dworkin 1980a, 1980b).  
22 I mean ‘goods’ in the broad sense of ‘things of value’. 
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typically include psycho-social phenomena such as particular attachments—e.g. to people, 
places and things—relationships, projects and the resulting complex of identities that 
structure and guide our lives (see Chapters 6 and 7.2). We typically experience such 
ultimately-valued goods as ethically distinctive, which helps to explain (i) the discontinuities 
we experience when attempting to compare the value of these phenomena to one another or 
to merely instrumental goods, (ii) the conflicts between such goods, and (iii) the rationality 
of feeling regret when we correctly prioritise one good over another—feelings for which 
monist conceptions of value (including preference satisfaction and wealth) find it difficult to 
account (Mason 2016, secs. 2, 3).  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explained the findings of more than four decades of L&E scholarship on 
legal transitions—the most mature body of scholarship on legal transitions in any academic 
discipline. This literature, drawing on neoclassical economics, takes KHE improvement to 
be the object of transition policy. Pioneering studies in the 1970s and 80s ushered in a 
consensus “new view” in favour of a generally reformative transition policy, overturning a 
long history of presumptively conservative transition policy (for losers). New view 
scholarship challenged conservative orthodoxy and brought rich insights and formidable 
tools to bear on a long-standing problem. Recognising that legal changes cause losses and 
gains, and perceiving legal changes as just another type of market risk—in principle 
foreseeable and manageable by rational agents as with all other kinds of decision-making 
under uncertainty—new view scholars provoked a new, more prosaic, and yet more dynamic 
way of thinking about the relationship between the state and market actors.  
Yet since the turn of the century, L&E scholarship on this topic has been marked by a 
persistent challenging of the assumptions that underpinned the seminal new view scholarship. 
Among these, I focused primarily on the assumptions of individual rational expectations and 
prudent risk management in efficient markets, while noting further disagreements about state 
behaviour and the political economy. Given the multiple fronts on which the putative 
efficientarian now has to defend her assumptions, prominent L&E scholars have noted that 
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the enterprise risks descending into indeterminacy. Consequently, the trend has been to 
delineate transition rules for ever more specific categories of situations. 
In the second half of the chapter, I levelled four very different criticisms at L&E analysis. I 
first argued that the empirical complexity crisis facing L&E scholarship arises in part from a 
theoretically intractable problem: that the agents whose expectations and behaviour, and the 
institutions whose design, will determine the efficiency or otherwise of a given transition rule 
are themselves partly endogenous to institutions for handling legal transitions; they therefore 
stand in need of a normative justification that the efficientarian cannot provide without 
forsaking efficientarianism, all the way down. The commonly-relied upon homo economicus 
model of the person, I then argued, is both empirically implausible and overly-demanding of 
ordinary citizens in many contexts. 
I then critiqued efficientarian distributions, asking first whether the maximisation of KHE 
could be justified in the light of its distributive consequences. Three common defences of 
(uncompensated) KHE were discussed. Only one of these—the synchronic quasi-utilitarian 
defence—had some plausibility, and this defence is contingent on the administratively-
demanding use of “welfare weights” in the CBAs that operationalise the KHE criterion. On 
the basis of this discussion of distribution rules, the best theory of legal change in the 
neighbourhood of efficientarianism is utilitarianism tout court, or at least some other form of 
welfarist consequentialism (Adler 2011; Fried 2003, 159–60). One option, in this general 
spirit, is to combine multiple policies into synchronic policy packages that, taken together, 
have utilitarian, sufficientarian or egalitarian implications (Ahmad and Stern 1991, 2009). 
This approach is potentially promising. However, one residual issue these approaches face 
relates to the conception of wellbeing they seek to optimise, viz. preference satisfaction. As 
I argued in my fourth criticism of L&E scholarship, this conception is vulnerable to strong 
objections given its insufficiently close correspondence with human ethical experience, and 
in particular its conflation of substitutable means with non-substitutable ends.  
These critiques hold valuable lessons that have shaped the development of my own theorising 
about legal transitions. Taking these in reverse order: first, a theory of legal transitions should 
account for and, where applicable, respond to, losses and gains in terms of a currency that is 
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sufficiently reflective of the nuance of people’s subjective experience, and should in 
particular reflect the distinction between non-substitutable ends and substitutable means (as 
to which, see Chapters 6.3, 7.2 and 9); second, the fact that winners gain more than losers 
lose is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify a theory of legal transitions—a different 
theory is needed (see Chapters 7 and 8); and third (regarding the first two criticisms), any 
theory of legal transitions that is proposed to govern legal transitions over the long run must 
specify (and ideally defend) an ideal of the person and the state (see Chapter 6). 
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 LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS:  
LIBERAL-EGALITARIAN THEORIES (I) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we have seen different ways in which ‘expectations’ about the future 
figure in theories of legal transitions. In Chapter 2 we saw that Bentham thought that 
individuals’ expectations matter because they enable people to make long-term plans and 
thereby live a coherent life. He thought that the law played an extremely significant role in 
shaping people’s expectations, and so argued that changes in the law should avoid frustrating 
them. In Chapter 3, I noted that similar conservative approaches to legal transitions (for 
losers, at least) prevailed in the American economics and legal academy up until the mid-
1970s, after which L&E scholars criticised the ‘old view’ assumption that agents expect the 
law to stay the same. On the ‘new view’, this assumption was replaced by a default 
assumption that agents have rational expectations: expectations based on all relevant, 
available information, including what governments have done in the past (see Fried 2003, 
125–27; Shaviro 2000, 19–25). While I criticised numerous aspects of the L&E approach to 
legal transitions—and I do not think we should endorse a default assumption of ‘rational 
expectations’—the critical point of the new view scholars is compelling. Since it is a central 
function of the state to change the law, and laws do in fact change all the time (often without 
conservative transition policy), why should we assume that agents expect the law to stay the 
same? At the very least, the assumption needs to be explicit and defended. 
Given the extensive treatment of expectations in the L&E literature, it is somewhat surprising 
that liberal-egalitarian political philosophers have in recent years—seemingly unaware of the 
L&E debate1—fixed on a ‘legitimate expectations’ approach to legal transitions that is closer 
to the discredited ‘old view’ (Brown 2011, 2012, 2017a, 2017b; Matravers 2017; Meyer, 
Pölzer, and Sanklecha 2017; Meyer and Sanklecha 2011, 2014; Moore 2017). The legitimate 
                                                 
1 Among the works in the legitimate expectations literature, I have found not one textual reference or citation 
to the L&E literature. 
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expectations literature tends (like the ‘old view’) to assume that agents expect the law to stay 
the same,2 but focuses (unlike the ‘old view’) on whether such expectations of legal stability 
are ‘legitimate’.  
The domain of legitimate expectations in which I and my interlocutors are interested is an 
agent’s expectations of inter-temporally consistent behaviour on the part of other agents, and 
more specifically an agent’s expectation that the state’s laws will stay the same over time.3 
The thought is that having one’s legitimate expectations frustrated by a change in the law 
gives one a normative entitlement to having those expectation secured (e.g. through 
grandfathering), or at least having one’s consequent losses compensated, by the state. For 
example, Meyer and Sanklecha (2011, 2014) consider whether climate change laws violate 
agents’ legitimate expectations about the level of greenhouse gases they will be able to emit.  
In this chapter, I argue that the concept of legitimate expectations (LE) is an inappropriate 
conceptual tool for resolving the problem of legal transitions. The claim is defended in two 
parts. In the bulk of the chapter (Part 4.2), I defend a narrower claim: that LE is an 
inappropriate conceptual tool for resolving an important subset of the problem of legal 
transitions, viz. normative controversies arising from characteristic legislative transitions. A 
characteristic legislative enactment (i) affects a large number of agents with heterogeneous 
expectations, plans and projects; and (ii) is of general application (applying impersonally to 
all agents or to broad classes of agents within the relevant jurisdiction, rather than to 
particular, identified individuals). I argue that any conceivable conception of LE will face 
serious problems when applied to the domain of characteristic legislative transitions (in doing 
so, I draw on the terminology for characterising concepts/conceptions, and the desiderata for 
normatively evaluating concepts/conceptions, set out in Chapter 1.6).  
In Part 4.3, I briefly sketch a promising future path forward for theorising about LE that 
avoids the pitfalls of current theorising. Specifically, I argue that normative claims based on 
LE are best understood as special rights claims arising from some triggering conduct in the 
                                                 
2 See below Part 4.2.1. 
3 I take this to be uncontroversial and assume that my interlocutors would settle on something similar. 
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course of interpersonal interactions in which the parties are engaged. I will explain that, on 
this conception of LE, it is theoretically possible that non-characteristic legislative 
enactments (small-n affected class; specific application) could violate LE. However, because 
of the quasi-private, ‘special rights’ nature of LE on my account, it is not really non-
characteristic legislative transitions per se that would ground the affected agents’ normative 
claim, but rather the earlier ‘triggering conduct’ on the part of the state (i.e. as part of some 
interpersonal interaction) that does so. Consequently, the only possible way in which legal 
transitions could violate LE is not really in the realm of the legal transitions problem at all. 
With this argument, I make good on my wider claim—that the concept of LE is an 
inappropriate conceptual tool for resolving the problem of legal transitions. Part 4.4 
concludes. 
4.2 LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN CHARACTERISTIC LEGISLATIVE TRANSITIONS 
The LE literature contains various proposed conceptions of LE. Each is constructed on a set 
of building blocks, some of which are explicit and some implicit. My aim is not to analyse 
particular LE conceptions per se, but rather to analyse the building blocks on which various 
families of LE conceptions have been and could logically be built—though I engage with 
particular conceptions along the way for illustration. In this sense, to borrow Lippert-
Rasmussen’s terminology from another context, I am engaging in a “theory-focused” 
critique, not a “theorist-focused” critique (Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, 184). I want to show 
that certain building blocks are appropriate for a good conception of LE, and other building 
blocks are appropriate to the circumstances of characteristic legislative transitions, but none 
is suited to both tasks. This analysis will motivate my claim that theorising about LE and 
theorising about characteristic legislative transitions should be advanced separately. 
The first and most obvious building block on which LE conceptions can be built is what I 
call the legitimacy basis—the phenomenon that determines whether an expectation is 
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legitimate or not.4 Nearly all of the scholarly discussion over LE conceptions has so far 
focused on the legitimacy basis. The second building block, which I call the expectation 
model, concerns the kinds of expectations being invoked, and the means by which they are 
identified. This issue is usually only mentioned by proponents of LE in passing (Brown 
2017a, 435–36, 2017b, 5; Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 372), and has so far not been the 
subject of debate within the literature. However, I believe its treatment to date has been 
inadequate, and that a more systematic analysis reveals problems with the application of LE 
to characteristic legislative transitions. I therefore begin by discussing the expectation model 
and its two possible parameter values, before turning to the legitimacy basis and its possible 
parameter values.  
4.2.1 The expectation model 
What are the kinds of expectations the legitimacy of which is in question? And by what means 
are they to be identified? I will take these questions in turn. 
I have already limited the relevant domain to “expectations of inter-temporally consistent 
behaviour on the part of other agents” (and, more specifically, on the part of the state) (see 
Part 4.1). But still there are three possible senses of ‘expectation’ that could be at work here: 
predictive; normative; and conjunctive. To expect X in the predictive sense is to believe that 
X is likely to happen. To expect X in the normative sense is to believe that X ought to happen. 
The two can come apart: I might have a predictive expectation that my cello teacher will be 
available for a lesson at 4pm on Tuesday, since that is our usual time, but I do not expect 
normatively that he will always be so available (at least not without his prior confirmation), 
since I know that from time to time he has other commitments that crop up, such as concerts 
and rehearsals. To expect X in the conjunctive sense is to believe that X is both likely and 
ought to happen.  
                                                 
4 I am adopting the equivalent language from the literature on desert concerned with the “desert basis” (see, 
e.g., Hsieh 2000, 92). 
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It is conjunctive expectations that scholars of legitimate expectations are interested in (see 
especially Brown 2017a, 435–36, 2017b, 5; cf. Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 372).5 And 
rightly so. The motivation for caring about expectations, particularly those based on laws, is 
that they facilitate the long-term planning that is widely thought to be important to practical 
agency, autonomy and wellbeing (Bratman 1987; Brown 2011, 713, 725, 2017b, 1, 107; 
Buchanan 1975, 419–22; Goodin 1995; Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 375; Raz 1979, 220–22; 
Sidgwick 1962, 271; Simmonds 2013, 39).6 Accordingly, one might think that we are really 
only interested in predictive expectations, since it is predictions that most obviously serve 
our interests in planning. But a little further reflection reveals that mere predictions tend to 
lack a robustness that a normative dimension adds. Consider again my cello lesson example. 
I wouldn’t plan my life too rigidly around my expected lesson time of 4pm Tuesday because 
I know there is a decent chance it may not eventuate (even though, in fact, there is a >50% 
chance it will). But now let’s assume that I have to take time off work to travel for two hours 
to get to my lessons, such that a high degree of regularity in my lesson time is needed. My 
teacher knows this and assures me that he won’t cancel or change lesson times without at 
least a month’s advance notice. The nature of our relationship is now such that I have a 
conjunctive expectation that my lessons will occur at that time. Crucially, the normative 
dimension now increases the robustness of my prediction that I will have a lesson at 4pm 
next Tuesday, and I arrange my work shifts accordingly.7 
                                                 
5 Meyer and Sanklecha (2014, 372) assume that agents affected by legal change have “epistemically valid” 
expectations in the sense that they hold them “on good grounds”; the authors do this in order to “bracket the 
epistemic” aspect of expectations so as to focus solely on the legitimacy of the expectations. In a similar move, 
Brown (2017a, 435–36, 2017b, 5) adds to his conjunctive understanding of expectations the requirement that 
the agent have an “epistemic justification or warrant” for their conjunctive expectation. I am sceptical of these 
moralised definitions of expectations (desideratum #VI), for I fear that much of the normative work in 
evaluating expectations that would otherwise be the sole task of the legitimacy basis gets buried into these 
undeveloped notions of what counts as an epistemically valid/justified/warranted expectation. To properly 
evaluate conceptions of LE that define expectations in this moralised way, we would need to know what the 
normative standard for epistemic validity/justification/warrant is in addition to knowing the proposed 
legitimacy basis. An additional reason why I favour the agent-focused empirical paradigm of LE (see Part 4.2.3, 
below) is that questions about the reasonableness (normativity) of the agent’s expectation can straightforwardly 
and transparently be addressed via the assessment of legitimacy alone. 
6 See also Chapter 2.3 on Bentham. 
7 Of course, it also increases the bare probability that I will have a lesson next Tuesday. 
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This example illustrates that many of our plans involve predictions that are normatively 
coloured by the subtleties of the social practices, and associated social roles, relationships 
and standards of conduct, that comprise our daily lives.8 My own view, as we shall later see, 
is that a good theory of LE will be sensitive to these subtleties. But for now I simply hope to 
have shown that it is conjunctive expectations (of inter-temporally consistent behaviour) that 
philosophers of legitimate expectations ought to be interested in. In any case, I shall assume 
as much for the remainder of the chapter (and thesis). 
Turning now to the question of the possible means by which the relevant decision-maker can 
actually identify what the expectations of affected agents are, I take there to be two broad 
possibilities: the Empirical Model and the Imputation Model.  
4.2.1.1 The Empirical Model of expectation-identification 
The Empirical Model is concerned with the relevant agent’s actual expectation. Accordingly, 
it entails that the decision-maker needs to investigate what that expectation was. Of course, 
no-one can literally access another person’s mental state; rather the expectation needs to be 
inferred. But on the Empirical Model one is nonetheless committed to investigating actual 
evidence—the agent’s testimony and conduct, the surrounding circumstances, etc.—in order 
to infer the relevant expectation, much as a civil or criminal law trial will involve making 
inferences of mens rea (intention, recklessness, etc.) from admissible evidence.  
This approach has a significant theoretical advantage: it is coherent with the motivation for 
caring about legitimate expectations in the first place (desideratum #I), viz. that agents’ actual 
expectations matter to how their lives go.  
But it raises two concerns the severity of which is contingent on the concept’s domain of 
application. Both concerns pertain to the fact that the empirical approach is epistemically 
demanding, requiring a detailed investigation of circumstantial evidence necessary to infer 
agent-specific mental states. The first concern is that as the number of agents affected by 
                                                 
8 On the predictive and normative dimensions of social roles and their effect on our practical agency, see 
Dahrendorf (1968). 
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some form of inconsistent behaviour grows, so too do the economic costs of empirically 
investigating the affected agent’s actual expectations. The second concern is that the 
empirical investigations themselves may be intrusive, and thus entail moral costs of some 
kind if conducted without adequate justification. 
In the domain of legislative transitions, it is the state that must ultimately determine which 
agents are entitled to transitional assistance. For LE theories, the normative basis of the 
state’s decision about transitional assistance relating to a legislative change is whether or not 
each affected agent had a legitimate expectation that the law would and ought to remain the 
same. As such, the state must first ascertain which agents in fact had that expectation. If the 
state must identify these expectations empirically, then it would have to carry out the relevant 
investigations into the circumstances of all potentially affected agents. Accordingly, the two 
concerns raised in the previous paragraph would arise with a heightened moral significance. 
While the consequences of this are, in a sense, obvious, they have been underappreciated in 
the LE literature, and are therefore worth spelling out.  
First, the state would have to expend (potentially immense) economic resources to conduct 
the necessary investigations. Financing the investigation effort would require either raising 
taxes, raising debt, or cutting existing public expenditure, which, all else equal, would have 
moral costs in the form of burdens on those agents adversely affected by the revenue-raising 
mechanism. Call these financier moral costs. Second, there would be moral costs arising in 
respect of the agents whose expectation is being investigated. A number of liberal-
egalitarians have highlighted the moral costs associated with overly-intrusive practices 
engaged in by the state in order to determine citizens’ entitlements (Anderson 1999; Carter 
2011; Wolff 1998). These scholars are particularly concerned about state practices that entail 
the revelation and evaluation of agents’ inner lives—their mental states, mental capacities, 
rationality or reasonableness (Anderson 1999, 305–6; Carter 2011, 551–69; Wolff 1998, 
107–15). Empirical investigations into agents’ conjunctive expectations about the law would 
involve precisely such probing of agents’ inner lives. Call these agent moral costs. I shall 
call this combination of financier and agent moral costs associated with the state’s empirical 
investigations the Moral Costs Problem. 
95 
 
Now note that in characteristic legislative transitions, the scale of the Moral Costs Problem 
is particularly severe. This, recall from Part 4.1, is because legislative enactments 
characteristically affect large numbers of agents with heterogeneous expectations, and apply 
impersonally. Accordingly, the range of affected agents is not only large but wide open, such 
that investigations would need to be made into all potentially affected agents. Consider, for 
example, the enactment of an economy-wide carbon tax, affecting producer and consumer 
prices for fuel, electricity, agricultural products, steel and cement, among others. If we now 
contemplate the moral costs of the state having to investigate the actual expectations about 
the legal status of greenhouse gas emissions among all potentially affected agents (as per 
Meyer and Sanklecha 2011, 2014, for instance), we should get a rough sense of the scale of 
the Moral Costs Problem. 
At this point, it might be objected that in representative democracies there exist structures of 
representation—be they geographic, interest-group based or otherwise—that enable 
governments cost-effectively to ascertain information about the effects of legislation on 
various groups. And in most political systems—including but not limited to representative 
democracies—the executive branch has means and incentives to ascertain such information, 
for example through stakeholder consultation.9  
In response, while such mechanisms might reasonably reliably enable the state to gauge the 
interests of affected agents, it is not necessarily a reliable guide to the prior expectations of 
those agents. As I discuss in the next section, there may be many alternative reasons why 
agents experience losses as a result of legal change, of which an incorrect prior expectation 
of legal stability is merely one. Yet constituency representatives would have a vested interest 
in ‘spinning’ all losses as resulting from expectations of legal stability. The state can readily 
see that the members of the coal industry association and the mining workers’ union have an 
interest in avoiding the carbon tax, but did they all really expect that there would never be, 
                                                 
9 I’m grateful to Michael Saward for suggesting this objection. 
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and ought never to be, a carbon tax? If it is truly (legitimate) expectations that matter morally 
in such cases, then the distinction matters a great deal. 
In any case, we can restate the Moral Costs Problem in scalar terms in such a way as to 
accommodate the objection without undermining the overall claim: the greater the number 
of agents that are (potentially) affected by a legal transition and the more heterogeneous their 
expectations are, the more morally costly it will be for the state to ascertain their expectations 
empirically. Even if representative mechanisms lower the marginal cost of empirically 
inferring an agent’s expectation, it still follows that the more wide-reaching a legislative 
change is, the more morally costly the Empirical Model becomes. Imagine, for example, the 
scale of the economic and moral costs involved if the British Government—notwithstanding 
all its considerable representative structures—were required to determine transitional 
entitlements and obligations associated with Brexit legislation using a theory of LE based on 
the Empirical Model of expectation-identification. The point is that in precisely those cases 
of legislative change that have the most far-reaching transitional implications, LE theories 
adopting the Empirical Model would entail the highest moral costs. 
4.2.1.2 The Imputation Model of expectation-identification 
The alternative option is for the state to simply impute to all agents adversely affected by the 
legal change the expectation that the law would stay the same. This is a financially costless 
and certainly much more practicable way for decision-makers to determine the relevant 
expectations of affected agents, and one that avoids the Moral Costs Problem.10 However, 
there are two serious problems with the Imputation Model.  
First is what I shall call the Motivation/Explanation Problem. Recall again that what 
motivates legitimate expectations theories is that agents’ actual expectations facilitate the 
long-term planning that is thought to be important to their practical agency, autonomy and 
wellbeing. Imputing expectations to agents is thus incoherent with the motivation for our 
moral concern with expectations in the first place (offending desideratum #I). It also 
                                                 
10 Though they would still need to ascertain which agents were adversely affected, as other theories do. 
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guarantees that the resulting LE conception will offend desideratum #IV (‘explanatory 
power’): when evaluating some conception of LE in the light of the objects it classifies as 
legitimate expectations, we are unlikely to find that classification explanatorily powerful if 
it makes no reference to the actual expectations of the adversely affected agents.  
Notably, a similar concern has been raised by legal scholars about using an imputation-like 
model of expectation-identification for the administrative law concept of LE that is found in 
various common law jurisdictions. Scholars have registered concern with the very real 
possibility, entailed by imputation, that one could be deemed to have a legitimate expectation 
about X despite having no actual expectation about, or even knowledge of, X. As one leading 
administrative law scholar puts it: “If the individual did not expect anything, then there is 
nothing that the doctrine can protect” (Forsyth 2011, 432). Similarly, Justice McHugh of the 
High Court of Australia (as he then was), writes: “If the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
were now extended to matters about which the person affected has no knowledge, the term 
‘expectation’ would be a fiction …”.11 
At this point, one might object along the following lines: “if people’s long-term projects have 
been adversely affected by a change in the law, then surely they must have expected the law 
to stay the same”. But this inference is unwarranted and likely to be wrong in many cases, 
leading to an over-determination of the class of agents deemed to have expected the law to 
stay the same (see also Räikkä 2014, 25).12 This brings us to the second problem faced by 
the Imputation Model, which I call the False Homogeneity Problem (this parallels the ‘new 
view’ critique of the equivalent ‘old view’ assumption in the L&E literature). Consider the 
following four kinds of case in relation to the enactment of a legislated carbon tax.  
First, some agents might expect the law to change but have sufficiently weighty 
countervailing reasons to pursue the affected project anyway (example: the pleasure-seeking 
                                                 
11 Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, at [31] per McHugh J 
(dissenting).  
12 This matters because it widens the population of agents whose expectation stands to be classified as legitimate 
or otherwise, thus raising the risk of ‘false positives’ when the legitimacy basis—whatever it may be—is 
applied. 
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SUV driver who loves driving a big car, so buys an SUV even though he expects a carbon 
tax to be implemented during the operational life of the vehicle and knows that this will 
reduce the car’s capital value due to the increase in fuel costs). Second, some agents might 
expect the law to change but for reasons of apathy or neglect don’t manage to change their 
plans in time (example: the passive investor who owns coal stocks and, despite expecting a 
carbon tax to be implemented soon, never gets around to instructing her broker to sell them). 
Third, some might expect the law to change but cannot reasonably adapt in time due to no 
fault of their own (example: the low-income tenant in poorly-insulated social housing who 
expects a carbon tax to be enacted but can’t afford to upgrade the insulation in her flat or to 
move elsewhere). And finally, I suspect that for many legal changes there is a large class of 
agents who just don’t ever turn their mind to the relevant law, its potential to change, and its 
effect on their various projects and plans.13 In all four classes of case, the imputation would 
be false.  
Again, we can restate this problem in scalar terms: the more agents that are (potentially) 
affected by a legal transition and the more heterogeneous their expectations are, the more 
vulnerable the Imputation Model is to the False Homogeneity Problem.  
4.2.2 The legitimacy basis 
I now turn to the issue that has generated virtually all of the scholarly debate in the LE 
literature: the legitimacy basis. I first consider the structure-focused accounts more common 
in the literature on legal transitions, followed by agent-focused accounts. 
                                                 
13 Perhaps we could say these agents had an expectation at a higher level of generality—say, that no laws would 
change in a way that adversely affected the value of any of their projects. But this reframing of the expectation 
illustrates the difficulty associated with determining exactly what expectation is to be imputed. Moreover, an 
expectation that the law would never change in an adverse way would also not be a very reasonable expectation 
for a person to hold. Why would we want to determine an agent’s transitional entitlements on the basis of an 
imputed unreasonable expectation? 
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4.2.2.1 Structure-focused accounts 
On a structure-focused account, the legitimacy basis is some macro-structural feature of the 
relevant legislative activity. Two such accounts are discussed14 by Lukas Meyer and Pranay 
Sanklecha (2011, 2014).15 On the Normative Authority View, “[i]f the political authority in 
charge of maintaining the background institutions and of ensuring widespread compliance is 
legitimate, then so are the expectations generated by those institutions and that compliance” 
(2014, 375, citing Meyer and Sanklecha 2011). On the Simple Justice View, legitimacy is a 
function not of the legitimacy of the authority that makes the law, but rather of the justness 
of the expectation of legal stability: effectively, an expectation that an unjust law will 
continue will not be legitimate, but insofar as the legal status quo is just, then one can 
legitimately expect it to continue (Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 377–79, 388).16 Additionally, 
the hybrid accounts proposed by Matt Matravers (2017) and Margaret Moore (2017) 
incorporate something like the Simple Justice View in the first stage of their LE 
conceptions.17  
Each of these accounts of the legitimacy basis is worthy of analysis in its own right, but 
consistent with my “theory-focused” critique I want to elucidate a deeper problem that all 
structure-focused accounts of the legitimacy basis face (and which Moore’s and Matravers’ 
accounts face insofar as they are structure-focused), which I call the Generality Problem. By 
locating the touchstone of legitimacy in some macro-structural feature of the government or 
law itself, structure-focused accounts yield determinations of legitimacy that apply generally 
                                                 
14 I say “discussed” because it is not clear whether Meyer and Sanklecha endorse these theories. 
15  Bentham’s view, that all laws create legitimate expectations, is also a structure-focused account. For 
discussion of this view and its particular problems, see Chapter 2.3 and Brown (2017a, 437–40, 2017b, 54–57). 
16 The authors also consider a “procedural” version of the Simple Justice View, according to which a just 
expectation is one that came about under a just basic structure. This is essentially the Rawlsian position (1971, 
10, sec. 48), but the authors leave it aside since it is an ideal-theoretic view that does not apply to real-world, 
non-ideal circumstances (Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 377–378), which for them and other contemporary 
scholars of legitimate expectations (e.g., Brown 2017b, 2) is the context of interest. 
17 Matravers argues that laws involving violations of fundamental democratic machinery, basic rights and 
liberties, and a “social minimum” of socio-economic entitlements (he draws on Rawls to fill these out) can 
never generate legitimate expectations that such laws will continue (2017, 318). According to Moore’s first 
stage, expectations can never be legitimate if they are contrary to “objective justice”, by which she means “rules 
or policies or practices that are egregiously unjust, that violate basic human rights, or some kind of moral 
minimum” (2017, 234). The theories of justice invoked in these views are discussed in my Chapter 5. 
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to all agents affected by a given legal change who share the expectation of legal stability; 
legitimacy is determined ‘upstream’ and the determination applies to all such expectations 
‘downstream’ of the legal change. Consequently, structure-focused conceptions of LE are 
insensitive to normatively relevant features of cases arising at the agent level that give us 
good reasons to treat different agents affected by the same legal change differently. These 
features might include: the kind of agents affected (e.g. corporations vs natural persons), the 
social roles the agents were performing when the expectation was formed (e.g. professionals 
vs lay-persons), and the other relevant circumstances in which the expectation arose. I say 
“might include” because my aim here is not to defend a particular agent-focused account, but 
rather to defend the more general claim that agent-focused considerations like these are 
normatively relevant. This more modest claim is sufficient to establish that structure-focused 
accounts face the Generality Problem. 
Consider the following example, inspired by Buchanan (1975, 421) and Hsieh (2000, 103): 
National Hospital Service: The government commits to establishing a National Hospital 
Service (NHS). To promote the initiative, the Prime Minister attends one of the country’s top 
science-focused high schools to encourage students to enrol in medicine. She says to the 
students that if they study medicine, they’ll “have a job for life with the NHS”.  
On the basis of the PM’s inspiring presentation and assurance of a job for life, Dorothy 
decides to switch her university preference from computer science to medicine. She 
undertakes extensive training over many years, at her considerable expense, and qualifies as 
a doctor, expecting that she will and ought to have a job for life at the NHS. However, just 
before she enters the job market, the government slashes funding for, and privatises, the NHS 
(assume this requires extensive legislative reform), and its new private owner decides to 
implement a hiring freeze for five years. Dorothy is never able to obtain employment as an 
NHS doctor despite her best efforts, and has to settle for a less lucrative and rewarding job. 
A company called SupplyCo is also adversely affected by this change in law. Spotting a 
business opportunity supplying medical equipment to the NHS, SupplyCo did well during 
the early NHS years. It formed the expectation that the state-ownership and funding of the 
NHS would and should be maintained indefinitely, and expanded its operations accordingly. 
When the NHS was privatised, SupplyCo’s share price fell dramatically.  
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Vanessa, an investor with shares in SupplyCo, also expected the NHS would and should 
continue in its current legal form indefinitely. She incurred a capital loss when SupplyCo’s 
share price tumbled after the privatisation and funding cuts. 
These three agents shared roughly the same expectation about the government’s commitment 
to the NHS, albeit that Dorothy’s expectation was more specific, pertaining to her having “a 
job for life at the NHS”. But they are all very different kinds of agents, whose expectations 
arose in the context of their performing very different social roles and in otherwise quite 
different circumstances. These differences seem normatively relevant to the classification of 
their expectation as legitimate or otherwise.  
Intuitively, Dorothy seems to have a stronger case for LE-based transitional assistance than 
the other agents because of the specific promise made to her and her classmates by the Prime 
Minister.18 SupplyCo and Vanessa, on the other hand, have a weak case. For one thing, there 
was no specific assurance made to them about the ongoing government support for the NHS. 
Moreover, SupplyCo is a business corporation and Vanessa a stockmarket investor, and both 
are making capital investments for profit in contexts in which investors themselves 
conventionally assume risks of loss, including so-called ‘policy risk’, as the quid pro quo of 
the chance for financial gain (see Chapter 8.3.2). Of course, markets for education and labour, 
too, carry inherent risks, and we might think that Dorothy ought to bear some of that risk. On 
the other hand, one might consider risks to the value of one’s skillset to be very difficult for 
agents to manage because they are important, lumpy and person-specific assets, making them 
virtually unavoidable and yet difficult to diversify and insure against (Shaviro 2000, 41–42). 
We need not resolve these questions decisively here, and reasonable minds are likely to differ 
on the details. What I hope to have established, though, is that the kinds of reasons that we 
would appeal to are reasons arising at the agent level, and these reasons suggest at least 
differences in the strength of the different agents’ normative claims. Structure-focused LE 
                                                 
18 I take no stand here on whether her expectation was legitimate, all things considered. My point is that she 
intuitively has an arguable case and a stronger one than SupplyCo and Vanessa. 
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conceptions are blind to such agent-level considerations, since they treat all agents with 
similar expectations (however identified) in the same way. 
Let me illustrate by applying Meyer and Sanklecha’s Normative Authority View to the NHS 
case. If we were to plug-in a conception of legitimate authority that yielded the verdict that 
the government was legitimate at the relevant time, then Dorothy, SupplyCo and Vanessa 
would all be deemed to have legitimate expectations of legislative stability with respect to 
the NHS.19 Intuitively, this is clearly the wrong result for at least SupplyCo and Vanessa 
(false positives), though an arguable case could be made that it gets the right result for 
Dorothy. If, alternatively, a conception of legitimate authority were plugged-in that yielded 
the verdict that the government was not legitimate, then none of the agents would be deemed 
to have a legitimate expectation. This would imply the correct result for SupplyCo and 
Vanessa, though possibly the wrong result for Dorothy (a false negative). Accordingly, this 
LE conception would perform patchily with respect to desideratum #III (“intuition 
correlation”). More fundamentally, the Normative Authority View fails to adequately explain 
these results (desideratum #IV). As I have argued, we want to classify agents’ expectations 
on the basis of the kinds of agent-level considerations to which this View is inherently blind, 
and not—or at least not only—by reference to the legitimacy of the governmental authority.  
Furthermore, structure-focused accounts of the legitimacy basis fail to account for 
idiosyncrasies arising from the conjunctive nature of expectations. If agents’ expectations 
about the future content of the law have this dual epistemic and normative character, then the 
formation of an expectation necessarily engages both the rational, epistemic capabilities of 
an agent (e.g. to form true beliefs on the basis of which to predict the future) as well as their 
moral-political capabilities (e.g. to critically reflect on and reason about the legal status quo). 
When we see that these forms of agency are involved in the formation of relevant 
expectations about the law, then we must acknowledge the potential for agents to make 
epistemic and moral-political errors when forming their expectations. If such errors are 
                                                 
19 I am assuming that legitimate authority is an “all-or-nothing” affair. For a discussion of Raz’s agent-relative 
approach to legitimate authority in the context of the Normative Authority View, see Meyer and Sanklecha 
(2014, 375–76). 
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possible, then they ought to bear upon an assessment of the legitimacy of an expectation. 
How, one might wonder, could an expectation be legitimate if it is irrational and/or immoral? 
Because of their generality, structure-focused accounts must ignore such nuances.20 
In sum, conceptions of LE that use a structure-focused legitimacy basis are not sufficiently 
fine-grained to pick up distinctions between affected agents arising at the agent level—
distinctions that seem to matter to our normative characterisation of those agents’ 
expectations and transitional entitlements. 
4.2.2.2 Agent-focused accounts 
Agent-focused accounts of the legitimacy basis, by contrast, do determine legitimacy by 
reference to normatively-relevant features arising at the agent level, such as the kind of agents 
affected, their relevant social roles, and other relevant circumstances in which their 
expectations were formed.  
I am not aware of any purely agent-focused accounts in the LE literature.21 Alex Brown’s 
(2017b) theory incorporates some agent-sensitive considerations at various stages,22 though 
it does not apply to primary legislation (I consider it in Part 4.3, below). However, Matravers’ 
and Moore’s hybrid conceptions of LE include agent-focused considerations at their second 
stage, i.e. to be considered where the expectations in question do not pertain to matters of 
basic justice (the first stage).23 For Matravers (2017, 319–21), agent-focused features that are 
potentially relevant to the legitimacy of an expectation include the position of the agent 
                                                 
20 What tends to happen is that these considerations are swept under the carpet via assumptions about the 
‘validity’ or ‘justification’ or ‘warrant’ for the agent’s holding the expectation, without specifying and 
defending the normative standards embodied in these assumptions: see above footnote 5.  
21  Meyer and Sanklecha’s Complex Justice View (2014, 383–87) could be considered to be a hybrid 
structure/agent-focused account of the legitimacy basis, since it includes structure-focused considerations (a 
requirement that the expectation respects relevant substantive considerations of justice that are uncontroversial: 
at 385–86) and agent-focused considerations (such as whether the agent’s expectation was consistent with her 
own other views about justice: at 386). I leave this account aside as its exposition and discussion would take up 
too much space. Suffice it to note that this account faces numerous problems, not least of which being the Moral 
Costs Problem, which applies a fortiori to this conception of LE since it requires the state to identify not only 
each agent’s expectation about the relevant law, but also each agent’s other relevant views about justice. 
22 See above footnote 5 and Green (forthcoming). 
23 I’m paraphrasing these authors here—refer to footnote 17, above, for the specific formulations of the first 
stage of their respective theories. 
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within the social structure, and whether the agent ought to have foreseen that their conduct 
was morally wrong and likely to be precluded by a future legal change. For Moore, 
determining the legitimacy of expectations (at the second stage) is a matter of determining 
the fairness of the expectation (2017, 239–42, 248). Moore does not give us a thorough-going 
account of fairness, but in the course of discussing some example cases she identifies 
numerous agent-focused considerations: (1) whether the agent developed a reliance interest 
based on their expectation that a law (or social practice) would continue; (2) whether the 
agent ought to have foreseen the relevant change to a law (or social practice); (3) the 
suddenness of the change; (4) whether the agent suffered a “serious” loss or disadvantage as 
a result of the change; and (5) countervailing distributional considerations, such as the agent’s 
pre-existing wealth relative to others (2017, 239–42, 248).24  
It can readily be seen how agent-focused accounts such as these could be sufficiently 
sensitive to agent-level considerations. They seem to enable us to differentiate among agents 
with similar expectations who are affected by the same legal change, as in my NHS 
hypothetical, in a way that would correlate with and adequately explain widely shared 
intuitions. For example, the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” with respect to future 
legal changes could provide a principled basis for distinguishing the legitimacy of 
expectations of legal stability harboured by a corporation or professional investor in a capital 
markets context from the expectations of a high school student making education choices on 
the basis of a specific assurance by the Prime Minister. My point, again, is not to endorse any 
particular agent-focused conceptions of LE (including any of those discussed in the previous 
paragraph), but rather to illustrate that such conceptions of LE at least have the conceptual 
resources to take account of intuitively difference-making features arising at the agent level; 
they can avoid the Generality Problem. 
However, we can readily see how such conceptions of LE entail onerous informational 
requirements. When applied to legislative transitions, this means the state would need to 
investigate a range of facts about all potentially adversely-affected individuals pertaining to 
                                                 
24 The numbering scheme is my own, added for clarity. 
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the kinds of agents they are, their relevant social roles, and other relevant circumstances 
surrounding the formation of their expectation. This would require potentially expensive and 
intrusive investigations by the state, giving rise to a version of the Moral Costs Problem, 
albeit in respect of the legitimacy basis, as distinct from the expectation model (again, this 
problem can be expressed in scalar terms: see above, Part 4.2.1.1). 25  When applied to 
characteristic legislative transitions, the scale of the epistemic burden would be such as to 
entail weighty moral costs for similar reasons to those expressed above pertaining to the 
Empirical Model of expectation-identification, discussed in Part 4.2.1.1. 
4.2.3 Two paradigms of legitimate expectations: a dilemma 
Based on the two main parameter values of each of the two building blocks of LE conceptions 
that I have discussed, we can identify four basic possible kinds of LE conception—and we 
can now see the tally of problems facing each one (Table 1). From these four possibilities, 
two represent more natural combinations than the other two, hence I identify two opposing 
paradigms of LE: the fine-grained, empirically-demanding Agent-Focused Empirical 
Paradigm (AFEP); and the coarse-grained, empirically undemanding Structure-Focused 
Imputation Paradigm (SFIP) (shaded cells in Table 1).  
Table 1: LE conceptions and their problems 
Legitimacy Basis 
Expectation Model 
Agent-focused Structure-focused 
Empirical  Moral Costs Problem (EM/LB) Moral Costs Problem (EM) 
Generality Problem 
Imputation  Motivation/Explanation Problem 
False Homogeneity Problem 
Moral Costs Problem (LB) 
Motivation/Explanation Problem 
False Homogeneity Problem 
Generality Problem 
Paradigmatic LE conceptions are shaded. EM = Expectation Model; LB = Legitimacy Basis 
We are now in a position to appreciate a fundamental dilemma facing anyone who seeks to 
build a good conception of LE and use it in a good theory of legal transitions. They must 
choose between: a theoretically and intuitively appealing conception of LE that faces high 
                                                 
25 An agent-focused legitimacy basis will typically and naturally combine with an empirical expectation model, 
so the two types of Moral Costs Problem will typically go together. 
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moral costs when applied to characteristic legislative transitions; and a theoretically 
implausible conception of LE that has no moral costs when applied to characteristic 
legislative transitions. 
This dilemma suggests that the two philosophical projects—LE conception-building, and 
theorising about legal transitions—should part ways. More constructively, the results of the 
above analysis suggest some minimal conditions for the development of good conceptions 
of LE and good theories of legal transitions, respectively. I will address the former in Part 
4.3, and the latter in Part 4.4, below. 
4.3 A WAY FORWARD FOR LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS THEORY 
Regarding the project of building a good conception of LE in general (i.e. not just for a theory 
of legal transitions), my analysis suggests the best way forward is to build on the fine-grained, 
context-sensitive AFEP—since it is motivationally coherent, and able to generate intuitively 
correct and explanatorily powerful results—but to limit its application to subdomains in 
which the moral costs of information-gathering are avoidable or at least justifiable.  
The most natural subdomain to build and test good conceptions of LE seems to me to be that 
of private interpersonal morality and, by extension, private law. These subdomains 
characteristically involve interactions among a small, closed number of identified individuals, 
whose expectations of inter-temporally consistent behaviour arise from some triggering 
conduct in the course of a social practice, relationship or transaction in which they are 
engaged. As such, my view is that LE can best be understood as a species of special rights 
(and corresponding special obligations) that are similar in nature to the special rights that 
arise from a (moral) promise or (legal) contract (Hart 1955, 183).26 Archetypical examples 
include a recurring dinner arrangement between friends (cf. Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 370), 
                                                 
26 Indeed, I think legitimate expectations are a good candidate for filling what Sidgwick identified as the “dim 
borderland” of private morality that falls short of explicit promises and binding contracts and encompasses 
“what are called ‘implied contracts’ or ‘tacit understandings’” (1962 [1874], 269–70). The common law of 
equity recognises quasi-legal obligations of transactional consistency that stem from certain kinds of 
behavioural interactions between agents that fall short of contracts—for example, via the doctrine of estoppel. 
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professional–client relationships, interactions among members of a private association, and 
the negotiation of a business deal between commercial parties. In these kinds of cases, the 
legitimacy of expectations of inter-temporally consistent behaviour will quite naturally be 
determined with reference to the practice-specific internal standards of the social practice in 
which the agents are engaged and their particular roles within it, as the two variants of my 
cello lesson example in Part 4.2.1 also illustrate. Moreover, the characteristically small-n, 
closed nature of private interactions ensures the costs of information-gathering in these 
subdomains would be manageable and in any case borne by the parties in the event of a moral 
or legal dispute among them; the state is simply not involved.27 As such, these investigations 
would entail no moral costs.  
Special rights-based conceptions of LE developed in these ‘core’ subdomains of private 
morality and private law could then be incrementally scaled to certain kinds of analogous 
public decision-making, providing a sound basis for the concept’s application in political 
philosophy (or ‘public morality’) and public law. Most relevantly, the more agent-focused, 
relational, practice-sensitive direction of LE theorising that I endorse could help to better 
delimit the concept’s application to administrative law—a domain in which the concept is 
widely found but subject to considerable jurisprudential controversy (see Brown 2017b, 7–
31). It is notable that some leading administrative law scholars already adopt the kind of 
approach to legitimate expectations (qua administrative law doctrine) that I am endorsing. 
Robert Thomas argues that legitimate expectations “operate only in the context of a specific 
relationship between an individual, or a specific class of people, and the administration” 
(2000, 45–46 footnote omitted). Agreeing with Thomas, Paul Reynolds notes that the 
adjudication of “legitimate expectations cases will require a more subtle investigation into 
subjective perceptions and individual relationships” (2011, 340). Moreover, courts in the 
                                                 
27 If, as I envisage, a suitably developed AFEP approach to LE were to be incorporated into private law doctrine, 
then the possibility of private litigation arises. This means the judiciary (and hence the state) would be involved. 
But that involvement would require the initiation of legal proceedings by the aggrieved party, and hence their 
consent to the information-gathering associated with litigation. 
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English common law system have tended to be loath to recognise the legitimacy of 
expectations arising from large-n, open-ended, and high-political contexts (see Steyn 2001).  
I take up elsewhere the more onerous task of developing and defending a specific conception 
of LE that takes the broad direction sketched here (Green, in prep.). For now I wish merely 
to highlight one important implication for legal transitions of this broadly-sketched direction: 
it leaves open the theoretical possibility that LE could apply to certain non-characteristic 
legislative transitions. For example, where legislation affects only a small, closed number of 
identified agents and there is some kind of special relationship between the state and these 
agents in the course of which some conduct by the state triggered the relevant expectations, 
I think it is possible that the expectations in question could be deemed legitimate (and because 
of the small-n, closed nature of the context, the moral costs of determining the expectations 
and their legitimacy could be adequately managed).  
However, once we conceptualise LE in this way, it is the special-right-creating triggering 
conduct (in the course of the relevant social practice / special relationship) that grounds the 
legitimacy of the expectation. We are no longer dealing with the standard problem of legal 
transitions, in which the simple fact that legislation is different from one period to the next is 
the normative issue. Rather, we are dealing with a quite different, quasi-private-law/morality 
doctrine, albeit one that sometimes applies to (non-characteristic) legislative transitions.  
On this last point, the direction of my proposed approach is consonant with that of Alex 
Brown in his most recent publications on the subject (2017a, 2017b).28 In Brown’s work, 
legitimate expectations have a special rights-like status similar to what I have proposed (see 
especially Brown 2017b, 48–51), with government agencies being liable for frustrating 
legitimate expectations that they were “responsible” for inducing, where they had assumed a 
role responsibility over the relevant policy domain (ibid 61). Again, it is this prior triggering 
conduct that is doing the normative heavy lifting. 
                                                 
28 I leave aside Brown’s earlier view on the subject (Brown 2011), which differs in numerous respects from his 
2017 publications. 
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A key difference between our approaches, though, is that the scope of Brown’s theory is 
limited to administrative actions:29 Brown rules out a priori the concept’s application to 
either primary legislation on the one hand, or private morality and private law on the other 
(Brown 2017b, 15–20, 113–17). I do not think that Brown’s scope limitation is defensible. 
Because of the broad way Brown specifies government “responsibility”,30  his theory is 
relatively conservative with respect to administrative actions; governments will frequently 
trigger their obligations to fulfil expectations or to compensate agents for frustrating them. 
Fittingly, for such a conservative approach, Brown appeals to the Kantian deontological 
maxim of respecting people as ends in themselves as a justification for his theory (ibid 189–
92).31 However, the fact that Brown limits the scope of his doctrine to administrative actions 
means that the state can frustrate expectations at will via primary legislation, without 
attracting any liability under his theory (ibid 113–17). This sits uneasily with the 
deontological justification given for his theory as a whole: a theory that protects people 
against losses caused by administrative actions on deontological grounds should, a fortiori, 
demand protection of the individual against losses caused by legislation, too.32  
My more general, private interaction-based approach avoids this problem of overly-rigid 
boundaries. Rather, it allows for a more fluid traversal of subdomain boundaries (private, 
public, administrative, legislative), so long as the relevant conditions (pertaining to the 
“social practice” and “triggering conduct”—which I have not developed here) are satisfied 
and the moral costs of information-gathering can be managed.  
                                                 
29 This encompasses both “administrative policies” (e.g., secondary legislation, general rules, regulations, and 
policy statements) and “administrative measures” (e.g., particular administrative orders, decisions, and 
adjudications that relate to a single agent or small number of identifiable agents) (Brown 2017b, 98). 
30  Brown specifies three illustrative (non-exhaustive) “modes” of action/omission by which government 
agencies will be deemed so responsible: (1) inadvertently, (2) negligently, or (3) intentionally causing the agent 
to expect that a particular administrative course of action will be taken (2017b, 64–76). 
31 Interestingly, Brown argues that his theory is partly grounded in, or supported by, both deontological values 
and principles and utilitarian values and principles (2017b, chaps. 6, 7). I have argued elsewhere (Green 
forthcoming) that the utilitarian justification for Brown’s theory is unpersuasive given the counter-utilitarian 
implications of his conservative theory in non-ideal societies. Rather, his conservative theory stands in need of 
a deontological justification (such as those that he also invokes).  
32 Brown adduces some additional reasons for excluding primary legislation (2017b, 113–17). I argue elsewhere 
that these are ad hoc, unpersuasive and at odds with his deontological justification (Green forthcoming). 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the concept of legitimate expectations has grave limitations as a basis for 
a theory of legal transitions. The best (least-problematic) basic kind of LE conception is 
agent-focused and concerned with the actual expectations of affected agents. Yet this fine-
grained focus on the affected agent’s mental state and circumstances places an epistemic 
burden on the normative evaluator. In subdomains involving private interpersonal 
interactions, this burden will typically be manageable, as it would be in certain subdomains 
of government activity, such as administrative actions that have a small-n, closed, relational 
character, and perhaps also (non-characteristic) legislative changes that have that character. 
Accordingly, I sketched a direction for theorising about LE that embraces these empirically-
sensitive, agent-focused building blocks and treats LE as a species of special rights that 
paradigmatically applies to small-n, closed, interpersonal interactions. But in characteristic 
legislative transitions, I argued, the epistemic burden entailed by this paradigm of LE 
generates qualitatively and quantitatively weighty moral costs. Future approaches to legal 
transitions will therefore need to balance the imperative to mitigate such moral costs with the 
imperative to take seriously the specific situations of the diverse agents typically affected by 
legislative change. The principles that I invoke in my theory of legal transitions have been 
framed with these countervailing imperatives in mind (a point I return to in Chapter 10.3).  
I have argued here that LE is an inappropriate conceptual vehicle for developing theories of 
legal transitions. But in the course of the discussion, we encountered numerous theories of 
the legitimacy basis that themselves seem like prima facie plausible candidates to be the 
conceptual vehicles for a theory of legal transitions in their own right, without the superfluous 
chassis provided by LE, viz. ‘legitimate authority’, ‘justice’, and ‘fairness’. I leave aside 
‘legitimate authority’-based views as I think they are non-starters (see my discussion of the 
Generality Problem, above). But justice and fairness are genuine candidates, worthy of 
consideration. I think LE can plausibly be conceived as a species of fairness (this, indeed, is 
how ‘old view’ approaches are conceived in the L&E literature), but in any event I consider 
a different theory of fairness—fairness as ex ante responsibility for managing risks (here, 
risks of legal change)—in Chapter 8. I consider ideal-justice theories of legal transitions in 
the next chapter, as a second type of liberal-egalitarian approach to legal transitions. 
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 JUSTICE: LIBERAL-EGALITARIAN  
THEORIES (II) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
We saw in the previous chapter that a number of legitimate expectations theorists have 
endorsed or considered the view that what makes an expectation legitimate is the substantive 
justness of the law that the relevant agent expects to continue, or of the basic structure of the 
society in which that law obtains (Brown 2017a, 440–42, 2017b, 57–59, 78–87; Buchanan 
1975; Matravers 2017, 159; Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 377–83; Moore 2017, 233–34; 
Rawls 1999, 273–77). In this chapter I consider the prospects of a theory of legal transitions 
that is grounded directly in considerations of justice, without invoking the fraught overlay of 
‘legitimate expectations’. Specifically, I focus on the notion of ideal justice in the 
Kantian/Rawlsian liberal-egalitarian tradition.1  
Writers in the liberal-egalitarian tradition are concerned with the instantiation of a just 
political-institutional order that is sufficient for individuals to form, revise and rationally 
pursue their reasonable conceptions of the good and associated life plans in accordance with 
justice. Achieving such an outcome requires not only securing to individuals a suite of 
political liberties but also distributing to them certain generalized resources (“primary social 
goods”) that are necessary if each is to be able to fully exercise their capacities for reason 
and rationality (Rawls 1971, 1974, 18). Individuals have rights to these liberties and 
resources and, via the institutions of the state, duties to provide them to all citizens. In this 
chapter, I explore the implications of a Kantian/Rawlsian ideal conception of justice for legal 
transitions, taken to its logical extreme and unaffected by independent considerations.  
                                                 
1 I mean ‘ideal justice as opposed to ‘conservative justice’ (on this distinction, see Chapter 1.2). To be clear: I 
am not suddenly moving into ideal theory; I am simply considering the non-ideal (real world) application of a 
theory or principle of legal transitions that is based on some ideal notion of justice. All one needs to accept is 
the possibility that an overall unjust (non-ideal) state can have (some) particular laws that are just.  
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In a broad-brush way, I share Meyer and Sanklecha’s (2014, 377–83) view that there is 
something intuitively plausible about basing a theory of legal transitions on justice, yet on 
closer inspection such a position is found wanting in certain important respects. Elucidating 
what is attractive and unattractive about such a view should therefore prove helpful in our 
quest for the best theory of legal transitions, and this thought motivates the approach and 
structure of this chapter. 
In Part 5.2, I defend the prima facie relevance thesis—the claim that considerations of justice 
appear, prima facie, to be at least relevant to the determination of disputes about legal 
transitions. I motivate this thesis by considering, as a foil, two views that take (ideal) justice 
to be an irrelevant consideration in legal transitions (Brown 2017b, 78–87; Simmons 2010, 
20–21). By appealing to intuitions in so-called ‘obvious injustice’ cases, such as slavery 
abolition, which seem to cry out for a justice-based principled explanation, I argue that justice 
considerations are prima facie relevant. The challenge for justice-based views arises when it 
comes to turning intuitions from ‘obvious injustice’ cases into a determinate, comprehensive, 
justice-based principle of legal transitions (that is applicable to non-ideal societies). In Part 
5.3, I try to sketch how such a principled approach might go, by building on theories about 
basic (or ‘natural’) rights and duties/responsibilities that have already been widely endorsed 
within the tradition. I will only sketch the approach because my aim is not to defend it, but 
rather to specify a plausible candidate justice-based principle of legal transitions so that it 
can be evaluated. In Part 5.4, I discuss numerous weaknesses of this candidate principle, and 
justice-based approaches to transitions more generally, which, I claim, are sufficiently grave 
as to warrant abandoning them altogether, despite their prima facie relevance. Part 5.5 
concludes. 
5.2 THE PRIMA FACIE RELEVANCE OF JUSTICE TO LEGAL TRANSITIONS 
Consider the following approach to legal transitions advocated by A. John Simmons:  
In   changing   even   unjust   institutional   rules,   we   are   generally sensitive to the moral 
dangers of “rug-pulling” … that is, cases where people base life plans or important activities 
on the reasonable expectation that the rules will remain unchanged … and then have the rug 
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pulled from beneath them by sudden institutional change. The loss and suffering that such 
changes in institutional rules can  bring  about  may  often  both  be  considerable  and  seem  
unfair to those who had little choice but to rely on the future being like the past. This fact  
seems  to  many  to  argue  for  a  requirement  that  institutional changes  proceed  gradually,  
with  ample  prior  warning,  or  that  such changes be accompanied by policies providing 
compensation for those who have innocently relied (to their detriment) on even unjust rules. 
(Simmons 2010, 20–21)  
I don’t doubt that there is some truth in Simmons’ position. But there are certain cases—call 
them ‘obvious injustice’ cases—which seem to put severe pressure on it. The paradigmatic 
case is that of the slave-owner in a society where slavery is legally permitted. He persistently 
breaches his basic duties of morality and/or justice owed to his slaves, and the slaves’ basic 
rights are systematically violated. When slavery is legally abolished, the slave-owner would 
experience a range of losses (lost capital investment and a loss of social status, at least2). The 
state then has to make a decision about transitional arrangements. Simmons seems committed 
to the view that slavery abolition should proceed slowly, or that compensation should be paid 
to slave-owners.3  
But this seems to fly in the face of ordinary morality and justice. Many readers will intuitively 
think that the slave-owner is not entitled to a conservative response. And the seemingly most 
obvious reason for this conclusion is that the slave-owner was under a prior, basic duty to 
avoid causing wrongful harm and/or violating others’ basic rights. In light of this basic duty, 
we might think, he ought to have at least adapted his behaviour and plans by never acquiring 
slaves in the first place, or freeing them once he had done so. It seems to follow 
straightforwardly that, when slavery is eventually abolished legally, he should not have a 
                                                 
2 Depending on one’s theory of loss, one might also add (forward-looking) expectation losses, such as loss of 
future income. 
3 Much might depend on what Simons means by “innocently relied”. But since Simmons explicitly envisages 
that his conservative approach applies to unjust rules, a charitable reading (one that avoids internal 
contradiction) would suggest that perpetrating injustice wouldn’t necessarily undermine a claim to “innocent” 
reliance.  
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claim against the state for a conservative remedy. When slavery is abolished, the law is 
simply catching up with what agents were already under a basic duty to do.  
The correctness of this conclusion seems to be fortified by symmetrical consideration of the 
winners from the legal change—in this example, the legally freed slaves. What transitional 
obligations do these ‘winners’ have? The freed slaves benefit from the legal change by 
receiving an increase in social status and opportunities (or so I shall assume). Should their 
disadvantageous position under the old laws be grandfathered? Should their benefits be 
clawed back (e.g. taxed away)? Again, most readers will intuit that the correct position is that 
these ‘winners’ should retain their benefits (if anything, we might think, it is the former slaves 
who are entitled to compensation for past wrongs4). Again, the best explanation for this 
intuition seems to be that the freed slaves have a basic right to their newfound benefits; since 
these gains are rightful requirements of morality and justice, they should not be denied them.  
Now consider Alex Brown’s view. Perhaps surprisingly for a liberal egalitarian, Brown is 
unimpressed by these kinds of considerations. In the course of arguing for his own 
‘government responsibility’-based legitimate expectations theory of legal transitions (see 
Chapter 4.3), Brown gives serious consideration to justice-based views but ultimately argues 
that the justice or otherwise of the expectation (or the underlying basic structure or particular 
law) is irrelevant (2017b, 78–87). To illustrate his view, Brown constructs a detailed case 
involving an obviously unjust system of racially-segregated access to housing (a system 
Brown concedes is unjust), and considers the position of a hypothetical white couple, Mr and 
Mrs van Ark, who buy land in a gated community designated whites-only and apply for 
planning permission from the state to build on the land. Permission is duly granted and the 
van Arks make various preparatory expenditures. But then the system of racially-segregated 
housing is abolished (“primarily”, Brown says, “for the reason that it is unjust”), whites-only 
gated communities are thus also abolished, and the van Arks’ planning permission is 
                                                 
4 I need not take a stand on this issue here. Suffice it to say that if one holds the view that persons are entitled 
to compensation or other remedy in respect of past moral wrongs or injustices (see Chapter 1.2 on rectificatory 
justice), then a fortiori one should not adopt a conservative theory of legal transitions in respect of the rightful 
legal reform of such wrongs or injustices.  
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rescinded before the house is completed. On Brown’s theory, the van Arks do have a 
legitimate expectation. Moreover, says Brown, “I believe they do irrespective of the fact that 
the substance of their expectation was unjust at the time of its creation”.5 
However, I think that Brown’s case trades on countervailing intuitions readers are likely to 
have about the importance of housing to people’s life plans (and hence their concern for the 
van Arks’ wellbeing independently of the injustice), and perhaps also on ambiguities in the 
case about the extent and social knowledge of the injustice. Consider instead the following 
case, where all such doubts are erased, thus isolating the obvious injustice: 
The Torture Games: The state of Barbarica holds an annual tournament in the capital, in 
which individual citizens—selected at random in advance—are involuntarily tortured for 
public entertainment. The Games bring in much revenue for the state, in the form of entry 
fees, tourism and gambling expenditure. The Government promotes the Games heavily for 
months in advance, specifically encouraging people to come and watch the “fun”—and the 
2018 Games are no exception. Brute is a wealthy man who loves watching the Games. Each 
year, he spends a considerable sum on travel to the capital, entry tickets, accommodation, and 
Games-related merchandise (all of which are non-refundable). He arrives at the capital in 
time for the 2018 Games only to find that, following a ministerial reshuffle, the Games have 
been cancelled because they are unjust.6  
Brown seems committed to the view that the injustice is irrelevant to Brute’s transitional 
entitlement, and that the state should compensate Brute for his out of pocket expenses. 
These kinds of obvious injustice cases present problems for theories such as those of 
Simmons and Brown. One reason we might think that they do so is because those theories 
deny that basic rights and duties of morality and justice can have implications for what agents 
ought to do, independent of what the law happens to be (Simmons) or of how public agencies 
                                                 
5 Brown’s position does not depend on the van Arks’ motivation. He goes on to consider a variant of the case 
that includes the additional stipulation that “the van Arks are committed to a system of racially segregated 
housing and fully intend to participate in and support that system”, and had perfectly viable options to buy land 
and housing in a racially mixed community. “What difference would this make to the issue of whether or not 
the van Arks’ expectation is legitimate? I believe that it makes no difference” (Brown 2017b, 84). 
6 I frame this as an administrative action because Brown’s theory applies to such actions only (2017b, 98). 
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have encouraged people to behave (Brown), and this seems to entail a mistaken 
understanding of what it is to be a moral and political agent. If people, qua moral/political 
agents, have basic duties of morality and justice to respect other people’s basic rights (as 
libertarians and liberal egalitarians must claim they do, even if the details are filled out quite 
differently) then surely it follows that those individuals must assimilate those basic duties 
into their cognition and agency—their beliefs, expectations, plans and actions. To go on 
mechanically believing, expecting, planning and acting as if there were no moral or political 
imperatives to do otherwise would be to deny the moral and political force of the duties 
themselves. Such mechanical indifference to wrongfulness and injustice would be a sign of 
a defective moral and political agent; one who cannot respond to moral and political reasons.7 
Agents, rather, have moral and political reasons to avoid basing their life plans and actions 
around the benefits they could receive from injustice and moral wrongdoing.8 This, at least, 
must be a relevant set of considerations for anyone who takes seriously the idea that justice 
entails basic rights and duties that stand apart from convention or law. 
This line of thought should register especially forcefully against Brown’s view, since he 
adopts a Kantian/Rawlsian conception of the person. Brown leans particularly heavily on the 
Kantian/Rawlsian assumption that individuals (like the van Arks) have rationally chosen 
their ends and generated a life plan through which they pursue those ends, entailing that the 
state has no business disrupting those plans by changing the law. In an earlier article, Brown 
justifies his conservative approach to legal transitions on the ground that “[t]o treat 
individuals as ends in themselves is to respect them as separate persons whose rational 
capacity to formulate and execute long-term plans must be respected” (2011, 725), and in his 
2017 book (in which the van Arks example is discussed) he reiterates this Kantian idea to 
                                                 
7 It is for this reason that Simmons’ claim that people have a “reasonable expectation that the rules will remain 
unchanged” is problematic. It is not “reasonable” to expect in a normative sense that unjust rules will remain 
unchanged if basic political duties behove us, as political agents, to resist and reform unjust institutions.  
8 Such avoidance will often be more feasible than Simmons assumes in the above-quoted passage (“those who 
had little choice but to rely on the future being like the past”). Agents can plan their lives on the assumption 
that unjust laws will change, and can treat any benefits arising from that injustice as provisional and liable to be 
disgorged when the laws do change—held as if ‘on trust’ for the victims of injustice. When the rug is unjust, 
one shouldn’t put too much furniture on it. See also Persad (2017, 292–95). 
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justify his conservative approach to legitimate expectations in administrative decision-
making (2017b, 190–92). However, even if we were to assume that the Kantian/Rawlsian 
model of the self were the right one, it is far from clear that it supports a uniformly 
conservative legal transition rule. At best, this conclusion would follow in a situation of ideal 
justice, for in such circumstances individuals’ rational life plans can be assumed to conform 
to the prior demands of justice (Rawls 1999, 392–96; see also Persad 2017, 284). But in non-
ideal contexts, no such assumptions can be made: individuals’ private plans are tainted by 
dint of being formed against a backdrop of injustice. If anything, those individuals are 
implicated in the rectification of that injustice since, on the Kantian/Rawlsian account that 
Brown otherwise seems to endorse, they have natural duties to establish just institutions, as 
we shall see shortly.  
I take it that these considerations are sufficient to motivate the prima facie relevance thesis.  
5.3  A JUSTICE-BASED PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL TRANSITIONS? 
From here on, though, we face a difficult challenge in turning intuitions from obvious cases 
into a determinate justice-based principle of legal transitions—one that can handle the myriad 
more complex (and less ‘obvious’) cases that commonly arise. In this Part, I sketch how one 
such principle might go, drawing on the work of those who endorse a (partial) justice-based 
account of legal transitions (Matravers 2017; Moore 2017). 
Building on the considerations outlined above in relation to the slavery abolition case, a 
seemingly plausible candidate for such a principle might go something like this:  
The Candidate Justice Principle: where a person suffers a loss as a result of a legal transition 
and that which they have lost was predicated on a violation of another’s basic right or of their 
own basic duty, the person should not receive transitional assistance (beyond what is 
necessary to secure their own basic rights); winners from legal transitions who have gained 
the entitlements implied by their basic rights should not be liable to having their transitional 
gains blocked or taxed away (other than to the extent necessary to comply with their own 
basic duties). 
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Of course, the devil lies in the detail of the underlying theory of justice—in this candidate 
principle, the underlying theory of basic rights and/or basic duties. Liberal-egalitarian 
scholars in both the idealist, Kantian tradition and those of a more critical or pragmatic 
inclination have posited the existence of basic rights and corresponding basic duties. By basic 
I mean to reflect the thought that, in these traditions, the rights enjoyed and duties owed are 
universal in that sense that they are enjoyed and owed by persons qua persons, regardless of 
their voluntary actions or group membership (e.g. Caney 2005). These are sometimes called 
“natural rights” (see Wenar 2015, sec. 6.1) and “natural duties” (e.g. Rawls 1971, 114), but 
I shall call them “basic” rights/duties to avoid the naturalistic connotations while still 
emphasising their purportedly universal, non-contingent character.  
In their (partly) justice-based theories of legal transitions for non-ideal theory, Matravers and 
Moore (writing about justice-based legitimate expectations theories) assume a Rawlsian or 
Rawlsian-inspired account of the content of basic rights.9 For Matravers, laws that instantiate 
the following rights and protections are deemed just (and expectations of their continuance 
must be honoured) while laws that violate these precepts are unjust (and cannot give rise to 
legitimate expectations):  
(a) fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political 
process: the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the scope of majority rule; 
and (b) equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative bodies are to respect: 
such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of 
thought and association, as well as the protections of the rule of law; and (c) with respect to 
social and economic matters, a ‘social minimum’ (an adequate standard of living to enable 
citizens to develop their moral powers and to participate in the political life of their 
communities). (Matravers 2017, 318, citations omitted) 
On Moore’s account, a society’s laws 
                                                 
9 In his consideration of the justice-based approach, Brown also assumes a broadly Rawlsian scheme (Brown 
2017b, 78–79, fn 1), but he ultimately rejects the justice-based approach to legitimate expectations. 
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are constrained by, at the minimum, universal negative duties (such as a no harm principle) 
or basic rights, which may include substantive claim rights. This means that rules or policies 
or practices that are egregiously unjust, that violate basic human rights, or some kind of moral 
minimum, cannot establish legitimate expectations, but that many laws which represent the 
agreed practices or policies of a certain way of organizing human life and are not objectively 
unjust can give rise to legitimate expectations. (Moore 2017, 234) 
Matravers and Moore hold that where the legal status quo violates basic rights, it cannot 
found a legitimate expectation that the status quo will be maintained. Expectations about the 
continuation of slavery, therefore, cannot be legitimate because the institution of slavery, in 
Matravers’ terms, would violate the “equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship” and the 
“social minimum” of socioeconomic goods to which persons are entitled and, in Moore’s 
terms, would be “egregiously unjust” and violate “basic human rights, or some kind of moral 
minimum”.10  
Two further points of principle would surely follow from this kind of approach.11 Losers 
from legal changes that instantiate basic rights surely cannot themselves be allowed to fall 
below the basic minimum thresholds (whatever they may be). Thus, when slavery is 
abolished, the slave-owner is not entitled to compensation for the full extent of his losses, but 
if he is ruined in the process, he is entitled to be brought up to the basic minimum to which 
everyone’s basic rights entitle them. Second, when considering the position of winners, 
insofar as the beneficiaries of just reforms are gaining their basic rights, these gains should 
not be blocked or taxed away (but if they gain more than their basic entitlements, then those 
further gains are at least in principle subject to taxation). This accounts for our intuition that 
the freed slaves are entitled to keep their ‘winnings’. With these additions, something like 
Matravers’ or Moore’s scheme of basic rights, when plugged into the Candidate Justice 
                                                 
10 Moore says this explicitly, using a variant of my slavery example (2017, 232–34). 
11 These implications are built into my Candidate Justice Principle. I think Matravers and Moore would endorse 
them on consideration, though they do not do so explicitly. 
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Principle, seems able to account for our intuitions concerning both losers and winners in 
obvious injustice cases like slavery abolition.  
Still, I think much more needs to be said about the basic duties if such an account is to handle 
the cases of the losers in the other ‘obvious injustice’ cases that we have discussed so far.12 
In the slavery abolition case, perhaps our intuitions are influenced by the fact that the loser 
from the reform, the slave-owner, is himself the perpetrator of an obvious moral wrong 
and/or injustice. His duty seems clear: ‘do not wrongfully cause harm to others’, or ‘do not 
wrongfully violate others’ basic rights’ (or something like this)—perhaps the paradigmatic 
moral duty (Feinberg 1984; Kant 1997 [1785]; Mill 1859; Rawls 1971, 114). But what about 
the van Arks in Brown’s housing segregation case, and Brute in The Torture Games? These 
agents do not wrongfully harm anyone—at least not in the interpersonal-interactional sense 
(I will say more about this shortly) that the slave-owner does. Yet, on Moore’s and Matravers’ 
accounts, since the legal status quo in each of these cases violates the “equal basic rights and 
liberties of citizenship” or is “egregiously unjust” or violates “basic human rights, or some 
kind of moral minimum”, then presumably neither the van Arks nor Brute would be entitled 
to compensation or any other transitional assistance. The conclusion in these last two cases, 
then, implicitly relies on a stronger notion of basic duties than merely ‘refraining from 
wrongfully harming another person’ or ‘violating another person’s basic rights’. Another way 
to put this worry is that if a justice-based principle is focused exclusively on basic rights then 
it will be unable to accommodate differences in the way different losers from just reforms 
are situated vis-à-vis the rights violations occurring under the legal status quo. It would face 
an objection of the kind I identified in Chapter 4 in terms of the “Generality Problem” facing 
structure-focused accounts of legitimate expectations. 
Consider first The Torture Games. Clearly in this case some people are violating the duty not 
to cause wrongful harm (or not to violate basic rights)—at least the torturers themselves and 
the state qua principal on whose behalf the torturers are acting as agents (remember that the 
                                                 
12 If the notion of justice is to be used in a legitimate expectations theory, then I think the notion of the duties 
is all the more important to consider, since it is surely one’s duties of justice that bear on the legitimacy of one’s 
expectations.  
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Games are state-run). But Brute is not wrongfully causing the harm because he is not causing 
it at all—assuming that his presence or absence at the Games makes no difference as to 
whether they will proceed. However, there is a second and a third sense in which one might 
hold Brute to be in violation of a basic duty. Let us consider whether these possibilities put 
Brute on the hook. 
The second sense in which Brute may be under a duty is insofar as he is the beneficiary of 
such wrongdoings / basic rights violations. Numerous philosophers have argued that, since 
one has a duty not to cause wrongful harm, then one also has a duty not to benefit from 
wrongful harm (and/or a duty to “disgorge” the wrongful benefits one has received) even if 
the beneficiary has not caused the relevant harm (e.g. Barry and Kirby 2017; Butt 2007, 2014; 
Goodin 2013; Goodin and Barry 2014; Lawford-Smith 2014; Pasternak 2016, 2017). This is 
because “when wrongful harm occurs, some things—jobs, material resources, competitive 
advantages, and so on—typically end up where they shouldn’t” (Barry and Kirby 2017, 286; 
see also Butt 2007; Lawford-Smith 2014). Analogously, benefiting from such maldistribution 
is like retaining objects whose title is “tainted” (Goodin 2013, 478; see also Butt 2007, 134; 
Parr 2016). By attending the Games, Brute benefits from others’ wrongdoing / basic rights 
violations. Whatever else may follow from his so benefiting, so the thought might go, surely 
it defeats any claim he might have to transitional assistance when the wrongdoing from which 
he benefits is discontinued. 
One difficulty with the wrongful benefitting argument in Brute’s case, though, is that he 
hasn’t benefitted from the 2018 Games, since these were cancelled before they started. He 
has incurred costs that he otherwise would not have incurred but for the Games’ cancellation, 
but he has not benefited from wrongdoing. At most, the wrongful benefiting argument would 
seem to rule out any claim Brute might have to what lawyers call the ‘contract’ or 
‘expectation’ measure of damages (i.e. compensation for the disappointed expectation of 
benefit). But it would not provide a reason against compensating him for his out-of-pocket 
expenses—that is, the ‘tort’ measure of damages, which would put him in the position he 
was in before he incurred those expenses.  
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So let’s consider a third possible duty that Brute has violated: the moral duty of rescue / 
mutual aid (Rawls 1971, 338–339). 13  Delmas (2014b, 298), synthesizing from various 
sources, describes this “Samaritan duty” as a duty 
to rescue people from serious peril when we can do so at no unreasonable cost to ourselves 
and others. It arises in situations in which (i) some fundamental human interest or non-
contingent basic need, including minimally the interests in life, security, and bodily integrity 
is threatened; (ii) the threat is immediate, imminent, or probable; and (iii) someone else—
typically an innocent passerby or bystander—is able to help at no unreasonable cost to him- 
or herself and others. 
As is clear from Delmas’ definition, what triggers the duty-bearer’s duty to aid is their 
capacity to aid; it is instantiated independently of one’s having caused or benefited from the 
victim’s peril, and independently of any special or associative relationship the agent has with 
the victim (though any such relationship would usually be held to raise the standard of care 
required of the duty-bearer). Again, though, this doesn’t seem to provide a reason for not 
compensating Brute, for there were no 2018 Games to stop, and hence no victims to rescue. 
Even if the 2018 Games did proceed, it is doubtful he would have met the conditions to 
instantiate the duty. Theoretically, perhaps he could run into the stadium and try to restrain 
the torturers, but this would probably be ineffective for more than a brief moment, and in any 
case would impose costs on him that are too great (arrest, fine or imprisonment, etc.). 
The difficulty with using all of these three kinds of basic duty (not wrongfully causing harm 
/ a rights violation; not benefiting from such a harm / rights violation; and failure to rescue) 
is that they are moral duties in an interpersonal-interactional sense—duties that we 
purportedly owe, paradigmatically, to proximate, specific, identified others without 
significant institutional mediation (cf. Pogge 2002, 170; Rubenstein 2009, 525–27; Young 
2011, 46). These duties pertain to what Young calls “wrongs of individual action” (2011, 46). 
The limitations on these duties (both this interactional scope-limitation and the conditions of 
each duty’s instantiation, e.g. “wrongful”, “reasonable cost”, etc.) leave a gap between the 
                                                 
13 According to Feinberg (1984, 171), this duty is “virtually as stringent” as the duty not to cause harm. 
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basic rights that individuals are said to have and the corresponding duties that others have in 
relation to those rights. Brute and the van Arks (to whom I will come shortly) seem to fall 
into these gaps.  
If the Candidate Justice Principle (or Matravers’ and Moore’s legitimate expectations 
equivalents) is to imply the conclusion that these agents should not receive transitional 
assistance on grounds of the underlying wrong, it seems that what is needed is a more 
political conception of persons’ basic duties. That might go something like this. Persons are 
not only moral agents, interacting with others in their immediate interpersonal environment: 
they are also political agents, capable of acting, individually and jointly with others, on larger 
public structures, including political institutions. This thought has led many to posit basic 
political duties (cf. Pogge 2002, 170; Rawls 1971, 114–15; Rubenstein 2009, 526–27; Young 
2011, 88–89).14 Kant argued that “when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, 
you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition, that is, 
a condition of distributive justice” (1996 [1797], sec. 42, 6:307, MG 86). In a similar vein, 
Rawls argued that individuals have a “natural duty of justice”, which “constrains us to further 
just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost 
to ourselves” (1971, 114–15).15 In a more critical tradition of scholarship, various authors 
have posited individual political responsibilities akin to Rawls’ natural duty of justice, 
including a duty to resist and reform unjust or oppressive institutions (e.g. Bedau 1969; Cudd 
2006; Delmas 2018; Murphy 2000; Shelby 2007; Shklar 1990; Young 2011). A key 
development in this regard was Iris Marion Young’s work on responsibility for justice (see 
Young 2011), which sparked a significant literature on “forward-looking responsibilities” for 
justice (see generally Smiley 2014; Young 2011, 92, 108–9).16  
                                                 
14 While the line between the moral and the political is clearly blurry, it is nonetheless a distinction that is widely 
endorsed in liberal-egalitarian thought, and therefore should be acceptable for the liberal-egalitarian 
constructive exercise I am engaging in here. On this distinction, see Young (2011, chaps. 2–3, especially pp. 
65, 70–74, 81, 86–89, 91–93). On the very similar distinction between interactional vs institutional duties, see 
Pogge (2002, 170) and Rubenstein (2009, 525–527). 
15 On the duty to help establish just institutions, see also (in the broadly Rawlsian tradition) Buchanan (2004). 
16 There is a parallel strand of literature on non-state “agents of justice”, beginning with Onora O’Neill’s (2001) 
article of that name. The emphasis in that literature is on the duties of non-state actors to stand in for states 
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While the precise formulations of forward-looking duties differ somewhat from theorist to 
theorist, as with the basic moral duties they reflect a common core idea. We might call this 
the political duty of just reform: a duty owed by all political agents to take positive action, 
individually or jointly with others, to resist and reform unjust institutions and structures, and 
to establish and maintain just institutions and structures, proportional to the costs they face 
in doing so. One way to understand this duty, then, is as the political equivalent of the 
capacity-based Samaritan (moral) duty outlined earlier. And if individuals have this kind of 
positive political duty (or “forward-looking responsibility”) to resist injustice and bring about 
justice, then they would seem, a fortiori, to have the following two negative political duty-
equivalents of the negative moral duties mentioned earlier: a duty not to [wrongfully17] cause 
or contribute to unjust structures (cf. Barry and Ferracioli 2013, 253–55; Goodhart 2018, 
216–19); and a duty not to benefit from unjust structures (we might call such benefiting 
“privilege”).  
Since I myself am not defending this scheme of duties, but rather sketching the kind of theory 
that a justice-based theorist would need, we can leave these duties fairly roughly defined. My 
point is that a proponent of a justice-based approach to legal transitions seems to need to 
posit something like these three basic political duties if their justice-based theories are to 
explain why many particular losers—those who do not violate a moral duty—such as Brute 
and the van Arks, should be denied transitional assistance when the law is justly reformed. 
If we return to Brute, armed with this wider set of political duties, our justice-based proponent 
could say that by buying tickets to the Games, Brute is supporting and contributing to an 
unjust social practice carried out by the state (or an ‘unjust political institution’ or an ‘unjust 
state’), and/or that he is failing to fulfil his duty to resist such an unjust 
practice/institution/state. Likewise if we turn to the van Arks in the housing segregation case, 
                                                 
when the state is ill-disposed or too weak to instantiate justice. It is thus primarily focused on the roles of group 
agents (O’Neill 2001, 2005, 435)—such as NGOs (Rubenstein 2009, 2015) and corporations (Orts and Smith 
2017)—but not exclusively so (see, e.g., Caney 2014; Deveaux 2015; Rubenstein 2009, 437; Weinberg 2009). 
17 The proponent of such a duty would need to specify the standard of liability involved, which raises additional 
complications, as I discuss in Part 5.4, below. 
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one might say that by buying land in a whites-only gated community, the van Arks are 
contributing to a structurally unjust system of racial segregation, benefiting from such a 
system, and failing in their duty to resist it (cf. Delmas 2018; Young 2011). It is their violation 
of these duties that could then be invoked to deny them transitional assistance when the laws 
are justly reformed. The political duties also provide additional reasons for denying 
compensation to the slave-owner: not only did he perpetrate a moral wrong against his 
particular slaves (and benefit from such wrongdoing, and fail to rescue proximate other 
slaves), but he also contributed to and benefited from a wider structural injustice, and, prima 
facie, failed in his duty to resist and reform these unjust institutions. 
In sum, by relying on our (admittedly sketchy) scheme of three basic moral and three basic 
political duties, and corresponding basic rights, we seem to have reached a conception of 
justice that, plugged into the Candidate Justice Principle (or Matravers’ and Moore’s 
legitimate expectations equivalents) entails and explains the intuitive reformative conclusion 
(i.e. ‘no transitional assistance’) in all three of our obvious injustice cases.  
But to get here, we have had to travel a long way from the simple and powerful intuition that 
the slave-owner should not be compensated when slavery is abolished. Along the way, we 
have had to appeal to some quite extensive rights and quite demanding duties, which contain 
concepts whose complexity we have glossed over (“human rights”, “equal scheme of basic 
liberties”, “social minimum”, “contributing [to injustice]”, “resisting [injustice]”, “wrongful”, 
“harm”, “benefiting”, “immediate/imminent/probable threat”, “unreasonable costs”, etc.). 
And we still haven’t left the practice pitch of ‘obvious injustice’ cases. These issues point us 
to some of the weaknesses of justice-based approaches to legal transitions—even if intended 
to govern only the ‘obvious’ cases (as Matravers and Moore intend)—to which I now turn.  
5.4 WEAKNESSES OF JUSTICE-BASED APPROACHES TO LEGAL TRANSITIONS 
An overarching weakness of justice-based approaches to legal transitions is that they require 
a clear and conclusive identification of what justice requires, and yet there are good 
theoretical reasons why people differ widely in their views about what justice requires. As 
Meyer and Sanklecha put it, justice-based views such as those I have considered so far rely 
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on the meta-ethically controversial position that there is both (a) a metaphysical truth about 
justice and (b) unfettered, confident epistemic access to that truth. Yet, even if (a) is true (a 
vexed matter I have no intention of broaching), (b) is clearly false (Meyer and Sanklecha 
2014, 379–81). At the very least, then, there are widespread differences in beliefs about what 
justice entails; political theorising must take place amid epistemic uncertainty about justice. 
If there is no metaphysical truth about justice, then the problem of disagreement is 
constitutive of the conditions of political theorising; political theorising must take place 
against a backdrop of pluralistic conceptions of justice (see List and Valentini 2016, 547). 
Either way, the fact of widely differing views about what justice requires—at least once we 
move beyond ‘obvious’ cases—presents two problems for the proponent of a justice-based 
approach to legal transitions.18  
The first is the normative problem of justification, and this goes to the theoretical (primary) 
aim of a theory of legal transitions (see Chapter 1.5). The proponent must be able to justify 
her preferred theory of justice, either by adducing reasons to think that it is ‘the’ true theory 
of justice, or by adducing reasons to think that it is capable of receiving widespread 
endorsement among a plural citizenry. Moreover, this account must be adjusted for the non-
ideal circumstances of theorising about legal transitions—i.e. the fact that the existing society 
is by definition unjust—and this is no mean feat, as I shall elaborate shortly.  
The second is the political problem of disagreement, and this goes to both the theoretical aim 
and the practical (secondary) aim of a theory of legal transitions. If a theory of legal 
transitions is to be capable of translation into an enduring set of political norms and practices 
concerning legal transitions, it must be capable of being agreed to by people with differing 
views about justice and about what the primary laws should be. Because transition norms are 
                                                 
18 Aside from the difficulties I discuss below, the proponent of a justice-based approach to legal transitions 
faces a further problem: ‘obviously unjust’ cases may not appear so clear-cut when judged in their historical 
context. There is a danger of inferring the broad applicability of justice from cases that, with the benefit of 
hindsight, now seem obvious. My point is not to deny the fact that the moral evils of slavery, torture and 
apartheid could have been, should have been, and in fact were widely understood as such at the time, so much 
as to remind us that many practices that are normal today (reforms with which many jurisdictions are currently 
grappling) might in the future come to be seen as ‘obvious’ injustices in the way that they are not now. 
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a kind of second-order normative issue that are proposed to apply in all instances of primary 
legal change, they should be capable of attracting wide support among the citizenry in a way 
that primary reforms will often fail to do (see Chapter 1.5). In this sense, transition norms 
can be seen as analogous to other democratic norms, such as the norm of “institutional 
forbearance”, according to which partisan officials refrain, when in office, from deploying 
all the institutional powers and prerogatives at their disposal to achieve partisan ends, out of 
the knowledge that they themselves will eventually be in opposition, and hence beneficiaries 
of the same restraint (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019). Because most of us will be winners 
sometimes and losers other times, it should be possible for transition norms to command 
widespread allegiance. Seen from this perspective, the difficulty with allying transition 
norms to a comprehensive theory of justice is that it would seem to lose this ‘second order’ 
character; it would be hostage to the shifting views about justice held by those in power at 
the relevant time. 
Now it is true that all normative theories of legal transitions—my own included—face these 
problems to some extent. My real objection to justice-based theories, then, is that they face 
them to a particularly great extent. This is so in virtue of two features of such theories. First, 
theories of justice tend to be highly moralised, in the sense that they are almost always the 
product of other normative principles and concepts that themselves require further 
specification and justification. This feature makes theories of justice especially brittle: there 
are multiple levels and points at which any theory of justice is vulnerable to the challenges 
of justification and disagreement. Second, theories of justice are deontological, and like all 
deontological theories their plausibility rests on the identification of an absolute threshold 
that divides just from unjust, right from wrong, duty-bound from permissible, etc. (Alexander 
and Moore 2016; Fried 2012). This raises the stakes for deontological theories: so much rides 
on defining the threshold correctly. When harnessed to a theory of legal transitions, this 
means that the difference between a person being fully compensated or receiving no 
assistance whatsoever depends on whether or not the relevant legal status quo is deemed 
unjust (and the reform just) or not. However, given their brittleness, it seems doubtful that 
such theories can bear this weight.  
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With these general observations in mind, let me proceed to illustrate these challenges by 
drawing on the justice-based approach to legal transitions sketched in Part 5.3, above. I will 
begin by focusing on the ‘basic rights’ aspects of a theory of justice, and then consider issues 
pertaining to ‘basic duties’.  
As noted above, both Matravers and Moore draw on Rawls’ theory to identify a minimalist 
conception of justice, such that laws contrary to these minimum conditions cannot found a 
claim for transitional assistance (in their versions, cannot ground a legitimate expectation). 
There is a basic question of why we should accept without argument that Rawls’ scheme (or 
their minimalist variants of it) is the correct one. But even if we were to accept this, the 
schemes specified are a long way from determinate. All the ‘obvious’ cases discussed in Parts 
2 and 3, above, involved paradigmatic rights violations: slavery; torture; and apartheid. As 
such, these cases put no pressure on the minimal justice conditions that both authors specify. 
But we don’t have to move too far away from these paradigmatic instances for such pressure 
to mount.  
Consider the following cases that involve similar categories of harms to our three ‘obvious 
injustice’ cases: 
 Instead of owning slaves, imagine that our businessman from the first example built 
a business empire on the back of very cheap labour, paying his employees wages that 
enabled them, working 42 hours per week, to just meet their subsistence needs, 
undertake some inexpensive personal hobbies, and participate to a modest degree in 
the political life of their community. Then the government raises the legal minimum 
wage by 50%, causing our businessman’s business to fail, leaving him with large 
capital losses (consumers also face price increases on labour-intensive products made 
within the jurisdiction).  
 In our second case, imagine that there is no longer any formal racial discrimination 
in access to housing, but the legacy of past discrimination means that neighbourhoods 
continue to be largely segregated, and many black persons cannot afford housing. The 
Government introduces a policy of forcibly acquiring and subdividing wealthy estates, 
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all of which happen to be white-owned, and redistributing the subdivided land to poor 
black families at a subsidised cost. Many wealthy whites are forced out of their homes 
but all of them are so wealthy that they simply buy new houses in other wealthy, 
largely white neighbourhoods nearby. 
 Instead of the state in our third example running a torture tournament, consider a 
much more common scenario entailing lesser violations of bodily integrity. Consider 
a state with moderately lax environmental regulations that permits factories to pollute 
the air to a level that exposes a large number of persons to pollution that (i) is certain 
to cause moderate ill-health, or (ii) (under a different scenario) causes a small risk of 
serious ill-health. The government decides to regulate pollution more stringently to 
reduce pollution-related illnesses, driving up the costs of the polluting activity, 
causing losses to various producers and to consumers of the factories’ products.  
On a rights-based justice approach, whether the losers in all these cases are entitled to 
transitional assistance (and whether the winners are entitled to keep all their gains) depends 
on our evaluation of whether basic rights were violated in the status quo and whether the 
reform protects those basic rights. In Matravers’ and Moore’s terms, it would depend on 
whether the relevant class of persons’ “social minimum”, “moral minimum” or “human rights” 
(etc.) were being violated under the status quo, and protected following the reform. The point 
in all these examples is that it is far from obvious where the line delimiting one’s minimal 
basic rights should be drawn. Did the workers have a basic right to the higher wages provided 
by the reform? What level of de facto social and economic inequality is rights-violating? 
What level of pollution-caused ill-health, or risk of serious ill-health, is rights-violating? The 
difficulty of rights specification is a major problem for the proponent of a rights-based justice 
view, because the kinds of legal transition cases I’ve just outlined are much more common 
than the abolition of clear-cut abominable practices of slavery, apartheid and torture.19  
                                                 
19 It is true that both Matravers and Moore adopt hybrid legitimate expectations theories of legal transitions, 
with the justice component serving only to rule out manifestly unjust expectations; in cases where minimal 
rights are not at stake, they advocate a case-specific inquiry to determine the legitimacy of the expectation, and 
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But let’s say our plucky justice theorist is up for the challenge, and spells out a detailed theory 
of rights, including a specification of the threshold of rights relevant to the cases outlined 
above. Any such specification would likely be vulnerable to objections at many points, and 
yet the lines, so drawn, will be highly consequential for the transitional losers and winners 
(the problematic combination of a brittle theory with high stakes consequences). Moreover, 
because rights-based justice theories of legal transitions will involve a single assessment of 
the justice of the legal status quo and its reform, all losers from that reform will be treated 
the same way, i.e. such approaches have the structural features that gave rise to the Generality 
Problem discussed in Chapter 4.2.2.1. 
Now consider duty-based justice approaches. The problem of specifying basic duties is 
complicated by a variety of factors that have been alluded to already. Even if we take the 
more straightforward moral duty of not causing wrongful harm, the terms ‘harm’ and 
‘wrongful’ must be specified, and this turns out to be no easy task (see, e.g., Feinberg 1984, 
chap. 1)—at least not if these terms are to mark absolute, deontological boundaries between 
right and wrong.  
This becomes even harder when we think about the political equivalent of that moral duty, 
i.e. not (wrongfully) causing or contributing to injustice. Is wrongfulness actually a condition 
of the duty? The notion of wrongfulness implies a mens rea requirement such as 
intentionality or recklessness (cf. Miller 2001, 455–60). Must the agent have known that what 
they were doing was unjust, if we are to deny them transitional assistance on the ground that 
they violated a basic duty? Or is it enough that they ought reasonably to have known 
(negligence), and if so, how is reasonableness to be understood when it comes to assessing 
whether people ought to know what the content of justice is? Moreover, when it comes to 
assessing what one ought to have known about the justice of relevant laws, should we take 
                                                 
hence the correct transitional response (Matravers 2017, 316–22; Moore 2017). But then they still need to 
delimit the boundary between the former and the latter, and I have deliberately constructed my examples to put 
pressure precisely on the identification of the relevant boundary. The higher the threshold is drawn, the more 
agreement one will get about cases above the threshold being unjust, but the wider the region of other cases 
over which the relevant secondary principle applies. One could lower the threshold in order to reduce the region 
of indeterminacy, but then one would get less agreement about whether cases above the threshold are unjust. 
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into account that, due to differences in their capabilities and social positions, some 
individuals and groups have greater reason to question the justice of the status quo, and to 
avoid contributing to it, than others? Or perhaps liability should be strict, in which case 
factual causation or causal contribution is sufficient. But then which conception of causation 
should we use (remembering that, when it comes to political cases, we will often be dealing 
with diffusely caused institutional failures and structural injustices)? And what about cases 
where the measures an agent could take to avoid contributing to (or benefiting from) an 
injustice are impossible or unreasonably costly (Delmas 2014a, 478; Goodin and Barry 2014, 
468–70)?  
The basic dilemma facing the would-be justice (basic duty) theorist, in specifying such a duty, 
is this: the wider the standard of liability specified (the weaker the mens rea and causation 
requirements), the more cases it will cover, but the more controversial it and its implications 
will be (and the less plausible it will be to claim that the duties are matters of ‘basic’ justice); 
the more narrow the standard of liability, the less controversial it and its implications will be, 
but it will cover fewer cases.  
The idea of benefiting from a moral wrong or injustice raises similar questions of knowledge 
and culpability, which will to some extent be affected by the nature and extent of the 
underlying moral wrong or injustice.20 There are other complexities associated with benefit-
based duties—concerning such matters as what ought to be done in response to having 
received unjust benefits, and how to disentangle unjust benefits from justly earned rewards 
when these are causally intertwined—which I need not explore here (see Butt 2014; Goodin 
and Barry 2014; Haydar and Øverland 2014; Parr 2016). Suffice it to say that affirmative 
action policies, of the kind at stake in the above-mentioned variant of the housing segregation 
case, raise vexed issues (cf. Thomson 1973). I don’t deny that benefits from past injustice are 
intuitively relevant, but it is not clear to me that threshold duties to avoid benefiting from 
                                                 
20 Though it may also be possible to defend a broader version of the duty not to benefit, which does not depend 
on an underlying wrong (Butt 2014, 345). 
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injustice provide the normatively (let alone politically) most attractive basis for determining 
the transitional entitlements of the losers from such reforms. 
Capacity-based duties seem to pose even greater problems. As is apparent from the 
conditions of the Samaritan (moral) duty specified by Delmas, quoted earlier, the 
instantiation of the duty will become more contestable as the affected interest becomes less 
fundamental, the threat less urgent, and the costs to the rescuer more onerous. These problems 
are exacerbated when it comes to fulfilling the capacity-based political duty of just reform. 
Like its moral equivalent, this duty is inherently sensitive to the personal costs incurred by 
the agent (Caney 2014, 136–139; Delmas 2014b, 304–6; Rawls 1971, 115), but what counts 
as “too much costs to ourselves” (Rawls 1971, 115)?  
Furthermore, this duty of just reform is thought to be imperfect and open-ended, permitting 
a degree of context-specific discretion on the part of agents as to how to discharge it (Delmas 
2014a, 482; Rawls 1971, 339–41; Young 2011, 143). In a highly unjust society, agents will 
have a wide set of options as to which injustices they expend their resources trying to combat. 
The opportunity cost of resources spent combating one injustice—say, poverty—is the use 
of those resources to combat another injustice—say, racial discrimination (Smiley 2014, 7). 
When the state then calls on people’s resources to tackle racial discrimination (say, by 
imposing new requirements on companies or raising taxes to pay for public programmes), is 
it right to deny transitional assistance to the poverty fighter on the ground that she was under 
a capacity-based duty to contribute to removing the racial injustice?  
The myriad agent-specific complexities that attend duty-based justice theories highlights a 
further problem: given that the state must determine the appropriate transitional response, 
application of a duty-based justice theory would, for any significantly-sized legal reform, 
embroil the state in a colossal analytical and investigative task, which would be financially 
costly and require intrusive probing of duty-bearers’ inner lives. In other words, it raises the 
Moral Costs Problem that I identified with agent-focused theories of legitimate expectations 
in Chapter 4. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
I began this chapter with a discussion of the thesis, endorsed by Simmons and Brown, that 
justice is irrelevant to legal transitions. Building on intuitions from some cases involving 
‘obvious injustice’, I developed the thought that if we take seriously the idea of moral agents 
who are able to think and reason critically about morality and justice, then the idea that justice 
is irrelevant to legal transitions seems unattractive. Justice seems prima facie relevant to legal 
transitions.  
Yet I went on to show that specifying in general terms a justice-based principle of legal 
transitions that is sufficiently determinate to generate the intuitive conclusions in obvious 
cases is no easy task; and applying such a principle, beyond the most obvious cases, is even 
more fraught. Basic rights and duties are complex normative ideals, specification of which 
seems to generate so many opportunities for normative and political disagreement that any 
specific theory advocated will inevitably provide a brittle foundation for a general theory of 
legal transitions. And yet because justice-based approaches draw lines that divide, in a 
deontologically absolute sense, those who are entitled to transitional assistance from those 
who are not, the precise specification of the threshold takes on a supreme importance for 
those who are affected by legal change. Justice-based theories, in short, place great weight 
on brittle foundations. This feature makes justice-based approaches ill-suited to the vast 
majority of legal reforms that occupy the problem space of contemporary legal transitions. I 
also argued that proponents of justice-based theories face a similar dilemma to that faced by 
legitimate expectations theories: rights-based justice theories suffer from the Generality 
Problem, while duty-based theories suffer from the Moral Costs Problem. 
In light of these concerns, I conclude that theories of legal transitions should not be based on 
justice per se. Accordingly, I do not include justice as an element of my own theory of legal 
transitions. Instead, I will specify and defend two principles that generate other reasons for 
transitional responses (Chapters 7 and 8). To avoid the first-mentioned problem with justice-
based theories—their brittleness / amenability to contestation—the two principles I propose 
will invoke more normatively basic concepts. The first of these concepts is wellbeing, 
understood in terms of centrality-weighted functionings, and the second is fairness, 
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understood in terms of social practices of allocating ex ante responsibility for managing risks 
of legal change. Though far from incontestable, I submit that these concepts (and the 
principles and theory that invoke them) are capable of garnering wider agreement among 
citizens who must be subject to transition norms than are theories of justice. To avoid the 
second-mentioned problem with justice-based theories—their deontological absoluteness—
the principles I develop in those chapters will generate reasons that have a magnitude as well 
as a direction. These ‘vectors’ of reasoning about legal transitions correspond to similarly 
graduated transitional responses, which I develop in Chapter 9. Because these responses, and 
the underlying reasons, are graduated, they avoid the ‘all or nothing’ character of 
deontological theories. As such, even if the underlying theoretical concepts are imperfect or 
subject to uncertainty or disagreement, the consequences of error are far less grave: for 
example, losers might get a bit more or a bit less time, money, or in-kind assistance to adapt 
to a legal change than they would have if the underlying concepts were optimal. This means 
the theory I propose is more robust to the problems of normative justification and political 
disagreement that plague justice-based theories. 
Still, one might wonder how the nagging intuitions from the obvious injustice cases can be 
accommodated. To do justice, as it were, to the prima facie relevance thesis, I think a theory 
of legal transitions must make room for the idea that people are moral and political agents 
who are able, to some extent at least, to exercise critical judgement about the states and laws 
that govern them (though, as we shall see, I think that social practices affect what this will 
look like in different contexts). The Kantian/Rawlsian tradition that has been the subject of 
the present chapter is, as I suggested in Part 5.2, right to reject a conception of the person that 
lacks such moral and political agency, and to insist instead on a conception of the person as 
a moral and political agent. However, as I shall argue in the next chapter, the 
Kantian/Rawlsian conception has problems of its own, and I adopt an alternative set of 
ontological foundations for my own theory of legal transitions. Moreover, through concepts 
such as central functionings (concerning wellbeing—see chapters 6 and 7) and citizenship 
practices (concerning fairness—see chapter 8) I hope to accommodate some of the basic 
ingredients that animate our intuitive justice-type concerns, without falling prey to the 
multifarious problems of justice-based theories that I have discussed in this chapter.  
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 ADAPTIVE RESPONSIBILITY THEORY: 
FOUNDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having critiqued various theories of legal transitions it is now time to turn to the specification 
and defence of my own theory of legal transitions, which I call Adaptive Responsibility 
Theory (“ART”).  
ART incorporates two kinds of pro tanto reasons—wellbeing reasons and fairness reasons—
into an overall judgement about appropriate transition policy. The Wellbeing Principle, 
developed in Chapter 7, holds that the state has a pro tanto reason to conserve the particular 
functionings of agents against losses, and not to conserve the generic functionings of agents 
against gains (i.e. not to grandfather a prior disadvantageous position or to claw-back gains), 
and the strength of those reasons is proportional to the ‘centrality’ of the functionings at stake. 
The Fairness Principle, developed in Chapter 8, holds that: the state has a pro tanto reason 
not to conserve the functionings of agents against losses or gains where and to the extent that 
the affected agent is deemed to have had ex ante responsibility for managing the risk of a 
particular kind of legal change (the opposite conclusion holds where and to extent that the 
state is deemed to have had ex ante responsibility for managing that risk of legal change). 
The strength of those reasons depends on the strength of the reasons for allocating 
responsibility to the relevant agent or the state, as applicable. I shall sometimes refer to the 
reasons generated by these two principles as ‘vectors’, as this nicely captures the idea that 
they have both a magnitude and a direction. I argue in Chapter 9 that the combination of 
weighted wellbeing and fairness reasons in any given case determines the most appropriate 
transition policy.  
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The aim of the present chapter is to explain, in the spirit of WRE, the core set of antecedent 
theoretical ideas that support ART.1 Part 6.2 introduces the core ontological assumptions that 
underpin ART, and explains how they support three key normative moves made in the 
subsequent three chapters. Part 6.3 specifies and defends the ‘currency’ of loss/gain that I 
will use throughout ART, which I call the “modified functionings conception of wellbeing”. 
Part 6.4 concludes. 
6.2 ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS: SELF AND SOCIETY, AGENCY AND STRUCTURE 
6.2.1 ART’s foundational foil: liberal models of the self and agency 
To understand the ontological positions I will assume for the purpose of my theory, it will be 
helpful to present their foil. The preceding four chapters ranged mainly over three (perhaps 
three and a half) traditions of political thought within a broadly liberal family: the libertarian 
tradition, which claims Lockean natural rights lineage (Chapter 2.2); the classical liberal 
tradition, which descends from the 18th century classical economists and utilitarians (Chapter 
2.3), and its half-brothers, the neoclassical school of economics and the L&E school of legal 
theory (Chapter 3); and, the Rawlsian liberal-egalitarian or ‘high-liberal’ tradition, which 
descends from Kant (Chapters 4 and 5). Underlying all theories of legal change is a tacit 
conception of the person-in-time. Normative theories pertaining to the value of stability or 
change must rely on some account of the agent’s temporal extension (or lack thereof) and of 
what counts as desirable or undesirable change—loss or gain—for a temporally extended 
agent. In our special case of legal transitions, normative theories of legal transitions rely not 
only on these general accounts, but also on a particular account of the agent’s role within a 
polis. As we have seen, the particular ideas invoked inform the content of one’s preferred 
theory of legal transitions.  
                                                 
1 As a shorthand, I will sometimes refer to these deeper ideas as “foundations” of ART, though in doing so I do 
not mean to imply that they are bedrock foundations in the sense of meta-ethical foundationalism (see Green 
2017, 185); I simply mean that they are more general philosophical assumptions, themselves contestable. 
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Speaking very broadly, the liberal traditions of thought with which I have engaged can be 
read as having supplied these theories of legal transitions with two models of the person: 
homo economicus and homo autonomous (cf. Willett, Anderson, and Meyers 2015, sec. 1). 
Homo economicus bears resemblance to the Lockean “punctual self” discussed in Chapter 
2.2.2.1—an extensionless consciousness that is ever-capable of remaking its contingent 
feature set through the application of rational self-discipline. But his rationalistic potential is 
fully unleashed only in neoclassical economic theory (Chapter 3.4.2), where he appears as 
the perfectly rational, fully-informed, self-generator of completely-ordered preferences over 
states the world, which he smoothly updates as necessary to navigate ever-changing 
exogenous conditions. Homo autonomous is the Kantian self (echoed in Rawls), who applies 
pure reason, free from all heteronomous sources of sensible and worldly influence, discerns 
the moral truth (or justice) and develops a rational life plan in conformity with that truth, 
which others must respect. I will return to these models at various points in the discussion 
below, but I want to highlight two core, ontological assumptions that they share in common:  
(i) the mind (and hence the self) is separate from the body and from the world; and  
(ii) the mind autonomously generates agency-oriented mental states (intentions, 
preferences, plans etc.) using the canons of procedural rationality or reason.2  
These assumptions are supported by the liberal models’ natural ally within the philosophy of 
mind: standard cognitive science. Standard cognitive science “is interested in describing the 
‘inner workings’ of the mind” and assumes that these inner mechanisms are 
“computational—as consisting of operations over symbolic representations” (Shapiro 2011, 
14). On this view of mind, the relation of cognition to perception and action is conceived in 
                                                 
2 I do not claim that all contemporary liberal theorists necessarily adopt conceptions of the person in the mould 
of either of the two liberal models explicated here, nor do I claim that all liberals endorse the two core 
assumptions of those models. To take just two examples, in the development of my own theory I have engaged 
with the work of liberal theorists such as Raz and Scheffler (see below Part 6.3 and Chapter 7.2) who would, I 
think, reject one or both of these core assumptions. Nonetheless, it is striking how frequently in liberal texts 
explicit or implicit appeals are made to features of one or other of these two models and their core assumptions, 
which I believe end up doing quite a significant amount of normative work. In any case, I hope to show that 
such appeals are prevalent in liberal theorising about legal transitions.  
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terms of the classical “sandwich model” (Hurley 1998), according to which “cognition … is 
segregated from processing in low-level systems, therefore acting like meat in a sandwich 
em-breaded by perception and action” (Wilson and Foglia 2015, sec. 4). The first ontological 
assumption of the liberal models of the self is underwritten by standard cognitive science’s 
commitment to the brain as the sole locus of cognition, while the second assumption is 
reinforced by the metaphor of the mind as a computer.3 
Together, these two core assumptions of the liberal models and their standard cognitive-
scientific underpinnings comprise one extreme pole of attraction within ontological debates 
in philosophy (and indeed in debates concerning self/society and agency/structure in a range 
of other disciplines). I take those assumptions to be problematic, for reasons more than amply 
propounded elsewhere by feminist and communitarian critics of liberalism,4 and by critics of 
standard cognitive science from the “4E”—embodied, embedded, extended and enactive—
paradigm of cognition (see Menary 2010; Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher 2018),5 all of 
which I draw on below.  
Yet, in repudiating these ontological positions there is a danger of attraction to the opposite 
pole, in which the self is conceived as continuous with, indistinguishable from and 
determined by material and social forces over which it has no control. There is a danger, that 
is, in moving from atomism to holism and from a fully autonomous conception of agency to 
                                                 
3 They also share Cartesian origins: see Taylor (1989, chap. 8) on the Cartesian origins of liberal models of the 
self; and Van Gelder (1995, 379–81) on the Cartesian origins of standard cognitive science. 
4 Feminist theories of the self, both critical and constructive, are largely a product of second and third wave 
feminism, which in different ways have radically challenged the foundations of liberal selfhood (Willett, 
Anderson, and Meyers 2015 provide an excellent synthesis of this vast literature). Communitarian theories of 
the self emerged largely in the course of debates that followed critiques of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) 
by Michael Sandel (1982), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), Charles Taylor (1985, 1989) and Michael Walzer (1983). 
For good overviews of the liberal-communitarian debates, see Bell (1993, 2016, sec. 2), Frazer and Lacey 
(1993) and Mulhall and Swift (1996). ‘Communitarian’ is, for some scholars, a label pinned by others; not all 
proponents of views discussed below identify as communitarian. The term should thus be read as a heuristic. 
5  The 4E paradigm draws on contemporary life sciences, including recent advances in neuroscience and 
psychology, as well as dynamical systems theory and robotics (see Shapiro 2011, chap. 3). Whereas the foil of 
feminist and communitarian critics are the liberal models of the self, the foil of the 4E paradigm is standard 
cognitive science. Much communitarian and 4E thought owes intellectual debts to the action-oriented 
philosophy of Aristotle (1962 [c.350 BC]; 2014 [c.350 BC]) and to the phenomenological insights of thinkers 
such as Husserl (esp. 1982 [1913]), Wittgenstein (1963 [1953]), Heidegger (1962 [1927]), Merleau-Ponty (1962 
[1945]), and more recently Dreyfus (1972, 1991, 1992) (see Anderson 2003). 
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structural determinism (Frazer and Lacey 1993, 172–74). But it is a mistake to see these 
opposing poles as binaries (ibid 171–81); rejecting the liberal ontological assumptions does 
not entail acceptance of “an engulfed, acritical, non-reflective subject” (ibid 198). A 
principled intermediate position is possible and, I believe, correct. Indeed, the ontological 
assumptions I explicate below are motivated, in large part, by a dissatisfaction with matters 
of emphasis and exclusivity in the liberal ontological assumptions. Rather than simply 
valuing intentional agency, reasonableness, instrumental rationality and critical reflection 
(alongside other modes of being), these are reified or valorised in the liberal models to an 
implausible degree, such that the individual’s basic and normal mode of being in the world 
comes to be seen as one of hyper-independence (cool, detached, sceptical, critical), hyper-
rationality (intentional, instrumental, calculative, efficient, prudent, reasonable), and 
unperturbed control over his or her environment.6 
6.2.2 The ecological account of the self and agency: core assumptions 
I will now outline the ontological assumptions that I adopt for the purposes of ART. Before 
I do so, an important caveat is in order. I can only explain and motivate these assumptions 
here: I cannot defend them in any detail. The detailed defence of antecedent theoretical ideas 
such as these would take any exercise of WRE too far beyond the scope of the middle-level 
theory or principles in support of which they are invoked (for my purposes, remember, the 
middle-level theory is a theory of legal transitions) (Green 2017, 186, 194–201). Nonetheless, 
by articulating these antecedent ideas and explaining the particular roles they play at various 
important points in my theory, I show how ART is tethered to them in various ways. The 
purpose served by the following discussion, then, is to lay my theoretical cards on the table, 
and in so doing to render ART more explicable and determinate than it otherwise would be. 
As I showed in the first half of this thesis and in Part 6.2.1, above, the theories of legal 
transitions that I critique rely implicitly on certain theoretical ideas—about the nature of the 
self, society and the good life, for example—and these required some excavation work to 
                                                 
6 For communitarian criticisms along these lines, see Bell (2016, sec. 2). In addition to making this general 
criticism, feminists have long pointed out the gendered nature of this picture, with the liberal conceptions coded 
masculine in opposition to the feminised other (see Willett, Anderson, and Meyers 2015, sec. 1).  
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bring them to light. It is hoped that, with the sketch of ART-supportive ontological 
foundations that follows, I can spare critical readers of my own theory the effort of such an 
“exercise in retrieval” (Taylor 1989, xi).  
The first ontological position I assume is a conception of the person or self that is embodied7 
and—more importantly for my later argument—embedded in its environment, yet 
nonetheless distinguishable from that environment. What I mean by “embedded” is that the 
subject cannot be understood as antecedently individuated, either from its own identities and 
commitments or from the wider social, cultural and material environment in which these are 
formed,8 and that its identity and agency cannot be adequately understood or interpreted 
without reference to that environment.  
Embeddedness is especially important for adequately understanding the self-interpretive, or 
“narrative” aspects of the self (Gallagher and Daly 2018), such as the relationships, 
attachments and projects with which we consciously identify and that we integrate into our 
self-conceptions. We can only self-interpret and self-reflect using language, and since 
language is an inherently social artifice, our self-understandings are necessarily bound up 
with the social practices and moral frameworks of the communities we inhabit (Taylor 1989, 
36–42). Our initiation into forms of life and their associated moral frameworks, moreover, 
orient us through time, enabling us to understand ourselves not only by where we have been, 
but by where we are going (ibid 46–47). It is through these social-cultural arcs that we 
interpret ourselves in narrative form, as having a history that projects forward into the future 
(MacIntyre 1981, 200–201; Taylor 1989, 46–48). These narrative aspects of the self will turn 
                                                 
7 I assume that the body is a constitutive part of the self, and of cognition, perception and action. However, 
since specific claims about embodiment are less relevant for my purposes, I leave them aside. For an overview 
of central 4E claims about the role of embodiment in cognition, perception and action, see Wilson and Foglia 
(2015, sec. 3). For discussion of embodiment in feminist writing on the self and agency, see, e.g., Coole (2005, 
2007), Frost (2016), Krause (2011), Nussbaum (2001a, 2001c, 2006), and Willett, Anderson and Meyers (2015). 
And for communitarian discussion of embodiment, see MacIntyre (1999) and Sandel (1982, 54–59). 
8 The claim that the self cannot be antecedently individuated from its ends, and the claim that the self cannot be 
understood ontologically as an asocial individual, existing prior to or independent of society, are similar but 
distinct (see Mulhall and Swift 1996, 10–18). I mean to endorse both. 
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out to be especially important for our discussion of the value of stability and change over 
time.  
None of this entails that we cannot critically reflect on and revise our beliefs, values and 
ends, but it does entail that we can only do so within the space of social and cultural 
possibilities that is already framed by our existing identities, beliefs and values (Taylor 1989, 
31). We cannot completely reinvent ourselves; we can only revise our beliefs, values and 
ends to a greater or lesser degree. Whatever ‘autonomy’ we have, then, cannot be autonomy 
in the literal, Kantian, sense that we are generators of our own laws; it must be autonomy of 
a looser, scalar, and more relational kind (e.g. Killmister 2013; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000).9 
My second ontological assumption is that one’s brain, body and environment are constantly 
interacting, and therefore changing over time. This much should be implicit from the above 
discussion of the self, but I want to locate this assumption more firmly at a ‘lower’ level: in 
the mechanisms of human perception, cognition and action. In this respect I follow dynamical 
and enactive theories of mind (Beer 2003; Van Gelder 1995), proponents of which accept the 
basic premises of embodiment10 and embeddedness, but add a crucial temporal dimension: 
since an organism’s brain, body, and environment are essentially interconnected and 
changing over time, perception, cognition and action can best be understood in terms of the 
dynamic interactions, or feedback loops, between them (see especially Van Gelder 1995). 
                                                 
9  Following Ryan and Deci (2000, 74), I also think autonomy, understood as one’s subjective feeling of 
volition—a sense of an internal locus of control—accompanying one’s actions is important to intrinsic 
motivation and wellbeing. 
10 Dynamical theories of agency rely on a further embodiment sub-thesis. The ‘regulation’ sub-thesis is that “an 
agent’s body functions to regulate cognitive activity over space and time, ensuring that cognition and action are 
tightly coordinated” (Wilson and Foglia 2015, sec. 3). Rather than merely transducing from worldly stimuli to 
cognition and executing in the world commands sent from the brain, “[b]odily structures facilitate the real-time 
execution of complex behaviors in response to complex and changing environmental events” and are thus 
“integral to the online control of cognition itself” (ibid). From an enactivist perspective, the body develops these 
sophisticated regulative capacities through a process of repeat performances of actions in familiar environments 
(and with familiar objects, people, etc.), which allows sensorimotor capacities to become attuned to those 
environments and objects, encoding tacit knowledge in the body that reduces the cognitive load on the brain 
(Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014, 341). 
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These dynamic interactions greatly complicate the liberal picture of autonomously generated 
agency-oriented mental states using canons of rationality or reason.  
Again, I do not deny that intentionality, instrumental rationality and reason are cognitive 
states of which agents are generally capable and that are useful to explain a significant sweep 
of human action, nor do I think that we should do away with the notion of agential causal 
responsibility. However, from the enactive perspective, agency can only be more or less 
intentional, rational and reason-based; likewise agential responsibility can only be a matter 
of degree.  
The middle-ground, ‘matter-of-degree’ positions I take with respect to the two ontological 
assumptions discussed in the preceding paragraphs is rendered more plausible by positing a 
more normal and more basic mode of being in the world, on and through which humans 
develop capacities for independent, critical thought and practical reason, and thereby gain 
important levers of control over their environment. This mode of being has been 
characterised by feminist, communitarian and 4E scholars in slightly different but convergent 
ways that can be broadly synthesised in terms of an instinctive, unreflective (or pre-
reflective), “in-the-moment” responsiveness to situated demands (Bell 2016, sec. 2; Willett 
and Willett 2013). 4E theorists often refer to this as “skilled coping”—engaging in the world 
in “a skillful and often effortless manner, without conscious deliberation, reasoning, or 
planning” (Schlosser 2015, sec. 2.4).11 Oft-cited examples in this literature include instances 
of “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990), from mundane, everyday activities such as driving a car 
to more recondite skilled practice such as musical improvisation or sporting prowess 
(Crawford 2015; Schlosser 2015, sec. 2.4). We could also include examples of the more fluid, 
instinctive, responsiveness to situational cues that often characterises the agency involved in 
caregiving activities traditionally coded feminine, such as caring for children (Addelson 
1994; Walker 1999; Willett, Anderson, and Meyers 2015, sec. 1; Willett and Willett 2013).  
                                                 
11 Here, the intellectual debts to Aristotle and the 20th century phenomenologists—see above footnote 5—are 
perhaps most obvious.  
143 
 
Feminist, communitarian and 4E scholars have all emphasised how much of our normal, day-
to-day experience of the world is characterised by skilled coping of this kind. Compared with 
the more minimal forms of volition and control involved in everyday skilled coping, 
cognitively effortful forms of agency based on instrumental rationality and critical reflection 
are much less normal—let alone the “higher or more refined” forms of agency, such as 
second-order-desire-reflective choice (Frankfurt 1971) and long-range planning (Bratman 
1987) that purportedly make human beings distinctively human (Schlosser 2015, sec. 2.3, 
2.5). Everyday skilled coping is also a more basic mode of being. It is, obviously, the only 
mode available to infants (and many non-human animals). The relatively independent and 
rational modes of being are thus not automatic in the way the liberal models seem to assume. 
Rather, they are dependent on skills acquired through ordinary environmental coping—skills 
that require ongoing development and practice in conducive social contexts, and in-the-
moment cultural and social scaffolds, as feminist, communitarian and 4E scholars recognise 
in convergent ways (Bell 2016; Clark and Toribio 1994; Van Gelder 1995, 379–81; 
MacIntyre 1999; Meyers 1989; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Schlosser 2015, sec. 2.4; 
Willett, Anderson, and Meyers 2015, sec. 2).12 It follows that the ‘higher’ modes of agency 
are contingent, and accessible to us only to a greater or lesser degree.13  
The picture of the self and society, agency and structure, reflected in the two ontological 
assumptions I endorse is similar, and indebted to, relational accounts of self, agency and 
autonomy (Benhabib 1992; Cornell 1992; Frazer and Lacey 1993, 175–81; Held 1985; 
Young 1990). However, I shall refer to these ontological assumptions as the ecological 
conception of the self and its agency, which connotes not just the individual’s social and 
cultural embeddedness (the “relational” aspects: Frazer and Lacey 1993, 199), but also its 
material embeddedness. My use of the term is a deliberate nod to 4E thinking, in which the 
                                                 
12 See also the work of psychologists Ryan and Deci on the importance of ‘autonomy-supportive’ interpersonal 
and social contexts (2000, 73–74, 2008, 187–88). 
13 For example, critical reflection is often required when our ordinary, habitual interaction with the world goes 
wrong, causing a rupture that requires attentive problem-solving (Bell 2016, sec. 2). 
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adjective ‘ecological’ is often used in relation to perception, cognition and attention.14 It also 
reinforces the notion of an individual as distinguishable from but deeply interconnected with 
its surrounding environment, which is a central theme of the science of ecology.  
6.2.3 Three key normative moves supported by the ecological account 
The ecological account of the self and agency supports ART in various ways. By “supports”, 
I do not mean to suggest that these ontological positions logically entail any of my normative 
positions. But ontological assumptions do tend to predispose one to certain directions in 
moral and political philosophy, and to fit better with some moral and political positions than 
others (Frazer and Lacey 1993, 187–88; Parfit 1973, 142). More specifically, ontological 
assumptions are part of what I called in Chapter 1.6 the “antecedent theoretical ideas” that 
motivate moral and political principles, part-constitute them (e.g. informing the specification 
of concepts, like freedom or wellbeing, contained in such principles), or supply premises in 
justifications for them. I want to conclude this discussion by highlighting up front three of 
the key normative moves in ART that I think the ecological account supports.  
First, the ecological conception of the self supplies a distinctive motivation for normatively 
valuing stability.15 This distinctiveness can be appreciated most clearly in contrast with the 
liberal models of the self, introduced in Part 6.2.1, above. The fact that the ecological account 
values stability stands in direct contrast to the ever-flexible homo economicus model, which 
supports a purely reformative approach to legal transitions. Yet the reason that the ecological 
account values stability is very different from the reason that the Kantian homo autonomous 
                                                 
14 The most prominent example is James Gibson’s ecological theory of perception, which places an agent’s 
interactions with the full informational array of its surrounding environment at the centre of the agent’s 
perceptual system (Gibson 1979). The work of James and Eleanor Gibson spawned the field of “ecological 
psychology”. In this spirit, I mean by “ecological” to focus on the interactions between the organism’s brain-
and-body and the full array of phenomena in its immediate environment (the environment to which it has 
sensory access)—from visual, acoustic and other sensory stimuli, to the material world of human-made and 
‘natural’ objects, and from language and other cultural symbols to the social relations we have with other 
humans and non-human beings. Something like this understanding of the ‘ecological’ is also used by other 
scholars, including the concept of “ecological rationality” developed by Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g. 
Todd and Gigerenzer 2012), and Matthew Crawford’s discussion of “ecologies of attention” (Crawford 2015). 
It should be clear from this description that I intend the adjective ‘ecological’ not in the sense of having an 
exclusive focus on the natural environment.  
15 More specifically, I mean stability of an agent’s particular functionings, as I shall elaborate in Part 6.3, below.  
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model does. Whereas the latter relies on the self’s transcendence of the real world, the 
ecological conception inverts the Kantian picture: our embodiment and embeddedness in the 
world of meaningful objects and attachments are not heteronomous forces to be repelled from 
the citadel, but are rather the very basis for our relatively coherent sense of self over time.  
Yet, just as the rejection of the ontological assumptions in the liberal models creates a danger 
of attraction to the opposite pole, there is an equivalent danger in rejecting pure reformism at 
the substantive political level: rigid conservatism. That is, there is a danger in moving from 
valuing the stability of attachments, projects and identities to valorising, romanticising or 
reifying such stability, and thus stifling the potential for valuable forms of change (Frazer 
and Lacey 1993, chap. 5). The ecological account of self and agency provides the basis for a 
principled reconciliation of the competing values of stability and change. It does so 
principally in two ways—and these are, respectively, the second and third key normative 
moves that the ecological conception supports. 
One of the ways in which ART reconciles stability builds on the observation that we tend to 
value stability more or less in different social practices. More specifically, social practices 
vary—both within societies and across them—in the way that they balance the benefits of 
stability with the benefits of risk-taking. Risks of legal change are no different: practices vary 
in the extent to which responsibility for managing such risks is allocated ex ante to the 
individual (privatised risk) or the state (socialised risk). In Chapter 8, I draw on this insight 
to develop a practice-based conception of fairness, which lies at the heart of the Fairness 
Principle of ART. As I discuss in Chapter 8, the ecological conception of the self plays an 
important role in motivating and justifying the appeal to social practices because social 
practices are a crucial part of the social structure in which individuals are embedded, and 
which both enables and constrains their agency. Viewed from the other direction, a normative 
principle that appeals to social practices requires an ontology that posits the reality of such 
practices, and on this score the ecological account delivers in a way that the liberal models 
sketched above do not (cf. Frazer and Lacey 1993, 17–18, 179–82). 
The other way in which ART reconciles stability and change is across time. The ecological 
account assumes that the self is constituted by the dynamic interactions among an organism’s 
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brain, body and world. These interactions mean that we are constantly changing; the self 
cannot be fully unified over time (Van Gelder 1995, 373, 380; Krause 2011, 301–2). But the 
durable attachments, projects and identities at the centre of our conscious, self-interpretive, 
“narrative” aspect of ourselves tend to change very slowly—almost always to an 
imperceptibly small degree from moment to moment. That change is consistent with the 
familiar phenomenology of self-identification, coherence and continuity over time to a strong 
degree (Daniels 1996, chap. 7; Krause 2011, 301–2; Taylor 1989, 49). To be sure, radical 
discontinuities occur—most dramatically with brain injuries, or rapid-onset degenerative 
mental conditions (Malabou 2012), but also in a more endogenous way, through ‘epiphanies’, 
for example—and  humans are capable of remarkable feats of adaptation to even radical 
bodily and environmental changes. But when it comes to our most central and fundamental 
attachments, projects and identities we tend to seek and—under normal conditions—to find 
a high degree of continuity (MacIntyre 1981; Taylor 1989, 46–49; Willett 2014). The 
emergent ontological picture, then, is of individuals who evolve; whose central attachments, 
projects and identities we have strong reason to stabilise in the short run, but less reason to 
stabilise in the longer-run. In this way, the ecological account motivates and justifies the 
adaptivist approach to legal transitions that I will elaborate and defend in Chapter 9, in which 
the central focus of transition policy is on adaptive measures, i.e. measures that ensure that 
people have the time and capabilities they need to successfully adapt to the conditions 
ushered in by a legal change.16 
6.3 ART’S CURRENCY: THE MODIFIED FUNCTIONINGS ACCOUNT OF WELLBEING 
An important part of any theory of legal transitions is what I called in Chapter 1.3 “the 
currency question”: with what currency should we measure losses and gains for the purpose 
of a theory of legal transitions? We have seen from Chapters 2–5 that there are various 
currencies in circulation across the literature on legal transitions: classical liberals and 
                                                 
16 Adaptive measures are the central focus of transition policy because they cover the large middle ground of 
cases in which the reasons generated by the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles do not conjointly point strongly 
toward either conservative or reformative state responses (because they sometimes do so point, conservative 
and reformative transition policies also have a role to play in ART, as I explain in Chapter 9). 
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libertarians are concerned about the loss of property; L&E scholars are concerned with 
changes in efficiency in the sense of aggregate resources expressed in money terms (on some 
views, they are indirectly concerned with changes in welfare/utility conceived as preference 
satisfaction); and liberal-egalitarians are concerned with the frustration of autonomous life 
plans. Though not the primary focus of these chapters, in each case it was argued that the 
particular currency invoked is problematic in one way or another. 
It is now time for me to set out and defend the currency that I will use in ART, drawing out 
along the way some connections with the ecological account of the self and its agency 
discussed above. The currency I advocate is what I shall call the modified functionings 
conception of wellbeing. I take there to be four steps in arguing for such a currency: 
1. Why wellbeing, not resources? 
2. Why a mixed objective–subjective conception of wellbeing, not a purely objective or 
purely subjective one? 
3. Why functionings (outcomes) not capabilities (opportunities)? 
4. Why a modified functionings account, not the standard functionings account? 
I take these questions in turn. As we progress through this list, the questions move from those 
that are more general and that have been extensively debated in the wider literature, towards 
those that are more specific and bear more directly on my theory of legal transitions. 
Accordingly, the amount of attention I devote to each question increases. 
6.3.1 Why wellbeing, not resources? 
I take it that wellbeing conceptions of persons’ non-instrumental good have three key 
advantages over resource conceptions. First, any normative theory that takes individuals to 
be ends in themselves should be ultimately concerned about how well that person’s life goes 
(Robeyns 2017, 57–59). While some resources are clearly instrumental to how well one’s 
life goes and others may be extrinsically valuable in virtue of their contingent connections to 
persons, resources in general are not what ultimately matters (Robeyns 2017, 48; Sen 1979a). 
Second, there are important ends that depend very little on material means. If we wish to 
148 
 
capture these, we must focus on ends directly (Robeyns 2017, 49). Third, persons have 
different abilities to convert resources into things that make their life go well (Robeyns 2017, 
45–49; Sen 1992, 19–21, 26–30, 37–38). Resourcist currencies could only approximate 
people’s opportunities to achieve valuable ends if people have the same or similar abilities 
to convert resources into valued ends (Robeyns 2017, 48). While resources could of course 
be distributed in a way that is sensitive to such differences, doing so would imply that 
resources themselves are not what ultimately matters. 
6.3.2 Why a mixed objective–subjective conception of wellbeing? 
The conception of wellbeing I adopt is a mixed objective–subjective conception of wellbeing, 
which stakes out a middle ground between the extremes of pure subjectivism and pure 
objectivism about what makes a life go well. There are good reasons to reject both extremes 
(Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2).  
Purely objective accounts take individuals’ own point of view insufficiently seriously (ibid 
chap. 2). The functionings account I will adopt is, like all accounts within the wider 
capabilities/functionings approach, normatively/ethically individualist: it treats persons as 
ends in themselves in the sense that “individual persons, and only individual persons are the 
units of ultimate moral concern … when evaluating different social arrangements, we are 
only interested in the (direct and indirect) effects of those arrangements on individuals” 
(Robeyns 2017, 57, emphasis in original). Accordingly, we have reason to ascribe a 
significant degree of moral value to individuals’ preferences, intentions, plans and choices.  
Purely subjective accounts (hedonic or happiness accounts; preference satisfaction accounts; 
and accounts based on autonomous planning), on the other hand, are vulnerable to various 
objections that point to the sensitivity of individuals’ psychological states to environmental 
phenomena that we have good reason to think are problematic (Robeyns 2017, 130–35). The 
liberal models of the self outlined above are vulnerable to such objections. The ontological 
assumptions of the liberal models predispose liberal politics to take individuals’ agency-
oriented mental states—or their behavioural expression—as the raw data for moral valuation, 
without sufficient attention to the cultural, social and material conditions in which they were 
generated (Chambers 2008; Frazer and Lacey 1993, 55–56; Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2). On 
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the ecological account, by contrast, individuals’ mental states and agency must be understood 
in terms of their embeddedness in and interactions with their environment. Insofar as we have 
reliable reasons to be concerned about the environmental conditions in which an individual’s 
mental states and agency have been shaped, we have a positive reason to take a more 
objective stance on what is good for the person, displacing the default deference to the 
individual in those cases (Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2).  
6.3.3 Why functionings, not capabilities? 
Accounts of wellbeing focused on agents’ capabilities and/or functionings are the most 
prominent among those that adopt mixed subjective–objective conceptions of wellbeing (see 
Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2; Robeyns 2017, 135–37; Sen 2008, 26). Following the seminal work 
of Sen (1979a, 1999), functionings are the “beings and doings” of human persons (see 
generally Robeyns 2017, 39–40). More specifically, functionings “are those beings and 
doings that constitute human life and that are central to our understandings of ourselves as 
human beings” (ibid 39). Capabilities are the “real freedoms or real opportunities” to achieve 
functionings (ibid 39). I adopt a functionings account of wellbeing, as opposed to a 
capabilities account.  
The main reason for doing so is that I think there is a certain prima facie attractiveness to a 
functionings account that makes it the natural choice within the field of possible 
capabilities/functionings accounts. Part of what motivates capability theorists (e.g. Robeyns 
2017, 129) to reject hedonic accounts of wellbeing is the fact that, on the latter, wellbeing 
can be achieved through the passive transmission of pleasurable mental experiences—a 
concern typified by Nozick’s famous “experience machine” thought experiment (1974, 42–
45). The objection is motivated by the conviction that what makes a life go well involves 
doing certain things (involving contact with the world beyond our heads), and being certain 
kinds of people (Nozick 1974, 43–45; Robeyns 2017, 129). But highly capable persons need 
not actualise many of the great possibilities for being and doing that are available to them, 
either. If it really is “beings and doings that constitute human life and that are central to our 
understandings of ourselves as human beings” (Robeyns 2017, 39), then we would seem to 
need a strong reason to prefer capabilities over functionings. At the same time, part of what 
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motivates capability theorists to reject resourcist accounts of wellbeing is the recognition that 
social and material structures constrain people’s ability to convert resources into valuable 
functionings. A focus on achieved functionings mitigates the risk that individuals will choose 
to forego crucial functionings due to social-structural pressures.17 Again, the motivation for 
rejecting this rival account of wellbeing generates momentum toward a functionings account, 
and so we seem to need a good reason for adopting a capabilities account instead. 
Before considering candidate reasons, I should note that both of the positions mentioned in 
the previous paragraph rely implicitly on certain ontological ideas:18 that the person’s basic 
mode of being is active rather than passive; and that social structures have a strong influence 
on individual choices (cf. Robeyns 2017, 129, 190–92). Both of these are features of the 
ecological account of the self and agency. This allows us to see how the ecological account 
supports the prima facie case that I have just made for a functionings account of wellbeing. 
The main reasons that have been given for preferring a capabilities account of wellbeing are 
that focusing on capabilities promotes the values of (i) individual choice, (ii) self-
responsibility and (iii) anti-paternalism (Nussbaum 2000, 87, 2006, 79; Robeyns 2017, 107–
10; Sen 1993, 40). While a capabilities account may promote these values to a greater extent 
than a functionings account, I don’t think that a functionings account performs either so 
absolutely badly on these measures, or so badly relative to the capabilities account, that the 
prima facie case for preferring functionings is displaced.  
With respect to (i) and (ii), there are at least two ways in which a functionings account, at 
least when constrained to the most important functionings, makes ample room for 
individuals’ freedom to choose over a wide range of options, and hence for a significant 
degree self-responsible agency. First, focusing on functionings manifests a concern to ensure 
that people have the underlying skills and dispositions that are necessary preconditions to 
                                                 
17 Though capability theorists are alive to that risk and therefore concerned about real opportunities, the risk is 
difficult to eliminate in practice. 
18 Robeyns rightly notes that antecedent ontological and explanatory commitments can influence important 
choices made within a broadly functionings/capabilities approach (Robeyns 2017, 68–69). 
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making valuable choices (for which they can reasonably be held responsible). Consider, for 
example, what are widely taken to be some of the most important generic capabilities: 
“imagination and thought”; and “practical reason” (Nussbaum 2006, 76–77). We can see 
instantly that to conceive of having “real opportunities” (capabilities) for imagination, 
thought and practical reason is somewhat strained. These are better understood as learned 
dispositions, dependent on the development by the agent of requisite skills through training, 
habituation, and ongoing practice during and beyond childhood (Claassen 2014, 64; Kramm 
2019; Robeyns 2017, 93–94). At the very least, the capabilities and functionings implicated 
in thought, imagination and practical reason are so fundamentally entwined that the lines 
become blurred to the point that insisting on the superiority of capabilities becomes artificial 
(Claassen 2014, 65–67; Gandjour 2008). In any case, the crucial point is that once a person 
has achieved these functionings qua stable dispositions, they will be capable of making all 
sorts of choices. They will also be capable of engaging in instrumental calculation, critically 
reflecting on their circumstances, formulating goals and plans, and performing other 
cognitively-demanding tasks associated with self-responsible forms of agency. If doing those 
things is valuable, then securing the underlying functionings is the right way to ensure people 
are able to do them.  
The second way in which a focus on achieving functionings respects people’s freedom to 
choose and their self-responsible agency is by the generic specification of functionings. As 
Robeyns notes, functionings and capabilities are standardly understood in generic terms, such 
as “being literate, being mobile, being able to hold a decent job”. As such, whether a 
particular person who, for example, has the functioning of being mobile “decides to stay put, 
travel to the US or rather to China, is not normatively relevant for the capability approach” 
(Robeyns 2016c, sec. 2.3, see also 2017, 49). Insofar as public policies aim at ensuring people 
achieve certain generic functionings, such policies will leave people with a wide range of 
choice as to the particular ways in which they realise those functionings.19 
                                                 
19 Nothing I say below in Part 6.3.4 undermines this claim, since my incorporation of particular functionings 
merely extends the functionings account to include particular functionings that people have already chosen. 
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The kind of freedom-to-choose that the functionings account of wellbeing provides is a 
positive and effective form of freedom. This position, too, is supported by the ontological 
assumptions I have made, since relational/ecological selves are conceived as inherently 
dependent on other persons, resources and structures to live flourishing lives (Frazer and 
Lacey 1993, 180). This account of the self and its freedom has a deflationary effect on the 
remaining argument that has been put forward for ultimately valuing capabilities rather than 
functionings, viz. “anti-paternalism”. The anti-paternalist argument is predicated on the 
assumption that individuals are ontologically independent (antecedently individuated and 
pre-social) and literally autonomous, such that all “interferences” by outside forces 
(especially the state) must be positively justified. These assumptions, or so I argued earlier, 
are implausible, and the ecological conception of the self and its agency rejects them. Rather, 
the functionings individuals have will, one way or another, be a product of the society in 
which they live and the state that governs it. So understood, we must acknowledge that what 
is called “paternalism” is just one of the multifarious ways in which external forces influence 
the individual, which may or may not be problematic (Claassen 2014, 2016, 1287–88). This 
shifts the terrain of the argument away from anti-paternalism per se back to the social and 
other conditions that best promote people’s flourishing. Undoubtedly, an overbearing state 
that seeks to control the full extent of an agent’s functionings would be a moral disaster (as 
would a minimalist state that leaves some individuals fully at the mercy of violent gangs or 
predatory corporations). But as I have already shown, far from entailing such a state, a 
suitably targeted functionings account of wellbeing would leave individuals with a wide 
range of valuable options from which to choose and would nurture the generic functionings 
needed to choose responsibly within that range. Anti-paternalism, then, does not seem to 
provide a strong reason to depart from the prima facie attractiveness of a functionings 
account, either. 
Finally, there are practical institutional reasons for favouring a functionings account for 
policy-oriented purposes of the kind for which ART is intended (cf. Robeyns 2016a, 401). 
Most importantly, achieved functionings are simply much easier to observe and measure than 
capabilities (Sen 1992, 52–53). For any applied purposes in which the theory is to be 
operationalised, therefore, focusing on functionings is a virtual necessity. Since the 
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secondary aim of my theory of legal transitions is practical action-guidance, the greater 
feasibility of focusing on functionings provides a further, albeit less deep, reason to favour it 
over capabilities. 
This concludes my defence of my use of a functionings account of wellbeing within ART. 
Before developing my conception of functionings further, I must emphasise that the 
arguments above pertain to the object of ultimate concern in a theory of wellbeing. Clearly, 
as functionings theorists emphasise, achieving functionings depends on the presence of 
propitious resources, structures and conditions (Robeyns 2017, 47–51; Wolff and Reeve 
2015, 460). Accordingly, my commitment to valuing functionings entails a commitment to 
the instrumental and extrinsic valuation of resources, structures and conditions insofar as they 
are necessary to sustain (instrumental), or part-constitutive of (extrinsic), a valuable 
functioning (see also Robeyns 2017, 50–51). This caveat will become important in my 
discussion of state responses (Chapter 9) since it means that, in some cases—most obviously 
the resource-poor—it will be necessary for the state to provide people with resources (in 
order to secure central functionings). 
6.3.4 Why a modified functionings account? Including particular functionings 
As noted above, functionings are standardly specified in generic terms (generally achievable 
and agent-neutral ‘types’), not particular terms (agent-relative, actually achieved ‘tokens’). 
Understanding functionings generically is desirable in its own right. It is particularly valuable 
when it comes to evaluating wellbeing, depravation or disadvantage objectively, since it 
allows one to identify components of a good life that a person lacks, and thus to make policy-
relevant normative claims about what such a person ought to have (that is, what they ought 
to gain). Translated into the present project, this strength enables us to adequately 
conceptualise the wellbeing gains of the ‘winners’ from legal change: we can analyse the 
generic functionings they will gain. Accordingly, I take it to be important that any conception 
of wellbeing for use in a theory of legal transitions should incorporate generic functionings. 
At any rate, mine does.  
The ecological account of the self and agency helps us to see, however, that an exclusive 
focus on generic functionings is too narrow. Specifically, the ecological account motivates 
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the recognition of an important kind of agent-relative value that inheres in agents’ particular 
beings and doings in the world; that is, the narrative functionings like the durable 
relationships, attachments, projects and practical identities that they consciously value, as 
well as the more basic functionings like the rudimentary bodily, cognitive, and extra-
corporeally extended functionings arising from their histories of brain-body-world 
interactions. I shall call these particular functionings. The cost of understanding functionings 
exclusively generically is that it leaves functionings approaches ill-equipped to account for 
many of the particular functionings losses that arise from social, economic and cultural 
changes, including those induced by legal transitions. Accordingly, I adopt a modified 
functionings account of wellbeing, which incorporates particular functionings alongside the 
standardly included generic functionings.  
To be sure, insofar as organism-bound functionings are concerned—such as blood filtration, 
or even ‘being healthy’—the distinction between particular and generic functionings is 
blurred to near-irrelevance, since the overwhelmingly normal way for an agent to have 
achieved such functionings is via their particular bodies.20 But when it comes to functionings 
that are achieved wholly or partly through external resources or conditions, the distinction 
becomes crucial. Consider the following example, which pertains to the generic functioning 
of ‘being adequately housed’ (or ‘having adequate shelter’):  
Homelandia: In the Republic of Homelandia, every person within its jurisdiction has a 
constitutionally guaranteed (and rigorously enforced) right to housing. However, Homelandia 
takes a large inflow of immigrants—many of whom were unhoused in their country of 
origin—and the Homelandic Government can’t quite build new housing at a rate sufficient 
to keep up with demand. What ends up happening is that existing housing stock gets 
subdivided, and poorer citizens get shuffled around from one home to another as the 
                                                 
20 Though even here the distinction remains significant in principle, since many normally organism-bound 
processes can become extra-corporeally extended—through use of a dialysis machine for blood filtration, for 
example. I owe the notion of an “organism-bound” process to Clark (2008, 123) and the blood filtration example 
to Shapiro (2011, 195). The distinction is also blurred to near-irrelevance in practice with respect to functionings 
that rely on external goods purely for immediate consumption. For example, I will tend not to develop any 
significant particular history with the carrots I need to eat in order to be adequately nourished. 
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government struggles to match supply with demand via its centralised housing allocation 
system. Ada is a poor citizen of Homelandia. She is forced by the government to move home 
roughly every three months. 
Understood generically, Ada enjoys the functioning of being housed. In fact, she even enjoys 
that functioning with a high degree of security (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 3): thanks 
to the rigorously enforced constitutional guarantee, there is a very high probability that Ada 
will always have a home in Homelandia; and she can have a high degree of subjective 
confidence in that fact (a high degree of “belief-relative security”: Herington 2017, 187). Yet 
every time she is forced to move home, Ada loses the particular functioning she has of being 
housed in that particular home. Intuitively, this loss of particular functionings matters to our 
normative evaluation of the case. As I flagged in Part 6.2.3, the ecological account of the self 
and agency helps us to see the value of such particular functionings: it is through our history 
of interactions with the world that we generate a relatively coherent sense of ourselves over 
time.21  
But if functionings were to be understood exclusively in generic terms, the 
capability/functionings approach could not account for the significance of these particular 
values and their loss. 22  While Kantian/Rawlsian liberals—and for that matter, some 
utilitarians (see, e.g., my discussion of Bentham in Chapter 2.3)—go too far in valorising 
long-term planning and the unity and coherence of one’s life, a purely generic conception of 
functionings seems to err in the other direction by failing to value such coherence at all. 
Furthermore, an exclusive focus on generic functionings leaves the standard 
                                                 
21 For a deeper explanation of the kinds of losses associated with home displacement, see my discussion in 
Chapter 7.2. 
22 No doubt the capability approach can say something else about what is wrong with the approach to housing 
in Homelandia. For example, it leaves citizens with very little control over their environment—arguably a core 
capability/functioning (Nussbaum 2011, 33–34). But this is a separate and additional point that neither 
subsumes nor detracts from my point. An alternative possibility is that we could account for such losses in terms 
of generic relational functionings like the functioning of ‘being in a familiar environment’ or ‘being embedded 
in networks of relationships’. But I join with Cohen (2011) in thinking that this philosophical tendency to 
express value only in (ever more sophisticated) generic terms still misses something important, which is nicely 
captured in Cohen’s thought experiment (ibid 211): imagine the qualities about your life partner that you love, 
and articulate these in generic terms; now imagine someone else came along with all of those generic qualities 
(and no additional drawbacks). Would you really be indifferent between the two?  
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capability/functionings approach unable to adequately manage trade-offs, whether intra- or 
inter-personal, between gaining generic functionings and losing particular functionings.23 
Consider each instance in which Ada is forced to move and new, hitherto homeless 
immigrants are given housing. If we were to account for the change in terms of aggregate 
wellbeing, where wellbeing means the achievement of generic functionings, then each such 
change would register as a Pareto improvement: some people’s (the new immigrants’) 
housing functioning has increased, while Ada is no worse off, since her generic functioning 
of ‘being housed’ has stayed the same.24 Yet this would be a false accounting, since it would 
fail to recognise the way that Ada is made worse off by the loss of her particular functioning 
of being housed in her particular home. Particular functionings fill this conceptual gap, 
providing a means by which to account for both the generic gains and the particular losses, 
and hence the trade-offs involved in processes of social and economic change.  
The closest analogue to this modified functionings account of wellbeing, of which I am aware, 
is that of Raz, articulated in The Morality of Freedom (1988).25 Raz places strong emphasis 
on the value to individuals of success in their goal pursuits, which are particular to the person 
(he includes personal relationships within this category26) (ibid chap. 12). At the same time, 
Raz’s account of wellbeing also includes a person’s “biologically determined needs and 
desires” (many of which will be generic) (ibid 290).27 The affinity between Raz’s account 
and mine extends further: Raz recognises that people’s goals, though unique, are necessarily 
                                                 
23 Robeyns (2017, 52–53) mentions that the capability approach could be used to evaluate changes in a single 
person’s (intra-personal) wellbeing over time, but notes that such uses are “much less prevalent in the scholarly 
literature”. However, as I hope to show in this paragraph, losses (negative changes over time) could not be 
adequately accounted for on the capability approach without incorporating a notion of particular functionings. 
24  At least, this would be the case if the housing functioning were considered in isolation from other 
functionings, such as control over one’s environment (see footnote 22, above). 
25 Raz, of course, uses this account for different purposes to me, but the account itself is relevantly similar.  
26 The value of relationships in Raz’s account of wellbeing is evident from his discussion of personal goals, the 
larger category into which personal relationships are subsumed, in chapter 12 (e.g. at 290–91, 311–12). It is 
also evident in chapter 7 (at 177–78) when discussing the example of a man and his relationship to his dog, and 
elsewhere in the book (e.g. at 155). For other broadly liberal accounts of the value of personal relationships, 
see, e.g., Scheffler (1997) and Nussbaum (2000, 122). 
27 Raz’s theory of wellbeing is endorsed and adapted by Nine (2018, 241–42) to a particular understanding of 
the self-through-time that is similar to my own. Indeed, Nine draws explicitly on the ideas of 
distributed/extended cognition theorists, as I do. 
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strongly conditioned by available “social forms” (ibid 307–13),28 implying a clear rejection 
of asocial individualism and an embrace of a position closer to communitarianism than 
standard liberal conceptions of the self (Mulhall and Swift 1996, 326–31, 343–45). Further, 
Raz emphasises the importance of practice and habituation, and de-emphasises the role of 
pure reasoning, as the means by which individuals come to instantiate social forms within 
their own goal pursuits and sense of self (1988, 311–13).  
The conception of wellbeing that I have endorsed and sketched above plays an important role 
in my theory of legal transitions. Wellbeing, so conceived, is one of the two ‘vectors’ of 
relevant reasons justifying state transition policy. In particular, it is a concept that is 
incorporated into (and hence part-constitutive of) the Wellbeing Principle developed in 
Chapter 7 and also into a key premise of the justification for that principle provided in that 
chapter. Furthermore, this conception of wellbeing is used as part of the conception of 
successful adaptation that I invoke in my discussion of adaptive state responses in Chapter 9. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I introduced some key theoretical constructs that underpin ART. I first 
described the ecological account of the self and its agency, explaining how its two core 
ontological assumptions differ from the assumptions shared by the liberal models of the self 
that implicitly underpin much of the theorising about legal transitions that I criticised in 
earlier chapters. I flagged three ways in which the ecological account supports ART: 
essentially, by providing positive grounds for valuing both stability and change, and for 
reconciling these across practices and across time. Second, I specified and defended the 
‘currency’ of loss/gain that will be used for the purposes of ART: the modified functionings 
account of wellbeing. 
I now turn to the two principles of ART, starting with the Wellbeing Principle. 
                                                 
28 By “social forms” Raz seems to mean something like social roles and social norms (see Raz 1988, 307–13). 
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 THE WELLBEING PRINCIPLE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the present chapter is to defend the following principle of ART—the Wellbeing 
Principle:   
a) the state has a pro tanto reason to conserve particular functionings that would 
otherwise be lost as a result of a legal change, and the strength of that reason is 
proportional to the centrality of the particular functionings at stake; 
b) the state has a pro tanto reason to refrain from conserving an agent’s prior functioning 
set against gains in generic functionings that they would otherwise enjoy as a result 
of a legal change, and the strength of that reason is proportional to the centrality of 
the generic functionings at stake 
In short, the Wellbeing Principle provides for the anticipated ex post effect of a legal change 
on wellbeing to be taken into account in the determination of transition policy and, crucially, 
via the concept of ‘centrality’ developed below, a sense of the weight that such wellbeing 
considerations should have.1 Note that the Wellbeing Principle considered in isolation is 
quite weak—all it establishes is what the state has a pro tanto reason (not) to do; it says 
nothing about the other reasons that should enter into the state’s calculations concerning 
transition policy. However, being one of only two principles within ART that provides 
relevant reasons to support one or another transition policy, it ends up being highly significant.  
For present purposes, the more important, interesting, and potentially controversial clause of 
the Principle is clause (a), concerning the stabilisation of particular functionings. Its effect is 
                                                 
1 Of course, only coarse-grained comparisons are possible using a notion of functioning centrality. Particular 
functionings will be more readily comparable on an intrapersonal basis than an interpersonal basis. Still, I 
maintain that coarse-grained interpersonal comparisons of functionings, weighted by their centrality, can 
meaningfully be made for the purposes of public policy. What is not on offer from such an approach is the kind 
of complete ordering enabled by the simplistic assumption of a single, fully comparable metric, such as money. 
But this does not imply that the Wellbeing Principle cannot be operationalised (see Robeyns 2017, 207–8). 
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to ensure that some of the strongest ‘conservative justice’ concerns raised in different ways 
by property and legitimate expectations theories are taken into account in a theory of legal 
transitions—albeit in a consequentialist and scalar form that I find more appealing as a basis 
for government policy and that is more consistent with the ontological foundations that I have 
endorsed (see Chapter 6.2.2). My argument for clause (a) is as follows, accompanied by a 
cross-reference to its treatment in this thesis/chapter in square brackets: 
P1: An agent’s wellbeing is of ultimate moral value [assumed—see Chapter 6.3.2]; 
P2: An agent’s wellbeing consists (partly) in the continuity of the agent’s particular 
functionings [defended in Chapter 6.3.4];  
P3: The degree to which a particular functioning contributes to an agent’s wellbeing 
is proportional to its centrality to the agent [defended in Part 7.2, below]; 
P4: Other agents have a pro tanto reason not to set back an agent’s wellbeing 
[standard claim of interpersonal morality, discussed immediately below] 
C1: Other agents have a pro tanto reason not to set back an agent’s particular 
functionings, the strength of which reason is proportional to the centrality of the 
functioning to the agent [deduction from P1–P4]; 
P5: The state is an agent [assumed]; 
C2: The state has a pro tanto reason not to set back an agent’s particular functionings, 
the strength of which reason is proportional to the centrality of the functioning to the 
agent [deduction from C1 and P5] 
P6: A legal change is a state act [assumed]; 
C3: The state has a pro tanto reason to conserve (i.e. not to set back) an agent’s 
particular functionings when it changes the law, the strength of which reason is 
proportional to the centrality of the functioning to the agent [deduction from C2 and 
P6]. 
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From the argument outlined above, it can readily be seen that it is a fairly short logical chain 
from placing moral value on particular functionings (qua constituents of an agent’s wellbeing) 
(P2) to the state having a reason to conserve an agent’s particular functionings when it 
changes the law (C3), once one makes the plausible assumptions that an agent’s wellbeing 
has moral value (P1), that the state is an agent (P5),2 and that a legal change is an act of state 
(P6).  
The bulk of the remaining normative load is borne by P3, which I will elaborate and defend 
in Part 7.2, below. P4 is a normative premise that claims that agents have (at least) a pro 
tanto reason not to set back another’s wellbeing. I take this claim (or relevantly equivalent 
variants thereof), to be a fairly uncontroversial, widely endorsed principle of morality, or at 
least an uncontroversial premise in more complex principles concerning wrongful harm 
(Smith 2013; Tadros 2016, chap. 10). Accordingly, I will not argue directly for P4. Rather, 
in the course of arguing for P3 (centrality weighting), I hope to demonstrate casuistically that 
the strength of the pro tanto reasons an agent has to not set-back another agent’s particular 
functionings is indeed proportional to the centrality of those functionings, and that this 
reasoning applies equally to acts of state, including legal changes. Furthermore, in Part 7.3 
of the chapter I will raise and respond to what I take to be the strongest objection to P4, which 
I call the “unjust functionings objection” (I also consider a similar, but weaker version of the 
objection that targets P2). 
Clause (b) of the Wellbeing Principle is, I take it, fairly uncontroversial, so I will only say a 
few brief words about it here. A key purpose of changing the law is to improve people’s lives. 
On the capability/functioning approach, this effectively means improving their most central 
generic functionings (on my account) or capabilities (on capability accounts). Nonetheless, 
for reasons I discuss in Chapter 8, there are conditions under which the state ought to block 
or reduce the transitional gains that would otherwise accrue to an agent arising from a legal 
change (through grandfathering their prior disadvantageous position or through clawing back 
                                                 
2 I follow List and Pettit (2011) in assuming that the state is a group agent (i.e. a corporate agent) and is capable 
of causing harm or loss, in its own right, to its citizens. 
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their gains, e.g. through a windfall tax). The effect of clause (b) is to limit, by dint of a 
countervailing reason, the extent to which the most central (i.e. highest-priority) generic 
functioning gains can be blocked or reduced. In other words: holding constant all other 
reasons for transition policy, the more central the gain in generic functioning (e.g. life, bodily 
integrity, physical health) to an agent caused by a legal change, the weaker the reason to 
block or reduce an agent’s enjoyment of that gain. We would not want to block a homeless 
person from being provided with secure shelter pursuant to a new housing policy, to take an 
obvious example!  
Clause (b) thus advances, albeit at a more conceptually basic level, the kinds of wellbeing 
interests that motivated the appeals to ideal justice with respect to ‘winners’ from legal 
change discussed in Chapter 5. Our intuitions about ‘winners’ in the slavery abolition case 
discussed in that chapter are also captured by appealing to the notion of central generic 
functionings. The main difference is that, where clause (b) of the Wellbeing Principle 
provides probative reasons to let winners keep their generic functioning gains, principles of 
ideal justice (applied to the transition context, as per Chapter 5) would secure their lexical 
priority. It is, undoubtedly, a strength of the latter that in ‘obvious injustice’ cases (such as 
slave-owning) wellbeing interests are accorded such priority. However, as I argued in 
Chapter 5, the deontological conception of ideal justice has considerable limitations that are 
most evident when we move to less clear-cut cases. Appealing, as I do in this chapter, to the 
weighty value of central generic functionings accommodates the relevance of proto-ideal-
justice considerations, albeit in my preferred consequentialist and scalar form.3  
Note, however, that in the case of generic functionings, I cannot rely on an historical 
interaction-based notion of “centrality” as I will for particular functionings, since the absence 
                                                 
3 This, of course, means I take a stand on the long-standing debates over lexical/deontological aggregation rules 
vs consequentialist aggregation rules. I cannot hope to say anything new about this debate here, and so must 
leave this as an undefended assumption. For discussions (which I find a compelling motivation for a complex 
form of consequentialism as a basis for government policy) of the challenges faced by ideal-justice theories, 
and the advantages of consequentialist theories, when it comes to comparing the effects of alternative 
government policy options on wellbeing across diversely situated agents and states of the world, see Adler 
(2011), Broome (1999), and Sen (1987). 
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of such a history is precisely what distinguishes generic from particular functioning (see 
Chapter 6.3.4).4 I therefore follow the standard capabilitarian commitment and conceive of 
centrality in terms of some objective (agent-neutral) conception of an agent’s flourishing, in 
the sense of functionings that are more or less constitutive of a flourishing human life in 
general. How to determine precisely what this is would take me well beyond the scope of this 
thesis.5 Accordingly, where discussing generic functionings in the remainder of this thesis, I 
will simply rely on functionings that are (or whose capability-equivalents are) widely-
regarded as central (Nussbaum 2006, 76–78; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007) and on example-
specific intuitions.  
In any case, it is losses, and hence particular functionings, that are of primary interest in the 
present chapter (and to theorists of legal transitions), and it is to the notion of centrality of 
particular functionings, and the normative significance of their loss, to which I now turn.  
7.2 CENTRALITY OF PARTICULAR FUNCTIONINGS 
In Chapter 6.3.4 I defined particular functionings as comprising both the cognitively 
sophisticated, conscious, “narrative” aspects of ourselves—our non-instrumental identities, 
relationships, attachments (to places, culture and material things), and projects—and more 
“basic” functionings, such as rudimentary bodily, cognitive, and emotional functionings that 
mostly operate subconsciously (cf. Nine 2018, 241–42; Raz 1988, chap. 12; Tadros 2016, 
chap. 10). Below, I first discuss the conceptualisation of centrality with respect to the former, 
“narrative” functionings and then consider the latter, more basic functionings.  
                                                 
4 There has been considerable discussion in the capability literature about how to prioritise among capabilities 
and (generic) functionings based on their normative importance or urgency (Robeyns 2017, 95). Nussbaum uses 
the adjective “central” with respect to capabilities to convey such normative priority (Nussbaum 2000, 15), 
which suggests the plausibility of my doing likewise for generic functionings (albeit in a scalar way). Some 
have used the adjective ‘basic’ to modify ‘capabilities’ for this purpose. However, Robeyns (2017, 94–96) notes 
that “basic capabilities” has been used by different authors to convey a variety of different meanings (I use the 
term “basic” to refer to more biologically rudimentary functionings—see below Part 7.2), so I prefer to use 
“centrality” to convey normative weight. 
5 My inclination is toward some kind of mixed expert-public deliberative approach (cf. Khader 2011; Nussbaum 
2000; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). 
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7.2.1 Centrality of narrative functionings 
Since narrative functionings are consciously valued, we can straightforwardly (at least 
conceptually) understand their centrality for an agent in terms of the weight that an agent 
subjectively places on them.6  
There are many philosophical accounts of what it means to “value” or “care about”7 things 
in the non-instrumental sense I intend to capture with reference to narrative functionings 
(Smith 2013, 304). In reviewing these, Matthew Smith notes that, despite differences in 
detail, “there is a substantial locus of agreement around the general picture” (ibid 304). 
Summarising this general picture, he takes an individual’s non-instrumental values or cares 
to be: 
central and particularly fixed elements of a person’s psychology: they have the function of 
regularly treating (or constituting dispositions to regularly treat) some object—be it a thing, 
a person, a practice, a project, a state of affairs—as normatively significant for oneself. By 
‘normatively significant’, I mean that, as a matter of course, one is practically and 
emotionally responsive to whatever the care-relevant state of the object is, e.g., its flourishing, 
realization, continued existence, etc., such that one (consciously or sub/unconsciously) 
adjusts how one lives one’s life in order to realize, promote, maintain, etc., that state, and one 
has characteristic emotional responses to changes in the cared-for object’s care-relevant state. 
(ibid 305, footnotes omitted) 
In emphasising both practical and emotional responsiveness, this ‘summary’ view is quite 
close to Scheffler’s (2011) conception of valuing, which I shall work with from here on. 
According to Scheffler (2011, 32), to value X is to hold (i) a belief that X is good or worthy 
of being valued, (ii) an emotional vulnerability to X, (iii) a disposition to experience those 
emotions as being merited or appropriate, and (iv) a disposition to treat certain kinds of X-
                                                 
6 The notion of subjective ‘centrality’ of (what I am calling) narrative functionings is a widely used construct 
in the social sciences, particularly in psychology (see, e.g., Huber and Huber 2012 on the “Centrality of 
Religiosity Scale”).  
7 Smith (2013) treats these notions as interchangeable. Scheffler (2011, 29–30) identifies some significant 
differences between them, and so focuses only on what it is to value something. 
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related considerations as reasons for action in relevant deliberative contexts. For my 
purposes, Scheffler’s distinction between element (i) on the one hand, and elements (ii) and 
(iv) on the other, illuminates what it means for someone to treat a narrative functioning as 
more or less central to their own flourishing. 
Consider first the difference between elements (i) and (ii). Scheffler notes that a given 
individual may believe that a great many things are valuable, but not value most of those 
things herself (ibid 31). I might instantly recognise value in other people’s friendships, yet 
those friendships don’t matter to how well my own life goes; I have no emotional 
vulnerability to the vicissitudes of those people’s relationship. By contrast, if I think of a 
close friend whose friendship I greatly value  
then I may feel pleased at the prospect of spending time with him, saddened if we rarely have 
occasion to see one another, eager to help him if he is in need, distressed if a serious conflict 
develops between us or if we become estranged, and shocked and betrayed if he harms me or 
abuses my trust (ibid 28).  
Similarly, I might think that stamp collecting is a valuable project, yet I personally do not 
take it to have any special normative significance in my own life, and part of what it means 
to say that is that I am not emotionally vulnerable to the fluctuating fortunes of the handful 
of stamps I happen to have in my stationery drawer, or any other stamps, for that matter. Yet 
I will feel frustrated, saddened and perhaps angry if an important project of mine becomes 
thwarted.  
Now consider the difference between (i) and (iv). While, again, one may believe that a great 
many things are valuable in a general sense (i), one has only a limited subset of things that 
one is disposed to treat as a source of reasons for one’s actions. Part of what it means to value 
X is to be “disposed to treat X-related considerations as constituting reasons for action in 
relevant contexts”; those considerations, in other words, have “deliberative relevance” in 
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given contexts (ibid 31). Elsewhere, Scheffler (1997, 2004) elaborates on the more specific 
kinds of reasons that relationships and projects provide us.8 In summary:  
If one values one’s relationship with another person non-instrumentally, then one will see 
oneself as having reason to devote special attention to that person’s needs and interests. 
Similarly, if one values a personal project non-instrumentally, then one will see oneself as 
having reason to devote special attention to the flourishing of that project (Scheffler 2004, 
257). 
The centrality to a person of some narrative functioning—such as a project or relationship—
can be captured, then, by attending to the role it plays in one’s emotional life and in one’s 
practical reasoning: 
Not everything that one values plays an equally central role in one’s life. I may value both 
my relationship with my son and my colleague’s contributions to department meetings, but 
they obviously do not play the same role in my life. Other things being equal, the degree of 
emotional vulnerability that one incurs in valuing a given thing will depend on the role that 
thing plays in one’s life. These differences in role, in turn, are largely constituted by 
differences in the range and character of the reasons for action with which different valued 
items are seen as providing us. I see my relationship with my son as providing me with 
compelling reasons for action in a very wide range of contexts, many of which are highly 
consequential. I also value my colleague’s contributions to department meetings, but these 
provide me with reasons for action only in a very limited range of contexts. We speak of 
valuing things to different degrees, and of valuing some things more than others. To some 
extent, these ordinal and comparative judgments reflect judgments about how valuable 
different things are. But to a great extent they are best understood by reference to differences 
of role, reason, and emotional vulnerability. (Scheffler 2011, 32–33, emphasis added) 
The projects, relationships and attachments that we value most centrally, moreover, come to 
define our most central identities and to exert a structuring and orienting force on our agency 
(Taylor 1989, 27–31). They “provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to 
                                                 
8 Of course, our relationships and projects are often intertwined, as Scheffler notes (2011, 259). 
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determinate from case to case what is good, valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I 
endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon in which I am capable of taking a stand” 
(ibid 27). Rawls says something very similar: one’s “convictions and attachments help to 
organize and give shape to a person’s way of life, what one sees oneself as doing and trying 
to accomplish in one’s social world” (Rawls 2001b, 405). In this way, these central 
functionings become the main plotlines of our personal narratives (see also MacIntyre 1981, 
200–201; Taylor 1989, 46–48).9  
Given their role in structuring and orienting our lives, we should expect the loss of our most 
central relationships, attachments, projects and identities to be phenomenologically 
distinctive; a kind of “injury” to the self (Noë 2009, 69). And we should expect this 
phenomenologically distinctive injury to register in our emotions and in our practical 
reasoning. Emotionally, such losses are likely to entail not only negative feelings like sadness 
but also more existential forms of despair and anguish. This is borne out empirically. For 
example, psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, who spent much of her career studying trauma 
victims, finds that trauma (marked by the suddenness of a severe loss) results in victims 
experiencing shattered assumptions about the meaningfulness and benevolence of their 
world, provoking existential crisis (Janoff-Bulman 1992). In terms of practical reasoning, 
such losses are likely to entail a kind of disorientation (Lear 2006, 60–62; Rawls 2001b, 405; 
Taylor 1989, 27–32).10 If a person were to lose their central identities, attachments and 
projects, they would be “at sea … they wouldn’t know anymore, for an important range of 
questions, what the significance of things was for them” (Taylor 1989, 27). In narrative terms, 
a central plotline in the narrative of one’s life will have unravelled, requiring a radical change 
in life course but without the orienting and structuring force that that very plotline would 
otherwise have provided.  
                                                 
9 Behavioural and clinical psychologists also speak of narratives as integrating human cognition at the highest 
level, and thus structuring our expectations of the world (e.g. Sarbin 1986). 
10 The spatial metaphor (orientation) is not merely convenient: there are indications that “the link with spatial 
orientation lies very deep in the human psyche”, notes Taylor, citing certain personality disorders where 
people’s radical uncertainty about themselves manifests in spatial disorientation (Taylor 1989, 28).  
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It is because of these distinctively damaging effects that agents have a pro tanto reason not 
to set back others’ functionings, where the strength of that reason is weighted by the 
functioning’s centrality to that other agent. In what follows, I briefly set out some examples 
of often-central narrative functionings that are commonly threatened by legal changes. These 
examples serve two purposes. The first is to illustrate the concept of centrality and 
casuistically substantiate the claim that the strength of the state’s pro tanto reason to conserve 
particular functionings is proportional to the centrality of the functioning at stake. The second 
is to demonstrate how the identification of common categories of central functionings enables 
the state, as a practical, institutional matter, to mitigate the Moral Costs Problem identified 
in Chapter 4, by minimising the need to undertake expensive investigations into agents’ inner 
lives (see also Robeyns 2017, 126).11  
7.2.1.1 Loss of personal relationships 
Valued personal relationships are a universal constituent of a flourishing human life, at least 
on any account that accepts the inherent pro-sociality of persons, as the ecological conception 
of the self does (see Chapter 6.2). Common experience and empirical evidence attest to the 
fact that losses or attenuations of centrally valued relationships are typically among the most 
traumatic events people can experience (Holmes and Rahe 1967).  
Some legal changes have a relatively direct effect on the capacity of people to sustain and 
develop their most valued personal relationships. These include changes to immigration and 
citizenship laws that may disrupt existing living arrangements, and changes to family law 
(e.g. affecting the rights of separated parents in relation to children). Many of the categories 
discussed below also affect personal relationships more or less directly. 
7.2.1.2 Loss of place attachment / loss of communities of place 
The existence and benefits to persons of ‘place-attachment’ to one’s home and local 
community, and the negative impacts of its loss, have been well documented by social 
                                                 
11 The tension between agent-sensitivity and moral costs identified in Chapter 4 is inescapable, but I submit that 
this common-categorisation approach is a good way of managing it. 
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scientists (see Anton and Lawrence 2014; Lewicka 2011, 451–54 for overviews of the 
empirical literature). Normative theorists of multiple stripes recognise that geographic place-
attachments are typically constitutive of people’s identities, such that displacement or the 
experience of major changes to the local context can be not only painful but deeply 
disorienting (D. Bell 2016, sec. 3; D. R. Bell 2004; Meyer 2001; Moore 2015, 38–39; Nine 
2018; Norton and Hannon 1997; Scheffler 2007; Stilz 2013).12 As Nine writes: 
Place attachment can provide an anchor in life and offer important benefits when we remain in those 
places to which we are attached. When these bonds are broken, the disruption generally brings about 
the fragmentation of routines, of relationships, and of expectations, and it upsets a sense of continuity 
that is ordinarily taken for granted (Nine 2018, 240, footnote omitted)  
A wide range of common legal transitions can adversely affect people’s place attachments. 
One obvious field concerns changes to land law, environmental law, and zoning law (or 
“planning law”, as it is known in some jurisdictions) that significantly alter the material 
character of a neighbourhood or prohibit valued activities that were previously permitted. 
Another obvious field concerns immigration and citizenship laws, which affect the residency 
and work entitlements of non-citizens.  
7.2.1.3 Loss of traditions, practices, identities and concepts 
A more amorphous category of narrative functionings often centrally-valued by people are 
what we might loosely call ‘cultural’ (including but not limited to religious) functionings. 
The ecological account of the self I endorse follows communitarian and feminist theorists in 
understanding the self as embedded in culturally-saturated environments containing 
traditions, practices, discourses, symbols, values and norms that we absorb consciously or 
otherwise and which profoundly shape our everyday lives and our narrative functionings 
(Frazer and Lacey 1993, 122; MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1998; Taylor 1985). While cultures 
are always changing, and indeed must do so if they are to survive in a changing environment 
                                                 
12 As these citations attest, recognition of the value of place attachment and disvalue of its loss are not limited 
to communitarians, but it is fair to say that communitarian theorists have especially powerful conceptual 
resources with which to defend the conservation of “communities of place” (D. Bell 2016, sec. 3).  
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(Scheffler 2007), certain cultural changes can threaten, or cause, what we might call ‘cultural’, 
‘psycho-social’ or ‘conceptual’ losses (cf. Lear 2006).  
Many kinds of legal change cause cultural losses, so understood. For example, new 
environmental, biosafety and animal welfare regulations can affect traditional land-use and 
hunting practices, like seal hunting and fox hunting (Ypi 2017, 3–5), or the traditions 
embodied in jobs and other skilled practices like coalmining (considered below). 
Immigration law changes can affect the cultural composition of communities and nations, 
affecting the objects of people’s place-identity and national identity (Miller 2000). Cultural 
policies and secularisation measures can affect people’s ability to practice their religious and 
other cultural activities (Laborde 2008).  
There is also a more direct way in which legal changes have effects on people’s ‘cultural’ 
narrative functionings. The law has an expressive function; it is, after all, the formal 
institutionalisation and public validation of norms expressed through concepts and categories 
that structure social relations (Dworkin 1989, 480–81). Insofar as these categories and 
structures have meaning for us in and of themselves, their being changed may entail a kind 
of loss to some. Among the more troubling examples of this phenomenon is the way in which 
some religious groups see the liberalisation of marriage as a threat to their religious identity 
(van der Toorn et al. 2017) and the way some white people see the elimination of legal 
privileges historically enjoyed by white people as a threat to their racial identity (Harris 1993). 
One way of making sense of cultural losses such as these is through an understanding of 
culturally constructed “symbolic boundaries” between groups, which are often linked to 
culturally prevalent moral hierarchies or “orders of worth” (Hall and Lamont 2013b, 57). 
Where people see these boundaries and hierarchies between groups as being more morally 
significant, or ‘thick’, they are more likely to understand themselves and their sense of 
dignity and self-respect13 as bound up with their position within them (Haidt 2012; Haidt and 
Graham 2007; Hall and Lamont 2013b, 57; Lamont 2000; Lamont and Molnár 2002; Taylor 
                                                 
13 Taylor defines “dignity” as “the characteristics by which we think of ourselves as commanding (or failing to 
command) the respect of those around us” (1989, 15). 
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1989, 15–16) and are more likely to experience adverse changes to such boundaries and 
hierarchies as affronts to their dignity and status (Gest 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017; Lamont 
2000; Stenner 2005). These kinds of insights can assist policymakers in designing effective 
adaptive transition policies (including expressive acts) to facilitate adaptation to symbolic 
losses of this kind (see Chapter 9.3). 
7.2.1.4 Skill loss 
If skilled coping with one’s environment is the basic mode of being in the world (see Chapter 
6.2.2) then our skills are by definition central to our flourishing (Crawford 2015; Sennett 
2008). Certain skills are also bound up with our central projects and identities. Indeed, on 
some views, what it means to be an embodied agent inhabiting particular niches14  and 
practical identities just is to have and to exercise skilled perceptions and actions characteristic 
of that niche or identity (Crowell 2013, 290–91; Sokolowski 2000, 32ff). The more skilled 
we are at some practice the more central it is therefore likely to be to our lives. It follows that 
loss of skills an agent values will tend to have a phenomenologically disorienting effect 
(Zoller 2017), as studies of injured and retired athletes (Lavallee et al. 1998) and the 
“deskilling” of employment (Braverman 1974) have argued.  
The effects of legal changes on people’s existing skills should therefore be of particular 
concern to policymakers and theorists of legal transitions. The most obvious example of 
relevant legal changes include regulatory changes that affect the viability of industries that 
require skills that employees cannot utilise in other jobs. 
7.2.1.5 Job loss 
Many legal changes affecting the economy cause job loss. Job loss often affects important 
instances of all of the above-mentioned kinds of narrative functionings: personal 
relationships, place attachments, cultural practices, social status, and skills (Jahoda 1982). 
Psychologists who study job loss have found that, by undermining these various functionings, 
job loss can have profound impacts on the identity and mental health of the job-loser (for a 
                                                 
14 I introduce the concept of a niche in Part 7.2.2, below. 
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review of the literature, see Brand 2015). For example, job loss places stress on the 
multiple—typically highly valued—social roles which are used to construct and sustain a 
person’s (positive) sense of self. These roles may not only include the worker’s specific job 
function, organisational affiliation or industry/profession, but may also include more general 
social roles such as being a valued contributor to society, colleague/friend, or breadwinner 
(Price, Friedland, and Vinokur 1998, 308–309).15 The serious psycho-social harms that job 
displacement causes, moreover, are partly explained in terms of the self-perceived centrality 
of one’s work role to one’s self-identity (Brand 2015, 365–66). Furthermore, insofar as job-
losers remain unemployed, they may acquire a stigmatised social status that can be a 
significant source of mental stress (ibid 362, 365).16 Job loss can also undermine personal 
perceptions of mastery and control, of meaning and purpose, and of belonging, which are 
critical to mental health (Ashforth 2001). And it typically has considerable flow-on effects 
into other important aspects of people’s lives, including their social interactions, family 
relationships, and daily rhythms / ‘time structure’ (Brand 2015, 364–70).  
7.2.2 Centrality of background functionings 
Our particular functionings, as noted, also include rudimentary bodily, cognitive, and 
emotional functionings. These mostly operate “behind the scenes to make it possible for us 
to pursue plans and relationships” and, more generally, to “make a person capable of having 
a life that can go well” (Nine 2018, 242). Insofar as these functionings are organism-bound, 
they are fairly obviously worthy of institutional protection in their own right—hence the 
widespread appeal of institutions protective of life, bodily integrity, and physical and mental 
health. Likewise, for the purposes of legal transitions, it would be straightforward to identify 
a change-induced deterioration in organism-bound functionings as a loss of central 
functioning with which a theory of legal transitions should be concerned. This identification 
                                                 
15 Due to the gendered nature of family roles and the especially central role that paid work plays in the 
construction of masculine identities, job losses often disproportionately affect the self-image of men (Lee and 
Owens 2002; Pugh 2015). 
16 Even when workers return to employment, they often find themselves in inferior jobs or industries—inferior 
not only in terms of pay, conditions and regularity, but also in terms of the psycho-social dimensions 
(Strangleman 2001, 257–60).  
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is made easier, moreover, by the more ‘generic’ nature of these functionings, making them 
relatively similar across the human species.  
Less obvious, however, is the way in which these basic, or ‘background’ functionings are 
supported—perhaps even partly realised or constituted—by aspects of the external world. 
One way to get a grip on this is via Gibson’s (1979) concept of an “affordance”, which can 
be understood as the possibility for action that some feature of an organism’s environment 
offers to that organism, given its bodily capacities and its goals. To speak of affordances is 
to recognise that we comprehend the world in relation to what we can do in it. A doorknob 
‘affords’ turning to sufficiently tall and able-bodied humans, but not to a worm or a bee, or 
to a person with severe arthritis. Many of the affordances that shape our possibilities for 
action are provided by objects in the environment, and humans have an extraordinary (though 
certainly not unique) ability to structure their environment, using props, crutches, jigs and 
scaffolds to assist them in performing cognitive tasks (Crawford 2015, pt. 1; Donald 1991; 
Kirsh 1995). A common example is using a pencil and notepad to perform mathematical 
tasks (Wilson 2004, 165–66), or the way a bartender spatially arranges cocktail glasses to 
provide prompts that structure the tasks necessary to complete multiple orders, reducing the 
need for storing the orders in one’s short-term memory (Crawford 2015, 32). When we 
interact with these objects, our cognitive performance is enhanced. 
Under certain conditions, it is plausible to consider objects like these, and other external 
features of the world, as part of an agent’s extended cognitive system or extended mind. On 
the strong version of this claim, the Extended Mind Thesis (Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 
1998), external features of the world can part-constitute the agent’s mind, and there is an 
ongoing debate within the philosophy of mind about the truth of this thesis and the conditions 
under which it is instantiated (see Shapiro 2011, 178–99). I can sidestep these metaphysical 
debates because, for my normative-institutional purposes, it is sufficient to recognise that 
external parts of the world can play a strongly causally-instrumental role in an agent’s 
cognitive system—a weaker claim, sometimes called ‘embedded cognition’ on which there 
is much wider consensus, including among critics of the stronger version (Rupert 2004, 2009; 
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Shapiro 2011, 193–96).17 What is interesting about these debates for my purposes is the 
discussion of conditions under which it has been thought plausible to consider external 
features of the world as part of an agent’s extended cognitive system.  
An approach that has generated considerable support relies on the dynamic-interactive 
conception of the mind that I introduced and endorsed in Chapter 6.2.2. Where an agent 
interacts continuously and reciprocally with an object, as part of a dense, non-linear feedback 
loop, it is plausible to conceive of the object as part of the agent’s extended cognitive system 
(Carter and Palermos 2016, 546–49). For example, many people rely on prosthetic limbs, 
hearing aids, spectacles, canes, Tactile Visual Substitution Systems, wheelchairs and other 
artificial medical and therapeutic devices for important basic functionings, such as 
perception, cognition and action of various kinds. ‘Smart’ personal devices also increasingly 
perform perceptual, cognitive, and even agentic tasks. We use smartphones, personal 
computers, and increasingly sophisticated wearable technologies to store a wealth of personal 
information, to organise our activities, to communicate with others, and to generate 
personalised recommendations, and these “have begun to blur the lines between our 
biological and digital existence” (Carter and Palermos 2016, 546).18 In some cases, people 
quite understandably form strong attachments to these objects, too, but in all cases their 
centrality to our functionings is due at least to the role they play “behind the scenes” (Nine 
2018, 242). The potential for objects to play a central role in our basic functioning means that 
their loss will be experienced as acutely disruptive, independently of their financial value. 
For my purposes we can consider the centrality of extended rudimentary functionings simply 
as the duration and intensity of reciprocal interaction between the agent and the relevant 
                                                 
17 For many normative moral-political applications, this weak version of the thesis will be sufficient. For 
example, Nine adopts the same approach in her analysis of the home as a component of our extended minds 
(2018, 244, fn 12), which I discuss below. But some normative applications depend on the truth of the strong 
version of the thesis—for example, Carter and Palermos’ (2016) argument that damage to certain personal 
objects should under certain conditions be classified as a criminal assault requires that those objects be 
conceived as constitutive parts of the person’s mind, and hence the person, in order to fit within the standard 
conception of assault in common law legal systems.  
18 As Carter and Palermos note, “[w]hether such biotechnologically hybrid feedback loops will occur rarely or 
frequently will depend on opportunity conditions, such as the availability of appropriate technology and social 
norms”, and these are advancing rapidly (2016, 550). 
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external component of the world. Because I rely on a scalar conception of centrality, I am 
relieved of the burden of defending any sharp distinction between an object that ‘is’ or ‘is 
not’ a constitutive part of a person or the person’s extended cognitive system; what matters 
for my purposes is that objects and other parts of the external world can be more or less 
central to our rudimentary functionings. Consequently, our rudimentary functionings can be 
more or less vulnerable to their loss. It will therefore be important, in estimating the centrality 
of agents’ particular functionings affected by legal changes, to take account of people’s 
extended cognitive functionings as well their more obvious (generic) biological functionings 
and their conscious, narrative functionings. 
Consider, for example, legal changes that lead to displacement from one’s home—including, 
potentially, changes in zoning regulations, large-scale public works that require the 
acquisition of residential property, and taxes on land, property or generalised wealth (insofar 
as such taxes effectively force the sale of one’s home). Attachment to one’s home is a 
common form of place attachment that widely figures centrally in the narrative aspects of 
people’s self-constructs (Anton and Lawrence 2014). But a full accounting of the effect of 
home-displacement on a person’s wellbeing requires consideration of the impact on their 
basic cognitive functionings, too.  
I discussed above how we humans purposefully structure our lives through objects and the 
affordances they offer us. Building up from single objects, 4E theorists invoke the concept 
of a niche, which can be understood as a durable network of interrelated affordances 
(Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014, 330). Cara Nine (2018), drawing explicitly on the Extended 
Mind Thesis, has recently argued that just as objects can form part of our extended cognitive 
system, so too can the niche spaces that we construct. She focuses in particular on the home 
and identifies three main extended cognitive functionings that home spaces enable: “(1) the 
ability to form memories, attitudes, beliefs, and emotional attachments; (2) the ability to 
evaluate, reflect, and revise values, attitudes, and beliefs; and (3) the ability to perform 
actions consistent with one’s commitments” (ibid 242). These basic functionings are, Nine 
argues, in turn linked to our practical reasoning and emotional regulation, our capacities to 
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form and achieve goals, plans and projects, and our capacities to build and sustain meaningful 
family relationships and wider interpersonal relationships (ibid 245–52).  
In light of the extended cognitive functionings that are enabled through the meaningful niche 
construction of a home environment, Nine argues that removal from one’s home should be 
understood as a pro tanto harm (Nine 2018, 242–43, 256–57), and describes in detail the 
disruption to cognitive functionings that can be caused by home displacement. In further 
empirical support for this claim, Nine points out that changes affecting the immediate home 
environment are among the events toward the top of the Holmes-Rahe stress scale (Holmes 
and Rahe 1967), a tool used by clinical psychologists to predict stress levels and associated 
illness (ibid 252–53).  
For my purposes, the same impairment of background cognitive functionings that Nine points 
to can be invoked to justify categorising displacement from the home as (typically) entailing 
a loss of central basic functionings, which add to the narrative-level loss of a (typically) 
central attachment. According to the Wellbeing Principle, the state has a strong pro tanto 
reason to stabilise such functionings, and I take it that this accords with and explains widely-
held intuitions in home-displacement cases. Likewise, we could undertake a similar analysis 
of extended cognitive functionings that are also involved in many of the other examples of 
narrative functionings considered above, such as those concerning other kinds of place 
attachments, personal relationships, jobs and other personal projects. 
This concludes my discussion of the centrality of functionings, which substantiates my claim 
that the strength of the state’s pro tanto reason to conserve particular functionings is weighted 
by the functioning’s centrality to the agent.  
7.3 THE ‘UNJUST FUNCTIONINGS’ OBJECTION 
In the above discussion, I provided examples of central attachments, projects and identities—
pertaining to objects, homes, places, people, cultural values, jobs and skills—the loss of 
which was, in almost all cases, intuitively troubling. But what about the devoutly Christian 
opponent of same-sex marriage whose project is frustrated by same-sex marriage 
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legalisation? Or the slave-owner who loses his identity, status, and attachment to his slaves 
when slavery is abolished? Or the gun owner who loses the deep attachment he has to his 
gun when restrictive gun laws are introduced? Or the segregationist whose life project is 
frustrated when segregation is abolished? Call these ‘unjust functioning cases’.19 Such cases, 
one might object, undermine the Wellbeing Principle because the state has no reason to 
stabilise such particular functionings, however central they might be to a person.  
Unjust functionings cases are a subset of a wider category of functionings that one might call 
‘odious’ functionings: functionings that are objectionable in some way, though not 
necessarily unjust. I take the unjust functionings cases to be the hardest, and so will respond 
to a version of the objection that concentrates on unjust functionings cases. If my responses 
succeed in responding to this version of the objection, they will succeed, a fortiori, against 
wider versions of the objection targeting odious-but-not-unjust functionings. 
The objector might target this objection at one of two levels. On one version of the objection, 
they might claim that my conception of wellbeing is flawed, in that wellbeing cannot consist 
in unjust (or otherwise odious) particular functionings. But this would result in a needlessly 
moralised conception of wellbeing that would considerably distort our ordinary 
understanding of that concept and its natural linguistic usage (desiderata #III, VI). Wellbeing 
is typically understood as a micro-level concept concerned with how well an agent’s life 
goes, with no necessary dependence on interpersonal normative ideals such as moral 
wrongdoing or injustice (Tadros 2016, 182). If anything, the relation typically goes the other 
way: our moral and political ideals are often motivated, part-constituted and justified by 
appeals to the more basic notion of wellbeing (Raz 1988, 166; Tadros 2016, 182).  
                                                 
19 A similar objection could be levelled by appealing to cases in which the agent’s lost functioning is predicated 
in part on the agent’s irresponsible or imprudent actions, amounting to a violation of a duty of fairness (or 
rather, resulting in a loss for which they should be held responsible, such that providing a transitional response 
to that agent would be unfair). My response to versions of this objection involving fairness cases is substantively 
the same as to justice cases, mutatis mutandis, while noting that fairness provides independent reasons for 
transition policy within ART, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Additionally, we should prefer a non-moralised conception of wellbeing because it is more 
theoretically versatile—it is deployable in both normative and positive theories. This is 
desirable from the perspective of conceptual parsimony. As List and Valentini note, “to avoid 
a proliferation of rival interpretations of the same concept, we might also be looking for a 
single interpretation that can successfully play multiple roles” (2016, 533). Since my 
conception more accurately tracks the actual subjective experiences of losers, it appears more 
promising as a positive-theoretical concept, such as an explanatory variable in a theory of 
political behaviour—including political behaviour that affects the prospects of enacting 
justice-enhancing laws.20 
Alternatively, the objector might level the objection at P4, the interpersonal morality premise 
(“Other agents have a pro tanto reason not to set back an agent’s wellbeing”) or C1 (“Other 
agents have a pro tanto reason not to set back an agent’s particular functionings, the strength 
of which reason is proportional to the centrality of the functioning to the agent”), insisting 
that reasons to conserve particular functionings should have no moral weight at all when the 
functionings are unjust. The objection, framed as such, is non-trivial, since the Wellbeing 
Principle provides a probative reason to conserve such functionings.21  
My first response is one that will register only against a liberal proponent of the objection. 
The response is that it is not an objection that a liberal could coherently make. This first 
response relies on a response by Matthew Smith (2013) to essentially the same hypothetical 
objection that he contemplates to his own principle of interpersonal morality, which is very 
similar to my P4. Smith’s “accommodation thesis” is: “If someone cares about something, 
then one ought to accommodate that care, and one ought not to frustrate that care” (by 
                                                 
20  In the empirical sub-fields of political science, political agents’ past experience or future prospect of 
transitional effects—especially transitional losses—is widely studied as a potential cause of political 
phenomena such as public attitudes, voting behaviour, lobbying, activism, and anti-system behaviour.  
21 The conservatism of the appropriate transitional response depends on the scale of the wellbeing loss (the 
centrality of the functioning lost—as per this chapter), the direction and strength of fairness-related reasons (ex 
ante allocation of responsibility for managing the risk of legal change—Chapter 8), and the combination of 
time and adaptive capabilities needed to successfully adapt to that loss (Chapter 9). I argue in Chapter 8.3.4 that 
the reasons generated by the Fairness Principle will become weaker the more the relevant circumstances are 
characterised by inequality, which has implications for the appropriateness of a conservative response in “unjust 
functionings” cases (see Chapter 10.1.2). 
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“cares”, Smith means something very similar to what one “values”, and hence to the narrative 
functionings that I discuss in Part 7.2, above) and, like my Wellbeing Principle, Smith’s is a 
pro tanto consideration only (Smith 2013, 298).  
Smith defends his accommodation thesis in thoroughgoing liberal terms, as an implication of 
the liberal commitment to treat individuals as unique ends in themselves, since it is such 
unique sets of cares that make one a unique individual. He is especially concerned about the 
paternalising effects of failing to attend to and accommodate individuals’ distinctive cares 
(ibid 306–9). Smith acknowledges the impulse of the persistent objector who complains that 
“[s]ome cares are awful and simply in virtue of being awful, they do not merit deference” 
(ibid 312). However, Smith stands his ground, pointing out that the liberal commitment to 
the moral significance of the individual that drives the impulse to repudiate moral 
consideration of unjust/awful cares is the very same commitment that justifies his 
Accommodation Thesis (ibid 312). That said, Smith acknowledges that this is not so much a 
decisive response as a recognition of a tension in which he, by virtue of his appeal to a 
thoroughgoing liberalism, is also stuck: 
This is one reason why a liberal morality of difference is so difficult to develop and 
complicated to realize in daily life. What I am offering here, then, is not a solution to a 
difficult moral problem but instead a diagnosis of what I take to be a central problem faced 
by the liberal. The problem is that the pluralism of values is not a pluralism of innocuous, 
morally neutral values. It’s a pluralism that includes values that many liberals will, on the 
basis of core liberal commitments, find odious. Insofar as one is committed to the moral 
significance of the individual, one ought to feel both the pressure to accommodate those 
values and to challenge them. If we simply draw up a list of acceptable values and disregard 
individuals (or parts of individuals) who fail to adopt those values, then we risk losing sight 
of the individual and seeing only locations in which proper attitudes can be manifested. We 
cannot stipulate away the problem of odious values without stipulating away a substantive 
feature of liberalism. (ibid 312–13, emphasis in original, footnotes omitted) 
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For my purposes, Smith’s insight serves as a response (of sorts) to the would-be liberal 
objector to my P4/C1. Yet, in virtue of the ontological commitments I have endorsed, I can 
be both sympathetic to Smith’s concerns about respecting the individual and yet say two 
further things in response to this objection, such that I am not left stuck with the liberal 
tension Smith identifies.  
First, the objection rests on an excessively certain conception of what justice requires—one 
that belies the messy, uncertain, contested terrain of the concept.22 In Chapter 5.4, I argued 
that the lines drawn in any theory of justice will be both brittle and highly consequential, and 
this makes theories of justice unattractive touchstones for a theory of legal transitions. In the 
inevitable multitudes of cases involving borderline just/unjust central functionings to which 
a theory of legal transitions would apply, the Wellbeing Principle registers the trace of a lost 
central functioning, and this provides a reason for the state to provide at least an adaptive 
response (see Chapter 9). This provides a kind of normative safety net for the losers who 
suffer most from legal change that is not otherwise available if we make the move proposed 
by the objector and draw the lines of justice in such a way that the loser’s central functioning 
is deemed unjust. Of course, this won’t be an issue in ‘obvious injustice’ cases, so the objector 
might respond by limiting the objection to obvious injustices. But then the objector would 
need a general theory of ‘obvious injustice’, i.e. a determinate specification of obvious 
injustice and its boundaries, as opposed to an ad hoc list of obvious injustices. As my 
discussion in Chapter 5 of Matravers’ and Moore’s justice-based first stage of their hybrid 
legitimate expectations theories shows, this is no mean feat. 
The objection’s second, and related, weakness is to rest on an excessively synchronic 
conception of the person, translating to an excessively punitive institutional approach to legal 
                                                 
22 Smith also acknowledges this point in a footnote to the penultimate sentence of the extract block-quoted 
above: “People who are not moral monsters can be wrong about the statuses of both their own values and the 
values of others. Reasonable people make such mistakes. We should not have to be moral experts in order to 
properly recognize others as individuals.” However, the liberal ontology of the self (to which Smith appeals) 
underwrites the universalised claims about the true content of justice to which many liberals subscribe (see my 
Chapters 5 and 6), which would seem to limit the extent to which they could lean on this kind of legitimate 
uncertainty about the content of justice.  
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transitions in injustice cases. I argued in Chapter 6.2 that the ecological account of the self 
affirms the agency of the individual but recognises that individuals’ actions are influenced 
by complex social forces, and that individuals can change and develop over time. I will argue 
in Chapter 9.3 that this provides the ontological foundation for a diachronic, adaptivist 
approach to legal transitions. Presumably, Smith and fellow proponents of a very strong 
conception of ontological individuality will be moved to respect unjust/odious functionings 
in an ongoing, inter-temporally robust way. By contrast, on the ontological foundations I 
endorse we need not be so moved by this inter-temporal demand to respect a person’s unjust 
(or odious) functionings over the long term. Rather, we can endorse measures to facilitate the 
adaptation of persons with ‘unjust functionings’ as part of a process of societal transition 
toward a legal regime that requires such persons to properly value other people’s central 
generic functionings. ART thus opens a diachronic route out of the liberal tension that Smith 
identifies, providing a more compelling response to the objection. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has specified and defended the Wellbeing Principle—the first of two principles 
that provide probative reasons for transition policy. The main focus of my argument has been 
the claim that the state has a pro tanto reason not to set back (i.e. to conserve against losses) 
people’s particular functionings, where this reason is weighted by the centrality of the 
functionings at stake. I have specified and explained in detail the notion of centrality, 
describing what it means for narrative functionings and rudimentary functionings—
particularly extended cognitive functionings—to be central to a person’s flourishing, giving 
numerous examples that commonly arise in legal transitions. I have also defended the 
argument against an objection concerning unjust functionings.  
The ultimate effect of the reasons generated by the Wellbeing Principle on the justification 
of particular transitional responses will depend also on the strength and direction of reasons 
generated by the Fairness Principle—the second principle of ART, to which I now turn. 
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 THE FAIRNESS PRINCIPLE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The second principle of ART concerns the value of fairness in legal transitions. Most 
generally, fairness is a moral ideal that arises from voluntary, cooperative social relations 
(Delmas 2014a, 474; Rawls 1971, 111–13). It requires reciprocity with respect to benefits 
received in the course of cooperation for mutual gain, which implies refraining from free-
riding on others’ efforts and contributions (Delmas 2014a, 467; Klosko 2005, 149; Rawls 
1971, 112). As such, the ideal of fairness is well-suited to the normative analysis of relations 
between persons in conditions of relative equality, where we can more readily infer that the 
shared contributions are aptly characterised as voluntary and cooperative (rather than, say, 
coerced and exploitative). We might think of these as the paradigmatic “conditions of 
application” of a theory of fairness (cf. List and Valentini 2016, 545–46). This does not limit 
the application of theories of fairness to ‘ideal’ societies, however, since relative equality 
could obtain as between a subset of the members of an unequal society, enabling us to apply 
the ideal to the relations of that subset of persons inter se. As I shall discuss later in this 
chapter, when such conditions are attenuated, the strength of the reasons generated by the 
Fairness Principle will diminish accordingly. 
These introductory remarks about the nature, content and conditions of application of the 
ideal of fairness are necessarily general. We need a more specific and refined conception of 
fairness for use within ART. One conception of fairness appeals to the notion of 
responsibility, holding that the distribution of the fruits of social cooperation is fair if people 
get what they are responsible for. On the particular, practice-based approach to the allocation 
of responsibility that I advocate, and taken as a pro tanto consideration only, I think there is 
something attractive about this idea.  
Responsibility is an historical principle, meaning that distributions should be sensitive to the 
way they came about. This backward-looking aspect of responsibility-based principles makes 
them useful for considering questions of risk from an ex ante perspective: we can ask, ex 
ante, who bears responsibility for managing some risk—including a risk of legal change—
182 
 
and allocate the outcome of that risk (good or bad), ex post, to the responsible agent (Fried 
2003). Thus we can ask, in respect of some impending legal transition, did the affected 
individual or the state bear the responsibility for managing that risk, ex ante? This leads me 
to the following principle of ART—the Fairness Principle: 
In respect of a legal change, the state has  
a) a pro tanto reason to refrain from conserving an agent’s functionings to the extent 
that the agent was, ex ante, responsible for managing the risk of such a change to 
him/her/itself, and the strength of that reason is proportional to the degree to which 
the agent was so responsible; and 
b) a pro tanto reason to conserve an agent’s functionings to the extent that the state was, 
ex ante, responsible for managing the risk of such a change to that agent, and the 
strength of that reason is proportional to the degree to which the state was so 
responsible. 
The plausibility of the Fairness Principle depends crucially on the persuasiveness of the 
account of what it means to be ex ante responsible for managing a risk of legal change. I 
begin, in Part 8.2, by discussing and rejecting one approach to allocating responsibility for 
risk that is prominent in the philosophical literature: non-moral (metaphysical) ‘luck 
egalitarianism’. This discussion, along with the discussion of the ontological foundations of 
ART in Chapter 6.2, helps to motivate the conventionalist—or practice-based—moral 
approach to responsibility allocation that I will go onto specify, defend and illustrate in 
Part 8.3. Part 8.4 concludes.  
8.2 NON-MORAL LUCK EGALITARIANISM AND LEGAL TRANSITIONS: A CRITIQUE 
If a central issue posed by the problem of legal transitions is how to allocate the risks of legal 
change ex ante, then an obvious candidate within liberal-egalitarian thought would be so-
called ‘luck egalitarianism’. Luck egalitarians typically take fairness to be “the demand that 
no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by arbitrary factors” (Wolff 1998, 106). Non-
arbitrary factors are commonly conceived as those factors for which the agent in question is 
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responsible: no-one should be advantaged or disadvantaged as a result of phenomena for 
which they are not responsible; but inequalities are justified insofar as they reflect choices 
for which people are responsible (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Rakowski 1991; Roemer 
1996). The products of luck, in other words, should be equalised through redistribution, but 
the products of responsible choice should not. Moreover, agents can become responsible for 
(un)lucky outcomes where they have voluntarily run risks and failed to take out insurance. 
Such chosen gambles, for which agents are responsible, Dworkin calls “option luck”, which 
he distinguishes from “brute luck”, for which agents are not responsible (1981, 293). The 
paradigmatic example of “option luck” is placing a bet in a gambling casino (ibid 293–95). 
This general luck-egalitarian principle of fairness could, it might seem, readily be applied in 
a transition context to determine whether or not losers should receive transitional relief and 
winners should be taxed. As Fried (2003) has noted, the philosophical literature on luck 
egalitarianism has largely paralleled the law and economics literature on legal transitions in 
its adoption of an “ex ante perspective”: “While the luck egalitarian literature has had little 
to say on the specific problem of legal transitions, its general argument for sticking people 
with the ex post consequences of their risky choices would cover that case” (Fried 2003, 
131).1 Indeed, for the luck egalitarian, transition policy would be a matter of working out for 
each affected agent whether the legal change in question was, ex ante, a risk they were 
responsible for bearing.  
Given that choices made under uncertainty are, following Dworkin (1981), generally 
considered matters of option luck, many luck egalitarians would probably be inclined towards 
a reformative transition policy: since agents take, and choose how to manage, risks to their 
functionings and holdings under conditions of pervasive uncertainty about the legal future, 
the consequences of those risks should lie where they fall. Distributive losses and gains 
would, in this way, seemingly track the prudence of individual agents with respect to their 
anticipation of future legal transition risks and their management of those risks via strategies 
                                                 
1 Indeed, to the author’s knowledge, Fried’s paper is the only one to address legal transitions from a luck 
egalitarian perspective, and it does so critically.  
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of self-insurance (diversifying their investments or hedging) or obtaining third-party 
insurance to the extent it is available.  
Whatever the merits of this reformative legal transition policy, the conclusion that individuals 
are responsible for the outcomes of legal change is inadequately justified: there is nothing 
within luck egalitarianism itself that dictates such a reformative approach to legal transitions. 
A fundamental problem facing luck egalitarianism is that, in standard accounts, it relies on a 
sharp distinction that is philosophically untenable: it is not clear, as a metaphysical matter, 
what individuals are (causally) responsible for, and what is a matter of circumstance for 
which they are not responsible (Scheffler 2003, 17–18).2 To posit otherwise is to rely on an 
implausibly asocial, individualist ontology (see Chapter 6.2). Luck egalitarians often bypass 
this issue by trading on cases in which we have clear intuitions about responsibility; indeed 
“the luck egalitarian literature, when it leaves behind the artifice of Monte Carlo in favor of 
real-world risk-taking, tends to gravitate to examples of ultrahazardous activity to defend its 
moralism about choice” (Fried 2003, 141). But this does not help us in the infinitely more 
complex cases that confront people in most aspects of their lives (ibid 141).  
Faced with this challenge, one strategy luck egalitarians have adopted is to define 
‘responsibility’ in a non-moral way, by specifying further non-moral properties in virtue of 
which responsibility is said to obtain. Prominent candidates are the “choice”- and “control”-
based accounts (see Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, chap. 3.4). But again, while one can identify 
cases in which strong intuitions about choice and control do seem to yield the right answers, 
there is no underlying non-moral fact about what constitutes choice or control, and so it is 
easy to identify cases in which these concepts give us no analytical purchase. Contemporary 
proponents of choice- and control-based accounts must therefore make continual refinements 
                                                 
2 Cohen concedes that reliance on this distinction may leave luck egalitarians “up to our necks in the free will 
problem,” but he dismisses this as “just tough luck” (1989, 934). One response is to accept non-moral luck 
egalitarianism as a true theory that lies in waiting until a committee of metaphysicians has pronounced on the 
truth about what individuals are responsible for (Knight 2006a). That would surely be enough to render this 
approach inadequate to a theory of legal transitions for use in the here and now (Fleurbaey 2001, 502; but see 
Knight 2006a). But at a deeper level I think that the search for metaphysically clear lines is itself misguided, as 
suggested by my endorsement of a different set of ontological (including social-ontological) foundations in 
Chapter 6.2 (see also McTernan 2016, 749–52; Scheffler 2003, 17–18). 
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to plug this determinacy gap, such as referring only to “genuine choice” (Cohen 1989, 934). 
But then, they need to say what distinguishes a “genuine” from a “non-genuine” choice, and 
so the search continues. As they undertake this search, non-moral luck egalitarians have been 
characteristically reluctant to admit any moral values into their avowedly non-moral 
conceptions of responsibility, choice, genuine choice, control, etc.3  
This search is misguided. As long as it continues, luck egalitarian accounts will remain 
indeterminate, or else they will smuggle in moral values about what people should be 
considered to be responsible for and in control of (Anderson 1999, 295–302; Fried 2003, 
146).4 But once moral values are introduced—as they must be to render a luck egalitarian 
account determinate—then the theory is no longer luck egalitarian, all the way down. A non-
moral conception of responsibility is required for luck egalitarianism to be rendered 
determinate (and hence for any practical purpose, such as theorising about legal transitions). 
Accordingly, the salient question becomes what ought people to be held responsible for 
(McTernan 2016). This means that, if they are to be normatively plausible, the kinds of 
judgements involved in evaluating the fairness of the outcomes of people’s risky choices 
must ultimately appeal to thick ideals embodied in social conventions (McTernan 2016), 
market outcomes, or ‘perfectionist’ theories of the good (Stemplowska 2009, 247–51)—all 
of which entail normative commitments outside of luck egalitarianism itself.5 The same goes 
for the more specific task of developing an ex ante fairness based approach to legal 
transitions. It is this task to which I now turn. 
                                                 
3 Some luck egalitarians have sought to draw lines based on simple lists of which aspects of a person should 
fall on each side of the boundary, as with Dworkin’s position that we are responsible for our preferences, tastes 
and ambitions, but not for our talents and abilities (2000, 289–90, 322–25). But such line-drawing exercises are 
arbitrary and easily criticised for lacking plausibility (Scheffler 2003, 19–21).  
4  We may say that avowedly non-moral conceptions of luck egalitarianism are vulnerable to “normative 
encroachment” (Southwood and Lindauer 2019). 
5 Of course, some scholars sympathetic to luck egalitarianism, or responsibility-sensitivity, including those cited 
in the preceding sentence, are up front about that and justify their approach accordingly. 
186 
 
8.3 EX ANTE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSITION RISKS: A PRACTICE-BASED APPROACH 
8.3.1 Theoretical introduction 
Accepting the necessity of a moral account, I claim that ascriptions of ex ante responsibility 
for risks of legal change should be based on an analysis of the social practices in which the 
relevant (at-risk) action occurs—be it investing on the stockmarket, buying a house, 
undertaking a course of skills training, etc.6 Determinations of ex ante risk responsibility 
should be, in other words, conventional, or practice-dependent.  
Two considerations motivate this appeal to practices. First, on the ecological account of self 
and agency I endorsed in Chapter 6.2, persons are conceived as deeply embedded in social, 
cultural and material structures, with which they constantly interact. Social practices (defined 
below) are a crucial part of the social structure in which individuals are embedded, and which 
both enables and constrains their agency (Frazer and Lacey 1993, 17–18). If social practices 
are thought to play a crucial causal role in shaping and explaining human behaviour, it seems 
plausible to attribute to such practices at least some role in normative moral and political 
theory (ibid 17–18, 180–82, 187–88). We can think of this as a ‘bottom-up’ motivation for 
appealing to practices (assuming ontology is at the ‘bottom’ of a normative theory). The 
second motivation, then, is ‘top down’. In Part 8.1, above, I noted that fairness is a normative 
ideal that regulates voluntary, cooperative relations. As such, it seems right that the content 
of fairness should be moulded to the particularities of local practices that structure such 
relations. A practice-based conception of fairness, then, is the logical meeting point between 
these bottom-up and top-down motivations.  
I adopt Haslanger’s conception of social practices as: 
patterns of learned behavior that enable us … to coordinate as members of a group in 
creating, distributing, managing, maintaining, and eliminating a resource (or multiple 
                                                 
6 In deferring to practices, I follow McTernan (2016), though I mean to refer to a wider notion of practices than 
encompassed by her “responsibility practices”, and this is because allocations of ex ante responsibility for 
managing legal risks are rather more implicit in wider social practices than the more explicit practices of holding 
people responsible, and associated reactive attitudes, that she has in mind (see McTernan 2016, 249). 
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resources), due to mutual responsiveness to each other’s behavior and the resource(s) in 
question, as interpreted through shared meanings/cultural schemas. (Haslanger 2018, 245, 
emphasis added)  
Among the elements emphasised in this definition (and in Haslanger’s surrounding 
discussion), two stand out as central: social coordination and resources. First, practices 
coordinate human action by encouraging or enforcing some behavioural regularity (they 
have a “descriptive normativity”—I will elaborate on this shortly) (ibid 237). They do so 
through the semiotic concepts, scripts and meanings that comprise culture (also referred to 
as “cultural schemas” or “social meanings”), which set expectations about the right way for 
people to behave in a given context (ibid 238–40). This leads to mutual responsiveness 
among practitioners: “One performance expresses a response to another, for example, by 
correcting it, rewarding or punishing its performer, drawing inferences from it, translating it, 
imitating it (perhaps under different circumstances), circumventing its effects, and so on” 
(Rouse 2007, 530, cited in Haslanger 2018, 240). In this way, practices “set the stage” for 
human agency, enabling and constraining it by providing social roles to perform, reasons to 
perform them, and scripts and tools to perform with (ibid 233–36, 240–42). 7  This 
coordinating aspect of practices is closely connected to the notion of social roles: social 
practices determine the sets of normative and predictive expectations that constitute an 
agent’s social roles, and the performance of those social roles (normally) reinforces those 
expectations, further facilitating coordination (cf. Zheng 2018, 873–75).  
The second central element in Haslanger’s definition is resources. Practices, according to 
Haslanger, always coordinate action in relation to resources, which Haslanger defines very 
broadly to mean things that have a positively (or negatively) valenced social (dis)value, be it 
economic, aesthetic, moral, prudential or spiritual (Haslanger 2018, 243). The social 
meanings that coordinate action “evolve to enable us to perceive, produce, and organize the 
                                                 
7 In this regard, practices may involve more or less formalised rules and shape intentional and unintentional 
agency: “practices fall along a spectrum from explicitly coordinated behavior that is rule-governed, intentional, 
voluntary (e.g., games), to regularities in patterns in behavior that are the result of shared cultural schemas … 
that have been internalized through socialization” (Haslanger 2018, 235, footnote omitted). 
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resource” (ibid 243), for example by “creating, distributing, managing, maintaining, [or] 
eliminating” it (ibid 245).  
The fact that practices, on this definition, coordinate action in relation to things of value 
(resources) helps us to understand the dual normativity of practices in a way that is helpful 
for my purposes with respect to legal transitions—which, after all, pertain to how some 
‘resource’ in this broad sense should be distributed in light of its being affected by a legal 
change. On the one hand, as noted above, practices have what Haslanger calls a “descriptive 
normativity” in that they in fact encourage or enforce the relevant behavioural regularities 
(we could think of this as a kind of normativity that is ‘internal’ to the practice). Thus 
resources “have normative significance in the context of our practices” (ibid 243, emphasis 
added). For example, “[a]n ear of corn can be viewed as something to eat, as a commodity to 
be sold, [or] as a religious symbol” depending on the social schemas we apply to it in the 
context of a practice. “The different schemas not only offer modes of interpretation, but 
license different ways of interacting with the corn”—cooking it, shipping it, drying and 
hanging it to be worshipped, etc. (Haslanger 2016, 126). But the fact that practices organise 
social coordination around things of value opens the possibility for a second, evaluative (or 
‘external’) kind of normativity that is familiar to the normative theorist (and the social critic 
or activist): “Practices differ in the extent to which they promote apt responses to what is 
valuable: they are problematic if they presuppose something to be valuable that lacks value, 
if they overestimate the value of something, or if they misconstrue how something should be 
valued” (Haslanger 2018, 244, emphasis added).  
When it comes to the allocation of ex ante responsibility for managing the risks of legal 
change, I am ultimately interested in the first, descriptive, kind of normativity of practices. 
Let me state the question of interest slightly more formally:  
in some practice P, does agent A conventionally bear responsibility for managing risk R (in 
which case, the risk is privatised), or does the state S conventionally bear this responsibility 
(in which case, the risk is socialised)?  
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Answering this question will be a matter of interpreting the social practice in question, the 
associated social roles of the agents engaged in the practice, and the distinctive goods, ends 
or resources in relation to which the practice coordinates action (cf. Goldberg 2017; 
MacIntyre 1981, 175, 1999, 65–66; Sangiovanni 2008). Through the interpretation of 
practices, we avail ourselves of conventional standards against which to assess the 
reasonableness of the decisions agents make in relation to ‘resources’ that are affected by 
legal change. Where it is clear which practice governs some relevant decision, and the 
practice clearly allocates ex ante responsibility for managing risks of legal change one way 
or the other (i.e. to the agent in question or to the state), the advantages of this practice-
dependent approach are greatest. Specifically, to the extent those conditions prevail, a 
practice-dependent approach helps to address two difficulties identified by Fried (2003) that 
otherwise arise when applying ex ante fairness considerations to legal transitions.  
First, in the domain of legal changes, with their complex political aetiologies, it is difficult if 
not impossible to foresee the existence, let alone probabilities, of many specific future legal 
changes, especially those in the more distant future (ibid 140–44). Given these difficulties, it 
becomes harder to characterise risks of legal change as being deliberately chosen in any 
meaningful sense, at least in some contexts.8 To operationalize a coherent requirement of ex 
ante prudence as our basis for transition policy, Fried argues, we therefore “need some theory 
about which risks are psychologically salient, such that they actually affect decision-making, 
and which are not” (ibid 141).  
Second, because risks of legal change are often bundled in with other choices and difficult to 
avoid or manage, it is often hard to say categorically that the agent chose to accept the risk 
in the sense of taking full responsibility for the outcome, good or bad (ibid 144–46). Some 
activities involve risk but are not pursued for the chance of a gain, or at least not only for that 
purpose, and these activities may be avoidable only at high cost. Moreover, standard risk 
management techniques, such as third-party insurance, diversification and hedging may be 
                                                 
8 Further, drawing on findings in psychology and behavioural economics, Fried argues that even insofar as a 
risk is objectively foreseeable, real-world agents systematically and predictably misapprehend risk and fail to 
behave in ways that maximise their expected utility (Fried 2003, 146–49). 
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unavailable or too costly. Thus, we need some theory about “what level of risk avoidance we 
can fairly require of people” in the name of prudence (Fried 2003, 144–45).  
To these two problems, we can add a third: if a fairness-based theory of legal transitions 
required the state to address both of the issues raised by Fried through a particularistic, agent-
by-agent analysis of foreseeability and prudence, the theory would be up to its neck in the 
‘Moral Costs Problem’ I identified in Chapter 4.  
A practice-based approach helps to address both concerns raised by Fried without resorting 
to the kind of particularism that raises the Moral Costs Problem. This is because there are 
certain practices in which participants generally expect certain kinds of agents with certain 
kinds of social roles to bear those risks (effectively, those agents are expected to be hyper-
diligent about the relevant risks). At the same time, there are other practices in which it is 
generally expected that agents can pursue the relevant activity secure in the knowledge that 
the risk of bad outcomes has been socialised. In such cases, we may value the security of 
what we have (with no downside or upside risk) more than the opportunity costs of financing 
such security (Stemplowska 2009, 248–51; Williams 2006, 501–3). 9  Identifying such 
practices avoids the need for agent-specific, particularistic judgements about foreseeability 
and prudence. What I hope to demonstrate with the following discussion of examples is that 
appealing to clear-cut conventional practices of this kind will help to settle, in a wide range 
of concrete cases, the question of whether or not it is fair to let individuals bear the 
consequences of their durable decisions where these are affected by a legal change. The first, 
common example case I discuss in the next section is an example of what I take to be a clear-
cut case. 
Sometimes, however, the interpretive exercise will be indeterminate as to the practice of risk 
allocation. This could be, for example, because the practice itself is unclear or in a state of 
                                                 
9 As Andrew Williams (2006, 501–3) points out, securing people’s entitlements (socialising the risk of bad 
outcomes) has a cost which can either be (i) internalised into risky activities themselves (e.g. through 
compulsory insurance, or taxes on the activity), which reduces the economic liberty of those who benefit from 
the security or (ii) externalised onto others (e.g. through social insurance, or redistribution), which reduces the 
economic liberty of those others. See also Shiffrin (2004). 
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flux, or because the resource in question is the subject of multiple practices that yield 
conflicting allocations of responsibility and it is unclear which takes precedence. The second 
common example I discuss (in Part 8.3.3, below), is an example of this kind, and I show that 
the Fairness Principle can handle such cases well. 
Some ambiguities in practices will be the result of conflicts between the two senses of 
normativity discussed above: some participants (or some external critics) will be contesting 
the descriptive normativity of a practice by questioning its aptness in light of other (external) 
schemas and norms (Haslanger 2018, 244–45). These kinds of cases—let’s call them “norm 
conflict cases”—are likely to be particularly interesting to normative theorists, especially 
where a risk of legal change is conventionally socialised (implying a reason to conserve the 
agent’s functionings) but where the relevant functionings are implicated in an ‘obvious 
injustice’ of the kind discussed in Chapter 5.2. These are the hardest cases for a practice-
based approach. The third common example case I discuss (in Part 8.3.4, below) involves 
such a norm conflict case. I argue that the Fairness Principle, and ART as a whole, can handle 
them satisfactorily.  
8.3.2 Common example #1: commercial competition 
Consider first the following case involving an efficiency-enhancing legal change: 
Trade liberalisation: The government of Adaria seeks to increase efficiency by liberalising 
trade in numerous sectors of its economy, including the auto sector, pursuant to a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with Beria. These countries enact the various provisions of the agreement 
in domestic law shortly after signing the agreement in 2017. The following agents are affected 
by the legal change: 
CarCo: CarCo is an automobile manufacturer with operations throughout Adaria. 
Pursuant to the entry into force of the FTA, CarCo loses various trade protections 
vis-à-vis Beria hitherto enshrined in Adarian law. Having failed to anticipate and 
prepare for this eventuality, CarCo can no longer compete with Beria’s auto 
manufacturers (which have lower production costs) and its net-present value declines 
dramatically. It is forced to close its Adarian operations and becomes insolvent. 
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Carmen: Carmen owns shares in CarCo as part of her share portfolio. She incurs an 
economic loss (capital depreciation) when CarCo’s share price falls. 
FinCo: FinCo is a bank with operations throughout Adaria. Pursuant to the entry into 
force of the FTA, Beria is required to liberalise its restrictions on foreign banks. 
FinCo had long anticipated the liberalisation of foreign trade restrictions in the 
banking sector and was ready to capitalise quickly on the new market opportunities 
to expand its operations and grow its profits in Beria. Its net-present value and share 
price both appreciated significantly upon the implementation of the FTA. 
Finnegan: Finnegan owns shares in FinCo as part of his share portfolio. He receives 
an economic benefit (capital gain) when FinCo’s share price rises.  
I take it that most readers in most countries would share my intuition that the state has a 
weighty reason to conserve neither CarCo and Carmen’s prior position (against their losses—
e.g. through compensation) nor FinCo and Finnegan’s prior position (against their gains—
e.g. by clawing them back through an ad hoc tax10). Moreover, I submit that this conclusion 
is robust to issues of timing, and hence to the questions of foreseeability (objective 
probability and psychological salience of the risk) identified by Fried. That is, I don’t think 
it matters when CarCo and FinCo were established or decided to invest in their relevant 
sector-specific assets. Nor do I think the timing of Carmen and Finnegan’s share purchases 
matters. Even if they all made their relevant decisions decades ago, well before any kind of 
free trade deal between Adaria and Beria was on the political agenda, I submit that the reasons 
not to conserve any of these agents’ positions would not change.11  
I suggest that the most powerful explanation for these conclusions lies in the nature of the 
social practice in the course of which these agents made their long-term decisions. CarCo 
and FinCo are corporations engaged in commerce in the pursuit of profit, and Carmen and 
Finnegan are (part-)owners of those corporations. The profit-seeking commercial 
                                                 
10 Of course there might be other valid reasons to tax their capital gains. My point is simply that conserving 
their prior position in the name of fairness doesn’t seem to be one of them. 
11 It is also, I suggest, robust to whether the agents were professional investors or laypersons with stock 
portfolios. But if they were professional investors then the conclusion would apply a fortiori. 
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competition in which these agents are engaged is a social practice the purpose of which 
approaches a pure, ‘free market’ allocative efficiency rationale. Elizabeth Anderson (2008, 
249), drawing on Hayek, explains this rationale:  
The great virtue of markets is that, in giving people the freedom to use their partial, situated 
knowledge according to their own judgments and tastes for risk, in response to market signals, 
they are able to effectively utilize essentially widely dispersed knowledge for the 
advancement of others’ interests.  
Market transactions—particularly those involving long-lived assets—entail a wide variety of 
risks (which can here be conceptualised as probabilities of deviations in future conditions 
relative to expectations about those future conditions). Consumer demand, competitors’ costs 
of production, or the weather, for example, might all turn out to be different from what was 
expected, and markets reward those who take and prudently manage these and other relevant 
risks with superior returns. Being an excellent capitalist, then, entails a very high standard of 
epistemic agency in general, such that it would be contrary to the very purpose of markets 
for governments to counteract market transactions on the basis that a particular risk was 
difficult to foresee, ex ante. According to Hayek (1982, vol. 2, 125, footnote omitted): 
The whole [market] system rests on providing inducements for all to use their skill to find 
out particular circumstances in order to anticipate impending changes as accurately as 
possible. This incentive would be removed if each decision did not carry the risk of loss, or 
if an authority had to decide whether a particular error in anticipation was excusable or not. 
This incentive may explain why it is contemporary business practice in many jurisdictions 
for changes in law and policy (often referred to as “policy risk”) to be characterised as 
everyday business risks that owners of capital should factor into the risk-return analysis (see, 
e.g., UNCITRAL 2001, 141). These are the standard descriptive-normative and predictive 
expectations that apply among players in the game of commercial competition.  
Commercial competition also shares certain features with the gambling casino. Like 
gamblers, business corporations and their equity holders typically voluntarily assume the risk 
of losses as the quid pro quo of the chance to benefit. Furthermore, like the gambling casino, 
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these risks are relatively ‘pure’ in the sense of not being inextricably bundled up with other 
choices that are difficult to avoid. Moreover, in line with the capital-intensive and highly 
voluntary nature of business ventures and stockmarket transactions, the agents engaging in 
these activities are conventionally expected to achieve their preferred risk position through 
their own actions (e.g. diversification, hedging, or third party insurance where available).  
Assuming these considerations accurately reflect commercial practice in the relevant 
jurisdictions, it seems reasonable to view the decisions of our hypothetical agents in Trade 
Liberalisation as an “implicit bet about the future” (Shaviro 2000), which CarCo and Carmen 
lost, and FinCo and Finnegan won, with the corresponding implication that the state has a 
strong fairness-based reason to let these losses and gains lie where they fall. The Fairness 
Principle therefore correlates with and powerfully explains our intuitions in this case 
(desiderata #3 and #4).  
In Trade Liberalisation, the social practice in question is the most important feature. The fact 
that two of the agents are corporations and two natural persons does not matter so much to 
the outcome. But it does not follow that the distinction doesn’t matter at all; it does matter, 
and in some cases it will matter decisively. That is because different standards of 
reasonableness with respect to the foreseeability and management of legal risks 
conventionally apply to different kinds of agents, too, given their different social roles in the 
context of practices. In addition to the fact that business corporations operate in market 
contexts for the pursuit of profit (like natural person shareholders), corporations have certain 
legal and structural privileges (such as limited liability for shareholders) that enable them to 
manage risks in pursuit of profit effectively and efficiently at scale, including by raising large 
sums of capital. Their function, structure, and capital-raising abilities enable corporations to 
avail themselves of capabilities to both anticipate (via governmental relations staff and 
lawyers) and manage (via diversification, hedging and insurance) legal risks to their business. 
This, I submit, provides a further reason why it is reasonable to hold corporations responsible 
for anticipating and managing risks of legal change in a strong ex ante sense, and hence a 
fairness-based reason against conservative transition policy for corporations (see also 
195 
 
Kaplow 1986, 549–50, 2003, 186; Logue 2003, 212).12 In other words, an interpretation of 
the practice of commercial competition yields general reasons to hold corporations to higher 
standards of ex ante responsibility for managing risks of legal change than natural persons, 
all else equal.  
8.3.3 Common example #2: residential property 
Now consider the following case, involving only natural persons and in the context of 
residential housing: 
Rail Link: In 2017 the government decides, on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, to build a 
high-speed rail link between two large cities (assume the rail extension is both efficiency-
enhancing and aggregate welfare-enhancing). Accordingly, it passes the Rail Extension Act, 
enabling it to rezone land, compulsorily acquire property lying in the rail corridor, and 
otherwise construct and complete the rail link. The following agents are affected by the 
project: 
Millie: Millie is an average, middle-aged, middle class citizen. She bought her first 
and only property in 1997—well before there was any politically salient discussion 
of a new rail link—in the then quiet, residential suburb of Suburbia. Millie conducted 
standard due diligence before her home purchase and this revealed no risks of major 
infrastructure works in the area. Millie’s home turns out, 20 years later, to be right 
next to the rail corridor (but not close to any of the new railway stations). Its value 
drops significantly due to the increase in noise from construction and operation of 
the rail link, and Millie incurs a corresponding capital loss on her property investment 
(but remains in her home and remains middle class and easily able to meet all her 
basic needs).  
Morris: Morris is an average, middle-aged, middle class citizen who bought his home 
at the same time, under the same circumstances (including the same level of due 
diligence) as Millie, albeit in a different part of Suburbia. Morris’ home turns out, 20 
                                                 
12 This is an additional reason to the fact that corporations cannot meaningfully be said to have wellbeing (or 
corporate wellbeing, if meaningful, is not normatively significant), which I discuss in Chapter 10.1.3.1. 
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years later, to be 300 metres’ walk from where one of the new stations on the rail 
link will be built—just far enough away to avoid the noise and inconvenience of its 
construction and operation, but close enough to add greatly to his convenience and 
quality of life once the rail link is operational. Morris receives a corresponding capital 
gain on his property investment (but remains middle class). 
Millie and Morris did standard due diligence and yet there was no indication of the prospect 
of such a dramatic zoning law change resulting in such a shift in their respective property 
values. Accordingly there is clearly a sense in which that risk was too remote to be 
psychologically salient to a reasonably prudent consumer, and this might be thought to 
provide a fairness-based reason to conserve their prior position (e.g. through some 
compensation). But there is another sense in which this risk, though remote, is precisely the 
kind of risk that we expect home owners to bear; the fact that “standard due diligence” did 
not reveal the risk of the rail link 20 years later is not dispositive. As we saw in Trade 
Liberalisation, there are some contexts in which agents should bear the risks of legal change 
even when these are not foreseeable. Houses are traded on markets and have an exchange 
value, which is subject to a wide range of risks. It is conventional in many parts of the world 
to expect home-buyers to assume many of those risks, even if they cannot identify all of them 
precisely, let alone their precise probabilities. Anderson’s and Hayek’s points about market 
incentives do resonate somewhat in the home purchase cases, too.  
But there are also some key differences between the home purchase cases and Trade 
Liberalisation. Critically, secure housing typically plays an important role in people’s most 
central generic and particular functionings, as I discussed in Chapter 7.2.13 To the extent it 
does so for a given agent, this matters in its own right for the purposes of the Wellbeing 
Principle (as I argued in Chapter 7). But facts about the role that certain goods conventionally 
play in people’s lives will also affect social practices concerning the level of risk 
                                                 
13 One might object that home ownership is not necessary for secure housing. This is likely to vary from society 
to society: in some countries, for example, the ready availability of secure, long-term leases may militate against 
the state promoting or providing special protection (including in respect of legal transitions) to first home-
ownership. But this only highlights the value of a social practice-based approach to allocating responsibility. 
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management/avoidance that it is reasonable to expect of people in respect of those goods 
(O’Neill and O’Neill 2012, 11–12; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 3).  
When one buys a house to live in, one is not only making a risky financial investment but 
also acquiring a secure place to put down roots, from which to form and maintain family and 
social relationships, work, and pursue other projects of value to them. For most people in 
most parts of the world, this kind of stability and security reflects a strongly culturally-valued 
form of life. Because secure housing is, if not strictly a precondition, at least highly conducive 
to these other important dimensions of wellbeing, it is also conventionally valued as a basic 
entitlement, “gateway social good” (O’Neill and O’Neill 2012, 11; O’Neill 2006, 578–80), 
basic right, 14  or human right (OHCHR/UNHABITAT 2009). This security would be 
undermined if we simply applied to home-owners the free market approach to the 
management of legal transition risks, since doing so would place them under considerable 
pressure to constantly inquire into and manage the risk of losing the value of their homes as 
a result of future legal changes. As Cohen says, in favour of conserving existing things that 
people value: “We cannot keep everything ‘under review.’” (Cohen 2011, 223, footnote 
omitted). In any case, one cannot easily unbundle these other values from the upside and 
downside financial risk aspects of a property purchase, and self-managing the risk of legal 
change to the value of one’s home is, for most people at least, difficult: one’s home is a costly 
and lumpy asset, often the most valuable asset a person owns, which complicates 
diversification or hedging strategies; and third-party insurance against risks of legal change 
is rarely available (Kaplow 1986, 593–96; Shavell 2014; Shaviro 2000, 40–42).  
Residential housing is, then, a token case of the category identified earlier in which a resource 
is subject to multiple practices that seem to imply conflicting approaches to risk allocation. 
Putting the situation in Haslanger’s terms, the resources at stake in a residential housing 
market are subject to multiple social practices involving different cultural schemas, which 
licence different ways of interpreting and interacting with those resources: houses have an 
                                                 
14 Freeman (2011, 31–32) interprets Rawls’ views on property (1999, 53–54) as implying that “ownership of 
one’s residence and personal belongings is necessary for individual independence and privacy” (Freeman 2011, 
32).  
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exchange value subject to market practices, but also have multiple, richer forms of use value 
as typical constituents of people’s central particular functionings, and publicly recognised 
generic value as part of a flourishing life generally (see also Radin 1982). By contrast, the 
resources implicated in commercial competition—most notably stock values and business 
asset values (e.g. commercial land, plant and equipment)—have only, or at least 
overwhelmingly, exchange value.  
Despite—or perhaps because of—these conflicting practices, it will often be the case that 
there is a more specific practice governing the allocation of responsibility for risks of legal 
change that can be identified through interpretation. For example, there may be a practice 
governing risks of particular kinds of legal changes to property and/or risks of legal changes 
affecting particular incidents of property. In fact, what we do see is a widespread allocation 
of some such risks to the state, even in the more economically liberal Anglo-American 
jurisdictions with which I am familiar. Specifically, we see the widespread use of 
constitutional immunities from uncompensated ‘takings’ or ‘acquisitions’ of property (e.g. 
Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution; Australian Constitution, sec. 51(xxxi)) and of 
‘existing use’ / ‘nonconforming use’ provisions in zoning/planning regulations (which 
grandfather previously lawful property uses that, following an amendment, would otherwise 
no longer comply).  
The practices just mentioned only protect against certain kinds of legal risks to certain 
incidents of property: they provide immunity against takings/acquisitions, and permit existing 
non-conforming uses. They do not necessarily protect against other risks, such as risks to the 
financial value of property.15 This may suggest the presence of a practice of allocating such 
other risks to the owners of property. Indeed, this way of thinking about ‘conflicting practice’ 
cases is consistent with the idea that a society may have a general practice according to 
which responsibility for the risk of legal change is allocated to the agent (or, in theory, to the 
state), but that this ‘default rule’ may be displaced by more specific practices, as with takings 
                                                 
15 Though, on some philosophical and jurisprudential theories of takings, they do. For an overview and critical 
analysis of such theories, see Wenar (1997). 
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and non-conforming use provisions for property in the jurisdictions mentioned above, where 
the risk is conventionally allocated to the state.16  
This general practice concerning responsibility allocation for risks of legal change we might 
think of as an element of the set of citizenship practices that obtain in a polity (cf. Waldron 
2012, 84). Any advanced political system has a set of social practices concerning the rights, 
duties and ethos of citizenship, a subset of which pertains to citizens’ critical engagement 
with the state and its laws. As we have seen, different political theories embody different 
normative ideals about citizenship and make different empirical assumptions about social 
circumstances and individuals’ general capacities for more or less active forms of citizenship. 
Recall, for example, that classical liberals conceive of the good life as being fulfilled 
exclusively or primarily in the private sphere, and citizenship is imagined as a shield against 
state interference, so people cannot reasonably be expected to engage in critical reflection 
about the law (see Chapter 2.3.2). The republican tradition, by contrast, has a much more 
active conception of citizenship (see Leydet 2017, sec. 1.2), and this might be thought to 
entail a general expectation that citizens will critically reflect on and engage with matters of 
legal change.  
On the ecological conception of the self and agency that I endorsed in Chapter 6.2, the 
expectations of citizenship will be driven by particular social structures and practices. It is, 
on this view, a genuinely open question as to the degree of civic engagement with questions 
of legal change that citizenship requires. 17  We can therefore legitimately look to the 
citizenship practices of a relevant society to ascertain general benchmarks for reasonable 
foresight and prudence when more specific practices are unclear, contested, or conflicting.18 
                                                 
16 This interpretive rule is analogous to the legal doctrine lex specialis derogat legi generali (the more general 
law must give way to the more specific law). 
17 In principle, an ecological self is imagined as potentially exercising a mix of more-‘private’ and more-‘public’ 
functionings across a range of more or less public social practices. 
18 For those inclined normatively toward a more active conception of citizenship as a normative ideal, this 
appeal to practices might seem disappointing. But nothing in my theory denies that states ought to cultivate 
more active citizenship practices over the long run as a matter of primary policy. My appeal to conventional 
citizenship practices to resolve difficult cases of legal transitions should, rather, be understood as an 
acknowledgement of the limits of what can be expected of people in the short run when people are understand 
‘ecologically’—as constituted by their distinctive identities and social roles; as practitioners of social practices. 
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At least in the Anglo-American jurisdictions just mentioned—but also, I suspect, much more 
widely—I think it is fair to say that there is a general citizenship practice of allocating 
responsibility for the risks of legal change to the individual, meaning this can be considered 
as a kind of ‘default’ rule, albeit one that is overridden where there is a more specific practice 
involving the allocation of risks to the state.19  
Returning to Rail Link, then, the brief survey of relevant responsibility practices in Anglo-
American jurisdictions suggests that, if our hypothetical rail link were situated in a country 
like the US, Canada, Australia of the UK, the risk of the relevant legal change would be 
allocated to the households in question since there has been no taking20 and existing uses 
have not been affected. (If this seems harsh on the losers, remember that the Wellbeing 
Principle also provides reasons for transitional responses, which may militate in favour of 
adaptive assistance: see Chapters 7 and 9.) But the point is that the social practice approach 
to risk responsibility directs us to have regard to what is conventional social practice in the 
relevant jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, market approaches to managing such risks will 
be prevalent in housing systems. In others, solidaristic approaches that provide greater 
security, with less economic freedom, will be more prevalent.21 And in cases of conflict, 
general citizenship practices may provide a default position.  
                                                 
It recognises that there is something normatively problematic about requiring people to live up to ideals and 
obligations that they have not had a reasonable opportunity to internalise, or whose internalisation has been 
thwarted by countervailing cultural, economic or political forces, as critically-minded civic republicans have 
recognised (Laborde 2008; White 2003). 
19 Again, I am assuming for now legal changes occurring under conditions of relative equality (including legal 
changes affecting similarly situated agents). Under such conditions, a default rule allocating responsibility to 
citizens has the further attractive quality of minimising the transaction costs of transitions (i.e. it will be more 
efficient than case by case redistribution), yet without compromising the distribution of wellbeing, since any 
serious wellbeing concerns will be picked up by the Wellbeing Principle (cf. Rawls 1971, 355). Under relative 
equality, it is also reasonable to expect that small wellbeing losses and gains from particular legal changes will 
cancel out over time (cf. Chapter 3.4.3.1). For this reason, my scheme is likely to be attractive to relational 
egalitarians (Anderson 1999, 2008; Scheffler 2003). 
20 At least, not on an ordinary language understanding of a taking—as to which, see Wenar (1997). 
21 Where the value of security is especially important, compulsory or state-provided insurance schemes can 
provide this function (O’Neill and O’Neill 2012, 11–12), and will often do so more effectively (e.g. if a 
formalised system is perceived to be more credible) than ad hoc approaches to legal transitions. 
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An important caveat is warranted here. I am not claiming that one should be neutral, as a 
matter of ideal primary laws/policies, between a fully marketised approach to housing (or 
any other resource, for that matter) or a more socialised or ‘solidaristic’ model, for I am not 
endorsing a thorough-going practice-based model of political morality. Rather, my appeal to 
practice is more limited: I am only defending the appeal to practices as part of a conception 
of fairness, and I do not think fairness is exhaustive of relevant considerations in the 
philosophy of public policy generally or legal transitions in particular. Moreover, as I noted 
in Part 8.1, fairness is paradigmatically applicable to conditions of relative equality among 
the mutually-interacting parties. Under such conditions, deferring to the ‘internal’ 
normativity of practices is likely to be unproblematic from the perspective of ‘external’ 
normativity. I consider more problematic, ‘norm conflict’ cases in the next section.  
8.3.4 Norm-conflict cases and the limits of fairness 
Let us conclude this discussion of example cases by considering some ‘hard cases’ for the 
practice-based approach. Consider a different case involving housing, in which social 
cooperation occurs in a context that is far from equal, giving rise to a ‘norm conflict’ in the 
sense discussed in Part 8.3.1: 
Segregated Housing: 22  the government of Attica (at t1) operates a system of racial 
segregation concerning access to important public services, including housing. Via zoning 
regulations, the best areas of land are reserved exclusively for whites and the worst 
exclusively for blacks (many mid-range areas are not racially segregated). It is also 
conventional practice to grandfather existing land uses when zoning laws are changed. Racial 
tensions within the country are highly salient, with the opposition Attican Black Congress 
Party (ABCP) campaigning, through formal channels and widespread protests, to end housing 
segregation and redistribute the best areas of land to oppressed black persons via changes in 
the zoning law. Though party officials make no explicit comment about grandfathering non-
conforming uses, it is obvious that any such grandfathering would thwart the purposes of 
their reform. Two years later (at t2) the ABCP wins an historic election victory and 
                                                 
22 This example is based on a similar one constructed by Alex Brown (2017, 81–84)—the seed for which, 
according to Brown, was planted by Matt Matravers—involving the van Arks, which I discussed in Chapter 5. 
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immediately implements its proposed housing reforms. The following agents are adversely 
affected: 
The Whites: Mr and Mrs White are affluent (middle-upper class), white citizens of 
Attica. They purchased a plot of land in a greenfields development, at t1, in an area 
zoned white-only and set about procuring the construction of a house on it that would 
come to be their new home, moving in one year later. A further one year later (at t2) 
the region in which their property is located is rezoned as black-only, and their 
existing use is not grandfathered. They have no choice but to sell their property. 
Given the changes in zoning, the best price they are able to get for their house (by 
selling it to a lower-middle class black family) is a fraction of their initial investment. 
Given the blow to their stock of wealth, they can now only afford to buy a modest 
property in a lower-middle class area. 
In this case, there was an established practice of grandfathering existing uses, but the 
‘internal’ normativity of this practice, insofar as it applies to racially segregated uses, was 
obviously unjust by ‘external’ normative standards of non-discrimination in access to 
gateway social goods. Now, recall from Chapter 5 that one of the strengths of an ideal-justice 
(basic duties) based approach to legal transitions is it provides a straightforward basis for 
rejecting any claim for transitional assistance by the perpetrators of ‘obvious injustice’. For 
those inclined to think the Whites deserve no assistance, on grounds of the obvious injustice 
in which they are implicated, this path is likely to be appealing. But recall that part of my 
criticism of the justice-based approach is that it is too straightforward, in the sense that it is 
unable to deal well with greater factual complexity. We could tweak the facts of Housing 
Segregation above to make it less clear-cut along various dimensions—for example, the 
extent of discrimination, the political salience of the discrimination, the Whites’ degree of 
control over their decision (ability to buy a home elsewhere), and so on—until our intuitions 
conflict, and we have to concede that ‘obvious injustice’ is a vague and indeterminate 
concept. In any event, by ultimately rejecting such an approach, I have forsaken this path to 
determining the present case. What is an easy case for an ideal-justice-based principle of 
legal transitions is a harder case for my practice-based Fairness Principle. Nonetheless, I 
think that ART as a whole can cope well with such cases. 
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As background social conditions become increasingly unequal, the paradigmatic conditions 
of application of the Fairness Principle become correspondingly attenuated, making it less 
plausible to characterise social relations as voluntary and cooperative (see Part 8.1). In cases 
like Housing Segregation, part of the explanation of the norm conflict is that background 
social conditions are so unequal. Under such conditions, the ideal of fairness has limited 
applicability—we have little reason to appeal to the internal normativity of social practices—
and therefore the Fairness Principle simply doesn’t yield strong reasons for one kind of 
transition policy or another (conservative or reformative). The Fairness Principle, remember, 
provides that fairness-based reasons for conservative or reformative transition responses are 
to be weighted in proportion to the degree of responsibility the state or the agent, respectively, 
is deemed to have had in the relevant case. If the conditions of application of fairness itself 
are attenuated, then so must be the reasons generated by the Fairness Principle. Consequently, 
in such cases the appropriate transition policy will tend to be more sensitive to the reasons 
supplied by the Wellbeing Principle (see Chapter 9). Since the Wellbeing Principle has strong 
(albeit indirect) resource-egalitarian implications (see Chapter 10.1.1), it is fitting that it play 
a more dominant role in unequal societies.  
Thus, in Housing Segregation, the Fairness Principle provides only weak reasons one way or 
the other, which rules out both strongly conservative and strongly reformative responses (see 
Chapter 9). The most appropriate transitional response to the Whites will rather be dictated 
by the effects of the transition on their wellbeing. For reasons discussed in Chapter 9, this 
should be limited to the provision of time and resources necessary to successfully adapt to 
the new conditions, which in their case seems unlikely to be too much, given their existing 
wealth (a key component of their “adaptive capability”, which I discuss in Chapter 9.3.1).23 
                                                 
23 Moreover, as I discuss in Chapter 9.3.2.1, for a reform as significant as that contemplated here, the procedures 
required (independently of ART) by the rule of law themselves have the effect of dilating the time for adaptation 
and increasing the information available to people like the Whites (and hence their adaptive capability). 
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8.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have specified and discussed the second of my two principles of ART, the 
Fairness Principle, and endorsed a more specific ideal of fairness concerned with the ex ante 
allocation of responsibility for managing the risk of legal change. After rejecting the non-
moral luck egalitarian approach to the allocation of this kind of responsibility, I specified, 
illustrated and defended a practice-based alternative. I argued that this conception of fairness, 
by piggy-backing on the internal normativity of concrete practices of responsibility 
allocation, provides plausible and relatively determinate reasons for conservative or 
reformative transitional responses (holding constant the wellbeing implications of a legal 
change) while avoiding the pitfalls and moral costs of particularistic foreseeability and 
prudence judgements rightly identified by Fried. I also discussed plausible interpretive 
responses in cases involving conflicting practices, highlighting the importance of general 
citizenship practices as providing a ‘default rule’ that specific practices may overturn.  
I cautioned, however, that the plausibility of the reasons generated by the Fairness Principle 
holds only to the extent that the conditions of application of the underlying ideal of fairness 
also hold. Effectively, the strength of the reasons generated by the Fairness Principle will be 
attenuated as the cases in question move away from the paradigm of voluntary social 
cooperation under circumstances of relative equality. When the Fairness Principle’s 
conditions of application hold, the marginal strength of the reasons generated by the 
Wellbeing Principle will be greater, and cases will tend to be more sensitive to the effect of 
legal changes on wellbeing, in the sense specified in Chapters 6 and 7. The two principles, 
in this way, are complementary. 
This does not mean that the two principles will always point in the same direction. Sometimes 
they will, and sometimes they will not. What remains is for me to develop a theoretical 
account of how, exactly, the state should respond to the reasons generated by the Fairness 
and Wellbeing Principles, considered together. It is this task to which I now turn. 
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 STATE RESPONSES: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF 
ADAPTIVE TRANSITION POLICY 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
I have now set out two ‘vectors’ of reasons about legal transitions: one based on wellbeing, 
and the other on fairness. It remains for me to show how different potential combinations of 
these reasons in a given case justify a particular transition policy response from the state.  
As we saw in the first half of the thesis, most discussions of transition policy gravitate toward 
one end of the transition policy spectrum or the other; toward the conservative or reformative 
“corner solutions” (Shaviro 2000, 3). I consider these extreme possibilities in this chapter, 
but less attention has been paid in the existing literature to the gradations in between these 
extremes. Responses falling in middle part of the spectrum can best be described as adaptive. 
The aim of adaptive transition policy is to facilitate the agent’s successful adaptation to the 
circumstances prevailing under the new legal regime. In this sense, an adaptive response is 
neither fully conservative, nor fully reformative. It is not fully conservative, since it presumes 
that the agent must change. It is not fully reformative because it presumes that the state has 
a role to play in facilitating that change, and this role may include providing for a measure 
of stability to one’s existing functionings. I decompose adaptive policies into two 
subcategories: procedural and substantive. Roughly (for now), procedural adaptive policies 
include measures such as notice periods, information campaigns, consultation processes, and 
deliberative and participatory processes. Substantive adaptive policies include a wide range 
of measures ranging from conditional cash transfers to public goods provision, and also 
include expressive acts (such as respect, recognition, acknowledgement etc.).  
This classificatory scheme yields a typology of four broad categories of transition policy that 
I will use throughout this chapter: conservative; adaptive (substantive); adaptive 
(procedural); and reformative. In the remainder of this chapter, I outline and defend the 
conditions under which each kind of response is most appropriate, i.e. best supported by the 
combination of reasons generated by the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles. Where 
applicable, I engage with existing literature on state responses to transitions. In Part 9.2, I 
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discuss conservative transition policies, which I take to include grandfathering and 
compensation (I focus on losers, but discuss winners briefly at the end of Part 9.2). Since this 
is where the existing literature has focused, I discuss others’ proposed justifications for such 
policies and defend my own, ‘instrumental’ justification in terms of wellbeing and fairness. 
In Part 9.3, I discuss adaptive transition policy (which is applicable to losers only). I describe 
what I mean by successful adaptation and explain the key variables influencing the success 
of an agent’s adaptation to the loss of a given central functioning (time and ‘adaptive 
capability’). I then consider the specific adaptive policies that states should take, in light of 
the balance of reasons generated by the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles. Reformative 
transition policy is, on my scheme, justified residually, i.e. where the reasons for conservative 
or adaptive transition policy are lacking (see Part 9.4). 
The most appropriate transition policy responses for transition losers, as defended in this 
chapter, are summarised in schematic, binary form (in reality, these are vectors) in Table 1, 
below. 
Table 1: Schematic representation of most appropriate transition policy responses for losers 
Fairness Condition 
Wellbeing Condition 
State has ex ante risk 
responsibility 
Individual has ex ante risk 
responsibility 
Ex post impact on peripheral 
particular functionings only Adaptive (procedural) Reformative 
Ex post impact on central 
particular functionings Conservative Adaptive (substantive) 
The most appropriate transition policy responses for transition winners are summarised in 
schematic, binary form in Table 2, below.  
Table 2: Schematic representation of most appropriate transition policy responses for winners 
Fairness Condition 
Wellbeing Condition 
State has ex ante risk 
responsibility 
Individual has ex ante risk 
responsibility 
Ex post impact on peripheral 
generic functionings only Conservative (stronger) Reformative (weaker) 
Ex post impact on central 
generic functionings Conservative (weaker) Reformative (stronger) 
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9.2 CONSERVATIVE TRANSITION POLICY 
9.2.1 Grandfathering 
9.2.1.1 Kinds of grandfathering 
A grandfather clause is defined as “an exemption from, or relaxation of, regulatory 
requirements, allowing actors to continue an activity following an institutional change that 
either legally prohibits or regulates the activity for others” (Damon et al. 2019, 25). The term 
has also come to be used in relation to statutory property markets such as tradeable permit or 
quota schemes for environmental resource use: if permits are allocated freely rather than 
auctioned, there must be an allocation rule; an allocation rule according to which permits are 
allocated based on past usage of the relevant resource has come to be referred to as 
grandfathering (ibid 25).  
Philosophical discussion of grandfathering has been focused mostly on the allocation of 
greenhouse gas emissions entitlements in the context of international (and, to a lesser extent, 
domestic) climate change law and policy. Most philosophers who have discussed emissions 
grandfathering have rejected it (L. H. Meyer and Roser 2006, 229ff; Moellendorf 2009; Roser 
and Seidel 2017, chap. 11). However, certain moderate versions of the principle have 
attracted qualified support (Bovens 2011; Knight 2013, 2014; Schuessler 2017). Before 
exploring the normative justifications provided by the latter group of scholars, it is necessary 
to understand the various senses in which the grandfathering they endorse is moderate and 
qualified. To do so, I must introduce some distinctions, which will also be helpful for the 
subsequent discussion of other transition policies. 
First, one’s prior legal position could be grandfathered to a greater or a lesser degree. In fact, 
there are two senses in which this is the case: the full extent of one’s prior position could be 
grandfathered (full grandfathering) or only part of it (partial grandfathering); and the 
grandfathering could be permanent or temporary (Knight 2013, 412–13; Schuessler 2017). 
The question of partial vs full grandfathering is particularly pertinent to activities undertaken 
by an agent that yield a variable flow of valuable goods, like uses of common pool resources 
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(e.g. fish catches, or grazing on common land), or polluting activities1 (e.g. yielding variable 
flows of greenhouse gas emissions).2 The potential for partial and temporary grandfathering 
means grandfathering is not an inherently ‘conservative’ transition policy: full and permanent 
grandfathering is the most conservative policy possible, but the more partial and temporary 
grandfathering becomes, the more appropriate it will be to classify it as an adaptive response 
rather than a conservative one. 
The second distinction concerns the relationship between the grandfathering claim and the 
normative considerations that purportedly justify such a claim.3 The strongest relationship is 
one in which the relevant normative considerations logically entail grandfathering (a 
necessary relationship). The second kind of relationship is a contingent, instrumental 
relationship, according to which grandfathering is justified because and to the extent that it 
promotes another value (Knight 2013, 415–16). The forms of justification for the transitional 
responses I discuss in this chapter posit an instrumental relationship in this sense.  
The third and final distinction concerns the weight of a grandfathering claim vis-à-vis any 
other admissible normative considerations that bear on the all-things-considered decision 
about transition policy. Knight (2013, 411–12) distinguishes three positions in relation to the 
specific case of greenhouse gas emissions, which can be generalised as follows: the 
grandfathering claim has absolute or determinative weight, i.e. it is the sole or lexically prior 
normative consideration (absolute weight); the grandfathering claim provides a pro tanto 
reason (moderate weight); or the grandfathering claim is a tie-breaker, applying only when 
all other considerations are equal (marginal weight) (cf. Knight 2013, 411–12).4 We can also 
                                                 
1 Flows of pollutants can be re-described in terms of resource usage: we can conceive, metaphorically, of a 
pollutant sink as a common resource that is ‘used’ by polluting it (see, e.g., Bovens 2011, 129).  
2 Variable historic flows and uses raise a further difficulty: how to determine the baseline level of flow or use 
that would count for the purposes of ‘full’ grandfathering. For a useful discussion of this issue, see Knight 
(2013, 413–14). 
3 See Knight (2013, 414–16) for a discussion of similar distinctions to which my account is indebted.  
4  Knight’s (2013, 411–12) account of these distinctions, to which my own is indebted, is substantively 
equivalent but uses slightly different terminology—strong claim, moderate claim and weak claim, respectively. 
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understand the ‘moderate weight’ category in terms of a spectrum of more or less weighty 
pro tanto reasons. 
The three sets of distinctions are related, in that the justified degree (extent and duration) of 
grandfathering depends on the other two sets of distinctions. The degree of grandfathering 
could be ‘internally’ limited by the underlying normative considerations that purport to 
justify grandfathering (the second distinction), or it could be ‘externally’ limited by other 
normative considerations as part of an all-things-considered decision about appropriate 
transition policy, assuming the normative consideration purportedly justifying 
grandfathering does not have absolute weight (the third distinction) (Bovens 2011, 136–44; 
Knight 2013, 413). 
In the remainder of this section, my interest is in seeing whether there is any plausible 
justification for full and permanent grandfathering (or something close to it).  
9.2.1.2 Necessary grandfathering 
The surest route to such a conclusion would be to identify a normative consideration that 
logically entails grandfathering (what I referred to above as a ‘necessary relationship’) and 
that has absolute weight relative to external considerations. Deontological constraints would 
be the most likely candidate to fit this bill. I have considered various possible deontological 
approaches to legal transitions throughout this thesis: libertarian natural property rights; 
justice; and (on some views) legitimate expectations. However, I argued that all such theories 
should be rejected (with the exception of a special rights-based version of legitimate 
expectations, which I argued will rarely apply to legislative transitions and is in any case not 
really a theory of legal transitions—see Chapter 4.3).  It is notable that the one scholar who 
has argued for necessary grandfathering on Lockean natural property rights grounds (Bovens 
2011) advocates only partial and temporary grandfathering due to a combination of ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ considerations. As such, that argument is better categorised as a claim for an 
adaptive response, albeit one based on different reasons from those that I advance in Part 
9.3.2, below. I conclude that there is no good theory of legal transitions that would necessarily 
entail strong (full and permanent) grandfathering. 
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9.2.1.3 Instrumental grandfathering 
There is a theoretically possible instrumental route to full and permanent grandfathering: if 
normative consideration X is best promoted by full and permanent grandfathering, and this 
consideration outweighs other, countervailing normative considerations, then full and 
permanent grandfathering will be the most appropriate response so long as consideration X 
and its superior weight obtain (cf. Knight 2013, 413). 
Neither of the remaining proponents of grandfathering (Knight and Schuessler) support full 
and permanent grandfathering. Rather, both support partial and temporary grandfathering—
which I think are better conceived as “adaptive” transition policies (see Part 9.2.2.3, below)—
on instrumental grounds. Coincidentally, both Knight (2013, 2014) and Schuessler (2017) 
provide a fairness (albeit luck egalitarian) argument for instrumental grandfathering and 
Knight also provides welfarist (utilitarian, egalitarian and sufficientarian) arguments.  
My own conclusion about grandfathering is in broad agreement with both Knight’s and 
Schuessler’s: considerations of wellbeing and fairness can provide pro tanto reasons for 
grandfathering on instrumental grounds. Those reasons will sometimes justify a partial and 
temporary form of grandfathering as an adaptive response. It follows from the Wellbeing and 
Fairness Principles, however, that a more complete and durable form of grandfathering could 
in principle be justified where weighty fairness and weighty wellbeing considerations point 
in the same direction.5 In Chapter 8, I accepted the possibility that in some contexts the state 
should be deemed ex ante responsible for managing certain risks of legal change in respect 
of some agents. Where this is the case, it seems to follow that a more or less conservative 
response is warranted. Among the relevant class of persons who lack ex ante risk 
responsibility for this reason, a more conservative response is warranted in respect of those 
individuals whose wellbeing has been very adversely affected, in the sense that they would 
otherwise lose more central particular functionings. At the limit, this would entail full and 
                                                 
5 Knight (2013, 413) acknowledges that the weight of welfare considerations could in principle instrumentally 
justify permanent grandfathering. We agree that this will be unlikely in practice. My point is that combining 
such reasons with fairness considerations (where ex ante risk responsibility is clearly assigned to the state) 
strengthens the justification for a relatively conservative form of grandfathering. 
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permanent grandfathering. For reasons I discussed in Chapter 6.2 concerning people’s natural 
rates of change and adaptation to new circumstances, I doubt that the wellbeing impact could 
ever justify this limit case in practice. However, I think it quite plausible that a relatively 
conservative (i.e. close to full and long-lived) form of grandfathering could be justified in 
particular cases where both wellbeing and fairness reasons are sufficiently weighty. That said, 
I suspect that such combinations will tend to be rare in practice, in light of the conception of 
wellbeing I adopt and my anecdotal knowledge of facts about actual practices of ex ante 
responsibility allocation for risks of legal change.  
Of course, there are certain kinds of primary legal change, and certain effects that such 
changes have on people, for which grandfathering is not a viable option because it would 
thwart the purpose of the primary legislation to an unacceptable degree. Examples include: 
existing land-uses that are fundamentally incompatible with the new zoning classification (as 
is often the case with major infrastructure projects, which necessitate the property being 
acquired to prevent existing uses or to demolish existing structures); and the loss of skills and 
jobs in industries that are effectively wiped-out by pressing environmental and public health 
and safety regulations. In these and other cases, we must turn to consider compensation as an 
alternative (putatively) conservative response. 
9.2.2 Compensation 
In the context of legal transitions, the most commonly discussed—indeed, often the 
assumed—transitional response is “compensation”. The term has a broader and a narrower 
usage. According to the broader usage, compensation means any form of monetary payment 
by the state to an agent adversely affected by a legal transition. On the narrower usage, 
compensation means a monetary payment by the state to an agent adversely affected by a 
legal transition, where the payment is justified by conservative reasons. In this part of the 
chapter, I am interested in the narrower usage.  
Specifically, I am interested in two kinds of conservative reasons, which align with the 
justificatory strategies discussed above with respect to grandfathering. On the first of these, 
compensation is a corrective remedy awarded in respect of violation of a right. In that case, 
compensation is logically entailed by (i.e. has a ‘necessary relationship’ to) the underlying 
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normative reason. I will call this corrective compensation. On the second, compensation is 
instrumentally justified because and to the extent that it promotes other values, where such 
values are themselves conservative (‘backward looking’) in the sense of restoring some 
feature of the status quo ante. Conserving an agent’s wellbeing (particular functionings) prior 
to a legal change-induced loss is a conservative value in this sense. I will call this 
instrumental compensation. I consider each strategy in turn. I then clarify the objective of 
compensation that follows from the position I advocate, which leads me to a surprising 
conclusion about the limited role of compensation in ART. 
9.2.2.1 Corrective compensation 
Corrective compensation has familiar analogues in private morality and private law (e.g. tort, 
contract and property). In the realm of legislative transitions, however, the plausibility of 
corrective compensation turns on the existence of a right to the legal status quo, enforceable 
against the state. I considered three possible rights-based justifications for grandfathering: 
natural property rights; ideal justice (basic rights); and legitimate expectations (qua rights-
like normative claim). If one of these provided a good basis for a theory of legal transitions, 
then it could ground a ‘second-best’ argument for corrective compensation: if there were 
independent reasons why grandfathering was not possible, practicable or otherwise desirable, 
but the legal change were to proceed anyway, the relevant right would be violated, and 
compensation would be necessary to correct that violation. However, I rejected all three bases 
for a theory of legal transitions (and hence as reasons for grandfathering). Accordingly, the 
second-best argument for corrective compensation also fails.  
9.2.2.2 Instrumental compensation 
The second-best argument does, however, work as a justification for instrumental 
compensation. Instrumental compensation is justified where (i) the coincidence of wellbeing 
and fairness reasons justifies conservative (relatively full and permanent) grandfathering of 
losers’ prior positions (see Part 9.2.1.3, above) but (ii) grandfathering is impossible, 
impractical or otherwise undesirable (e.g. it would excessively thwart the purpose of the 
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primary legal reform). 6  Accordingly, the argument I made in respect of instrumental 
grandfathering in the penultimate paragraph of Part 9.2.1.3, above, applies, mutatis mutandis, 
in respect of instrumental compensation, subject to the addition of condition (ii), discussed 
in the final paragraph of Part 9.2.1.3.  
9.2.2.3 The objective of compensation 
A clarification is warranted concerning the objective of the instrumental compensation I 
envisage. It is helpful to introduce a distinction defended by Bob Goodin (1989) between 
means-replacing compensation and ends-displacing compensation. Goodin argues that there 
is a difference between losing something—like money, or goods that can readily be acquired 
on a market—that are merely replaceable means to our ends, and losing something that, for 
one reason or another, is irreplaceable. In the former case, compensation can replace what 
has been lost such that the person can genuinely be left no worse off than they were (or 
otherwise would have been) without the loss, or at least very close to it; it is means-replacing. 
In the latter case, since the relevant object cannot be replaced, compensation can at best give 
the agent the means to pursue a different end; it is ends-displacing. While this different end 
could be seen as, in a sense, ‘as good’ as the end one has lost, or as leaving the person ‘as 
well off’, or ‘indifferent’ compared with what they had, Goodin insists (contra the welfare 
economist7) that it is an inferior form of compensation compared with means-replacing 
compensation. This is so, Goodin argues, because it forces the affected agent to pursue 
different ends from the ones they had in fact chosen. That the ends are different compromises 
the unity and coherence of the person’s life, and that they are forced upon the person by 
policymakers compromises the person’s autonomy (Goodin 1989, 68–70).  
                                                 
6 See Brown (2017b, 35–38, 94–98, 101) for a more detailed discussion of the kinds of cases in which the prima 
facie duty of the state to provide a substantive remedy (he discusses expectation-fulfilment, but similar 
considerations apply to grandfathering) is overridden by independent (“public interest”) considerations. 
7 Goodin considers the welfare-economist objection that there will always be some compensating price, or 
package of goods, that leaves a person on the same indifference curve they were on before the loss. He responds 
that there are actually two kinds of indifference corresponding to the two kinds of compensation (1989, 66). 
Welfare economists, with their “studied indifference to the deeper structure of people’s preferences” (ibid 64), 
err in failing to distinguish between the two. See also DeMartino (2015) and my Chapter 3.4.4. 
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Indeed, because humans are social and interpretive beings, the social causes of policy-
induced losses and the social nature and effects of many kinds of particular functionings 
(ends) losses will often imply that the provision of ends-displacing compensation to 
individuals is inadequate—potentially even worsening the loss (DeMartino 2015, 331–34). 
With regard to the social causes of loss, there is something distinctive about losing one’s 
most central particular functionings because the state changed the law—something that the 
payment of compensation alone seems inapt to repair (cf. DeMartino 2015, 332). Expressive 
acts such as recognition, acknowledgement, respect, and possibly apology—perhaps 
accompanied by monetary payments—may be more fitting responses (ibid 332–33). Some 
losses are also highly social in nature and in their effects. For example, in cases where 
individual functionings are lost because some communal public good is lost (e.g. because of 
a hazardous facility siting that affects community safety or amenity, or where a community 
is devastated by the regulatory wipe-out of a vital industry), individual ends-displacing 
compensation may well be less apt than the provision of other public goods (Mansfield, Van 
Houtven, and Huber 2002). Absent such expressive acts, public goods or other appropriate 
state responses, ends-displacing compensation may be perceived as trivialising the loss, or 
insulting to the losers, and may be repudiated by the persons and communities to whom it is 
offered. As DeMartino (2015, 333) notes, citing empirical work by Frey et al. (1996), this 
“might help to explain why the promise of financial payments to communities for public 
projects that threaten harm, such as environmental damage, sometimes reduces support for 
the projects”.8 These kinds of cases demonstrate that where legal changes adversely affect 
people’s central particular functionings, it will be important to carefully identify the causes, 
                                                 
8 The social-scientific literature on host community reactions to industrial facility siting is vast and complex, 
highlighting a wide range of factors that influence community responses, including the type (e.g. monetary vs. 
non-monetary; individualised vs collective) and quantum of compensation offered, the process of arriving at 
the compensation offer (e.g. how inclusive/participatory it was), the way the offer is framed, wider contextual 
factors, and more (see Mors, Terwel, and Daamen 2012, for a review of the literature). Nonetheless, there is 
more than enough evidence to complicate the simple picture that individualised ends-displacing compensation 
alone is always sufficient to conserve affected persons’ prior wellbeing. Note that the term “compensation” in 
this literature encompasses non-conservative and non-monetary benefits, and thus is used more loosely than 
both the narrow and broad usages I identified at the beginning of Part 9.2.2. 
215 
 
nature and effects of losses and to fit an appropriate response. This is a key motivation for 
adaptive transition policy. 
Given that ends-displacing compensation requires people to abandon one or more of their 
previous ends and facilitates their adoption of new ones, and given the evident complexity of 
this process, there is a sense in which ends-displacing compensation is not really 
compensation at all—at least not if compensation is understood in the narrow (conservative) 
sense introduced at the beginning of Part 9.2.2. Rather, developing new central functionings 
following the loss of existing ones seems to me to be the very definition of adaptation. At 
the very least, ends-displacing compensation, where compensation is understood in the sense 
intended here—as a monetary payment justified by conservative reasons—is very close on 
the conservative–reformative spectrum to a monetary payment justified by adaptive reasons, 
which I discuss in Part 9.3, below. There may be a difference in emphasis or context, but in 
substance it would not be a large one.  
9.2.2.4 The surprisingly limited role of compensation in transition policy 
For my purposes, these remarks about the inferiority and nature of ends-displacing 
compensation have two important implications for the choice and justification of transition 
policies. One concerns the pairwise comparison between grandfathering and compensation, 
and the other the pairwise comparison between compensation and adaptive assistance. With 
regard to the former, in cases where it is only money or some other replaceable good whose 
loss is threatened by a legal change, the difference between grandfathering and compensation 
is theoretically nil (or in practice, small), since either full grandfathering or full compensation 
will leave the agent in the same position as before with respect to their particular ends. 
Compared with grandfathering, means-replacing compensation under those conditions is, we 
might say, a ‘close second-best’.9 But in cases where the relevant loss of central functionings 
involves an irreplaceable end (hence means-replacing compensation is not a theoretical 
                                                 
9 Of course, a feature of my theory is that the state only has a reason to conserve ‘mere means’ such as these 
where they are instrumentally necessary to support a person’s central functionings—as with a poor person, for 
example (see Chapter 6.3.3). 
216 
 
possibility), the inferiority of ends-displacing compensation makes it a ‘distant second-best’; 
grandfathering should be favoured, all else equal.10 Furthermore, in reference to the second 
pairwise comparison, I also noted that once a legal change displaces an agent’s central 
particular functionings (ends), ends-displacing compensation might be inferior to, or better 
conceived as part of, an adaptive transition response. 
This matters quite a lot for ART. Because the ultimate focus of my Wellbeing Principle is on 
people’s ‘ends’, qua particular functionings weighted by their centrality, it will often be the 
case that the strongest reasons the state has to conserve wellbeing will apply to people’s 
irreplaceable ends—their particular home or jobs, for example. In these kinds of cases, where 
the state also bears ex ante responsibility for managing the relevant risk of legal change, I 
have argued that a conservative response—grandfathering or ends-displacing 
compensation—will be most appropriate on instrumental grounds.11 Where grandfathering 
is not possible, practicable or desirable for independent reasons, ends-displacing 
compensation will be the only form of compensation (understood as a conservative response) 
available. But if ends-displacing compensation is really a form of adaptive assistance—and 
not necessarily the best one—then the scope for (conservative) compensatory responses is 
accordingly limited.  
The combined effect of these implications, then, is to overturn the traditional emphasis within 
the transition literature on compensation: when the reasons from the application of ART 
shake out across a wide sweep of cases, compensation will rarely be the most appropriate 
response.12 
                                                 
10 Goodin draws a similar implication from his analysis: that prevention of the loss is better than compensation 
(1989, 70–72). I agree, but I am assuming that prevention is not a transition policy option because the primary 
legal change is taken as a ‘given’. Goodin overlooks the potential for grandfathering as a superior transition 
policy to ends-displacing compensation in these cases. 
11 This will not always be the case: where a central particular functioning is necessarily dependent on income 
or some other readily replaceable resource that is threatened by a legal change, the reason to conserve the 
functioning effectively becomes a reason to replace the means (see Chapter 6.3.3). 
12 “Rarely”, but not “never”: see previous footnote. 
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9.2.3 Conservative responses for winners 
With respect to winners from legal change, conservative responses (grandfathering or claw-
back of gains) of greater or lesser degree will be most appropriate where the state has assumed 
ex ante responsibility for managing the relevant risk of legal change according to the Fairness 
Principle (see Table 2, above). Such responses are justified by the symmetrical application 
to winners of the underlying fairness-based rationale for conservative policy to losers: where 
there is a practice of allocating ex ante responsibility for upside risks to the state, then the 
individual has no claim of fairness to that upside, should it eventuate. It will often be the case 
that the allocation of upside and downside risks of legal change go together—recall, for 
example, practices relating to commercial competition and the gambling casino, where both 
the downside and upside risks are appropriately allocated to individuals. This may hold for 
allocations of responsibility to the state, too. For example, one could envisage a practice 
whereby the state socialises the risk of state-caused losses in property values and also the 
‘upside risk’ of state-caused gains in property values, with the latter effectively acting as the 
insurance premium for the former.  
The strength of the reasons for conservative transition policy for winners will vary in light of 
reasons generated by the Wellbeing Principle: where the winners would gain a relatively 
central generic functioning, the reasons to conserve the agent’s prior position will be weaker 
than when the winners would gain merely peripheral functionings. For example, consider 
again the case of Rail Link from Chapter 8.3.3, where a new rail link decreases Millie’s 
property value and increases Morris’ property value. Let’s further assume that the impact on 
both of their central functionings is minimal—the change in their capital stock has effect only 
on their peripheral functionings—and let’s further assume that the clear practice in the 
jurisdiction is to allocate to the state the responsibility for managing risks of legal changes 
from major state infrastructure projects (admittedly, this would be an unusual practice). 
Clawing back Morris’ gains would be an appropriate response in those circumstances. 
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9.3 ADAPTIVE TRANSITION POLICY 
9.3.1 Adaptivist institutions and the concept of successful adaptation 
Given that wellbeing and fairness reasons will rarely jointly point strongly in the direction of 
conservatism, and will often point somewhere in the middle of the transition policy spectrum, 
I argue that a central goal of transition policy should be to facilitate agents’ successful 
adaptation to new conditions.  
Surprisingly little has been written about adaptive transition policy. There are, however, 
various state institutions that are analogously adaptivist to those that I consider below insofar 
as they (i) adopt, at least implicitly, a diachronic (or multi-chronic) conception of the person 
(or part thereof, e.g. the person’s health, wellbeing, functionings, skills, attitudes, behavioural 
dispositions, etc.); and (ii) aim to facilitate a desirable change in a particular person (or part 
thereof) over time. Some such institutions are inherently adaptivist, such as education policy 
(Brighouse et al. 2018) and climate change adaptation policy (Lindley et al. 2011). 
Additionally, there are many areas of social policy in which adaptivist models are possible, 
and have in fact been used and/or advocated by philosophers and subject-matter experts, 
including: clinical healthcare policy for addiction-based disorders (Pickard 2013, 2017); 
criminal law and criminal rehabilitation policy (Lacey and Pickard 2013, 2015); temporary 
earnings-related benefits in social welfare policy (Goodin 1990); and so-called ‘structural 
adjustment assistance’ and other forms of labour market and industry policy aimed at 
facilitating adaptation to changing technological, market or policy conditions (Green and 
Gambhir 2019, pt. 3.1).13 
The only advocacy of adaptive state responses I found in the literature on state responses to 
legal and other transitions is that of Schuessler (2017). Schuessler combines luck-based and 
welfarist considerations into a principle of justice he calls the “buffering principle”: 
                                                 
13 Insightful recent work has been done on adaptive and diachronic aspects in other parts of morality and ethics, 
including processes of fitting emotional change (Na’aman forthcoming) and diachronic accounts of moral 
responsibility (Khoury 2013). 
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People who seriously suffer under adaptive pressures through no fault of their own ought to 
receive the resources or the time they need to adapt in a morally acceptable way if they lack 
the means to do so on their own. Acceptability implies that, if possible, the suffering of those 
people should not exceed a threshold that is to be determined by moral considerations. (The 
costs of intervention may enter these considerations.) (2017, 153) 
Schuessler’s principle is very similar to the adaptive approach that I favour in respect of a 
considerable part of the terrain of legal transitions, and is similar in its justification 
(combining responsibility and wellbeing considerations). It differs, however, in numerous 
respects. First, the buffering principle is framed as an independent principle of justice (ibid 
154). Second, it is a pro tanto consideration to be counterbalanced against consequentialist 
considerations about wellbeing, even though it is itself justified by wellbeing considerations 
involved in transitions, and even though it is framed as a principle of justice—a combination 
that seems rather incoherent. Third, it is broader in scope than my theory insofar as his 
principle applies to all kinds of losses, not merely those caused by legal transitions (ibid 154–
55). I remain agnostic in this thesis about the state’s obligations outside of legal transitions, 
suffice it to note that expanding adaptive responses to cover losses that have other proximate 
causes (e.g. market changes) would dramatically expand the scope of the state’s liability. 
Fourth, and most importantly for present purposes, the buffering principle is, in a different 
way, narrower than my approach insofar as it applies only to no-fault, “brute luck” losses 
(what Schuessler elsewhere calls “undeserved” losses), whereas adaptive responses are 
available on my approach even where the ex ante risk responsibility is (conventionally) 
allocated to the individual—and hence, potentially, where the individual is at “fault” or 
“deserving” of those losses14—if the effects on their wellbeing are sufficiently significant.15 
Schuessler says little, though, about what it means to adapt in a ‘morally acceptable way’—
or, in my terms, to adapt successfully. I define successful adaptation as follows:  
                                                 
14 The Fairness Principle is, of course, not based on luck/desert but rather on conventional allocations of 
responsibility (see Chapter 8). 
15 Schuessler says that an expansion of scope to include fault-based losses “seems plausible” but does not pursue 
that possibility (2017, 153). 
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Successful adaptation is a process, beginning with the loss of a central particular functioning, 
by which a person cultivates new central particular functionings, or centralises previously 
marginal particular functionings.  
From this definition, we can see that there is an ‘adaptation’ factor and a ‘success’ factor. 
That a person cultivates new particular functionings (or newly centralises formerly marginal 
ones) following a loss implies that adaptation has occurred. That these particular 
functionings are central implies that the person has found new sources of meaning, value and 
purpose in their life—in the sense of something to which the person is emotionally vulnerable 
and which serves as a source of practical reasons for them—to displace that which has been 
lost, and this is what makes the adaptation successful.  
Metaphorically, the adaptation process can be seen as a ‘bridge’ between the set of particular 
functionings that has been lost and a new set of particular functionings. The length of the 
bridge corresponds to the centrality of the functioning that has been lost. Like crossing a 
bridge, a process of adaptation is a liminal state. Constructing and crossing a bridge, 
moreover, takes time, effort and supportive conditions, as does recovering from and adapting 
to a loss. Moreover, as one crosses a bridge, one can still look back to see where one has 
come from, but as one goes further along it, one can eventually see the other side, and look 
forward to it. Similarly, adaptation, though fundamentally about change, will often require 
both forward-looking and backward-looking work (Janoff-Bulman and Berg 1998; Miller 
and Omarzu 1998; Snyder 1998). The backward looking aspect involves accepting and 
coming to terms with the loss of the relevant functioning, including recognising and 
respecting its value and mourning its loss, all of which requires cognitive and emotional 
work. The forward-looking aspect involves cultivating new particular functionings. This 
requires the availability and accessibility to the agent of a range of valuable social practices, 
roles and relationships from which the agent can choose. And it requires individuals to have 
the time and capabilities to identify with options among these and, through a process of 
engagement and reflection, integrate these into their scheme of narrative functionings and 
into their more basic modes of being (cf. Ryan and Deci 2000). Both of these aspects are 
facilitated (or hindered) by a range of internal capacities and external resources, conditions 
and structures (discussed below). 
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Just how much work a process of adaptation entails depends in part on the number of 
particular functionings that have been lost and their centrality to the agent, as well as her 
baseline generic functioning levels and the dynamic effect of the particular functionings 
losses on her generic functionings. It is important in this regard to identify how particular 
events (those triggered by legal changes) affect interrelated networks or bundles of 
functionings, including through spill-over or flow-on effects from one to another (cf. Wolff 
and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 7).16 Many of the categories of loss considered in Chapters 7 and 
8—such as home displacement and job loss—typically implicate bundles of central 
functionings, which helps to explain their seriousness.  
Another variable affecting successful adaptation is time. The longer the time period over 
which a change to a central functioning occurs, the more manageable it will be, all else equal. 
This follows from the position, discussed in Chapter 6.2, that we are always changing anyway 
because of the dynamic interactions among brain-body-environment, but that we typically 
change slowly, such that most changes are only perceptible over long stretches of time. If 
changes affect our central particular functionings slowly, we have more time to process those 
changes, and to adjust our expectations, plans and practical affairs (Goodin 1990).  
The final key variable affecting adaptation is what I call adaptive capability.17 The greater 
one’s adaptive capability, the better one will be able to manage a given kind of loss over a 
given timeframe. A person’s adaptive capability can be understood as the factors that affect 
their ability to prepare for the risk of (ex ante) and to respond to and recover from the 
manifestation of (ex post) an adverse event (Lindley et al. 2011). For our purposes, the 
adverse event is a legal change affecting one’s functionings. Empirical and empirically-
informed philosophical literatures on personal resilience to shocks and losses suggest that 
such factors can be grouped into three categories: ‘internal resources’ (or, in terminology I 
                                                 
16 In a manner similar to the way in which Wolff and De-Shalit (2007, chap. 7) have urged policymakers’ 
attention more generally on supporting “fertile functionings” and avoiding “corrosive disadvantage”, I am 
arguing that theorists of legal transitions should be particularly concerned with densely connected, or 
“clustered”, central functionings. 
17 The term ‘adaptive capacity’ is often used to refer to a similar idea. I prefer adaptive capability because 
‘capacity’ connotes internal abilities whereas ‘capability’ connotes internal abilities and external factors. 
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used in Chapters 6 and 7, rudimentary or background functionings); ‘external resources’; and 
external conditions/structures (cf. Wolff and Reeve 2015, 460). Table 3 lists the constituents 
of these three categories, with illustrative examples. 
Table 3: Adaptive Capability—constituents and examples 
Category Constituents Examples 
In
te
rn
al
 r
es
ou
rc
es
a  
Knowledge, cognitive 
abilities 
Greater knowledge about the political system and the law will tend 
to enable people to better anticipate risks of legal change 
Emotional and social 
skills 
Emotional and social skills enable people to leverage social 
networks in aid of effective recovery from loss, and to build new 
relationships (Thompson 1998, 25–27) 
Self-efficacy and 
autonomous 
motivation 
People who perceive themselves to be more efficacious are better 
able to integrate new goals and values into their autonomous 
motivation structures, and more autonomously motivated people are 
better able to change their behaviour and tackle new projects (Deci 
and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Deci 2008)18 
E
xt
er
na
l 
re
so
ur
ce
sb
 
Money/financial assets Money can be used to educate oneself about risks, manage risks 
(e.g. through purchasing insurance), outsource risk-management to 
professional advisers, and purchase goods and services that aid in 
the recovery from losses and in the pursuit of new projects  
Property rights Secure housing provides control over resources necessary for 
managing and recovering from risks. 
Social networks 
(instrumental benefits) 
Social networks can be leveraged to cope with losses, aid in 
recovery, and pursue new projects (Hall and Lamont 2013b, 64). 
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The physical layout of 
urban environments 
Transport infrastructure affects people’s mobility and access to new 
opportunities (Beatty and Fothergill 1996, 638) 
Institutionalised 
entitlements/ 
obligations 
The education system affects people’s general civic competencies 
(e.g. understanding the government and legal system). Government 
services that support people’s autonomous motivation improve their 
ability to adopt and achieve new goals (Deci and Ryan 2000; Ryan 
and Deci 2008; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 10). 
Social practices, social 
norms and customs, 
cultural imaginaries 
and cultural 
repertoires, etc. 
Cultural schema and social norms can affect how some groups of 
losers experience the effects of legal change—for example, cultural 
stigmatisation of the unemployed can inhibit the adaptation of job-
losers (Brand 2015, 365–70). In other cases collective imaginaries 
can provide symbolic resources on which people can draw to 
construct new identities and strategies of action (Hall and Lamont 
2013b, 64).  
References: (a) (Hobfoll 1989, 2002; Hobfoll, Stevens, and Zalta 2015; Lindley et al. 2011, 20–28); (b) 
(Lindley et al. 2011, 20–28; Wolff and Reeve 2015, 460); (c) (Hall and Lamont 2013a, 2013b, 64; Holland 
2017; Lindley et al. 2011, 20–28; Nussbaum 2000; Schlosberg 2012; Sen 1999; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007; 
Wolff and Reeve 2015, 460) 
                                                 
18 Within Deci and Ryan’s Self-Determination Theory, autonomy “concerns the self-endorsement of one’s 
behavior and the accompanying sense of volition or willingness” in the sense of having “a more internal 
perceived locus of causality” (Ryan and Deci 2008, 186–87). 
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9.3.2 Adaptive transition policy measures 
From this discussion of the role of time and adaptive capability as factors affecting successful 
adaptation, we can see a wide range of potential intervention points for adaptive transition 
policy. I summarise these transition policy options below, dividing them into procedural and 
substantive measures. For each of these two categories, I will indicate the combination of 
fairness and wellbeing reasons for which such measures would be instrumentally justified (I 
assume that, as far as the state is concerned when contemplating a particular transition policy 
response, the centrality of a lost/threatened functioning to a particular agent is given19).  
9.3.2.1 Procedural adaptive measures 
Where the state has responsibility for managing the risk of legal change risk in respect of a 
given agent (fairness condition), but the adverse wellbeing impact on that agent is relatively 
small (wellbeing condition), the state will have, overall, positive but relatively weak reasons 
to conserve the agent’s particular functionings. In these circumstances, procedural adaptive 
transition policies will be most appropriate.20 It must be remembered, moreover, that the idea 
of conservation of functionings has to be understood against a baseline level of normal 
change in people’s functionings: since brain, body and world are constantly interacting, they 
are constantly changing, albeit relatively slowly (Chapter 6.2). Where the impact of a legal 
change on people’s particular functionings is small, then, there is little the state need do to 
ensure that affected persons successfully adapt.  
In fact, in these circumstances, the standard procedural and formal requirements for 
introducing legal changes—requirements thought to be central to the rule of law—will often 
be sufficient to discharge the responsibility the state has for managing the risks of legal 
change to people’s particular functionings.21 The following formal and procedural rule-of-
                                                 
19 Of course, states should (prima facie) be particularly concerned to avoid or minimise where possible causing 
the loss of those kinds of central functionings that we know are particularly difficult for people to adapt to.  
20 The same can be said where the fairness reasons are weak (i.e. not strong in either direction), albeit that the 
combined reasons (still assuming weak wellbeing reasons) will then point closer to the reformative end of the 
spectrum. 
21 In such ‘peripheral impact’ cases where, in addition, the individual bears responsibility for managing the risk 
of legal change (according to the Fairness Principle) the state’s transition policy should be reformative. In such 
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law requirements applicable to legislation provide affected agents with both considerable 
notice (time) and relevant knowledge (adaptive capability) to adapt to legislative changes 
(Waldron 2012, 106–9): 
 public consultation;  
 the commissioning of reports and consultative papers; 
 informal stages of public debate; 
 successive stages of official deliberation in the legislature (including in legislative 
committees and often in two chambers); and 
 formal prospectivity (i.e. a present or future commencement date for the enactment). 
As the effects on wellbeing (central functionings) increase, 22  however, the ex ante 
responsible state may need to provide more extensive procedures to discharge that 
responsibility, for example, by providing more salient information campaigns and more 
inclusive consultation processes targeted at vulnerable groups, and potentially even more 
deliberative or participatory policymaking processes, which give people a greater degree of 
control over the legal risks they face.23  
While procedural measures will typically be most appropriate and sufficient in cases of state 
responsibility for the relevant risk (where wellbeing impacts are low), they may also play a 
role in facilitating adaptation where individuals bear the responsibility but where wellbeing 
impacts are more significant, as we shall see in the following section.  
9.3.2.2 Substantive adaptive measures 
Substantive transition policies will generally tend to be most appropriate where agents’ 
central functionings are threatened by the relevant legal transition (wellbeing condition) but 
                                                 
cases, the procedural requirements independently imposed by the rule of law may mean that the individual 
effectively is given more time than is warranted by transition policy. 
22 Of course, if they increase a lot then we are closer to the realm of conservative transition policy: see Part 9.2. 
23 We might say that the state must, in these circumstances, go beyond what is required by the rule of law. 
Alternatively, we might say that the extensiveness of the procedures required by the rule of law (e.g. those on 
Waldron’s list, above) should be proportionate to the effects of the proposed law on agents’ central functionings. 
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where a conservative response is not required because the state does not have ex ante 
responsibility for managing the risks of legal change (fairness condition).  
Substantive measures that states can take to increase the time available to adapt and/or to 
enhance people’s adaptive capabilities include the following (see generally Green and 
Gambhir 2019, pt. 3.1; Trebilcock 2014):  
 deferred or phased in commencement dates of new laws or provisions; 
 partial and/or temporary grandfathering (see above Part 9.2.1); 
 public insurance schemes, or subsidies for private insurance;  
 conditional cash transfers tied to the recipient’s spending the money on certain 
measures designed to facilitate their adaptation;  
 in-kind provision of goods or services;  
 measures to improve people’s general social connectedness24 and specific access to 
social support services;  
 expressive acts that publicly recognise and confer esteem on those who have incurred 
losses in the wider public interest;25 and  
 measures that in other ways expand people’s opportunities to access new meaningful 
endeavours, be they in the formal labour market (e.g. by stimulating aggregate 
demand for meaningful labour), via informal labour, or via artistic or recreational 
pursuits.  
As noted above, the reasons generated by the Wellbeing Principle and the Fairness Principle 
provide general guidance as to the kind and magnitude of appropriate adaptive state responses 
to transition losses. However, they cannot themselves fully determine which of these many 
specific policy options will be most appropriate; they can only really require a response 
within a range of permissible adaptive measures. This opens the space for additional 
                                                 
24 This can be fostered in a variety of ways, including through urban planning regulation, public support for 
social institutions (e.g. subsidisation of arts and sport), labour market regulation, and social policy.  
25 DeMartino (2015, 332) lists various forms of “acknowledgement” that may constitute appropriate (full or 
partial) reparation for particular kinds of harm, including apology, sympathy, gratitude, recognition, respect, 
and honour. 
226 
 
normative values to be introduced to bridge the gap between the range selected by ART and 
the specific adaptive policy response (in the language I introduced in Part 9.2.1.1, such 
additional values would then carry marginal weight). For example, we could imagine 
efficiency in the sense of cost-effectiveness (not Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) being a helpful 
value for discriminating among specific adaptive measures. Likewise, we could appeal to 
liberal-egalitarian justice considerations to play a role in ‘obvious injustice’ cases: for 
example, this would rule out “apologising” to those who lose unjust functionings, and 
perhaps lead instead to a focus on developing opportunities for such persons to engage in 
justice-respecting alternative projects. In light of these possibilities, we can perhaps best 
understand the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles as the core modules of ART, and envisage 
a range of additional optional modules based on other values and political traditions to help 
discriminate among measures within the wide ‘adaptive’ range of the transition policy 
spectrum.26  
I will conclude this discussion of adaptive transition policy by discussing three illustrative 
examples, in which I assume that substantive adaptive transition policy is the most 
appropriate response in light of the wellbeing and fairness reasons (i.e. individual 
responsibility but significant wellbeing impact). 
Adapting to job and skill losses 
In Chapter 7.2.1, I discussed the role of skills and jobs in people’s central functionings, and 
their vulnerability to loss as a result of many kinds of legal changes. We can also see how 
such losses often have flow-on effects that further erode people’s adaptive capability, by 
undermining their internal and external resources (Brand 2015, 364–70). With respect to loss 
of jobs, states could support individuals to transition to alternative employment by providing 
them with a combination of supportive services (e.g. careers counselling, job search services) 
and measures to expand the availability of and access to alternative jobs that have similar 
characteristics. These could include, for example, expanding transport infrastructure or 
                                                 
26 I borrow the language of “modules” from Robeyns (2017), who uses it in relation to the capability approach. 
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public transport services where there are mobility barriers to matching labour supply and 
demand, or place-based industry policy to stimulate economic opportunities in the places 
where unemployed workers already are. Where affected persons have invested in specialised 
firm-specific or sector-specific skills, the state can facilitate the redeployment of the skills 
that people would otherwise risk losing, for example by using its convening power to 
negotiate sector-specific agreements with businesses and workers, and using industrial policy 
to subsidise worker reemployment or on-the-job retraining (Green and Gambhir 2019, 
pt. 3.1). Where skills are no longer marketable, the state can provide or subsidise education 
and training to support workers to upgrade their skills as an aid to reemployment.  
Community adaptation to loss of place attachment 
People who live in rural areas and smaller communities tend to be more place-attached than 
urban dwellers, which may render them less capable of adaptation to geographic 
displacement or to sudden changes affecting their community (Anton and Lawrence 2014; 
Lewicka 2005). In these cases, provision of community-level public goods and services may 
be appropriate (Mansfield, Van Houtven, and Huber 2002), for example new economic, 
social or civic infrastructure, expanded provision of social services, or funding for 
environmental and amenity improvements (Green and Gambhir 2019, pts. 3.1, 4). 
Additionally, procedural measures may be effective in such contexts: involving local 
residents in processes to decide collectively their town’s future direction in the face of major 
threats (e.g. the regulatory wipe-out of a key industry) can help communities and individuals 
to adapt successfully (Veldhuizen et al. 2018).27 Similarly, expressive acts can play a role in 
facilitating adaptation in some contexts. For example, where legal changes such as reductions 
in trade protection or new environmental regulation contribute to the decline of spatially-
concentrated industries such as auto manufacturing or coalmining, official acknowledgment 
of the contribution that affected communities have made to the national economy of the past, 
                                                 
27 Other measures can be used to promote diversify people’s options for central functionings in such places, 
including improving transport connectivity to other areas, though these themselves pose threats to the cultural 
experience of place, suggesting the importance of coupling these options with ex ante measures. 
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and acts to memorialise those contributions, can facilitate adaptation to regional change 
(Green and Gambhir 2019, pt. 3.1). 
Already disadvantaged and vulnerable persons 
Persons who are already poor or otherwise disadvantaged are often particularly vulnerable to 
the effects of legal changes (Lindley et al. 2011; Nine 2018, 252–53; Wolff and De-Shalit 
2007). Of course, poverty entails a lack of external resources with which a person can prepare 
for, reduce and manage risks to their central functionings, and with which they can repair, 
modify or replace losses. Poverty also entails a chronic feeling of scarcity that undermines 
one’s internal resources: the constant quest to make ends meet entails a “tunnelling” of one’s 
attention toward scarce necessities, which reduces one’s cognitive abilities, self-control, and 
ability to focus on other things (Shafir and Mullainathan 2013). Accordingly, poverty also 
diminishes one’s ability to adapt to losses in central functionings, and the resources that 
support them, that one does (or rather, did) have. This reinforcing relationship between 
generalised disadvantage and adaptive capability underscores and adds to the point made 
earlier about the importance of loss dynamics and clustering: the flow-on effects of central 
functioning loss are likely to be exacerbated under conditions of existing disadvantage, and 
may include the loss of internal resources to adapt to yet further losses (Lindley et al. 2011, 
20–21; Nine 2018, 250–52; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 68–70). The upshot is that 
policymakers should be especially careful to: identify the ways in which legal changes may 
adversely affect the wellbeing of the already disadvantaged, remembering that poor persons’ 
central functionings will often be indirectly affected by reductions in their income or 
purchasing power; target procedural measures at disadvantaged persons and groups; and 
mitigate any adverse wellbeing effects through substantive adaptive measures.  
Useful insights in this regard can be gleaned from recent climate policy reforms, including 
fossil fuel subsidy removal and carbon pricing, both of which tend (in the absence of 
transition policy) to have negative effects on poor persons (Dorband et al. 2019; Hills 2012; 
Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019). Since poor persons tend to be excluded from policy 
consultation processes, to have less access to information, and to face barriers in accessing 
substitutes/alternatives, experience from these reforms shows that transitional responses 
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should include: ex ante consultations that are inclusive of poor persons and representative 
groups (e.g. relevant charities) during planning and implementation; and targeted information 
campaigns, so as to communicate the effects of the intended policy on such groups and the 
means by which they can access available substantive transitional support (Hills 2012; 
Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). Successful substantive 
measures have included targeted conditional or unconditional cash transfers and the 
provision of in-kind goods and services (such as energy efficiency retrofits, free energy 
efficient products, etc.) to ensure that central functionings are at least maintained (Hills 2012; 
Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). 28  These measures 
overwhelmingly target the external resources, structures and conditions relevant to adaptive 
capability. Pro-poor transition policy should also be autonomy-supportive (see Table 3, row 
8), providing genuine choice and control to poor and other disadvantaged persons and groups 
(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 10; Wolff and Reeve 2015, 460–61). 
Wealthy persons 
What about the opposite end of the baseline adaptive capability spectrum, such as the 
wealthy? Insofar as external resources are concerned, the wealthy will by definition tend to 
have sufficient resources on which to draw in order to adapt successfully to losses in central 
functionings. Assuming the wealthy don’t lack adaptive capability deficits in areas other than 
external resources (i.e. in internal resources29 and external structures and conditions), there 
will often be little in the way of substantive transition policy that the government can and 
should do to facilitate their successful adaptation. Whatever reasons the state may have to 
provide a transitional response to the wealthy will therefore tend to be discharged through 
the side-effects (time and information) of standard procedural measures, as discussed in Part 
9.3.2.1, above. 
                                                 
28 When it comes to poor persons, the Wellbeing Principle generates such strong reasons for conservative 
transitional responses that means-replacing compensation and substantive adaptive support will tend to 
converge on the same response. 
29 In order to avoid intrusive and disrespectful state interventions (see Chapter 4 where I discuss the Moral Costs 
Problem), there will in any case be limits to what the state can do to address internal resource deficits. 
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9.4 CONCLUSION 
I began this chapter by considering the conditions under which conservative transition 
responses—grandfathering, and compensation (losers) or claw-back (winners)—will be the 
most appropriate transition policy. I acknowledged a potential conservative role for 
grandfathering and (to a lesser extent) compensation on instrumental grounds. I also 
explained why, in practice, compensation will rarely be the most appropriate transition 
response under ART—a somewhat surprising implication given the standard emphasis on 
compensation in the literature and public debate.  
The remainder of the chapter focused on an under-theorised but normatively attractive set of 
transition policy options (for losers) that I have called adaptive transition policy. I defined 
the objective of ‘successful adaptation’ to the conditions created by a legal change, explained 
the key factors that affect it (time and adaptive capability), outlined the procedural and 
substantive options available to governments to facilitate it, and specified the conditions (in 
light of the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles) in which such adaptive policies will tend to 
be most appropriate.  
I have not discussed reformative transition policy in any detail. The content of reformative 
transition policy—let losses and gains lie where they fall—is self-explanatory. The 
justification for reformative transition policy is a residual one: it is the appropriate response 
under those conditions in which the state lacks wellbeing or fairness-based reasons for 
conservative or adaptive transitional responses, i.e. when the individual has ex ante risk 
responsibility and the wellbeing impacts on losers are small and on winners are large.  
This concludes my specification and defence of ART. 
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 CONCLUSION 
In this concluding chapter I would like to draw out some of the implications of ART and 
compare these with the implications of the other theories I have critically analysed in this 
thesis. In Part 10.1, I will compare the theories according to their implications for different 
agents: individual natural persons (those with different resource endowments, and those with 
different particular narrative functionings) and collectives (corporations and communities). 
In Part 10.2, I will compare the theories’ implications in ten concrete cases by way of a 
summary table. The remainder of the chapter steps back from the particulars of the different 
theories and considers this thesis’ key contributions (Part 10.3), before closing with some 
suggested directions for future research (Part 10.4). 
10.1 COMPARING THE THEORIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFERENT AGENTS 
10.1.1 Effects on individuals with different resource endowments 
I noted in Chapter 1.2 that theories of legal transitions, to the extent they recognise 
conservative claims, will constrain what can be implemented by way of ‘ideal theory’. One 
way in which they may do so pertains to the permissibility of redistributive resource transfers. 
Since resources are typically at stake in legal transitions, and since all theories I have 
considered are either directly or indirectly concerned with resources, it will be useful to 
consider the normative constraints that the various theories place on the state’s ability to 
redistribute resources, and hence on the degree of resource egalitarianism each theory would 
permit.1 
Starting at the most conservative end of the spectrum, libertarian theories would seemingly 
preclude the state from engaging in any kind of resource redistribution whatsoever. A similar 
restriction would effectively apply on a Pareto efficiency theory of legal transitions: since 
                                                 
1 I say “permit” because theories of legal transitions are not first-order theories of distributive justice that 
prescribe ideal distributions; but insofar as they entail conservative or substantive adaptive transitional 
responses they potentially constrain what can be done in the name of first-order distributive justice.  
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full compensation must be paid to the losers by the winners, with an allowance for transaction 
and administration costs, the direct effects of such redistribution would be negative-sum, and 
so non-Pareto-improving.2 Bentham’s classical liberal theory of legal transitions would be 
slightly less restrictive, since he advocated wide-ranging government interventions, 
including to improve the condition of the poor. However, his highly conservative approach 
to legal transitions places severe restrictions on the state’s power to achieve such 
redistribution through directly taking from the propertied classes.  
In the middle of the range we have various liberal-egalitarian theories. At the more 
conservative end of this middle group sits Alex Brown’s theory (which applies to public 
administration only). In respect of persons who made plans on the basis of expectations of 
legal stability induced through the acts or omissions of a responsible government agency, 
Brown’s theory requires the fulfilment of the expectations or compensation for reliance 
losses. As noted in Chapter 5.2, the inequality or injustice of the status quo is irrelevant to 
the legitimacy of people’s expectations on Brown’s theory. 3  Brown invokes Kant’s 
categorical imperative to respect persons as ends in themselves to guard against any such 
sacrifices of one for the many (Brown 2011, 724–28, 2017a, 459, 2017b, 191–92). 
Presumably, then, administrative policies designed to redistribute resources in a more 
egalitarian fashion would often trigger the state’s liability to fulfil conservative expectations 
or pay compensation. Other legitimate expectations theories could also end up being quite 
conservative, depending on how the legitimacy basis is specified. Certainly the Legitimate 
Authority View (Meyer and Sanklecha 2011, 2014, 275–77), if specified in terms of a 
relatively minimal conception of legitimate authority, would result in most expectations of 
legal stability being legitimate, entitling the relevant agents to compensation upon the 
frustration of those expectations by redistributive reforms. This would have significant 
                                                 
2 The same goes for the “cross and compensate” version of libertarianism (i.e. if property really just yields a 
liability rule)—see Chapter 2.2. 
3 Brown claims his theory would have egalitarian distributive implications (2017b, 148–53), but I have argued 
elsewhere that this is improbable in the aggregate, given the theory’s conservatism (Green forthcoming). 
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counter-egalitarian implications, as Meyer and Sanklecha’s (2011) discussion of climate 
change mitigation reforms suggests.  
Justice-based views (Matravers 2017; Meyer and Sanklecha 2014, 377–87; Moore 2017), be 
they legitimate expectation-based theories or otherwise, would seem to be more permissive 
of (justice-enhancing) redistributive resource transfers, though this would depend on how the 
concept of justice is specified. A narrower conception of justice would end up being more 
conservative. On the other hand, as I explored in Chapter 5, in non-ideal societies justice-
based approaches could be highly reformative and would therefore permit widespread 
redistributive transfers.  
Efficientarian theories have the greatest reformative potential, at least on the ‘new view’, in 
which a fully reformative transition policy is the default (Chapter 3.3.1). This approach 
would therefore also permit widespread redistributive transfers. However, the reformative 
conclusion of ‘new view’ efficientarianism is contingent on the balance of empirical 
consequences, and as I noted in Chapter 3 it has been challenged on its own terms. The trend 
is toward analysing particular kinds of cases in which the default does not hold, leading to a 
patchwork of different conclusions, some significantly more conservative than the new view 
default. At the very least, adherents of the diachronic quasi-utilitarian defence of 
uncompensated Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency-enhancing policies seem committed to permitting 
uncompensated redistributive transfers (up to the utilitarian optimum). 
In contrast, ART permits the redistribution necessary for a strong (though not absolute) form 
of resource egalitarianism. I think this as an important implication of the theory, which merits 
some explanation and discussion. In this discussion, I focus on the effect of the Wellbeing 
Principle, assuming that the Fairness Principle will tend on the whole to generate reformative 
reasons (due to practices of commercial competition and default citizenship practices—see 
Chapter 8.3) and therefore not counteract the resource-redistributive impulse of the 
Wellbeing Principle to a great degree. For heuristic purposes, I will also refer to relatively 
peripheral functionings simply as “peripheral functionings” and will likewise drop the 
“relatively” from “central functionings”, as if central–peripheral were a binary, even though 
I actually intend them as poles on a spectrum. 
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It is worth noting at the outset that my ultimate concern with human functionings inevitably 
leads to a degree of permissible inequality in resources. Even if we were, hypothetically, to 
endorse as a matter of ideal theory an egalitarianism of functionings, this would entail 
permissible inequality of resources. This is because an ultimate concern for functionings 
implies a merely instrumental concern for resources (Robeyns 2017, 50), and given 
differences in individuals’ capacity to convert resources into functionings (“conversion 
factors”), equality of functionings will imply inequality of resources (Robeyns 2017, 45–49; 
Sen 1992, 26–30, 36–38).4 If ideal equality of functionings permits resource inequality, then 
ART permits resource inequality, a fortiori. This is because it is a non-ideal theory that 
provides reasons to stabilise particular functionings (and hence resource holdings that are 
instrumental to those functionings) to an extent that would not be condoned in an ideal-
theoretic society created de novo. For these reasons, ART would permit some degree of 
resource inequalities, thus constraining the egalitarian possibilities of ‘ideal theory’. 
However, for the following reasons, the constraints that ART places on egalitarian resource 
redistribution will tend to be quite minimal.  
The main reason for this is that the state only has strong wellbeing-based reasons to stabilise 
central particular functionings. Many functionings affected by legal changes will be merely 
peripheral, meaning the state has only correspondingly weak reasons to stabilise them—
reasons that will usually be discharged by adhering to standard legislative and administrative 
procedures mandated by the rule of law (see Chapter 9.3.2.1). While the state has reasons to 
stabilise central functionings, the resource implications of these reasons will turn out to be 
quite limited. This is because the state does not have a direct wellbeing-based reason to 
stabilise people’s resources. The only wellbeing-based reasons for the state to stabilise 
people’s resources are indirect, i.e. insofar as such resources are (i) necessarily instrumental 
to stabilising their central particular functionings, or (ii) extrinsically valuable because bound 
up with those central particular functionings.  
                                                 
4 Sen and Robeyns make this point in respect of capabilities, not functionings, but it applies also to functionings. 
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With respect to (i), the cases in which resources are necessarily instrumental to central 
functionings will typically be those where the resources belong to persons who are already 
poor, and hence whose resources support necessary functionings like food, shelter and 
clothing. To the extent that the Wellbeing Principle implies that payments or other resources 
should go to such persons, those transfers will avoid worsening existing inequalities. Nothing 
counter-egalitarian about that.  
With respect to (ii), conserving extrinsically valuable objects will no doubt have some 
counter-egalitarian implications, but these will be severely limited by the inherent practical 
(cognitive, emotional, spatio-temporal) limitations on one’s total set of central particular 
functionings. Recall from Chapter 7.2 that one can only have so many central relationships, 
attachments, identities and projects before the addition of new ones displaces the existing 
ones in a zero-sum process (Scheffler 2011, 31). Persons who have a significant range of 
choice about what to value must inevitably prioritise among these. While it is possible for a 
person to accumulate a virtually unlimited stock of resources, and thus of peripheral 
functionings, only a limited amount of money and other resources is necessary to enable and 
service the central functionings of an inherently limited self. In this sense, the effect of 
weighting particular functionings by their centrality has a similar effect to the assumption of 
decreasing marginal utility of money: the functionings-benefit from an additional unit of 
resources approaches zero.5 It follows that removing many resources from wealthy persons 
will tend to have a very limited impact, if any, on their central functionings (Robeyns 2016b).  
We are now in a position to appreciate the strong, indirect resource-egalitarian potential of 
ART, via the Wellbeing Principle. If the Principle is correct, the state has weighty reasons to 
stabilise only central functionings and the resources necessarily instrumental to, or 
extrinsically-related to, those functionings. It follows that it is normatively permissible—or 
at least, not impermissible by reason of its transitional impact—for the state, through due 
process of law, to tax and otherwise expropriate vast (though not unlimited) sums of wealth 
                                                 
5 In this respect, my approach adopts a similar attitude toward money as does the capabilities approach (Robeyns 
2017, 47–51).  
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from wealthy individuals, which will then be available for egalitarian redistribution. The 
effect of the Wellbeing Principle’s centrality weighting, then, is to put a ceiling on the 
resources that can robustly be protected from the adverse effects of legal change.  
10.1.2 Effects on individuals with different particular functionings 
A weakness of resourcist theories of legal transitions—those that use currencies such as 
money or property—is that they fail to capture many important effects on persons, namely 
those that are not adequately expressed in terms of the relevant resource. Property theories 
fail to capture effects on persons that do not affect their property, such as their relationships, 
projects, identities, and attachments. Efficiency theories can in principle reduce everything 
to the value of money (WTP/WTA) or preferences, but as I argued in Chapters 3.4.4 and 
9.2.2.3, this currency fails to capture the distinction between people’s non-substitutable 
particular functionings (ends) and mere means to those ends. The effect of such theories is to 
let losses of such particular functionings lie where they fall.  
A key motivation for expressing wellbeing in terms of my modified functionings account is 
that it means ART captures such effects on people’s non-substitutable ends. Consequently, 
where such functionings are threatened as a result of a legal change, and they are relatively 
central and/or it would be fair to protect them, ART would provide at least an adaptive 
response in respect of those threatened functionings. This means that there are many kinds 
of cases in which ART requires the state to provide a measure of stability and relief, if only 
partial, to those whose non-substitutable ends are threatened by legal change (see Chapter 7). 
I consider this to be a strength of ART.  
Additionally, credible public commitments to the transition policies implied by ART will 
likely improve people’s wellbeing, all else equal, whether or not legal changes that affect 
their central functionings in fact materialise. These benefits would follow from agents’ 
subjective (belief-relative) sense of heightened security with respect to their central 
functionings that such a commitment would entail. Security with respect to some central good 
can be conceived as the current probability of enjoying it in the future (cf. Herington 2015, 
2017; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). One’s subjective (belief-relative) sense of security with 
respect to some such good can seriously affect one’s wellbeing in at least two ways 
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(Herington 2017, 188–90). First, (in)security of central functionings affects the psychological 
components of wellbeing: insecurity can cause fear and anxiety, whereas security is apt to 
cause psychological and emotional tranquillity (Herington 2017, 188). Second, perceived 
insecurity adversely affects one’s cognitive functioning and capacity to make long-term 
plans, and hence one’s ability to engage in practical reasoning and ultimately one’s 
functioning as an agent (Herington 2017, 189–90; John 2011; Shafir and Mullainathan 2013; 
Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, chap. 3). By providing a degree of security in proportion to the 
functionings that are most central to people’s lives (holding fairness reasons constant), ART 
addresses one of the central concerns motivating many theorists in the conservative camp of 
legal transitions (see Chapters 1.2, 2, 4, 5.2), yet without falling into the trap of conserving 
everyone’s resources and doing so indefinitely. 
The potentially less palatable implication of providing a measure of stability and relief in 
respect of people’s non-substitutable ends is that doing so will sometimes require similar 
adaptive responses in respect of persons whose identities, projects, relationships and 
attachments are odious, offensive, and even unjust. I defended this implication in Chapter 
7.3. In a theory of legal transitions, we are not looking for a wrinkle-free conception of justice 
(which, as I showed in Chapter 5, would in any case inevitably be far too vague and/or 
controversial to do the work of a theory of legal transitions). Rather, we are looking for the 
most defensible normative theory all round (the primary, theoretical aim of this thesis) and 
one that is also likely to be robust to pluralistic views about justice and the good life (relevant 
to both the theoretical aim and the secondary, practical aim). By appealing to basic values 
like wellbeing and practice-based conceptions of ex ante risk allocation (fairness), I believe 
ART can achieve these aims better than its rivals.  
Three further points further ameliorate the sting of this ‘unpalatable’ implication of ART. 
First, we must remember that those high in adaptive capability will usually not require further 
state assistance to adapt successfully to legal changes. That means those who have done best 
out of the previously unjust, offensive or odious status quo will tend not to receive state 
assistance under ART (see also Part 10.1.1, above). Second, the point of adaptive responses 
is to facilitate adaptation to the new status quo. Where the lost functionings were genuinely 
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odious, offensive or unjust, adaptive assistance will be directed toward the affected persons 
developing replacements of those functionings. ART thus provides a diachronic way of 
achieving the same outcome that the would-be justice theorist wants to achieve 
synchronically/immediately. As such, ART operates in the way that other diachronic policy 
institutions mentioned in Chapter 9.3.1 already work. Third, we must remember that the 
Wellbeing and Fairness Principle will often point only generally toward a range of 
permissible state responses, from which a specific measure (or package of measures) that 
facilitates successful adaptation is required; other values will be often necessary to select the 
specific responses from within this range (see Chapter 9.3.2). In cases where the lost 
functionings were genuinely odious, offensive or unjust, this can shape the kinds of responses 
that are appropriate, as I discussed in Chapter 9.3.2.2. 
10.1.3 Effects on collectives 
Let us now consider how the various theories deal with group agents and non-agent groups. 
I will consider the case of corporations (qua group agents) and communities (qua non-agent 
groups). 
10.1.3.1 Business corporations (qua group agents) 
Business corporations are key players in political processes and have much at stake—both to 
lose and to gain—from legal transitions. They make many—and often expensive—long-
term-investments in highly risky market contexts that are sensitive to a wide range of laws. 
They also are typically the most active claimants of conservative transitional assistance, 
frequently both lobbying against proposed legal reforms that adversely affect them and 
simultaneously seeking transition relief in the event a reform is enacted (Green 2017, 184). I 
have touched on issues particular to corporations at various points throughout the thesis, but 
because of their prominence in contemporary legal transitions they merit some brief 
discussion in the context of this overall comparative evaluation of the various theories. I 
assume that corporations are profit-seeking group agents with separate legal personality (i.e. 
they are incorporated).  
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Among the families of theories I have critically discussed, the one that engages with 
corporations most explicitly is the efficientarian L&E family. It is the only one, moreover, 
that incorporates anything close to a realistic conception of the modern business corporation 
into the analysis of legal transitions. The standard ‘new view’ conclusion that corporations’ 
losses and gains should lie where they fall comes close to the conclusion of ART, albeit for 
different reasons (as I shall elaborate shortly).  
The other theories I have critically discussed have oddly little to say about corporations. This 
is not so much of an issue for theories in the liberty tradition because we can discern their 
treatment of corporations from their more general commitment to economic liberties and 
market exchange. In the libertarian case, corporations would probably be treated no 
differently from natural persons, and would receive conservative protection from legal 
transitions (cf. Bovens 2011). The classical liberal treatment of corporations is likely to be 
similar, though it is complicated by the fact that classical liberals envisage state regulation to 
maintain the efficiency of free markets—for example, by regulating to prevent monopolies 
(Freeman 2011, 21). It is not clear whether classical liberals would consider such regulations 
to be permissible without compensating the adversely affected corporations.6 The place of 
corporations in liberal-egalitarian theories of legal transitions is, however, less clear. Meyer 
and Sanklecha (2011, 2014) consider the case of climate change mitigation reforms in detail 
across two papers, but they never mention corporations—despite the fact that corporate 
entities control most of the trillions of dollars of resources (fossil fuels deposits and other 
capital) at stake in climate mitigation (Green 2017, 184). Alex Brown’s theory of legitimate 
expectations is intended to cover corporations, though he says little about them explicitly 
(Brown 2017b, 64, 192). How corporations would be treated under a justice-based theory 
(especially a duty-focused one) is but one further complication that such theories would need 
to address. 
                                                 
6 Freeman says that “contemporary classical liberals accept government’s powers of eminent domain for public 
purposes (on the condition that compensation is provided for any government ‘taking’)” but mentions no such 
compensation requirement as attaching to the other regulatory interventions on his list of those that classical 
liberals permit (Freeman 2011, 21). 
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According to ART, there is no a priori restriction on providing transitional assistance to 
corporations, however various aspects of the theory effectively rule out such assistance, or at 
least make it both highly improbable and substantively limited. The content of the Wellbeing 
Principle effectively makes it impossible for there ever to be a wellbeing-based reason to 
provide assistance to corporations directly in their capacity as group agents. This is because, 
on the normatively-individualist functionings approach to wellbeing that I have defended, 
what ultimately matters is human wellbeing (see Chapter 6); corporations are at best 
instrumentally or extrinsically valuable to humans and cannot themselves generate 
wellbeing-based reasons for transitional responses. In theory, the Fairness Principle could 
generate reasons to provide transitional responses in respect of corporations. That said, I think 
it will rarely be the case as an empirical matter that social practices relevant to the activities 
of corporations will allocate risks of legal change to the state. This is for two reasons 
discussed in Chapter 8.3.2. First, corporations engage in business competition for profit—a 
practice in which the risk of legal change is standardly allocated to the market participants 
themselves. Second, there are additional reasons to do with corporations’ nature, objectives, 
functions and powers that will typically mean that any exceptions to the standard practice of 
market-based risk allocation will rarely apply to corporations. 
Two implications follow from this application of ART to corporations. First, it will always 
be normatively permissible—or at least, not impermissible by reason of its transitional 
impact—for the state, through due process of law, to regulate, tax and otherwise adversely 
affect the property and other resources of corporations without grandfathering or providing 
compensation in any form. Second, the most that could theoretically be required of the state 
in respect of legal transitions affecting corporations is an adaptive response of a procedural 
nature which, in the uncommon cases where this is required, will typically be satisfied by 
adherence to the legislative and administrative processes independently required by the rule 
of law (see Chapter 9.3.2.1). I think these implications of ART will correlate with widely 
held intuitions and that the wellbeing and fairness-based reasons for this result are 
explanatorily powerful. Moreover, given the amount of global wealth owned or controlled 
by business corporations, these implications add considerably to the already strong indirect 
resource-egalitarian potential inherent in ART, discussed above. 
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What of corporations that are extrinsically valued as part of agents’ central narrative 
functionings—their identities, attachments and projects? Could ART justify providing 
assistance to corporations as an indirect way of providing assistance to those natural persons 
to whom the corporation is extrinsically valued in this way? In theory, yes, but in practice, 
not likely. The practices of risk allocation pertaining to business competition, as noted in 
Chapter 8.3.2, typically allocate risks of legal change to the investor, so there will rarely be 
a fairness-based reason to conserve such narrative functionings. At most, the Wellbeing 
Principle might generate a reason for substantive adaptive support of some kind, but it seems 
highly unlikely that the kind of persons who identify so closely with particular corporations 
will lack the resources to successfully adapt to legal change-induced corporate failures on 
their own.  
10.1.3.2 Communities (qua non-agent groups) 
It is worth briefly comparing the way ART treats corporations with the way it would treat 
non-agent groups. I will consider ‘communities’ (of place or purpose), since such 
communities are frequently affected by legal changes (see Chapters 7.2 and 9.3). To take a 
topical example, consider the regional coalmining communities that will be hit by losses 
associated with climate change mitigation policy. Now note that, since such groups are 
neither humans with ends of their own nor incorporated group agents that could theoretically 
receive transitional assistance in their own right, there can be no case for providing assistance 
to communities as such. However, insofar as such communities feature in the central 
particular identities, attachments and projects of individual persons, it is both plausible and 
likely that adverse effects on such groups will register as losses in the central functionings of 
individuals, generating at least wellbeing-based reasons for transition policy. Moreover, as 
argued in Chapter 9.3.2.2, it will often be appropriate in such cases for the state to provide 
transitional responses at the group level, in the form of public goods and services that 
facilitate the adaptation of group members.  
Given the importance of group identities and attachments to how well people’s lives go, I 
take this to be a considerable strength of ART. It is a strength, moreover, that is not evidently 
242 
 
shared by the other theories I have critically analysed (little has been said in the normative 
legal transitions literature about non-agent groups7).  
10.2 COMPARING THE THEORIES: IMPLICATIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES 
Having compared the theories considered in this thesis across different kinds of agents, it 
will also be instructive to compare the implications of the different theories in a range of 
important kinds of legal reforms. I present this comparison in tabular form in the two 
landscape pages that follow.  
I consider ten cases. Precise comparisons between the theories are not possible without 
providing considerable details on relevant cases. To mitigate this problem, I have chosen 
cases that are widely known and have effects that will be obvious to most contemporary 
readers, or else I have included cases that have been described in greater detail at other points 
in the thesis (e.g. Carbon Tax, Rail Link, Trade Liberalisation). Still, the analysis will 
necessarily be somewhat simplified, but I think it sufficiently captures the thrust of the 
different theories. For the purposes of giving a little more content to social practices (and 
thus the Fairness Principle), I will assume that all of these legal changes occur in jurisdictions 
with competitive, majoritarian electoral systems and liberal-market political-economic 
institutions, such as the US, the UK and Australia. 
For each case, I consider the following six theories as representatives of the different 
approaches I have considered: 
1. Libertarian natural property rights theories, assuming an “everyday libertarian” 
interpretation (since actual theories are indeterminate); 
                                                 
7 The exception is Brown, whose theory of legitimate expectations applies to the expectations of “individual 
citizens, groups, businesses, civil society organizations, institutions, and instrumentalities” (2017b, 64), though 
he does not distinguish between groups and group agents or between business corporations and other kinds of 
groups / group agents. 
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2. Classical liberal conventional-instrumental property rights theories, represented by 
Bentham’s conservative theory; 
3. The efficientarian ‘new view’ in L&E; 
4. Meyer and Sanklecha’s Legitimate Authority View of legitimate expectations, 
specified with a fairly minimal conception of legitimacy such that the jurisdictions I 
am considering—the US, UK and Australia—satisfy the minimal conditions (let us 
assume); 
5. The Candidate Justice Principle, filled out with a basic rights-based specification of 
justice; 
6. ART. 
Since the general implications of the first five of these theories will be the same across each 
case (non-italicised text in Table 1), I will use ‘ditto marks’ (“ “) in row two and subsequent 
rows, but I will highlight some particular implications that bear on our intuitive evaluation 
of those theories in italics (in other words, the italicised text should not be read as describing 
the totality of implications). Since ART is more nuanced, non-italicised text is used 
throughout the ART column. 
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Table 1: Summary of case-implications of different theories 
Theory 
Case 
Libertarian 
(natural property 
rights) 
Classical liberal (Bentham) L&E (‘new view’) Legitimate Expectations 
(Legit. Authority View) 
Candidate Justice Principle 
(rights-based) 
ART 
Carbon tax 1st best: law 
impermissible 
(states can’t 
mitigate climate 
change); 
2nd best: 
grandfathering or 
compensation for 
all natural property 
rights violations 
(states can’t 
respond with 
sufficient urgency / 
fossil fuel 
corporations 
receive trillions in 
compensation); 
winners keep gains 
 
Grandfathering or 
compensation for all persons 
whose property rights are 
infringed (losers); winners 
keep gains (states cannot 
respond with sufficient 
urgency to climate change, or 
fossil fuel corporations receive 
trillions in compensation) 
Fully reformative.  
Possible exceptions for 
‘human capital’ and 
residential property but 
only to overcome 
limited opportunities 
for risk mitigation (e.g. 
failures in insurance 
markets for legal risk). 
(Poor consumers face 
erosion of central 
functionings due to 
increased energy 
prices; vulnerable 
workers may receive 
some assistance) 
Grandfathering or 
compensation for all 
losers (assuming 
‘imputation’ model of 
expectation identification) 
or for all those who in fact 
expected no carbon 
taxation (‘empirical’ 
expectation model); 
winners keep gains 
(states cannot respond 
with sufficient urgency to 
climate change, or fossil 
fuel corporations receive 
trillions in compensation) 
Depends if status quo unjust 
(and the reform just). If so, 
fully reformative for all 
winners and losers (poor 
consumers face erosion of 
central functionings due to 
increased energy prices; many 
vulnerable workers pushed out 
of labour market). If not, fully 
conservative for all losers (and 
perhaps all winners) (states 
cannot respond with sufficient 
urgency to climate change, or 
fossil fuel corporations 
receive trillions in 
compensation) 
Adaptive assistance for persons whose 
central particular functionings are 
adversely affected, e.g. poor consumers 
(conditional cash transfers; in-kind 
goods and services); vulnerable workers 
(e.g. retraining; job-search assistance); 
specially-affected communities (e.g. 
local public goods). 
No assistance for corporations, 
investors, or individuals with sufficient 
adaptive capabilities to self-adapt 
Wealth tax “ “ 
(States cannot do 
anything to 
address wealth 
inequality) 
“ “ 
(States cannot do anything to 
address wealth inequality at 
the upper end of the 
distribution in respect of 
existing stocks of wealth) 
“ “ 
(Some middle-class 
home-owners may lose 
their home, though 
potentially protected 
due to limited risk 
mitigation 
opportunities) 
“ “ 
(States cannot do anything 
to address wealth 
inequality at the upper end 
of the distribution in 
respect of existing stocks 
of wealth) 
“ “ 
(States cannot do anything to 
address wealth inequality at 
the upper end of the 
distribution in respect of 
existing stocks of wealth or 
some middle-class 
homeowners lose their home) 
Generally reformative (lack of impact 
on central functionings of the wealthy); 
conservative re first home possession 
and use (e.g. protecting an existing 
central functioning + assumed practice 
of risk allocation to state re use of 
residential property); adaptive support 
where no such practice but central 
functionings affected (e.g. centrally 
valued objects such as heirlooms for 
current holders only) 
Zoning law 
change 
“ “ 
(State has no 
power to control 
zoning) 
“ “ 
(All existing uses, including 
commercial/industrial uses, 
are fully protected) 
“ “ 
(No existing uses 
protected, except 
possibly existing 
residential home uses) 
“ “ 
(All existing uses expected 
to continue, including 
commercial/industrial 
uses, are fully protected)  
“ “ 
(All uses, including 
commercial/industrial uses, 
are fully protected or no 
existing uses, including 
residential home uses, are 
protected) 
Standard practices typically protect 
existing uses (or require compensation); 
additional (wellbeing-based) reasons to 
protect uses tied to central particular 
functionings of persons, e.g. residential 
property uses 
Rail link 
(property 
value changes 
only) 
“ “ 
(State has no 
power to build 
infrastructure 
projects) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for lost 
property values) 
“ “ 
(Losses and gains lie 
where they fall) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for 
expectation-based losses, 
e.g. property values) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for lost 
property values or fully 
reformative) 
Standard practices typically don’t 
protect financial value per se. Adaptive 
assistance available where  
use values impaired 
245 
 
Gun control “ “ 
(State has no 
power to regulate 
gun production, 
sale, purchase or 
use) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for lost 
property values) 
“ “ 
(Individuals lose guns 
without any transitional 
assistance) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for 
expectation-based losses, 
e.g. gun value and 
personal projects) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for lost 
property values or individuals 
lose guns without any 
transitional assistance) 
Standard practices allocate risk of (1) 
outright takings to state, but not for (2) 
regulation of sale, use etc. Re (1): where 
also loss of central functioning  
compensation (adaptive cash transfers); 
otherwise procedural measures. Re (2): 
where also loss of central functioning  
adaptive support (opportunities for new 
functionings); otherwise, no support 
Same-sex 
marriage 
legalisation 
“ “ 
(State has no 
power to regulate 
marriage) 
“ “ 
(No assistance to cultural 
losers since no loss of 
property) 
“ “ 
(Fully reformative; no 
assistance to cultural 
losers) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for 
expectation-based losses, 
e.g. expectations of 
religious conservatives re 
‘sanctity of marriage’) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation to cultural 
losers or no assistance to any) 
Individual bears responsibility for risks 
of legal change (default citizenship 
practices); loss of wellbeing of 
cultural/religious conservatives provides 
reason for adaptive support, but little the 
state can do other than ensuring 
sufficient opportunities for developing 
other central functionings 
Fox-hunting 
ban 
“ “ 
(State has no 
power to regulate 
fox hunting) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation in respect 
of lost value of property 
incidents, e.g. liberties to hunt 
foxes) 
“ “ 
(Fully reformative) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for 
expectation-based losses, 
e.g. expectations of 
continued liberty to hunt 
foxes) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation to losers 
or no assistance to any) 
Individual bears responsibility for risks 
of legal change (default citizenship 
practices); loss of wellbeing provides 
reason for adaptive support, but insofar 
as affects the landed gentry, no 
assistance required as those affected 
have sufficient adaptive capabilities 
Trade 
liberalisation 
“ “ 
(State has no 
power to regulate 
trade) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation in respect 
of lost property value)  
“ “ 
(Workers may receive 
some assistance due to 
lack of opportunities to 
mitigate risks to their 
human capital)  
“ “ 
(All losers fully 
compensated for 
expectation losses; 
beneficiaries keep gains) 
“ “ 
(All adversely affected 
corporations and natural 
persons are fully 
grandfathered or 
compensated, or none is) 
Individual bears responsibility for risks 
of legal change (market practices and 
default citizenship practices); adaptive 
support to vulnerable workers whose 
jobs/skills are adversely affected (e.g. 
retraining, job search assistance) 
Immigration 
liberalisation 
“ “ 
(State has no 
power to regulate 
immigration) 
“ “ 
(No assistance to losers since 
no loss of property) 
“ “ 
(Fully reformative) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for 
expectation-based losses, 
e.g. economic and cultural 
expectations)  
“ “ 
(Full compensation to cultural 
losers or no assistance to any) 
Individual bears responsibility for risks 
of legal change (default citizenship 
practices); loss of wellbeing of cultural 
losers provides reason for adaptive 
support (e.g. ensuring sufficient 
opportunities for developing other 
group-based central functionings)  
Brexit “ “ 
(State has no 
power to regulate 
relevant matters) 
“ “ 
(Grandfathering/compensation 
for lost property) 
 
“ “ 
(Fully reformative, with 
possible protections for 
lost human capital and 
residential property) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation for all 
expectation-based losses) 
“ “ 
(Full compensation to all 
losers or no assistance to any) 
Risk of constitutional changes more 
likely allocated to state, so strong 
reasons for at least extensive procedural 
measures to facilitate adaptation. 
Additional reasons for stronger 
(conservative or substantive-adaptive) 
measures re central functioning losses 
(e.g. grandfathering immigration status); 
procedural adaptive approach re mere 
resource losses and gains 
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10.3 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
Integrative, trans-disciplinary coverage 
One key contribution of this thesis has been to provide the first academic treatment of the 
problem of legal transitions that integrates normative perspectives from across the three 
disciplines that have considered this issue: political philosophy; economics; and law. A major 
advantage of this integrative, trans-disciplinary approach is that it has identified connections 
across previously disconnected disciplinary conversations. For example, contemporary 
political philosophers writing about legitimate expectations may not be aware that similar 
arguments about expectations and reliance were made by American economists and legal 
scholars up until the mid-1970s. They may also be unaware that L&E scholars launched, in 
the last quarter of the 20th century, some powerful criticisms of such expectation-based 
approaches, questioning the assumption that agents expect the law to stay the same, and 
recognising that the prospect of gains from legal change is a crucial part of the analysis of 
transitions. Furthermore, L&E’s recognition that much of the value at stake in legal 
transitions is controlled by corporations—something which, it is fair to say, political 
philosophers writing on legitimate expectations have been slow to appreciate—adds an 
important degree of realism to the analysis of transitions. In the other direction, political 
philosophers’ objections to resourcist theories, and their richer conceptualisations of the 
nature of agents’ wellbeing, provide important grounds for critiquing the efficientarian 
project of L&E. For my purposes, this integrative approach has allowed me to learn from the 
strengths and weaknesses of each theory, to the benefit of ART. 
Critiques of proposed theories 
A second key contribution has been my critique of the main candidate theories of legal 
transitions. Using the method of WRE, I developed critiques of each theory at multiple levels: 
the theory itself (especially its determinacy); its ‘downstream’ implications in particular 
cases; and its ‘upstream’ theoretical antecedent ideas, including normatively salient concepts 
such as property, ownership, efficiency, legitimacy, justice, and responsibility, as well as 
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deeper ontological ideals about the self/persons (especially as understood trans-temporally), 
agency, and society. In some of these critical chapters, especially those pertaining to the 
longer-standing and much debated concepts of property and efficiency, I brought wider 
critiques of libertarian, classical liberal and neoclassical economic ideas to bear on the more 
specific issue of legal transitions. In others, particularly those pertaining to the liberal-
egalitarian themes of legitimate expectations and justice, I developed novel critiques of 
theories of legal transitions which I hope will shape the nascent evolution of liberal-
egalitarian debates on these topics. 
A new theory of legal transitions 
The third and most significant contribution of this thesis has been to specify and defend a 
new theory of legal transitions: Adaptive Responsibility Theory. ART strikes a hitherto 
elusive principled middle path between the conservative and reformative extremes to which 
existing theories of legal transitions gravitate. While ART will imply strongly conservative 
or reformative state responses in some cases, the theory’s central focus is the ‘adaptive’ state 
responses that occupy the wide middle ground of the transition policy spectrum. Adaptivism 
is a position that accepts the inevitability and desirability of the self’s evolutionary change 
over time and that recognises that, under propitious conditions, agents can successfully adapt 
to even major changes to their central functionings. Many agents already have the resources 
and other capabilities that they need to adapt perfectly well within what Waldron aptly calls 
the ordinary “rhythms and cycles” of democratic, rule-of-law-based legislative activity 
(2012, 83, 108–9). Others, though, need state assistance to adapt successfully. Through a 
combination of procedural and substantive measures targeting these people’s adaptive 
capabilities and the time they have before a legal change takes effect, adaptive transition 
policy can build a bridge for them to cross from the social, cultural and material conditions 
prevailing under the legal status quo to the new set of conditions ushered in by the legal 
change. Such an approach serves to stabilise protected central functionings to a degree in the 
near term, while equipping people with the means to change over the longer term. 
ART has, I think, a number of key normative-theoretical strengths over its rivals: it 
parsimoniously combines the two most important kinds of normative reasons for transition 
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policy, viz. wellbeing and fairness; it specifies these reasons in terms of both a direction 
(conservative or reformative) and a magnitude, allowing them to be combined in a way that 
generates nuanced reasons for particular transition policy responses; it incorporates a wide 
range of possible transition policies, recognising that the bulk of the logical space of reasons 
generated by the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles imply a case for adaptive measures of 
one kind or another; it is grounded in plausible and coherent ontological, moral and political 
foundations; and it is capable of generating reasonably determinate, intuitively correct and 
explanatorily powerful conclusions in a wide range of specific cases.  
With respect to the practical aims of this thesis, the theory also has a number of advantages. 
First, the reasons for action it generates can be approximately inferred by the state in a low-
cost, respectful way. With regard to fairness, this simply requires an interpretation of relevant 
practices. With regard to wellbeing, this can be done through the identification of common 
categories of central functionings that are at stake in a particular legal transition (as illustrated 
in Chapter 7.2), and through an understanding of the linkages between central functionings 
and permissibly-observable individual resources and conditions, such as income, wealth, 
occupation, and place of residence (cf. Carter 2011, 562, 564). Second, the relatively basic 
notions of wellbeing and fairness that generate the reasons for transition policy are the kinds 
of reasons that I think are capable of commanding widespread agreement in polities whose 
constituents disagree on first-order questions of what the law should be—questions that often 
involve conflicting understandings of justice and the good life. 
In addition to the overall contribution and strengths of ART, the constructive chapters made 
a number of proto-contributions to wider debates. These include: the elaboration of the 
ecological account of the self and agency, and the articulation of connections between this 
account and the concepts of wellbeing, fairness, and adaptation; the specification of the 
concept of particular functionings and the defence of a modified functionings account of 
wellbeing that incorporates particular functionings alongside the standardly included 
‘generic’ functionings; the specification and defence of a practice-based conception of 
fairness in terms of conventional allocations of ex ante responsibility for managing risk; the 
argument that compensation (understood narrowly as monetary payments for conservative 
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reasons) has only very limited applicability as a state response to transitions; the motivation, 
specification and defence of adaptive transition policies; and the articulation of the link 
between propitious conditions for adaptation to legal change and the minimal (formal and 
procedural) requirements of the rule of law.  
10.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many exciting directions for future research that this thesis illuminates. I will 
conclude by mentioning six clusters of these.  
The first cluster involves picking up some of the lines of argument for theories of legal 
transition that I suggested in my critical discussion but did not pursue in detail. At the end of 
Chapter 2, I suggested that other instrumental arguments for property rights could be used to 
develop a partial theory of legal transitions based on property, including the ‘natural’ part of 
Stilz’s hybrid theory (e.g. Stilz 2013, 2018) and arguments about personal property made by 
Radin (1982). In Chapter 3, I suggested that genuine utilitarianism, and somewhat-Paretian 
‘policy packages’ that at least leave low-income persons no worse off, are distributional 
objectives worth exploring in the context of legal transitions. And in Chapter 5, I set the 
would-be justice theorist of legal transitions a challenge to specify a good justice-based 
theory of legal transitions that can handle more than ‘obvious injustice’ cases.  
A second cluster concerns the development and refinement of ART. In particular, there is 
room for further refinement of the adaptive transition policy options. I noted in Chapter 9 
that the fairness and wellbeing reasons generated by ART only go so far in selecting 
appropriate adaptive responses; additional normative theories and values are needed to 
generate more specific policy recommendations within the range generated by ART. As such, 
I suggested that the version of ART specified in this thesis could be viewed as the “core” 
theory, with additional normative values generating optional “modules” containing a more 
refined menu of adaptive policy options (e.g. “the ART-Republican Module, with rigorous 
civics education and extensive pre-reform deliberative and participatory mechanisms”, etc.). 
Further thought—perhaps in collaboration with economists—should also be given to the 
incorporation of a ‘cost effectiveness’ criterion (a different conception of efficiency to those 
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explored in Chapter 3) that can be used to select among the permissible range of policy 
options generated by the Wellbeing and Fairness Principles. And there is interesting potential 
to bring in justice considerations to develop adaptive transition policies for the losers from 
transitions away from ‘obvious injustices’—a project that certainly has political merit in an 
era of Trumpian backlash. 
The third cluster of future research directions involves picking up some of the ideas I 
developed in the course of critiquing other theories or developing ART, but which have wider 
applications than legal transitions and thus may be of more general interest to normative 
political, legal and/or economic theorists. One of these is the ecological conception of the 
self and agency, and more generally links between political and legal philosophy and 4E 
philosophy of mind, which are only just beginning to be explored (e.g. Carter and Palermos 
2016; Nine 2018). The notion of ‘particular functionings’, and the modified functionings 
account of wellbeing of which it is a part, could facilitate the extension of 
functionings/capabilities theory into new policy realms where loss dynamics are salient. The 
practice-based conception of fairness as ex ante risk allocation, building on McTernan (2016) 
and the approach I develop in Chapter 8, has considerable potential as a rival to non-moral 
luck egalitarianism for the analysis of risky choices. Cashing out the values of stability and 
predictability under the rule of law, in light of many of the other ideas and themes explored 
in this thesis, is a topic that also merits more detailed treatment in the philosophy of law. 
Likewise the ‘special rights’ conception of legitimate expectations holds promise as a 
political- and legal-theoretic institution (see Green, in prep.). 
A fourth cluster of research directions involves more specific applications of ART. As the 
range of example cases listed in Table 1, above, suggests, this includes issues such as: climate 
change and the “just transition” to low-carbon economies (UNFCCC n.d.); other regulations 
necessary to tackle urgent and looming environmental crises and improve public health and 
safety; measures to reduce inequality and redistribute resources, such as tax reforms 
pertaining to wealth, property and incomes; consumer protection and antitrust/competition 
regulation; Brexit; and a range of reforms that have significant socio-cultural implications, 
including immigration and multicultural policy, reforms to the institution of marriage and 
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other domestic partnership statuses, and the regulation of cultural practices such as fox-
hunting. Other specific applications include relevant domains of positive law, such as the law 
of property, takings, eminent domain, legitimate expectations, and investor-state dispute 
settlement. 
A fifth cluster concerns scope expansions. In Chapter 1.3, I noted that there might be lessons 
and ideas from this thesis’ discussion of normal legal transitions for more fundamental 
transitions in the machinery of government (such as devolutions; joining supranational 
structures; constitutional replacements; and economic system transitions). There might also 
be lessons for the state’s role in non-legally-induced changes, such as social, labour market, 
education, industrial, and regional policy, and initiatives to address ‘technological 
unemployment’ from innovations in fields such as automation and artificial intelligence.  
Finally and perhaps most importantly, I think there is a fascinating research agenda to be 
developed at the intersection of normative theories of legal transitions, democratic theory and 
empirical political science. Exciting collaborations between normative and empirical 
democratic theorists—e.g. in the field of deliberative democracy—are already occurring, and 
many of these pertain to contentious policy reforms. Future normative theory on legal 
transitions could both learn from and contribute to this research agenda. For example, I have 
suggested that ART captures widely held, basic transitional concerns about wellbeing and 
fairness, and is more likely to generate political agreement among citizens who otherwise 
disagree about primary laws and policies. I have also argued that democratic processes such 
as information provision, consultation, public deliberation and participatory policy 
mechanisms have a valuable role to play in facilitating successful adaptation to legal changes. 
These ideas could usefully be empirically tested through a combination of fieldwork with 
would-be losers and winners from legal change, surveys, and field experiments. 
*** 
I began this thesis with an illustration of the interplay between normative ideas and the 
politics of legal transitions, using a case-study of attempted carbon pricing reforms in 
Australia. Climate change is but one of many immense challenges of policy and legal reform 
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across a dizzying array of issue domains that societies and their governments are facing—
and at a time when democracy is under strain from many quarters. It is hoped that the ideas 
advanced in this thesis might help societies steer these reforms successfully through the 
muddy waters of transition politics. There are, of course, limits to what normative theories 
can achieve, even when embraced by powerful hands: major reforms will always involve the 
disagreement, bargaining and compromise characteristic of realpolitik. But as Australia’s ill-
fated carbon pricing schemes showed, trying to sail these treacherous seas without a 
normative compass can be politically disastrous, leaving governments bogged down in a 
morass of side-payments that can ultimately sink the very reforms they are trying to 
implement. It is hoped that ART might provide at least a prototype of the normative compass 
that well-intentioned governments and their citizens need to avoid getting lost in transition. 
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